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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’accusé est vu en train de chercher la victime le jour du meurtre. Une bande‑vidéo le montre entrant dans son immeuble d’habitation, situé à un pâté de maisons du lieu du crime, moins d’une heure après la découverte du corps poignardé du défunt.
The accused was seen looking for the deceased on the morning the deceased was killed.  A videotape showed the accused entering his own apartment building, located one block from the crime scene, less than an hour after the deceased had been found stabbed.  Under warrant, the police seized from the accused’s apartment a napkin with the deceased’s pager number on it.  The accused was charged with the deceased’s murder shortly after a jailhouse informant reported that he had overheard a conversation between the accused and a third inmate.  According to the informant, the accused told the third inmate that he had purchased drugs from the deceased and stabbed him.  Although the informant was called as a witness at the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor has not yet received approval from the Attorney General’s in-custody informer committee to call him at trial.  The accused brought a McClure application for an order compelling production of the files, documents and notes, if any, relating to communications between the appellant and his lawyers concerning the appellant’s involvement in the deceased’s death.  The motions judge found that the accused had satisfied both the threshold question and the innocence at stake test of the McClure application.  He ordered production of one document and portions of other documents.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
10 L’intimé Jason Brown est vu en train de chercher Baksh le jour du meurtre. Il est aussi à la recherche d’un vélo de montagne qu’il lui aurait donné dans le cadre d’une transaction en matière de drogue.
10 The respondent Jason Brown was seen looking for Baksh on the morning that Baksh was killed.  Brown was also looking for a mountain bike that he had allegedly fronted to Baksh as part of a drug deal.  Witnesses stated that Brown had in his possession a napkin, on which Baksh’s pager number was written in red ink.  A videotape showed Brown entering his own apartment building, located one block from the crime scene, at 4:47 a.m. on July 21, 1998, less than an hour after Baksh had been found stabbed.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Droit criminel—Entrave à agent de la paix—Cycliste vu en train de commettre une infraction aux règles de la circulation—Demande d’identité adressée par un constable dans l’intention de lui donner une contravention—Refus du cycliste de donner son identité—Motor-vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, chap. 253, art. 2, 58, 63, 127 et 128, modifié par 1975 (B.C.), chap. 46, art. 121 et 173(1)—Police Act, 1974 (B.C.), chap. 64, art. 17(1), 22 et 30—Summary Convictions Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, chap. 373, art. 101—Code criminel, S.R.C. 1970, chap.
Criminal law—Obstructing peace officer—Cyclist seen committing traffic infraction—Police officer asking cyclist for identification with intention of giving traffic ticket—Cyclist refusing to give name—Motor-vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 253, ss. 2, 58, 63, 127, 128, amended 1975 (B.C.), c. 46, ss. 121, 173(1)—Police Act, 1974 (B.C.), c. 64, ss. 17(1), 22, 30—Summary Convictions Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 373, s. 101—Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 450(2).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Q. Qu'avez-vous vu en plus de la voiture?
A. Oh, probably a couple hundred feet.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
·      « [Il] a été vu en train de manipuler le pantalon d’un autre patient et il se serait emparé de [20 $] appartenant à ce patient.  Il a d’abord avoué avoir subtilisé cette somme, puis il a retiré cet aveu. »
·      “[He] was seen handling another patient’s pants and was believed to have taken [$20.00] from the patient.  He admitted taking the money at first, but later retracted his admission.”
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L'arrêt O'Connor, précité, est une décision de la Haute Cour de l'Australie. O'Connor a été vu en train de retirer un support de carte et un couteau d'une automobile. Un policier l'a vu faire, s'est identifié et lui a demandé pourquoi il avait pris ces articles.
O'Connor, supra, is a decision of the High Court of Australia.  O'Connor was seen removing a map holder and a knife from a car.  A police officer saw him, identified himself and asked O'Connor why he had taken the articles.  O'Connor ran away with the officer in pursuit.  When he was arrested, O'Connor stabbed the officer with the knife.  He was charged with theft of the map holder and knife and wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm.  O'Connor testified that he had consumed alcohol and car sickness tablets before these events and stated that he had no memory either of taking anything from the car or of his subsequent arrest.  Medical evidence was given that the combined effect of the tablets and alcohol could have produced such a state of intoxication that O'Connor would have been incapable of reasoning or forming an intent to steal or wound.  The trial judge directed the jury, in accordance with Majewski, supra, that evidence of self‑induced intoxication, although relevant in determining whether the accused had acted with intent to steal or to inflict grievous bodily harm, was not relevant with respect to the included alternative offence of unlawful and malicious wounding.  O'Connor was acquitted on the charges of theft and wounding with intent and convicted of the included offence of unlawful wounding.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L'identité des appelants existait avant la violation de la Charte, tout comme les perceptions des témoins du crime. Une telle preuve existe dès qu'un accusé est vu en flagrant délit. Cette preuve ne peut pas être considérée comme "émanant" des appelants simplement parce qu'elle peut par la suite servir à établir la crédibilité de la preuve d'identification.
Per McIntyre and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ. (dissenting): The admission of the evidence of the identification line-up would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The fairness of the trial was not affected by the admission of the evidence. The identity of the appellants existed prior to the violation of the Charter, as did the perceptions of the witnesses to the crime.  Such evidence comes into existence when an accused is seen committing the crime.  The evidence cannot be considered as "emanating" from the appellants simply because it may later be used to establish the credibility of identification evidence.  Evidence that could not have been obtained but for the participation of the appellants will not automatically render the trial process unfair.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La notion de «pris sur le fait» ou «vu en train de commettre une infraction» n’est pas inconnue. Le concept a parfois servi à donner un pouvoir d’arrestation quand l’infraction est commise en présence de celui qui procède à l’arrestation.
The notion of “found committing” or “within his view” is not unknown. The concept has been resorted to on occasion to give a power of arrest where the offence is committed in the presence of the arrester. But even here the application of the concept is not without problems. In an article “Arrest: a General View”, [1966] Crim. L.R. 639, at p. 645, the following appears:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Par ailleurs, vu en particulier la lettre adressée le 10 mars 1989 par le procureur de la requérante au procureur des défendeurs principaux dans laquelle il faisait part de son intention d'aller en appel devant cette Cour si les pourparlers de règlement échouaient, les défendeurs en garantie peuvent difficilement invoquer ou prétendre à un préjudice en l'espèce, puisque le délai additionnel en cause est d'environ un mois.
I do not think that the criterion of whether an intention to appeal was indicated within the prescribed deadlines, though important, is the only one limiting the discretion conferred on a judge of this Court by s. 59 (formerly 65) of the Act.  In any case, having in mind in particular the letter to counsel for the principal defendants from counsel for the applicant on March 10, 1989, in which he mentioned his intention to appeal to this Court if the negotiations were unsuccessful, the defendants in warranty are not really in a position to claim or to allege injury in the circumstances, since the additional time involved is about a month.  Finally, the instant case depends on obtaining leave from this Court and the extension of time sought here is only so that an application for leave can be filed.  I think, in view of the matters involved, that the applicant should not be deprived of the right to refer the question to this Court solely because of the additional delay that occurred.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’autre inculpé, un nommé Rynn, avait fait des aveux et offert un plaidoyer de culpabilité la veille du procès. La seule preuve contre Moore c’est qu’on l’avait vu en compagnie de Rynn avant et après le temps où ce dernier avait commis l’infraction.
The Moore case involved a burglary. There was no direct evidence. The other accused, one Rynn, had confessed and submitted a plea of guilty the day before the trial. The only evidence against Moore was that he had been seen in Rynn’s company before and after the time when the latter commited the offence. It was quite properly held that the plea of guilty by Rynn could not be relied on to convict Moore, without other evidence of his participation in the act. In his reasons Lord Goddard L.C.J. said (at p. 54):
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien qu’on ait appliqué aux arrestations la notion de «vu en train de commettre une infraction», son application à l’obligation de révéler son identité est une curieuse innovation. Elle va à l’encontre de toute la jurisprudence.
Although the idea of “within his view” has been applied to arrests, its application is relation to a duty to disclose identity is novel and bizarre. It runs counter to all authority. The right to remain silent, enunciated in Rice v. Connolly, does not admit of such erosion. There is nothing in the language nor in the facts of that case to suggest that the broad principle ceased to have application in the event of a police officer witnessing an infraction.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En 1974 et à l’époque en cause, R.E.A. Logan, président de Real Marketing Ltd., une compagnie albertaine de commercialisation du soufre qui possède des données sur ceux qui ont du soufre à vendre, a vu en l’intimée un vendeur éventuel de soufre.
In 1974 and at the material time, R.E.A. Logan, the president of Real Marketing Ltd., an Alberta company engaged in the marketing of sulphur and knowledgeable as to who had sulphur available for sale, located the respondent as a potential vendor of sulphur and communicated this information to Kirkpatrick. This communication went forward to Kirkpatrick by the solicitors representing Real Marketing Ltd. after it was established that Real Marketing Ltd. would receive 50¢ per long ton sold to Rockland. Real Marketing Ltd. agreed to split this 500 per long ton with a Mr. Bozman, Bozman having “found” the prospective purchaser.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La Cour d’appel semble estimer que l’obligation d’accommodement devait être appréciée au moment où l’employée s’était vu en définitive refuser une mesure additionnelle (par. 31). À mon avis, cette approche repose sur une compartimentation des différents problèmes de santé de l’employée.
The Court of Appeal appears to have held that the duty to accommodate must be assessed as of the time the employee was effectively denied an additional measure (para. 31).  In my view, this approach is based on a compartmentalization of the employee’s various health problems.  Undue hardship resulting from the employee’s absence must be assessed globally starting from the beginning of the absence, not from the expiry of the three‑year period.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
33 La Cour d’appel semble estimer que l’obligation d’accommodement devait être appréciée au moment où l’employée s’était vu en définitive refuser une mesure additionnelle (par. 31). À mon avis, cette approche repose sur une compartimentation des différents problèmes de santé de l’employée.
33 The Court of Appeal appears to have held that the duty to accommodate must be assessed as of the time the employee was effectively denied an additional measure (para. 31).  In my view, this approach is based on a compartmentalization of the employee’s various health problems.  Undue hardship resulting from the employee’s absence must be assessed globally starting from the beginning of the absence, not from the expiry of the three‑year period.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[23] Vu en outre l’absence de [traduction] « motifs propres à l’affaire » qui autoriseraient la Cour d’appel à dégager ses propres conclusions de fait, notamment quant à la mens rea exigée, la cour a jugé qu’il convenait d’ordonner la tenue d’un nouveau procès (par. 68).
[23] Moreover, in the absence of “case-specific reasons” that would authorize the Court of Appeal to make its own findings of fact, notably as to the requisite mens rea, a new trial was found to be the proper remedy (para. 68).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Au procès, la défense a mis en preuve que la Commission de censure avait autorisé la présentation du film comme film réservé aux adultes et que celui‑ci avait été vu en Alberta par un vaste auditoire sans qu'aucune plainte ne soit présentée à la Commission.
Appellant, owner of an Edmonton theatre, was charged with presenting an obscene motion picture contrary to s. 163 of the Criminal Code. At trial, the defence adduced evidence indicating that the film had been approved and classified by the Censor Board as a restricted adult movie and that it had been previously shown in Alberta to a large audience with no complaint being made to the Board. The evidence further showed that the film had been similarly approved and classified by the other provincial censor boards across the country. The trial judge found the film immoral, indecent and obscene and convicted the appellant. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision. This appeal is to determine whether the trial judge applied the proper test in finding the appellant guilty of presenting an obscene entertainment.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[76] Au cours de cette période, Nguyen avait été vu à quatre reprises en train d’entrer dans la résidence des Cornell : une fois [traduction] « pour environ deux minutes », une autre fois « pour environ huit minutes », la fois suivante, « pour une courte visite » et, finalement, « pour quelques instants » (motifs du juge O’Brien, par. 61). M. Nguyen n’avait jamais été vu en train d’entrer quelque chose dans la maison des Cornell ou d’en sortir quoi que ce soit.
[76] During this time, Nguyen was observed entering the Cornell dwelling four times: once “for approximately two minutes”; once “for approximately eight minutes”; next, for “a short visit”; and, finally, for “a short stop” (reasons of O’Brien J.A., at para. 61).  Nguyen was never seen carrying anything into or out of the Cornell dwelling.  Tran was never observed entering the dwelling at all, but had been seen in the vicinity.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[165] Premièrement, comme nous l’avons vu en ce qui concerne l’inscription, les termes clairs de la Loi assujettissent le droit de voter à l’inscription sur la liste électorale ou au dépôt d’un certificat d’inscription (art. 149).
[167] Third, such an approach would be unfair.  It disregards the fact that other qualified electors who did not follow the necessary steps to become entitled to vote may have rightly been turned away from the polling station and not permitted to vote on election day. The Act sets out the rules and procedures electors must follow in order to exercise their constitutional right to vote. Those rules must be applied fairly and consistently if the right is to have meaning.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[101] Ainsi qu’on l’a vu, en matière de poursuites abusives, la malveillance exige la preuve d’un but illégitime afin de distinguer les actes qui ne confèrent pas de droit d’action de ceux qui en confèrent un parce qu’ils ne relèvent pas du rôle d’un « représentant de la justice ».  Comme le signale le juge Vancise avec justesse, ni les demandeurs ni les juridictions inférieures ne relèvent quelque but illégitime qui aurait incité M. Miazga à poursuivre les intimés.
[101] As explained earlier, the malice element of malicious prosecution requires  proof of an improper purpose so as to differentiate between prosecutorial conduct that is not actionable and that which is, by virtue of the fact that it brings the prosecutor outside of his or her role as “minister of justice”.  As Vancise J.A. aptly noted, neither the plaintiffs nor the courts below have pointed to any such improper purpose that impelled Miazga to prosecute the respondents.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Les autres mandats de perquisition se rapportant à cette opération avaient déjà été exécutés et M. Nguyen, le seul individu soupçonné de faire le trafic de drogues ou d’être membre d’un gang qui avait jamais été vu en train d’entrer dans le domicile, était déjà détenu par la police.
[65] Shortly before executing their warrant to search the Cornell home, the police observed Lorraine and Ashley Cornell leave and drive away.  The other search warrants relating to this operation had already been executed, and Mr. Nguyen, the only suspected drug dealer or gang member ever observed entering the dwelling, was already in police custody.  The police made no effort to intercept the departing women in order to secure — or at least attempt to secure — a nonviolent, peaceful means of entering the residence  to search within.  Instead, some 15 minutes later, the tactical team made its unannounced and violent “dynamic entry”.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Entre‑temps, le témoin D. W. avait téléphoné à la police.  Deux policiers, les agents Jorgensen et Randhawa, sont arrivés peu après que le second garçon fut sorti des buissons.  Ils ont témoigné avoir vu, en entrant dans le parc, l'appelant accroupi dans les buissons.  L'appelant a tenté de quitter le parc en sautant par‑dessus une clôture, mais il en a été empêché par l'agent Randhawa.  Celui‑ci a fait produire à l'appelant une pièce d'identité, lui a appris qu'il faisait l'objet d'une enquête relativement à de possibles agressions sexuelles contre des enfants et l'a fait monter à l'arrière du fourgon cellulaire dans lequel Randhawa et Jorgensen s'étaient rendus au parc.  Les policiers ont ensuite interrogé les témoins adultes et les plaignants.
The complainants were five and six years old at the time.  Two adult witnesses, D. W. and L. W., lived in a house which was adjacent to the park. They were working in their yard on May 22 at around 5 p.m. when D. W. observed the appellant walking in a crouched position along some bushes at the edge of the park. He was leading a young boy by the hand. When the appellant and the boy disappeared in the bushes, the witness L. W. went closer to attempt to find out what was happening. She saw the appellant and the boy seated together in an unusual position and overheard the appellant say "Let's keep it our secret, it will be our little secret." After the first boy left him in the bushes, a second young boy joined the appellant in the same secluded location. Once again L. W. heard the appellant say "shhh" and "let's keep it our little secret" before the second boy also left the bushes.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le seul témoignage défavorable c'est que l'appelant a été momentanément vu en état de démarche chancelante, et qu'il marmonnait au moment où on l'a vu couché sur un divan; or ce sont là des symptômes compatibles avec la maladie diagnostiquée.
To find intoxication in the present case, and hence to conclude that the failure to appear was unjustified, is to give testimonial cogency to evidence that is not far short of surmise, when related to other evidence in the case by witnesses much better situated to speak to that fact. No one testified to any odour of alcohol; the evidence on this was that there was none. The only adverse evidence was to the effect that the appellant was momentarily seen to be unsteady on his feet and that he mumbled when seen lying on a chesterfield, symptoms that are consistent with the diagnosed illness. The adverse evidence defies the principle of proof on a balance of probabilities let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
D'après lui, comme il était personnellement au courant des faits en raison de ce qu'il avait vu en entrant au palais de justice et étant donné l'urgence de la situation, il détenait le pouvoir de délivrer l'injonction comme il l'a fait.
14.                     McEachern C.J.S.C. held that the authority of the court to protect its process was in no way pre‑empted by provincial legislation relating to labour disputes or essential services. Recognizing that the circumstances had to be unusual, McEachern C.J.S.C. held that where a criminal contempt threatened to disrupt court proceedings, the court had the authority to move ex mero motu in order to maintain the proper administration of justice. He held that as he had direct knowledge of the facts from observation upon entering the court‑house and, in view of the urgency of the situation, he did have authority to issue the injunction in the manner in which he had.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le fait qu'il ait dit à Snowbird d'arrêter quand il l'a vu en train d'étrangler la victime indique que, si l'appelant avait jamais été partie à des infractions, il s'était retiré à ce moment‑là de tout acte conjoint avec Snowbird qui comportait le meurtre de Mme Johnson.
However, there was no evidence that the appellant knew or had any reason to believe that death was likely to result from the sexual assault.  Nor did the death result from the sexual assault.  Rather, as stated above, the jury must have found that the death occurred due to strangulation.  There was no evidence that the appellant was a party to Snowbird's strangulation and suffocation of Mrs. Johnson.  Once again, the only evidence was that of his statement in which he denied any participation in those acts.  The fact that he told Snowbird to stop when he saw him strangling the victim indicates that if the appellant ever had been a party to any offences, from that point on he had removed himself from any joint enterprise with Snowbird that involved the killing of Mrs. Johnson.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le principal agent de sécurité de la Compagnie a témoigné qu’il visitait le secteur de la poudrière une ou deux fois la semaine en moyenne. Arrivé sur les lieux, il avait l’habitude de décadenasser la barrière et de se rendre jusqu’à la poudrière. Il n’avait jamais vu personne sur l’emplacement à part des employés de la mine. Durant l’hiver de 1969-70, il avait vu, en quelque rares occasions, des traces de moto-neige juste à l’ouest de la barrière. Il n’en avait pas vu près de la poudrière. Il n’a pas rapporté la présence de ces traces au gérant de la mine. Il n’a rien fait au sujet de ces traces parce que, comme il le dit, il aurait été nécessaire de placer un garde pour défendre l’accès ou surprendre quelqu’un à cet endroit.
The chief security officer of the Company testified that he visited the powder magazine area on an average of once or twice a week. He would unlock the gate and proceed to the powder magazine. He had never seen anyone on the site other than mining personnel. In the winter of 1969-70 he had seen, on a very few occasions, snowmobile tracks just west of the gate. He had seen none near the powder magazine. He did not report the presence of these tracks to the mine manager. He did not do anything about them because, as he said, it would have been necessary to post a guard to prevent entry or to catch somebody who was there.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Selon lui, il était impossible de dire [TRADUCTION] "si la plaignante, quand elle a identifié l'accusé la seconde fois, n'a fait qu'identifier l'homme qu'elle avait vu en cour la première fois, ou si elle procédait alors à une identification valide de son agresseur" (p. 285).
7.                Matas J.A. in his dissenting reasons concluded that the trial judge was correct in directing a verdict. He thought that "the difficulty with the several descriptions furnished by the complainant was compounded by the improper show‑up identifications" (p. 284). He concluded that it was impossible to say "if the complainant identified the accused on the second occasion only as the man she saw in court the first time or whether she was making a valid identification of the assailant" (p. 285). Accordingly, for this reason Matas J.A. thought that the only course open to the trial judge was to direct a verdict of acquittal.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’équipe de surveillance leur avait transmis des renseignements portant que l’accusé avait été vu en train de remettre une substance ayant l’apparence d’une poudre blanche à d’autres personnes en échange d’argent, ce qui les a amenés à soupçonner l’accusé d’avoir du crack sur lui.
10 With regard to the manner in which the search was conducted, I would agree with the Crown that the three searches must be looked at individually and justified according to the circumstances applicable to each of them.  In my view, the first search was perfectly justified.  As provided for in Cloutier, supra, the reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest provided the authority to search for evidence related to the crime.  The arresting officers had reasonable cause to believe the accused was hiding evidence.  Information that the accused had been observed passing a white powdery substance to other persons and receiving cash in return was passed onto the arresting officers by the surveillance team, giving rise to a suspicion that the accused would have crack cocaine on his person.  In addition, as the arresting officer approached the accused, he observed the accused crushing something between his fingers that left a white residue.  During the course of the arrest, the police found what looked to be cocaine under the table where one of the suspects was arrested.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Comme nous l’avons vu, la question de savoir si Mme McLeod était capable d’identifier l’accusé comme étant son agresseur, ou si elle l’a simplement identifié comme étant l’homme qu’elle a vu en état d’arrestation et lors des audiences précédentes, est une question qu’il appartient au jury de trancher en définitive.
93 In the same paragraph (para. 52), my colleague says that the trial judge should have stressed that Mrs. McLeod could not have divorced her previous recollection of the assailant from the mental images she formed after having seen the appellant arrested by the police on television. I disagree that a caution of this nature should have been given by the trial judge. As I discussed above, whether Mrs. McLeod was able to identify the accused as her assailant, or whether she was merely identifying him as the man she saw being arrested and at previous hearings, was ultimately a question for the jury to answer.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En ces occasions il avait également remarqué les écriteaux sur la bouée signalant le danger que représentait la chute (Danger—Falls Ahead), cette chute-là qu’il avait vue. Le jour de l’accident, il a vu en venant du côté sud du chenal et ensuite au centre, un pont ordinaire à six piliers, sans aucun signe de l’existence d’un barrage ou de vannes.
I am of the opinion that he also complied with the second requirement and determined that the bridge was prepared to allow him to enter. The suppliant, as I have stressed, had never seen the lock, dam and bridge except when the gates and curtains were down and had then and only then observed a waterfall on the north side thereof. On those occasions, he had also noted signs on the buoys warning of “Danger—Falls Ahead”, referring to the very falls which he had observed. On this occasion, he observed from the south end of the channel, and then again from midstream, an ordinary six-pier bridge with no sign of any dam or gate or curtain. The suppliant, neither then nor on previous occasions, saw any concrete weir. In normal flow of water, that weir was covered with 14 feet of water, and even with the dam open with 28 inches of water. The suppliant, when the gates and curtains had been lowered on these previous occasions, had observed the signs warning of the waterfall and had also observed the waterfall which was the subject of such warning.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
55 Le présent litige soulève plusieurs aspects du recours aux règles et principes  appartenant à l’ordre public.  Il faut se demander, en premier lieu, si les droits d’auteur, en tant que droits moraux, sont analogues aux matières énumérées à l’art. 2639, al. 1 C.c.Q. et donc hors du domaine de compétence de l’arbitrage.  Ensuite, on doit déterminer si cette même disposition interdit l’arbitrage portant sur la paternité des droits d’auteur en raison du caractère erga omnes de ce type de décision.  Enfin, bien que la question de la validité des contrats n’ait pas été portée devant lui, comme nous l’avons vu, en raison du débat survenu entre les parties, il demeure utile d’étudier si l’arbitre aurait pu détenir la compétence de déclarer les contrats d’édition invalides en raison des vices de forme dont ils auraient été affectés selon les prescriptions des art. 31 et 34 de la Loi sur le statut professionnel des artistes.
55 This case raises a number of aspects of the application of the rules and principles that form part of public order.  We must first ask whether copyright, as a moral right, is analogous to the matters enumerated in art. 2639, para. 1 C.C.Q. and is therefore outside the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the arbitration system.  Second, we must determine whether that provision prohibits arbitration as to the ownership of copyright based on the erga omnes nature of this type of decision.  And third, although the question of the validity of the contracts was not before the arbitrator in this case, as we have seen, because of the discussion that took place between the parties, it is nonetheless useful to consider whether the arbitrator might have had the authority to declare the publishing contracts invalid because of the defects of form that were alleged to exist in them, under the rules set out in ss. 31 and 34 of the Act respecting the professional status of artists.
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