dénie – Traduction – Dictionnaire Keybot

Spacer TTN Translation Network TTN TTN Login Deutsch English Spacer Help
Langues sources Langues cibles
Keybot 21 Résultats  scc.lexum.org  Page 9
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
A mon avis, l’arrêt Pierce Fisheries ne dénie pas toute défense à l’accusée; en particulier, il ne l’empêche pas d’invoquer en défense qu’elle a fait tout son possible pour s’informer de la présence de homards d’une taille inférieure au minimum réglementaire.
I do not read Pierce Fisheries as denying the accused all defences, in particular the defence that the company had done everything possible to acquire knowledge of the undersized lobsters. Ritchie J. concluded merely that the Crown did not have to prove knowledge.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
28(1)a) de la Loi sur la Cour fédérale mais, abstraction faite de toute erreur, l'excès de compétence ou le refus de l'exercer c'est-à-dire, l'exercice par un tribunal administratif d'un pouvoir que la loi lui dénie ou le refus d'exercer un pouvoir que la loi lui impose.
Additionally, as I have already indicated, s. 28(1)(a) of the Federal Court Act does not apply to the error as such, but quite apart from any error, to the excess of jurisdiction or refusal to exercise it, that is, the exercise by an administrative tribunal of a power denied to it by the Act or the refusal to exercise a power imposed on it by the Act. Section 28(1)(a) does not distinguish between types of excess of power, the stages of the hearing at which they occur and the circumstances causing them. It applies to any excess of power. There is therefore no reason to make a distinction where s. 28(1)(a) makes none, between on the one hand excess of jurisdiction ratione materiae committed at the beginning of a hearing, whether or not resulting from an error, and on the other, an error made during the hearing or in the conclusion of a hearing and the corrective orders attached to it, despite the fact that the administrative tribunal has jurisdiction ratione materiae.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Cet article crée un lien direct entre l’assureur et la victime d’un accident d’automobile; il dénie à l’assureur le droit d’invoquer, à l’encontre de la victime, des moyens de défense qu’il pourrait faire valoir contre l’assuré lui-même.
The section creates a direct connection between the insurer and the victim of an automobile accident; it denies the insurer the right to rely as against the victim on defences which it could advance against the insured. However, this section does not have the effect of including among the insured risks an uncertain event which the parties intended to exclude. In a recent case, General Security Insurance Company of Canada v. Bélanger[3], Pigeon J. at p. 808, speaking for the Court, said the following concerning the first two paragraphs of s. 6:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il est cependant évident que la prescription est un obstacle insurmontable à l’encontre de toute demande de ce genre. Vu qu’il s’agit d’un cas où la loi dénie l’action, les tribunaux pouvaient en vertu de l’art.
If the expropriation was tainted with illegality and appellant can ask that it be annulled on this ground, he might perhaps, had it not been for the prescription, have obtained damages instead of the annulment of the expropriation, as indicated by the trial judge’s last reason. It is clear, however, that prescription is an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any claim of this nature. Since this is a case where the right of action is denied, the Court could, under art. 2188 C.C., of its own motion supply the defence of prescription.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
7.03 qui limite expressément la juridiction du tribunal au pouvoir de décider la question selon les clauses de la convention et qui lui dénie expressément tout pouvoir de changer ou d’amender la convention ou d’y ajouter ou retrancher quoi que ce soit.
The Company had the right, in my view, under the terms of the agreement, to reduce the hours of work for a period, rather than impose a lay-off. When the Arbitration Board held otherwise it added to the agreement by imposing upon the Company a duty, not assumed through collective bargaining, to lay off employees whenever there was a shortage of work, and in doing so the Board acted in violation of Art. 7.03 which expressly limited the jurisdiction of the Board to deciding the matter within the existing provisions of the agreement and explicitly denied it the power to add to, subtract from, alter or amend the agreement in any respect. Bell Canada v. Office and Professional Employees’ International Union Local 131[1].
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Les moyens par lesquels la poursuite a été mise au courant de l'existence d'une conversation antérieure ne sont pas pertinents. C'est uniquement lorsque le témoin dénie l'existence de la conversation antérieure que la poursuite doit prendre les moyens de la prouver.
I agree.  There was nothing in the Criminal Code to stop Glenda Jordan from testifying as to her previous conversations with the accused Schimmens or with Wolton, whether they were intercepted or not.  Had she been questioned, for example, about a prior conversation with a neighbour, her own testimony concerning that conversation would form an incontestable part of the record.  The hearsay nature of the conversation and the fact that it may have been private are immaterial once the witness decides to give testimony in relation to the conversation.  Under such circumstances, the means by which the Crown has been made aware of the existence of a prior communication are immaterial.  It is only when the witness denies the existence of the previous conversation that the Crown must take steps to prove it.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
150 prévoit l’imposition d’une punition plus rigoureuse de l’accusé en Colombie-Britannique qu’ailleurs au Canada (excepté en Ontario), pour la même infraction, il lui dénie en tant qu’individu l’égalité devant la loi.
In addressing itself to these issues the British Columbia Court of Appeal necessarily had to look to the Criminal Code, under which the accused was charged and which prescribed the punishment for his offence, as the reference point for judging whether s. 150 offended the Canadian Bill of Rights. Admittedly, the relevant Criminal Code provisions are themselves unexceptionable in that respect. In my opinion, the majority of the Court rightly concluded that in so far as s. 150 provided for the imposition of a greater punishment of the accused in British Columbia than elswhere in Canada (save Ontario) for the same offence it denied to him as an individual equality before the law.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
On ne peut accepter que la loi dénie aux appelantes quelque droit qu’elles ont acquis en Saskatchewan ou en Ontario à l’égard de l’exploitation dans ces deux provinces de leur usine respective de chlore et de soude caustique.
It could not be accepted that the Act denies to the appellants any legal rights they acquired in Saskatchewan or in Ontario in respect of the operation there of their respective chlor-alkali plants. The appellants’ contention of constitutional invalidity based on alleged deprivation or divestment of a “right” outside Manitoba proceeded upon a misconception. What the appellants were claiming was an immunity in Manitoba based on a licence to pollute granted outside. That licence was not granted as against the respondent or against any of the assignor fishermen, nor could it be. Manitoba, in enacting s. 4(2), simply took care to exclude any possible contention that a licence granted in another province could provide a defence against liability for injury to Manitoba property.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
7.03 qui limite expressément la juridiction du tribunal au pouvoir de décider la question selon les clauses de la convention et qui lui dénie expressément tout pouvoir de changer ou d’amender la convention ou d’y ajouter ou retrancher quoi que ce soit.
The Company had the right, in my view, under the terms of the agreement, to reduce the hours of work for a period, rather than impose a lay-off. When the Arbi­tration Board held otherwise it added to the agreement by imposing upon the Company a duty, not assumed through collective bargaining, to lay off employees whenever there was a shortage of work, and in doing so the Board acted in violation of Art. 7.03 which expressly limited the jurisdiction of the Board to deciding the matter within the existing provisions of the agreement and explicitly denied it the power to add to, subtract from, alter or amend the agreement in any respect. Bell Canada v. Office and Professional Employees' Interna­tional Union Local 131 ([1974] S.C.R. 335).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Cette garantie qui annule et remplace toute autre garantie formelle ou implicite, quelle qu’elle soit, y compris toute garantie implicite de qualité loyale et marchande et d’aptitude à un usage particulier, est l’unique garantie de véhicule définissant valablement toutes les obligations et toute la responsabilité de la General Motors Products of Canada, Limited, et la General Motors Products of Canada, Limited, dénie qualité et pouvoir à quiconque d’assumer en ses lieu et place une responsabilité autre à l’égard des véhicules concernés.
This Warranty is the only warranty applicable to the Vehicle and is expressly in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or implied, including any implied warranty of mercantability or fitness for a particular purpose, and of any other obligation or liability on the part of General Motors Products of Canada, Limited, and General Motors Products of Canada, Limited, neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to assume for it any other obligation or liability in connection with such Vehicle.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il est vrai que cette Loi sur l'assurance automobile doit s'interpréter de façon telle qu'elle ne déroge au droit commun qu'en autant qu'elle l'exprime sans ambiguïté. Il n'en reste pas moins que le principe qui en est la base dénie le droit d'action de façon générale à tous les accidentés.
This method of approach receives support from the case of Szeto c. Fédération (La), Cie d'assurances du Canada, [1986] R.J.Q. 218, before the Quebec Court of Appeal where the court refused the claim of an accident victim against the Régie in respect of an automobile accident between two residents of Quebec in Ontario.  That case, of course, arose out of quite different facts, but the manner in which the court dealt with the relation of the Automobile Insurance Act to the general law is of assistance.  Paré J.A. (speaking for himself and L'Heureux-Dubé J.A.) (as she then was) had this to say, at p. 220:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il est toutefois allégué que, pendant la . période prévue, l’article attaqué dénie (l’égalité devant la loi» aux femmes enceintes qui ne remplissent pas les conditions fixées au par. 30(1), parce qu’il leur enlève le droit aux prestations payables à tous les autres prestataires, hommes et femmes, qui ont exercé un emploi assurable pendant huit semaines et sont capables de travailler et disponibles à cette fin.
It was contended, however, that the impugned section denied "equality before the law" for the period therein specified to pregnant and child-bearing women who failed to fulfil the conditions required by s. 30(1) because it denied them the benefits available to all other claimants both male and female, who had eight weeks of insurable employment and who were capable of and available for work.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
C'est en vain que la défenderesse invoque en outre les art. 20 et 402 C.p.c.  Le premier suppose un "droit" pour lequel le Code ne prévoit pas de mode d'exercice; ici la législation ambiante dénie le droit prétendu.
[translation]  The defendant's reliance on arts. 20 and 402 C.C.P. is also in vain.  The former assumes a "right" for which the Code provides no method of exercise:  here the ambient legislation denies the alleged right.  Article 402 is a general rule, older than art. 400, to which the latter deliberately creates an exception.  Accordingly, the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant means that it cannot be applied to the medical record held by a hospital.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De même, en l'espèce, la protection qu'accorde l'art. 7 n'est pas liée au moment où est intervenu l'acte de l'accusé, mais à celui où on lui dénie l'opportunité de faire valoir sa défense d'erreur de fait de bonne foi.
23.                     Likewise, in the present appeal, the protection accorded by s. 7 is not related to the time of the accused's conduct, but to the time when he is denied the opportunity to put forward his defence of honest mistake of fact. This is when he becomes vulnerable to the loss of his liberty in a way which offends the principles of fundamental justice. And this takes place at his trial post‑Charter.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
6 de la Loi de l’indemnisation des victimes d’accidents d’automobile, directement responsable envers les époux Foster des dommages que son assuré a fait défaut de payer. Même si cet article dénie à l’assureur le droit d’invoquer des
The issue is solely as to whether, in the circumstances, respondent is directly liable to the Fosters under s. 6 of the Highway Victims Indemnity Act for the damages which the insured failed to pay. Although this section denies the insurer the right to rely on defences which it could advance against the insured, it does not have the
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’allégation selon laquelle, pendant la période prévue, l’art. 46 dénie «l’égalité devant la loi* aux femmes enceintes qui ne remplissent pas les conditions fixées au par. 30(l), parce qu’il leur enlève le droit aux presta­tions payables à tous les autres prestataires, hommes et femmes, qui ont exercé un emploi assurable pendant huit semaines et sont capables de travailler et disponi­bles à cette fin, est rejetée.
The contention that s. 46 denied "equality before the law" for the period therein specified to pregnant and child-bearing women who failed to fulfil the conditions required by s. 30(1) because it denied them the benefits available to all other claimants both male and female, who had eight weeks of insurable employment and who were capable of and available for work, was not accepted.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Si un défendeur publie au sujet d’un demandeur des propos qu’un jury pourrait considérer soit comme un fait, soit comme un commentaire et si le demandeur dénie tous ces propos ou n’admet pas qu’il s’agisse d’un commentaire, et si le défendeur décide de faire valoir que certains propos constituent un commen­taire loyal (fait de bonne foi et sans malice) sur des faits fidèlement relatés (à supposer que le juge ait tranché la question de l’intérêt public), il incombe au défendeur de prouver ce qu’il allègue.
It is plain from these remarks (which I adopt as a correct statement of the law) that where the pleadings, as in the present case, disclose that the plaintiff does not acknowledge the words complained of are comments or opinions, but the defendants, in their pleadings, raise the issue of comment and of fairness of the comment, the onus is on the defendants to prove fair comment. The normal principle that he who asserts, must prove, applies. In such event (assuming the words complained of are capable of being a comment and further assuming that condition (b) mentioned above is not applicable as is the situation here), it is for the Judge to determine, as a matter of law, (1) whether there is any evidence of condition (a), that is, any evidence entitling the jury to find that the statements upon which the comments are based are true; and (2) whether there is any evidence of condition (c), viz., the requirement of honesty. If he finds there is some evidence to support the finding that those conditions are met, he must place the defence of fair comment before the jury for their consideration (assuming that he has previously ruled that the element of public interest was proved). If, on the other hand, the trial Judge finds as a matter of law, that there is no evidence to support the presence of either of these two conditions, he should not put the defence of fair com­ment to the jury.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ou s’agit-il plutôt d’un instrument pédagogique destiné à sortir la religion de la tête des enfants à partir d’une approche essentiellement agnostique ou athée, qui dénie toute validité de principe aux valeurs et à l’expérience religieuses?
[53] This brings us to one of the problems that arise in this matter in determining whether the ERC Program is consistent with Quebec’s constitutional obligations relating to freedom of religion.  First, a finding of a violation of the two Charters cannot be based solely on a subjective perception of the Program’s impact.  Moreover, the Program’s design and the content of the educational and administrative framework do not make it easy to assess the program’s concrete impact in the everyday workings of Quebec’s public school system.  In other words, is it a program that will provide all students with better knowledge of society’s diversity and teach them to be open to differences?  Or is it an educational tool designed to get religion out of children’s heads by taking an essentially agnostic or atheistic approach that denies any theoretical validity to the religious experience and religious values?  Is the program consistent with the notion of secularism that has gradually been developed in constitutional cases, particularly in the field of education?  The state of the record makes it impossible to answer these questions with confidence.