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La visite du premier ministre a également fait la une l’automne dernier, lorsque celui-ci a assisté à la réception donnée après le tournoi pour plus de 600 personnes à la somptueuse propriété de M. Grant.
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So did the Premier’s visit here last fall, when he attended a post‑tournament reception for more than 600 at Grant’s palatial home.
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Des trois interprétations possibles des dispositions en cause, savoir, que ces dispositions s’excluent l’une l’autre, que le ministre peut choisir la façon dont il agira et que le ministre est tenu d’agir d’une certaine façon, les deux premières favorisent la conclusion qu’en l’espèce, le contribuable n’encourt pas la pénalité prévue au par.
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Of the three possible constructions of the relevant provisions, namely, mutual exclusiveness, election by the Minister, and mandatory duty on the Minister, the first two support the conclusion that on the facts herein the taxpayer is not liable to the penalty under s. 56(2); and the third supports the assessment of the penalty on a strained reading of the statutory provisions.
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117: [TRADUCTION] «Si des mesures provinciales et fédérales se répètent essentiellement, chaque situation prévue par l’une l’est également par l’autre et il n’y a pas de place pour l’application de la disposition provinciale, étant donné que la loi fédérale s’applique intégralement»).
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ence between the provincial and the federal legislation; there is no true repugnancy in the case of merely duplicative provisions since it does not matter which statute is applied; the legislative purpose of Parliament will be fulfilled regardless of which statute is invoked by a remedy-seeker; application of the provincial law does not displace the legislative purpose of Parliament.
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[traduction]  Le mandat est le rapport qui existe entre deux personnes dont l'une, l'agent, est en droit considérée comme la représentante de l'autre, le commettant, si bien que cet agent peut, par la conclusion de contrats ou l'aliénation de biens, influer sur la situation juridique du commettant à l'égard de tierces parties.  [En italique dans l'original.]
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Agency is the relationship that exists between two persons when one, called the agent, is considered in law to represent the other, called the principal, in such a way as to be able to affect the principal's legal position in respect of strangers to the relationship by the making of contracts or the disposition of property.  [Emphasis in original.]
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62 Cet argument repose sur une fausse prémisse.  Il est certes vrai que la somme de 315 458 $ réclamée à l’appelant est supérieure à la sanction à laquelle l’exposerait une poursuite par voie sommaire.  Toutefois, si l’appelant était poursuivi par voie de mise en accusation, l’amende maximale serait de 500 000 $ (al. 160b) de la LD).  Qui plus est, dans un cas comme dans l’autre, l’amende ne remplace pas la confiscation compensatoire :  il s’agit de deux conséquences distinctes dont l’une ne dépend aucunement de l’autre.  L’une, l’amende, est manifestement pénale et tient donc compte des facteurs et des principes pertinents en matière de détermination de la peine; l’autre, de nature civile et purement économique, est plutôt déterminée par un simple calcul mathématique.
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62 This argument is based on a false premise.  There can be no doubt that the amount of $315,458 demanded from the appellant is greater than the sanction he would face in a summary conviction prosecution.  However, if the appellant had been proceeded against by way of indictment, the maximum fine would have been $500,000 (s. 160(b) of the CA).  In either case, moreover, the fine does not replace the ascertained forfeiture.  These are two distinct consequences that are completely independent of each other.  One of them, the fine, is clearly penal in nature and thus takes into account the relevant factors and principles governing sentencing; the other, being civil in nature and purely economic, is instead arrived at by a simple mathematical calculation.
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56(1) et par l’art. 56(2), mais il soutient que les pénalités prévues dans l’un et l’autre cas s’excluent néanmoins l’une l’autre. C’est là, en réalité, l’argument de l’avocat du contribuable qui soutient que l’exclusion réciproque vaut dans les deux sens; si le fait d’être passible d’une amende en vertu de l’art.
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Counsel for the Minister conceded a possible overlap in the conduct that is referred to in s. 56(1) and in s. 56(2) but he contended that nonetheless the liability to penalties was mutually exclusive. This, indeed, was the point taken by counsel for the taxpayer who contended that mutual exclusiveness meant a two-way street; if liability to a penalty under s. 56(2) excluded liability under s. 56(1), so would liability to a penalty under s. 56(1) exclude liability under s. 56(2); and he submitted further that the
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En l’occurrence, elle est accompagnée des expressions « sous la direction » de et « au profit » de. Ces expressions ne s’excluent pas l’une l’autre. Au contraire, elles ont le même objectif et se chevauchent souvent dans leur application.
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[53] The phrase “in association with” should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning and statutory context.  It is accompanied here by the terms “at the direction of” and “for the benefit of”.  These phrases are not mutually exclusive.  On the contrary, they have a shared purpose and will often overlap in their application. Their common objective is to suppress organized crime.  To this end, they especially target offences that are connected to the activities of criminal organizations and advance their interests.
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C’est dans ce sens qu’il faut entendre sa prétention que les pénalités prévues à l’art. 56 s’excluent l’une l’autre; il faut pour cela, évidemment, que l’on accepte comme fondé l’argument selon lequel le même comportement peut tomber sous le coup de l’art.
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What counsel for the Minister argues, however, in amplification of his contentions already noted, is that when the Minister is faced with a factual situation which would justify a penalty either under s. 56(1) or under s. 56(2) he is obliged by reason of s. 56(3) to act under s. 56(2) in imposing a penalty, with the result that none can be imposed under s. 56(1). It is in this sense that his submission must be taken that the penalties under s. 56 are mutually exclusive; and, it depends, of course, on accepting as valid the contention that the same conduct may be caught by s. 56(1) and by s. 56(2), not in the segmented sense already commented upon, but in the fuller sense that the Minister may choose to treat the conduct, although cognizable under s. 56(1), as coming under s. 56(2) which imposes a lesser maximum penalty.
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[37] Évidemment, la règle générale excluant les déclarations extrajudiciaires disculpatoires comporte des exceptions, dont l’une — l’exception relative aux déclarations mixtes — est pertinente en l’espèce.  Tout comme en Angleterre, il est établi depuis longtemps au Canada que la déclaration extrajudiciaire d’un accusé qui renferme à la fois des éléments inculpatoires et des éléments disculpatoires doit être mise en preuve dans son intégralité et que les éléments disculpatoires sont admissibles quant au fond en faveur de l’accusé : R. c. Hughes, [1942] R.C.S. 517, p. 521.  L’exception relative aux déclarations mixtes procède manifestement d’un souci d’équité envers l’accusé, mais elle repose aussi, plus pragmatiquement, sur le fait qu’il est souvent difficile de discerner, dans une déclaration, les éléments inculpatoires des éléments disculpatoires.
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[37] Of course, the general rule that excludes out-of-court exculpatory statements is not without exceptions.  One such exception is relevant here — the mixed statement exception.  Just as in England, it has long been established that where the Crown seeks to tender an accused’s out‑of-court statement which contains both inculpatory and exculpatory parts, it must tender the entire statement, and the exculpatory portions are substantively admissible in favour of the accused:  R. v. Hughes, [1942] S.C.R. 517, at p. 521.  Fairness to the accused is the obvious rationale for the mixed statement exception.  The exception is also based on the more pragmatic consideration that it is often difficult to determine which parts of a statement are inculpatory and which parts are exculpatory.
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Le fait que Planet y ait eu recours ne peut être interprété comme une renonciation de Lester aux services de Brent et de Wade. La preuve montre que les deux sociétés, par l'intermédiaire de leurs employés communs, s'aidaient l'une l'autre ‑‑ par un "échange de bons procédés" comme l'a expressivement décrit la Cour d'appel.
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Given the interrelationship between the two companies in question, I agree that it may not be appropriate to distinguish between the principals of the company and the company itself, as did the Court of Appeal.   Nevertheless, it remains difficult to see on what basis a transfer or disposition of expertise can be said to have occurred.  Both companies are entitled to use the expertise of the Lester brothers.  The fact that Planet did so cannot be construed as a question of Lester's having relinquished the services of Brent and Wade.  The evidence shows that the two companies, through their common employees, assisted each other -- "mutual back scratching", as the Court of Appeal graphically put it.  For example, in relation to the Cow Head job, Lester received from Planet the information and prices which enabled Lester to obtain the contract. Conversely, when working at the Burin site Planet benefited from previous knowledge attained by Lester at the Clarenville site.  The relationship is better described as a sharing of expertise than as a disposition from Lester to Planet.
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Je peux vous dire qu’en droit ils sont considérés comme des complices et qu’il existe une règle de droit selon laquelle le témoignage d’un complice ne peut confirmer ou appuyer celui d’un autre. Vous ne devez pas examiner leurs dépositions pour voir si elles corroborent effectivement l’une l’autre.
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In this trial we heard evidence about Mr. Derry and Ms. Potts. As a matter of law I can tell you that both of them are looked upon as accomplices and it is a rule of law that the evidence of one accomplice cannot confirm or support the evidence of another. You should not consider their evidence to see if they do, in fact, support one another. I have not pointed out all the evidence that might be capable of supporting the evidence of these two witnesses. In the end you should ask yourselves whether enough of the important parts of their testimony have been confirmed to persuade you that their story is true and that it is safe for you to rely on it. I must tell you that you are not legally required to find such support before you can rely on their evidence.  You may rely on it without finding support if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it is true. However, it is dangerous for you to accept the evidence of Ms. Potts and Mr. Derry unless you find some support for it in the other evidence. [Appellant’s Record, No. 31980, at pp. 53-54]
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L’appelant a témoigné pour sa propre défense. Il a affirmé qu’après avoir quitté le logis de la victime entre 18 h 30 et 19 h le 25 mars 1977, il s’est rendu chez une amie et il y est resté environ une demi-heure. Il s’est alors rendu dans plusieurs hôtels et il a consommé de la bière à chaque endroit. Il n’a rencontré personne qu’il connaissait à ces hôtels et n’a pu dire quelle quantité de bière il avait consommée. Enfin, il a entrepris de chercher un endroit où il pourrait s’introduire par effraction et se procureur de l’argent. Vers une heure du matin, il est entré dans un immeuble d’appartements et a croisé quelqu’un dans le corridor. Pour expliquer sa présence, il a affirmé qu’il était poursuivi et qu’il était entré dans l’immeuble pour se cacher. L’homme qu’il avait abordé, un nommé Weedmark qui a témoigné pour la poursuite, a consenti à ce que l’appelant passe la nuit à son appartement. L’appelant a relaté qu’ils ont tous les deux regardé la télévision, écouté la radio et pris une bière au cours des deux heures qui ont suivi. A un moment donné, l’appelant a demandé à Weedmark s’il pouvait lui prêter une arme à feu ou de l’argent pour s’en acheter une. L’appelant a
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The appellant gave evidence on his own behalf. He said that after leaving the deceased’s residence between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. on March 25, 1977 he went to the home of a woman friend for about half an hour. He then visited various hotels, drinking beer at each establishment. He did not see anyone he knew at these hotels and could not say how much beer he had consumed. Finally, he began to look for a place where he could break in and procure some money. He walked into an apartment building about 1:00 a.m. and encountered a man in the hallway. He said, to explain his presence, that he was being pursued and had come into the apartment building to hide. The man he spoke to, the Crown witness Weedmark, agreed to allow him to spend the night in his apartment. The appellant described how the two men watched television, listened to the radio and had a beer in the course of the next two hours. The appellant at one point asked Weedmark if he could lend him a gun, or lend him money in order to buy one. He also asked him to cut his hair but Weedmark declined. There was some discussion about switching clothes but this did not occur. The appelant