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78; P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (éd. feuilles mobiles), vol. 2, p. 35-16 et 35-17; H. Brun et G. Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel (3e éd. 1997), p. 930-936; M. Rothstein, « Section 1 : Justifying Breaches of Charter Rights and Freedoms » (1999-2000), 27 Man.
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28 In Sharpe, supra, McLachlin C.J. summarized the onus imposed on the public authority under s. 1 of the Charter as follows. To justify the intrusion on free expression, a government must demonstrate, through evidence supplemented by common sense and inferential reasoning, that the impugned law meets the tests set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, and refined in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, and Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), supra. The goal of the impugned law must be pressing and substantial. The law must be proportionate to the goal in the sense of furthering the goal, being carefully tailored to avoid excessive impairment of the right, and productive of benefits that outweigh the detriment to freedom of expression. (See Sharpe, at para. 78; P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (loose-leaf ed.), vol. 2, at pp. 35-16 and 35‑17; H. Brun and G. Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel (3rd ed. 1997), at pp. 930-36; M. Rothstein, “Section 1: Justifying Breaches of Charter Rights and Freedoms” (1999‑2000), 27 Man. L.J. 171.)
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