curda – -Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  Tutti i poteri al Presi...  
I critici sostengono che le attuali misure non si sono limitate a colpire i presunti cospiratori, assumendo piuttosto la forma di una repressione su vasta scala dell’opposizione. Agli arresti ci sono infatti anche molti oppositori del governo, tra cui avvocati curdi, sindaci di province meridionali a maggioranza curda, politici di sinistra, accademici laicisti e giornalisti.
They fear that the new presidential system would turn Turkey into a more authoritarian state, further erode its record on human rights and freedoms, and that a “one-man rule” would further undermine a democratic system which is already threatened by the ongoing crackdown on secularists, leftists and pro-Kurdish politicians.
  le notizie - Page #13  
La nuova Diyarbakir e la distruzione dell’identità curda in Turchia
Navalny: how to auto destroy an opposition
  2011 - Archivio articol...  
Istanbul apre alla cultura curda
Russia’s Middle Class Looks to Emigrate
  Europa - Ultime notizie...  
È un obiettivo delle Forze Democratiche Siriane, unità sostenute dal Pentagono e formate in maggioranza da militanti curdi, ma verso Al-Bab sono dirette anche le forze ribelli filo-turche, nell’ambito dell’operazione “Scudo dell’Eufrate” lanciata da Ankara, formalmente contro lo Stato Islamico (ma prevalentemente in funzione anti-curda).
The title is Post Mortem, and it recounts the Katyn massacre, where thousands of Polish officials died at the hand of Stalin, a forbidden theme for many decades. With this new film, the director Andrzej Wajda shows how a people cannot live without considering their history. Just like individuals. He believes that the bond with the history and literature of one’s own land continues to be very strong, as all his works show, starting with those of his prestigious beginnings.
  La vittoria di Pirro  
(SDF), la coalizione a guida curda che opera contro l’Isis. La Turchia ha protestato ma ancora nel recente incontro negli Usa tra Trump ed Erdogan non sono esplose le divergenze tra alleati. Il presidente turco sembra non volersi alienare le simpatie del nuovo presidente americano, unico leader occidentale a essersi congratulato con lui subito dopo la vittoria al referendum e che sulla Siria potrebbe sempre cambiare idea (le ultime affermazioni della Casa Bianca sui “forni crematori” di Assad potrebbero fare da preludio a un nuovo cambio di direzione, dopo la riappacificazione
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s success in the constitutional referendum on April 16 may well turn out to be a pyrrhic victory. The president’s pro-reform campaign prevailed, but the consensus that seems to have buoyed Erdogan until now (having been further boosted following the failed coup of July 2016) is wearing dangerously thin. The “yes” campaign in the vote to modify the Turkish Constitution won a mere 51.41% of the vote, and “no” prevailed in Turkey’s major cities, a result that signalled the president’s weakness more than his strength. In upcoming battles (and there are many on the horizon), the difficulties for the Turkish leader could be particularly insidious.
  Così la Russia ha vinto...  
La Turchia ha logorato la sponda con l’Occidente, è stata costretta a rinunciare ad abbattere Assad e alle sue ambizioni di potenza regionale e si è dovuta sottomettere alla Russia, e ora vede il pericolo di un’entità autonoma curda al proprio confine meridionale crescere enormemente.
So, even if America’s contribution to the defeat of Islamic State was greater than Russia’s (especially in the two main battles to liberate Mosul and Raqqa), the payoff has gone to Moscow. Russia is viewed by all Middle Eastern players as the power that is gaining ground in the region, while the US is back-pedalling. Turkey, initially very hostile towards Moscow, is now increasingly adopting a pro-Russian stance (out of necessity in order to safeguard its own strategic interests in Syria, if at all possible). Saudi Arabia, the other vanquished power in the Syrian conflict,
  Lo scivolone di Trump  
Inoltre in tempi recenti – diciamo da quando la partita contro Assad è sembrata definitivamente persa per Erdogan, e ancor di più dopo il fallito golpe del luglio scorso – la Turchia si è avvicinata alla Russia di Putin e all’Iran, nel tentativo di impedire la nascita di un’entità autonoma curda in Siria e non solo.
Saudi Arabia, the effective leader of the Sunni bloc, has recently adopted a more aggressive foreign policy stance than in the past. Part of the explanation for this shift lies in the fact that the Saudis appear to be losing ground in the region, with Iraq becoming a Shia state after the removal of Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein by the USA, the Houthi insurgency (a Shia rebel movement) in Yemen, the destabilization of Bahrain (a satellite state of Riyadh where a Sunni monarchy rules over a Shiite majority), the failure of the Sunni majority’s insurrection in Syria and, generally speaking, the rise of Iran. Iran’s ascendancy as a regional power was made possible by the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration and by the fight against ISIS, which expanded Tehran’s room for manoeuvring. But the succession to the throne has also contributed to Saudi Arabia’s emboldened foreign policy. After the death of King Abdullah in January 2015, the new King Salman came to represent the “hawks” of the royal family. In the summer of 2017, Salman named his son Mohammed as heir to the throne. The crown prince and defence minister is in favour of the war in Yemen and of taking a more aggressive line against Tehran.