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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	b)  pour une infraction pour laquelle la personne peut être poursuivie par voie de mise en accusation ou punie sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, ou
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	(b)  an offence for which the person may be prosecuted by indictment or for which he is punishable on summary conviction, or

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107 Aux termes de l'al. 11h), une personne déclarée coupable d'une infraction et punie ne peut être jugée ni punie de nouveau pour la même infraction. La catégorie de personnes auxquelles s'applique l'al.

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Section 11(h) protects a person found guilty and punished for an offence from being tried or punished again for the same offence.  The class of persons to whom s. 179(1)(b) applies is identified by the fact of having been convicted of one of the enumerated offences.  Any conviction under that section, however, will be based on violating its terms and not of having been convicted of one of the enumerated offences.  Section 11(h) is therefore not violated.

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[traduction] On reproche souvent à l’approche subjective de permettre aux auteurs d’une faute d’éviter toute punition pour la mort de leurs victimes, alors qu’une faute moindre aurait été punie. Je renvoie à l’exemple souvent donné de l’automobiliste à qui il est préférable de tuer une personne plutôt que de simplement la blesser.

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A criticism often made about the subjective approach is that it allows the authors of a fault to go unpunished for the death of their victim whereas a lesser fault would have been sanctioned.  I refer to the often‑mentioned example of the automobilist who is more advantaged by killing a person rather than only injuring him or her.  This reflects again a confusion between exemplary and compensatory damages.  It is also useful to note that the circumstances in which an advantage might seem to accrue to the author whose victim does not suffer from the fault are more seldom seen now that exemplary damages can be awarded.  These damages take into consideration the gravity of the act, which is not a prime consideration in evaluating compensatory damages.  [Emphasis added.]

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[TRADUCTION] Il n’est pas vrai en droit qu’une personne n’est pas susceptible d’être punie deux fois pour le même acte; personne ne l’a jamais dit dans quelque affaire que ce soit, et l’Interpretation Act ne le dit pas.

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It is not the law that a person shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same act; no one has ever said so in any case, and the Interpretation Act does not say so. What the Act says is that a person ‘shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence’. Not only is it not the law, but it never has been the law, and that it is not the law was expressly decided in the highest criminal Court in the land then existing the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, as far back as 1867, in Morris (1867), 10 Cox C.C. 480.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION] La règle générale est que lorsqu’une personne a été reconnue coupable d’une infraction et punie par une cour compétente, transit in rem judicatam, c. ‑à-d. la déclaration de culpabilité constitue une fin de non-recevoir à l’égard de toute autre procédure pour la même infraction et elle ne doit pas être punie de nouveau pour la même affaire.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The general rule is that where a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, i.e. the conviction is a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he must not be punished again for the same matter. This applies not only to indictable offences, but also to courts whose jurisdiction is entirely

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107 Aux termes de l'al. 11h), une personne déclarée coupable d'une infraction et punie ne peut être jugée ni punie de nouveau pour la même infraction. La catégorie de personnes auxquelles s'applique l'al.

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Section 11(h) protects a person found guilty and punished for an offence from being tried or punished again for the same offence.  The class of persons to whom s. 179(1)(b) applies is identified by the fact of having been convicted of one of the enumerated offences.  Any conviction under that section, however, will be based on violating its terms and not of having been convicted of one of the enumerated offences.  Section 11(h) is therefore not violated.

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[TRADUCTION] Ce moyen de défense ne peut être soulevé sur la base d’un plaidoyer d’autrefois convict; il relève plutôt d’une règle consacrée en common law suivant laquelle lorsqu’une personne a été trouvée coupable d’une infraction et punie, par une cour compétente, alors transit in rem judicatam, c’est-à-dire: la condamnation empêche toute procédure subséquente intentée pour la même infraction et la personne ne peut être punie de nouveau pour la même chose;…

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The defence does not arise on a plea of autrefois convict, but on the well established rule at common law, that when a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, that is, the conviction shall be a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he shall not be punished again for the same matter;…

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[traduction] Cela suppose un élément de culpabilité qui ne se limite pas à la corruption ou à la malhonnêteté, mais qui doit être tel que l’inconduite  reprochée porte délibérément atteinte à l’intérêt public et doit être condamnée et punie.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	This involves an element of culpability which is not restricted to corruption or dishonesty but which must be of such a degree that the misconduct impugned is calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and punishment. [p. 394]

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Bref, une peine assortie d'un élément réprobateur représente une déclaration collective, ayant valeur de symbole, que la conduite du contrevenant doit être punie parce qu'elle a porté atteinte au code des valeurs fondamentales de notre société qui sont constatées dans notre droit pénal substantiel.

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The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should communicate society’s condemnation of that particular offender’s conduct.  In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law.  [Emphasis in original.]

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION] La règle générale est que lorsqu’une personne a été reconnue coupable d’une infraction et punie par une cour compétente, transit in rem judicatam, c. ‑à-d. la déclaration de culpabilité constitue une fin de non-recevoir à l’égard de toute autre procédure pour la même infraction et elle ne doit pas être punie de nouveau pour la même affaire.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The general rule is that where a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, i.e. the conviction is a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he must not be punished again for the same matter. This applies not only to indictable offences, but also to courts whose jurisdiction is entirely

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(3) Un acte d’accusation présenté aux termes du paragraphe (1) peut comprendre une infraction qui n’est pas mentionnée à l’alinéa (2)a) ou b) si le prévenu consent, et cette infraction peut être poursuivie, traitée, jugée et punie, à tous égards, comme si l’infraction en était une à l’égard de laquelle le prévenu avait été renvoyé pour subir son procès, mais quand cette infraction a été entièrement commise dans une province autre que celle où le prévenu comparaît devant la cour, le paragraphe 434(3) s’applique.

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(3) An indictment that is preferred under subsection (1) may include an offence that is not referred to in paragraph (2)(a) or (b) if the accused consents, and that offence may be dealt with, tried and determined and punished in all respects as if the offence were one in respect of which the accused had been committed for trial, but if that offence was committed wholly in a province other than that in which the accused is before the court, subsection 434(3) applies.

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11. Lorsqu'un acte ou une omission constitue une infraction visée par plus d'une loi du Parlement du Canada, qu'elle soit punissable par voie d'acte d'accusation ou sur déclaration sommaire de culpabilité, une personne qui accomplit l'acte ou fait l'omission devient, à moins que l'intention contraire ne soit manifeste, assujettie aux procédures que prévoit l'une quelconque de ces lois, mais elle n'est pas susceptible d'être punie plus d'une fois pour la même infraction.

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11. Where an act or omission is an offence under more than one Act of the Parliament of Canada, whether punishable by indictment or on summary conviction, a person who does the act or makes the omission is, unless a contrary intention appears, subject to proceedings under any of those Acts, but is not liable to be punished more than once for the same offence.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	b) soit pour une infraction pour laquelle la personne peut être poursuivie sur un acte d'accusation ou punie sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire;
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	(b) an offence for which the person may be prosecuted by indictment or for which he is punishable on summary conviction, or

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	27 Notre Cour est saisie, pour la première fois, de la question de savoir si un principe de justice fondamentale visé par l’art. 7 de la Charte veut que la conduite moralement involontaire ne soit pas punie.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	27 Whether it is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter that morally involuntary conduct should not be punished is a novel question before this Court.    We are thus called upon to canvass once more the contents of the “principles of fundamental justice”, this time in the context of the defence of duress as framed by s. 17 of the Criminal Code.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	(2)  L’interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité vise l’infraction punie au Canada par un emprisonnement d’au moins deux ans.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	6 The appellants, Medovarski and Esteban, fall within the scope of the current s. 64 which alters the legislative regime to ensure that they have no right of appeal under the IRPA.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Au contraire, toutes les décisions où il était question de dispositions semblables en matière de relations du travail au Canada démontrent que les ordonnances rendues par la commission et déposées auprès de la cour ont la même force exécutoire que les ordonnances de la cour, et leur inobservation peut être punie au moyen d'une procédure en outrage et d'autres procédures semblables.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	On the contrary, all the decisions dealing with similar provisions in labour legislation in Canada establish that where such Board orders are filed with the Court, they have the same force and effect as orders of the Court and disobedience can be punished by contempt and other similar proceedings.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	3. . . .  une personne est pénalement responsable et peut être punie pour un crime relevant de la compétence de la Cour si :
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	3.  . . . a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	(i) de l’existence de motifs raisonnables de croire que, si l’on procède à l’exécution de l’ordonnance, la personne intéressée sera punie pour des activités d’un caractère politique ou soumise à de graves tribulations, ou
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	(i) the existence of reasonable grounds for believing that if execution of the order is carried out the person concerned will be punished for activities of a political character or will suffer unusual hardship, or

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Le fugitif bénéficie d'autres protections. Le traité prévoit que la personne livrée ne doit pas être détenue, jugée ou punie pour une infraction autre que celle pour laquelle l'extradition a été accordée.

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Turning to the treaty at issue here, none of its terms is inconsistent with the Act's stipulations that the extradition judge should be concerned solely with Canadian law.  Nothing in the Treaty requires proof of foreign law at the extradition hearing, and the isolated provisions that invoke the law of the requesting state are merely to assist the executive in its duty of ensuring that the requesting state has complied with the terms of the Treaty.

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934: [TRADUCTION]  «S'il n'en était pas ainsi, une personne à l'étranger, qui glisse un colis contenant une drogue dangereuse dans les bagages d'un passager innocent qui l'apporte ensuite ici, ne pourrait être punie...»

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40.              The approach in Treacy and in Doot has been followed in later cases. In R. v. Wall, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 930 (C.A.), it was held that acts done abroad in order to further the fraudulent evasion of a restriction on importation of drugs into the United Kingdom were punishable under the relevant statute. As Cairns L.J., speaking for the court, noted at p. 934: "If it were not so, a person abroad who slipped a package containing a dangerous drug into the luggage of an innocent passenger who then brought it into this country would not be punishable...."

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[TRADUCTION] Ce moyen de défense ne peut être soulevé sur la base d’un plaidoyer d’autrefois convict, il relève plutôt d’une règle consacrée en common law suivant laquelle lorsqu’une personne a été trouvée coupable d’une infraction et punie, par une cour compétente, alors transit in rem judicatam, c’est-à-dire: la condamnation empêche toute procédure subséquente intentée pour la même infraction et la personne ne peut être punie de nouveau pour la même chose; autrement, il y aurait eu possibilité de deux punitions différentes pour la même infraction …Il est nécessaire en la présente affaire que l’on prouve …qu’antérieurement l’appelant a été accusé des mêmes voies de fait, bien que non selon une formule identique, mais malgré tout dans des termes semblables, et puis trouvé coupable et puni.

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The defence does not arise on a plea of autrefois convict, but on the well established rule at common law, that when a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, that is, the conviction shall be a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he shall not be punished again for the same matter; otherwise there might be two different punishments for the same offence… It is necessary in the present case to have it proved… that on a former occasion the appellant was charged with the same assault, although not in the same words, yet in terms the same, and that he was then convicted and punished.

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Le traité prévoit en outre (et c'est le cas pour tous les traités) que la personne livrée ne doit pas être détenue, jugée ou punie pour une infraction autre que celle pour laquelle l'extradition a été accordée (par.

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Nor is this all the protection afforded the fugitive.  The treaty further provides (and this is so of all the treaties) that the person surrendered shall not be detained, tried or punished for an offence other than that for which extradition has been granted (Art. 12(1)).  In short, he can only be prosecuted by the requesting state for the offence for which his surrender was made.  Anglin J. made this abundantly clear in Buck v. The King (1917), 55 S.C.R. 133, where, in dealing with the offences for which a person who had been extradited to Canada could be prosecuted, he stated, at p. 145:

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Tout ce dont il est question ici est que la seule personne accusée a commis la seule infraction de voies de fait simples, qu'elle a été déclarée coupable de cette infraction et punie par une cour établie à cette fin par le législateur fédéral, et qu'elle fait maintenant face à des poursuites semblables intentées en vertu d'une autre loi du Parlement, savoir le Code criminel, et ce, devant une autre cour.

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The section makes no reference to any particular tribunal but deals entirely with a prohibition against punishment more than once for the same offence. There is no question but that here the one accused committed the single offence of common assault and that he has been convicted and sentenced for that offence in a court established by Parliament for that purpose and is now faced with the like prosecution under another Act of Parliament, the Criminal Code and before another court.

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Les décisions où il était question de dispositions semblables en matière de relations du travail au Canada démontrent que les ordonnances rendues par la commission et déposées auprès de la cour ont la même force exécutoire que les ordonnances de la cour, et leur inobservation peut être punie au moyen d'une procédure en outrage et d'autres procédures semblables.

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The inability of the judge to inquire into the validity of the order on the contempt proceeding does not deprive him or her of a responsibility which should rest with a s. 96 court.  The judge must determine whether the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has breached the directive in a way that amounts to public defiance of the authority of the court and if so, must determine the sentence.  A judge entertaining a motion for contempt of an order made by a judge of the court, as opposed to an inferior tribunal, would not have the power to go behind the order for its validity is not an issue on the contempt hearing.  Section 142(7) cannot insulate an inferior tribunal's decision from scrutiny as an affected party can always challenge the directive of the board on jurisdictional grounds.

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[TRADUCTION] Ce moyen de défense ne peut être soulevé sur la base d’un plaidoyer d’autrefois convict; il relève plutôt d’une règle consacrée en common law suivant laquelle lorsqu’une personne a été trouvée coupable d’une infraction et punie, par une cour compétente, alors transit in rem judicatam, c’est-à-dire: la condamnation empêche toute procédure subséquente intentée pour la même infraction et la personne ne peut être punie de nouveau pour la même chose;…

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The defence does not arise on a plea of autrefois convict, but on the well established rule at common law, that when a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, that is, the conviction shall be a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he shall not be punished again for the same matter;…

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Selon moi, la bonne méthode consiste à évaluer la conduite à la lumière de toutes les circonstances et à déterminer si elle mérite d'être punie en raison de son caractère scandaleusement dur, vengeur, répréhensible ou malicieux.

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I do not share my colleague's view that punitive damages can only be awarded when the misconduct is in itself an "actionable wrong".  In my view, the correct approach is to assess the conduct in the context of all the circumstances and determine whether it is deserving of punishment because of its shockingly harsh, vindictive, reprehensible or malicious nature.  Undoubtedly some conduct found to be deserving of punishment will constitute an actionable wrong but other conduct might not.  I respectfully adopt the following statement made by Clement J.A. in Paragon Properties Ltd. v. Magna Envestments Ltd. (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 156 (Alta. C.A.), at p. 167:

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Je ne peux que répéter ce que j’ai dit plus haut:  c’est le fait que l’État a eu recours à la restriction de la liberté par l’emprisonnement pour faire respecter la loi qui est décisif dans une analyse faite en fonction de la Charte. La personne dont la liberté a été restreinte par l’emprisonnement n’a pas été privée de moins de liberté parce qu’elle a été punie pour une infraction réglementaire plutôt qu’un crime.

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Again, both the Crown and a number of interveners have argued that this interpretation of s. 11(d) should not apply in a regulatory setting.  I can only reiterate my earlier comment that it is the fact that the state has resorted to the restriction of liberty through imprisonment for enforcement purposes which is determinative of the Charter analysis.  A person whose liberty has been restricted by way of imprisonment has lost no less liberty because he or she is being punished for the commission of a regulatory offence as opposed to a criminal offence.  A person whose liberty interest is imperilled is entitled to have the principles of fundamental justice fully observed.  The presumption of innocence, guaranteed by s. 11(d), is clearly a principle of fundamental justice.  [Emphasis in original.]

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Ce moyen de défense ne peut être soulevé sur la base d’un plaidoyer d’autrefois convict, il relève plutôt d’une règle consacrée en common law suivant laquelle lorsqu’une personne a été trouvée coupable d’une infraction et punie, par une cour compétente, alors transit in rem judicatam, c’est-à-dire: la condamnation empêche toute procédure subséquente intentée pour la même infraction et la personne ne peut être punie de nouveau pour la même chose; autrement, il y aurait possibilité de deux punitions différentes pour la même infraction.

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I think the fact that the appellant had been convicted by justices under one Act of Parliament for what amounted to an assault is a bar to a conviction under another Act of Parliament for the same assault. The defence does not arise on a plea of autrefois convict, but on the well-established rule at common law, that where a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a Court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, that is, the conviction shall be a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he shall not be punished again for the same matter; otherwise there might be two different punishments for the same offence.

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E.M.M. a également été battue avec divers articles de maison, allant des manches à balai, tourne‑vis et clés à molette jusqu'aux marteaux. Au dire de cette victime, durant un épisode particulièrement révoltant, son père l'a punie d'avoir brûlé des rôties en lui écrasant la figure contre le grille‑pain encore chaud.

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9                 E.M.M., one of the two female twins, suffered some of the most severe abuse.  On seemingly countless occasions, she was beaten with the bare hands of the respondent, including being thrown by the respondent against cupboards and down stairs.  When the family moved to Victoria, she was subjected to more aggravated assaults involving repetitive whippings with a wet electrical cord, or with a leather belt emblazoned with metal snaps - an instrument the children would learn to call the "Devil's Fang" because the hook of the buckle would cut skin when pulled away.  E.M.M. also sustained beatings with miscellaneous household instruments ranging from broomsticks, screwdrivers, wrenches to hammers.  According to her accounts, during one egregious incident, the respondent castigated her for burning toast by shoving her face into the hot toaster.

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Selon moi, la bonne méthode consiste à évaluer la conduite à la lumière de toutes les circonstances et à déterminer si elle mérite d'être punie en raison de son caractère scandaleusement dur, vengeur, répréhensible ou malicieux.

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I do not share my colleague's view that punitive damages can only be awarded when the misconduct is in itself an "actionable wrong".  In my view, the correct approach is to assess the conduct in the context of all the circumstances and determine whether it is deserving of punishment because of its shockingly harsh, vindictive, reprehensible or malicious nature.  Undoubtedly some conduct found to be deserving of punishment will constitute an actionable wrong but other conduct might not.  I respectfully adopt the following statement made by Clement J.A. in Paragon Properties Ltd. v. Magna Envestments Ltd. (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 156 (Alta. C.A.), at p. 167:

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Ce moyen de défense ne peut être soulevé sur la base d’un plaidoyer d’autrefois convict, il relève plutôt d’une règle consacrée en common law suivant laquelle lorsqu’une personne a été trouvée coupable d’une infraction et punie, par une cour compétente, alors transit in rem judicatam, c’est-à-dire: la condamnation empêche toute procédure subséquente intentée pour la même infraction et la personne ne peut être punie de nouveau pour la même chose; autrement, il y aurait possibilité de deux punitions différentes pour la même infraction.

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I think the fact that the appellant had been convicted by justices under one Act of Parliament for what amounted to an assault is a bar to a conviction under another Act of Parliament for the same assault. The defence does not arise on a plea of autrefois convict, but on the well-established rule at common law, that where a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a Court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, that is, the conviction shall be a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he shall not be punished again for the same matter; otherwise there might be two different punishments for the same offence.

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-B. , [1985] 2 R.C.S. 486, et d’autres arrêts subséquents, notre Cour avait reconnu que l’exigence que la personne moralement sans reproche ne soit pas punie est un principe de justice fondamentale. Il assimila le caractère volontaire au sens moral à la culpabilité morale.

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11 Writing for the Court of Appeal, Laskin J.A. upheld the trial judge’s finding that the immediacy and presence requirements in s. 17 infringe s. 7 of the Charter.  First, he maintained that it would violate the principles of fundamental justice to convict a person whose actions are morally involuntary.  He held that this Court in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, and subsequent cases had recognized, as a principle of fundamental justice, the requirement that the morally blameless should not be punished.  He likened moral voluntariness to moral blameworthiness.  Those who act in a morally involuntary fashion, he stated, are not morally blameworthy for what they do.  It follows that it would be contrary to s. 7 of the Charter to attach criminal liability to their conduct.  In the alternative, he found such similarity between moral blamelessness and moral involuntariness that it would be as unfair to punish morally involuntary conduct as it would be unjust to punish morally blameless behavior.

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Bref, une peine assortie d'un élément réprobateur représente une déclaration collective, ayant valeur de symbole, que la conduite du contrevenant doit être punie parce qu'elle a porté atteinte au code des valeurs fondamentales de notre société qui sont constatées dans notre droit pénal substantiel.

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81               Retribution, as well, should be conceptually distinguished from its legitimate sibling, denunciation.  Retribution requires that a judicial sentence properly reflect the moral blameworthiness of that particular offender.  The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender's conduct.  In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law.  As Lord Justice Lawton stated in R. v. Sargeant (1974), 60 Cr. App. R. 74, at p. 77: "society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentences they pass".  The relevance of both retribution and denunciation as goals of sentencing underscores that our criminal justice system is not simply a vast system of negative penalties designed to prevent objectively harmful conduct by increasing the cost the offender must bear in committing an enumerated offence.  Our criminal law is also a system of values.  A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated.  In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instills the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code.

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[TRADUCTION] Il n’est pas vrai en droit qu’une personne n’est pas susceptible d’être punie deux fois pour le même acte; personne ne l’a jamais dit dans quelque affaire que ce soit, et l’Interpretation Act ne le dit pas.

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It is not the law that a person shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same act; no one has ever said so in any case, and the Interpretation Act does not say so. What the Act says is that a person ‘shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence’. Not only is it not the law, but it never has been the law, and that it is not the law was expressly decided in the highest criminal Court in the land then existing the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, as far back as 1867, in Morris (1867), 10 Cox C.C. 480.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Bien que les actes et les personnes visés par cet article soient définis de manière générale, l’application d’une norme subjective fait en sorte que seule soit punie la personne ayant un état d’esprit coupable.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	[43] The words “abandon” and “expose” are not given an exhaustive definition in s. 214 the Code and therefore their ordinary grammatical meanings remain relevant to their interpretation. Both words suggest actions taken with knowledge of their consequences. The Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd ed. rev. 2005), for example, defines “abandon” as “cease to support or look after (someone); desert”.

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(1), les procès‑verbaux relatifs aux procédures engagées devant toute cour qui a déclaré cette personne coupable d'une infraction visée par la partie V ou l'a déclarée coupable du défaut de se conformer à une ordonnance rendue en vertu de la Loi par la Commission ou par une cour, ou qui l'a punie pour ce défaut, constituent, sauf preuve contraire, la preuve que la personne contre laquelle l'action est intentée a eu un comportement allant à l'encontre d'une disposition de la partie V ou a omis de se conformer à une ordonnance rendue en vertu de la Loi par la Commission ou par une cour.

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It is important to note that s. 31.1 does not create a general action for damages.  Before any person can recover under s. 31.1 he or she must have suffered loss or damage as a result of (i) conduct contrary to Part V of the Act or (ii) the failure of the defendant to comply with an order of the Commission or a court under the Act.  Section 31.1(2) of the Act provides in part that in any action under subs. (1) against a person, the record of proceedings in any court in which that person was convicted of an offence under Part V or convicted of or punished for failure to comply with an order of the Commission or a court under the Act is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof that the person against whom the action is brought engaged in conduct that was contrary to a provision of Part V or failed to comply with an order of the Commission or a court under the Act.  It seems to me that s. 31.1 is fully integrated into the Act, indeed, it is a core provision of the very pith and substance of the Act.   As the Attorney General of Canada submits, the civil action for damages provided by s. 31.1 for an occurrence of the anti-competitive practices set out in s. 34(1)(a) is clearly as much a part of the legislative scheme regulating competition throughout Canada as is the criminal action for fines and imprisonment or the administrative action involving an inquiry or the reduction of customs duties.  Together or apart, the civil, administrative, and criminal actions provide a deterrent against the breach of the competitive policies set out in the Act.  In this respect s. 31.1 is part of a legislative scheme intended to create "a more complete and more effective system of enforcement in which public and private initiative can both operate to motivate and effectuate compliance" (per MacGuigan J. at p. 77 in Québec Ready Mix, supra).

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D'après la mens rea subjective, nul ne sera puni pour ce qu'il n'entendait pas faire ou, à tout le moins, pour ce qu'il n'a pas prévu. En outre, son utilisation renforce le sentiment que la personne moralement innocente ne sera pas punie.

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In determining whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of the accused would have foreseen the risk of death arising from the unlawful act, the trier of fact must pay particular attention to any human frailties which might have rendered the accused incapable of having foreseen what the reasonable person would have foreseen.  Once the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that this reasonable person in the context of the offence would have foreseen the risk of death created by his or her conduct, the focus of the investigation must shift to the question of whether a reasonable person in the position of the accused would have been capable of foreseeing such a risk.

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[TRADUCTION] Ce moyen de défense ne peut être soulevé sur la base d’un plaidoyer d’autrefois convict, il relève plutôt d’une règle consacrée en common law suivant laquelle lorsqu’une personne a été trouvée coupable d’une infraction et punie, par une cour compétente, alors transit in rem judicatam, c’est-à-dire: la condamnation empêche toute procédure subséquente intentée pour la même infraction et la personne ne peut être punie de nouveau pour la même chose; autrement, il y aurait eu possibilité de deux punitions différentes pour la même infraction …Il est nécessaire en la présente affaire que l’on prouve …qu’antérieurement l’appelant a été accusé des mêmes voies de fait, bien que non selon une formule identique, mais malgré tout dans des termes semblables, et puis trouvé coupable et puni.

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The defence does not arise on a plea of autrefois convict, but on the well established rule at common law, that when a person has been convicted and punished for an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, transit in rem judicatam, that is, the conviction shall be a bar to all further proceedings for the same offence, and he shall not be punished again for the same matter; otherwise there might be two different punishments for the same offence… It is necessary in the present case to have it proved… that on a former occasion the appellant was charged with the same assault, although not in the same words, yet in terms the same, and that he was then convicted and punished.

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Bien que les actes et les personnes visés par cet article soient définis de manière générale, l’application d’une norme subjective fait en sorte que seule soit punie la personne ayant un état d’esprit coupable.

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Per Rothstein and Moldaver JJ.:  Section 218 is child protection legislation.  It targets three limited classes of people faced with a situation where a child under 10 is or is likely to be at risk of death or permanent injury.  A common sense approach dictates that the offence is duty‑based and that penal negligence is the level of fault required to establish guilt as regards the proscribed consequences.  Further support for this view is found in a review of the provision’s language, its placement in the Criminal Code, relevant scholarly opinion, its legislative evolution and history and the gravity and social stigma associated with the offence.

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En effet, on a, pendant des siècles, insisté en common law pour que la personne qui provoque une attaque et qui, au cours du combat qui s'ensuit, cause ensuite la mort de la personne qu'il a attaquée, se retire du combat si elle désire faire valoir la légitime défense. Sinon, une personne qui désire causer la mort d'une autre, sans être punie, pourrait délibérément provoquer une attaque qui lui permettrait de réagir en frappant un coup mortel.

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82               Not only is the result McIntosh argues for anomalous; to my mind it is unwise and unjust.  The common law has for centuries insisted that the person who provokes an assault and subsequently kills the person he attacks when that person responds to the assault must retreat if he wishes to plead self-defence.  Otherwise, a person who wished to kill another and escape punishment might deliberately provoke an attack so that he might respond with a death blow.  People who provoke attacks must know that a response, even if it is life-threatening, will not entitle them to stand their ground and kill.  Rather, they must retreat.  The obligation to retreat from provoked assault has stood the test of time.  It should not lightly be discarded.  Life is precious; the justification for taking it must be defined with care and circumspection.

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9 (le droit à la protection contre la détention ou l'emprisonnement arbitraires) et à l'art. 11h) (le droit d'une personne de ne pas être jugée ni punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a déjà été déclarée coupable et punie)?

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Respondent's earlier convictions of sexual assault involving children made him subject to the prohibition in s. 179(1)(b) of the Criminal Code that he not commit vagrancy by loitering near playgrounds, school yards or public parks.  On two occasions, respondent, who was carrying a camera with a telephoto lens in a public park near to where children were playing, was stopped by police and questioned as to whether he had a criminal record.  On the first occasion, he was warned that a convicted sex offender was not permitted to loiter near a public park, school yard or playground.  On the second, he was arrested and charged under s. 179(1)(b) of the Code with two counts of vagrancy ‑‑ "at or near a playground" and "in or near a public park" ‑‑ and the camera and film with frames focusing on the crotch areas of young girls playing in the park with their clothing in disarray were seized.

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11h) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Cet alinéa prévoit qu’une personne ne doit pas être punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a été déclarée coupable et pour laquelle elle a été punie.

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49 Are prison disciplinary hearings criminal proceedings that can lead to imprisonment?  This question was considered in R. v. Shubley, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3, albeit in a somewhat different context.  The issue in that appeal was whether a prison disciplinary offence constituted an “offence” within the scope of s. 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  That subsection provides that a person found guilty and punished for an offence cannot be punished for it again.  It was held by the majority that a conviction in a prison disciplinary proceeding did not constitute punishment for an “offence” within s. 11(h).

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Elle pourrait répondre:  "Je n'ai rien à voir avec cet incendie criminel, alors pourquoi suis‑je punie? J'ai un intérêt dans la moitié de la maison. J'aurais pu contracter ma propre police d'assurance sur cet intérêt; si mon conjoint avait mis le feu, j'aurais alors été protégée. Pourquoi le droit à l'indemnisation devrait‑il dépendre de l'existence d'une ou de deux polices? Si l'on m'avait expliqué cela, pourquoi aurais‑je accepté de contracter une police "conjointe"? J'avais tout à perdre."

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Bearing the above principles in mind, I shall now attempt to assess whether the indemnification obligation in the policy here is joint or several.  In my view, the latter is the case.  As I see it, reasonable persons, unversed in the niceties of insurance law, would, in purchasing fire insurance, expect that a policy naming them as an insured without qualification would insure them to the extent of their interest.  Moreover, reasonable persons would expect that they would lose the right to recover for their own willful destruction.  But the same persons would find it an anomalous result if informed that they stood to lose all if their spouse burned down their house.  The following responses would be forthcoming:  "I had nothing to do with that act of arson so why am I being punished for it?  My 50 per cent interest in the house belongs to me.  I could have taken out my own insurance policy on my interest; in that case if my spouse burnt down the house I was protected.  Why should my getting paid depend on whether there is one policy or two?  If it had been made clear to me, why would I have ever agreed to take out a `joint' policy?  I only stood to lose."

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11h) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Cet alinéa prévoit qu’une personne ne doit pas être punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a été déclarée coupable et pour laquelle elle a été punie.

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49 Are prison disciplinary hearings criminal proceedings that can lead to imprisonment?  This question was considered in R. v. Shubley, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3, albeit in a somewhat different context.  The issue in that appeal was whether a prison disciplinary offence constituted an “offence” within the scope of s. 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  That subsection provides that a person found guilty and punished for an offence cannot be punished for it again.  It was held by the majority that a conviction in a prison disciplinary proceeding did not constitute punishment for an “offence” within s. 11(h).

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Je trouve qu’il s’agit là d’une disposition bizarre parce que dans ses premiers mots («lorsqu’un acte ou une omission constitue une infraction visée par plus d’une loi…») il paraît refléter le principe de droit nemo bis vexari, et cependant dans les mots qui le terminent («n’est pas susceptible d’être punie plus d’une fois pour la même infraction») il reflète l’adage nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.

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The above-quoted s. 3 was an amalgam of earlier legislation having a particular application and found in The Offences against the Person Act, 1869 (Can.), c. 20, ss. 40 and 41, The Wreck and Salvage Act, 1873 (Can.), c. 55, s. 33, and The Breaches of Contract Act, 1877 (Can.), c. 35, s. 6. It was carried literally into the first Criminal Code, 1892 (Can.), c. 29, s. 933, but in the 1906 revision it underwent a change to conform with s. 33 of the United Kingdom Interpretation Act, 1889 (U.K.), c. 63. The present s. 11 of the Criminal Code is in substance a reenactment of the United Kingdom s. 33, but with a slight alteration in language. In its material terms, it conforms to the comparable United Kingdom section. I find it a curious provision because in its opening words (“where an act or omission is an offence under more than one Act…”) it appears to reflect the maxim nemo bis vexari, and yet in its concluding words (“not liable to be punished more than once for the same offence”) it reflects the maxim nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto’.

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La Commission ne doit pas négliger des preuves dignes de foi apportées en vue d’établir l’existence de motifs raisonnables de croire que, si l’on procède à l’exécution de l’ordonnance d’expulsion, la personne intéressée sera punie pour des activités d’un caractère politique ou soumise à de graves tribulations.

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The Board must not disregard credible evidence offered to prove the existence of reasonable grounds for believing that if execution of the deportation order is carried out the person concerned will be punished for activities of a political character or will suffer unusual hardship. However, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction in relation to a decision of the Board under s. 15(1)(b)(i) does not extend to the point of interference with the weight assigned by the Board to evidence where, either taken by itself or in relation to conflicting or modifying evidence, the Board must decide on its force in meeting the standards fixed by s. 15(1)(b)(i). The Parliament of Canada has made it clear that the granting of asylum should not rest on random or arbitrary discretion under s. 15(1)(b)(i), but rather that a claim to the Board’s favourable interference may be realized through evidence upon the relevance and cogency of which the Board is to pronounce as a judicial tribunal.

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9 (le droit à la protection contre la détention ou l'emprisonnement arbitraires) et à l'art. 11h) (le droit d'une personne de ne pas être jugée ni punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a déjà été déclarée coupable et punie)?

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The respondent was convicted of the first count.  The trial judge found that, even though s. 179(1)(b) infringed ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, these infringements were a justifiable limitation under s. 1.  The second count was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.  An appeal to the British Columbia Supreme Court was dismissed.  The Court of Appeal, however, allowed respondent's appeal and quashed the conviction because the breaches of ss. 7 and 11(d) were not justified.  The constitutional questions before this Court queried if s. 179(1)(b) infringed several sections of the Charter, and if so, whether those infringements were justifiable under s. 1.  The Charter provisions allegedly infringed were:  s. 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the person), s. 11(d) (the right to be presumed innocent), s. 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment), s. 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned) and s. 11(h) (the right not to be tried and punished for the same offence if already found guilty and punished for that offence).

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9 (le droit à la protection contre la détention ou l'emprisonnement arbitraires) et à l'art. 11h) (le droit d'une personne de ne pas être jugée ni punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a déjà été déclarée coupable et punie)?

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Respondent's earlier convictions of sexual assault involving children made him subject to the prohibition in s. 179(1)(b) of the Criminal Code that he not commit vagrancy by loitering near playgrounds, school yards or public parks.  On two occasions, respondent, who was carrying a camera with a telephoto lens in a public park near to where children were playing, was stopped by police and questioned as to whether he had a criminal record.  On the first occasion, he was warned that a convicted sex offender was not permitted to loiter near a public park, school yard or playground.  On the second, he was arrested and charged under s. 179(1)(b) of the Code with two counts of vagrancy ‑‑ "at or near a playground" and "in or near a public park" ‑‑ and the camera and film with frames focusing on the crotch areas of young girls playing in the park with their clothing in disarray were seized.

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Il ressort de cette dernière que nul ne sera puni pour ce qu'il n'entendait pas faire ou, à tout le moins, pour ce qu'il n'avait pas prévu, et son utilisation renforce le sentiment que la personne moralement innocente ne sera pas punie.

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The objective view, however qualified, does not fully serve these ends.  It is true that the qualified objective view would theoretically protect some of the individuals the subjective view would protect, but by no means all; see Tutton, supra, per Wilson J., at p. 1419.  And it does not respond to the educative and psychological ends sought to be attained by those advocating subjective mens rea.  Indeed, it introduces a differentiation between individuals in criminal proceedings that, however well meant, seems foreign to our law.  What is more, the qualified objective approach loses most of the practical advantages sought to be attained by the objective approach.  Indeed, some of the difficulties that have been perceived to result from the adoption of the subjective view would be exacerbated.  I think, in particular, of the difficulties of instructing a jury.  On this question, too, I find McLachlin J.'s reasons more persuasive.

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sonne intéressée sera punie pour des activités d’un caractère politique ou soumise à de graves tribulations». C’est tout ce dont la Commission est obligée de tenir compte en vertu de l’art. 15(1)b)(i); par contre l’article 15(1)a) dit simplement qu’elle doit tenir compte de toutes les circonstances du cas pour choisir parmi les redressements applicables dont j’ai déjà parlé.

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concerned will be punished for activities of a political character or will suffer unusual hardship”. This is all that the Board is required to have regard to under s. 15(1)(b)(i); in contrast, s. 15(1)(a) says simply that it have regard to all the circumstances in deciding upon the remedies prescribed, to which I have already alluded. But to treat s. 15(1)(b)(i) as pointing to an objective test of its provisions is not to foreclose the duty of the Board to weigh the evidence after it first decides that it is relevant and credible. On this view, the question that remains in this case is whether the Board erred in its assessment of the evidence, either by misstating or misunderstanding it or ignoring relevant portions thereof, to such a degree as to make its conclusion one that is not supportable on the evidence. I do not think that this Court’s appellate jurisdiction in relation to a decision of the Board under s. 15(1)(b)(i) should be extended to the point of interference with the weight assigned by the Board to evidence where, either taken by itself or in relation to conflicting or modifying evidence, the Board must decide on its force in meeting the standards fixed by s. 15(1)(b)(i).

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9 (le droit à la protection contre la détention ou l'emprisonnement arbitraires) et à l'art. 11h) (le droit d'une personne de ne pas être jugée ni punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a déjà été déclarée coupable et punie)?

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The respondent was convicted of the first count.  The trial judge found that, even though s. 179(1)(b) infringed ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, these infringements were a justifiable limitation under s. 1.  The second count was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.  An appeal to the British Columbia Supreme Court was dismissed.  The Court of Appeal, however, allowed respondent's appeal and quashed the conviction because the breaches of ss. 7 and 11(d) were not justified.  The constitutional questions before this Court queried if s. 179(1)(b) infringed several sections of the Charter, and if so, whether those infringements were justifiable under s. 1.  The Charter provisions allegedly infringed were:  s. 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the person), s. 11(d) (the right to be presumed innocent), s. 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment), s. 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned) and s. 11(h) (the right not to be tried and punished for the same offence if already found guilty and punished for that offence).

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Toutefois le juge Devlin a ajouté: [TRADUCTION] «Si une personne est punie à cause d’un acte commis par un tiers sur lequel elle ne peut raisonnablement avoir ni influence ni contrôle, la loi ne punit plus l’insouciance ou l’incapacité pour promouvoir le bien-être de la collectivité, mais s’abat sur la victime à sa portée».

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The element of control, particularly by those in charge of business activities which may endanger the public, is vital to promote the observance of regulations designed to avoid that danger. This control may be exercised by “supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control” (Lord Evershed in Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen,[40] at p. 174). The purpose, Dean Roscoe Pound has said (The Spirit of the Common Law (1906)), is to “put pressure upon the thoughtless and inefficient to do their whole duty in the interest of public health or safety or morale.” As Devlin J. noted in Reynolds v. Austin & Sons Limited[41], at p. 139: “. a man may be responsible for the acts of his servants, or even for defects in his business arrangements, because it can fairly be said that by such sanctions citizens are induced to keep themselves and their organizations up to the mark.” Devlin J. added, however: “If a man is punished because of an act done by another, whom he cannot reasonably be expected to influence or control, the law is engaged, not in punishing thoughtlessness or inefficiency, and thereby promoting the welfare of the community, but in pouncing on the most convenient victim.”

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9 (le droit À! À la protection contre la dÀ) Àtention ou l'emprisonnement arbitraires) et À! À l'art. 11h) (le droit d'une personne de ne pas À+ Àtre jugÀ) Àe ni punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a dÀ) ÀjÀ! À À) ÀtÀ) À dÀ) ÀclarÀ) Àe coupable et punie)?

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\+\+\+Ü Ü Ô s. 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment), s. 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned) and s. 11(h) (the right not to be tried and punished for the same offence if already found guilty and punished for that offence) -- If so, whether justified under s. 1 -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 9, 11(d), (h), 12 -- Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 179(1)(b).Ä Ä Á œ œ Áà ÃCriminal law -- Sexual conviction -- Loitering -- Definition of "loitering" ©© Criminal Code prohibiting convicted sexual offenders from loitering in school yards, playgrounds and public parks -- Convicted sexual offender convicted of loitering by play area in public park -- Whether infringement of s. 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the person), s. 11(d) (the right to be presumed innocent), s. 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment), s. 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned) and s. 11(h) (the right not to be tried and punished for the same offence if already found guilty and punished for that offence) -- If so, whether justified under s. 1 -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 9, 11(d), (h), 12 -- Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 179(1)(b).Ä Ä Á œ œ ÁRespondent's earlier convictions of sexual assault involving children made him subject to the prohibition in s. 179(1)(à ÃbÄ Ä) of the à ÃCriminal CodeÄ Ä that he not commit vagrancy by loitering near playgrounds, school yards or public parks. On two occasions, respondent, who was carrying a camera with a telephoto lens in a public park near to where children were playing, was stopped by police and questioned as to whether he had a criminal record. On the first occasion, he was warned that a convicted sex offender was not permitted to loiter near a publicÔ Ø' ˆ,î)î)J J Ô park, school yard or playground. On the second, he was arrested and charged under s. 179(1)(à ÃbÄ Ä) of the à ÃCodeÄ Ä with two counts of vagrancy -- "at or near a playground" and "in or near a public park" -- and the camera and film with frames focusing on the crotch areas of young girls playing in the park with their clothing in disarray were seized. Á œ œ ÁThe respondent was convicted of the first count. The trial judge found that, even though s. 179(1)(à ÃbÄ Ä) infringed ss. 7 and 11(à ÃdÄ Ä) of the à ÃCharter, Ä Äthese infringements were a justifiable limitation under s. 1. The second

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9 (le droit À! À la protection contre la dÀ) Àtention ou l'emprisonnement arbitraires) et À! À l'art. 11h) (le droit d'une personne de ne pas À+ Àtre jugÀ) Àe ni punie de nouveau pour une infraction dont elle a dÀ) ÀjÀ! À À) ÀtÀ) À dÀ) ÀclarÀ) Àe coupable et punie)?

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\+\+\+Ü Ü Ô s. 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment), s. 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned) and s. 11(h) (the right not to be tried and punished for the same offence if already found guilty and punished for that offence) -- If so, whether justified under s. 1 -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 9, 11(d), (h), 12 -- Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 179(1)(b).Ä Ä Á œ œ Áà ÃCriminal law -- Sexual conviction -- Loitering -- Definition of "loitering" ©© Criminal Code prohibiting convicted sexual offenders from loitering in school yards, playgrounds and public parks -- Convicted sexual offender convicted of loitering by play area in public park -- Whether infringement of s. 7 (the right to life, liberty and security of the person), s. 11(d) (the right to be presumed innocent), s. 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment), s. 9 (the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned) and s. 11(h) (the right not to be tried and punished for the same offence if already found guilty and punished for that offence) -- If so, whether justified under s. 1 -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 9, 11(d), (h), 12 -- Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 179(1)(b).Ä Ä Á œ œ ÁRespondent's earlier convictions of sexual assault involving children made him subject to the prohibition in s. 179(1)(à ÃbÄ Ä) of the à ÃCriminal CodeÄ Ä that he not commit vagrancy by loitering near playgrounds, school yards or public parks. On two occasions, respondent, who was carrying a camera with a telephoto lens in a public park near to where children were playing, was stopped by police and questioned as to whether he had a criminal record. On the first occasion, he was warned that a convicted sex offender was not permitted to loiter near a publicÔ Ø' ˆ,î)î)J J Ô park, school yard or playground. On the second, he was arrested and charged under s. 179(1)(à ÃbÄ Ä) of the à ÃCodeÄ Ä with two counts of vagrancy -- "at or near a playground" and "in or near a public park" -- and the camera and film with frames focusing on the crotch areas of young girls playing in the park with their clothing in disarray were seized. Á œ œ ÁThe respondent was convicted of the first count. The trial judge found that, even though s. 179(1)(à ÃbÄ Ä) infringed ss. 7 and 11(à ÃdÄ Ä) of the à ÃCharter, Ä Äthese infringements were a justifiable limitation under s. 1. The second