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Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. c. Le gouvernement de la Saskatchewan - [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576 - 1976-10-05
Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. v. The Government of Saskatchewan - [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576 - 1976-10-05
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Lorsque les paiements ont été effectués en vertu d'une loi inconstitutionnelle, rien ne justifie que ces sommes soient retenues. Comme le dit le juge Dickson dans l'affaire Amax, précitée, à la p. 590:
My colleague advances another reason why the appellants should be denied recovery in this case.  He says, in effect, that the appellants would be receiving a "windfall" if they received their money back because in all likelihood they have already recouped the payments made on account of the ultra vires tax from their customers.  In terms of my colleague's analysis, the appellants are unable to show that the unjust enrichment of the province was at their expense.  In my view there is no requirement that they be able to do so.  Where the payments were made pursuant to an unconstitutional statute there is no legitimate basis on which they can be retained.  As Dickson J. stated in Amax, supra, at p. 590:
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J’ajouterai seulement qu’avant les plaidoiries en l’espèce, mais après la décision de la Cour d’appel de la Saskatchewan, cette Cour a jugé que le par. 5(7) était ultra vires de la législature de la Saskatchewan (Amax Potash Limited c. Le Gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, encore inédit[49]).
The Province pleaded s. 5(7) of The Proceedings against the Crown Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 87, in response to the appellant’s claim for recovery of tax and this was a subsidiary question upon which leave to appeal to this Court was granted. The point does not arise in the disposition I would make of this appeal. I would only add that prior to argument in the present appeal, but subsequent to the decision of the Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan, this Court held that s. 5(7) was ultra vires the Legislature of Saskatchewan (Amax Potash Limited v. The Government of Saskatchewan, not yet reported[49]).
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Le juge Esson a rejeté le point de vue selon lequel l'arrêt Amax établit que les sommes versées à titre d'impôt conformément à une loi déclarée ultra vires par la suite ne peuvent jamais être conservées et que des considérations de droit privé comme celles retenues dans l'affaire Nepean ne sont pas pertinentes.
Esson J.A. disagreed with the view that Amax stands for the proposition that any money paid as taxes under a statute later held to be ultra vires can never be retained, and that private law considerations such as were relied upon in Nepean are irrelevant.  Rather, Amax simply stood for the proposition that an attempt by a legislature to enact a statute barring access to the courts would be struck down as attempting by covert means to impose illegal burdens.  Amax held that fundamental principles of federalism preclude a province from barring access to the general law where the issue is whether the province has exceeded its powers and whether, if it has, the taxpayer is entitled to a remedy.  However, where the legislature has not created such a bar, there is no reason why the province should not be able to rely on ordinary principles of justice and fairness in defending itself against a taxpayer's claim for repayment of moneys.  The airlines should be entitled to recover only if they could satisfy the requirements of the action for money had and received which are rooted in principles of justice and equity.
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85 L’appelant Garland sollicite une ordonnance de conservation de « type Amax » pour le motif que les PPR à un taux criminel continuent d’être perçues pendant la présente instance et que, n’eût été les délais inhérents au litige, les sommes en question n’auraient jamais été payées (Amax Potash Ltd. c. Gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576).
85 The appellant, Garland, requests an “Amax-type” preservation order on the basis that the LPPs continue to be collected at a criminal rate during the pendency of this action, and these payments would never have been made but for the delays inherent in litigation (Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576).  In my view, however, a preservation order is not appropriate in this case.  Consumers’ Gas has now ceased to collect the LPPs at a criminal rate.  As a result, if a preservation order were made, there would be no future LPPs to which it could attach.  Even with respect to the LPPs paid between 1994 and the present, to which such an order could attach, a preservation order should not be granted for three further reasons: (1) such an order would serve no practical purpose, (2) the appellant has not satisfied the criteria in the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, and (3) Amax can be distinguished from this case.
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Même s’il existait quelque raison de croire que Consumers’ Gas n’exécuterait pas un tel jugement, une ordonnance de type Amax permet au défendeur de dépenser les sommes d’argent détenues dans le cours normal de ses affaires, de sorte qu’aucun véritable fonds ne serait créé.
86 First, the appellant has not alleged that Consumers’ Gas is an impecunious defendant or that there is any other reason to believe that Consumers’ Gas would not satisfy a judgment against it.  Even if there were some reason to believe that Consumers’ Gas would not satisfy such a judgment, an Amax-type order allows the defendant to spend the monies being held in the ordinary course of business — no actual fund would be created.  So the only thing that a preservation order would achieve would be to prevent Consumers’ Gas from spending the money earned from the LPPs in a non-ordinary manner (for example, such as moving it off-shore) which the appellant has not alleged is likely to occur absent the order.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Arrêt appliqué: Amax Potash Ltd. c. Gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576; arrêts mentionnés: Thorson c. Procureur général du Canada, [1975] 1 R.C.S. 138; British Columbia Power Corp. v.
Applied: Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576; referred to: Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; British Columbia Power Corp. v. British Columbia Electric Co., [1962] S.C.R. 642; Ryves v. Duke of Wellington (1846), 9 Beav. 579, 50 E.R. 467; In re Nathan (1884), 12 Q.B.D. 461; Orpen v. Attorney General for Ontario, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 366; Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. v. MacLay, [1920] 3 K.B. 402; Irwin v. Grey (1862), 3 F. & F. 635, 176 E.R. 290; Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735; Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor, Malaysia, [1980] A.C. 458; Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, [1968] A.C. 997.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pour ce qui est de la nouvelle taxe, le juge Macdonald a conclu que, comme il s'agissait de taxation directe, rien ne s'opposait à ce qu'elle soit adoptée rétroactivement. À son avis, c'est à tort que les lignes aériennes ont invoqué l'arrêt rendu par cette Cour dans l'affaire Amax Potash Ltd. c.
So far as the fresh tax was concerned, Macdonald J. held that since the tax was direct, there was no impediment to enacting it retroactively.  In his view, the airlines' reliance on this Court's decision in Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576, (hereinafter Amax), to challenge the validity of this new tax was misplaced.  In the present case, a fresh tax was being levied retroactively pursuant to a valid re-enactment. Amax applied to a situation where there was no consitutional basis for the impugned legislation.  It did not apply to invalidate a taxing statute where there is a constitutional power to enact such a measure provided it is done in proper form, as in the present cases.  Sections 25(1) to (4) were, therefore, valid, and each of the airlines was in consequence obliged to pay a fresh tax pursuant to these provisions.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L'avocate a fait remarquer que, dans l'arrêt Amax, précité, cette Cour a statué qu'une législature provinciale ne peut adopter une loi empêchant le remboursement d'impôts perçus en vertu d'une loi inconstitutionnelle.
Counsel for Pacific Western Airlines led the airlines' attack on the validity and applicability of the "mistake of law doctrine".  First of all, she stated, the Court should require restitution because to do otherwise would undermine the Constitution and be contrary to public policy.  The province should not, therefore, be permitted to legislatively escape the consequences of its unconstitutional act.  Nor should the airlines be denied recovery by the application of common law or equitable principles developed in the context of private law or in non-federal states.  In the Amax case, supra, she noted, this Court held that a provincial legislature could not enact a statute barring recovery of taxes collected under an unconstitutional statute.  It would be anomalous, she continued, if a court could deny recovery on the basis of a common law rule -‑ the mistake of law rule ‑- that the legislature could not enact.
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85 L’appelant Garland sollicite une ordonnance de conservation de « type Amax » pour le motif que les PPR à un taux criminel continuent d’être perçues pendant la présente instance et que, n’eût été les délais inhérents au litige, les sommes en question n’auraient jamais été payées (Amax Potash Ltd. c. Gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576).
85 The appellant, Garland, requests an “Amax-type” preservation order on the basis that the LPPs continue to be collected at a criminal rate during the pendency of this action, and these payments would never have been made but for the delays inherent in litigation (Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576).  In my view, however, a preservation order is not appropriate in this case.  Consumers’ Gas has now ceased to collect the LPPs at a criminal rate.  As a result, if a preservation order were made, there would be no future LPPs to which it could attach.  Even with respect to the LPPs paid between 1994 and the present, to which such an order could attach, a preservation order should not be granted for three further reasons: (1) such an order would serve no practical purpose, (2) the appellant has not satisfied the criteria in the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, and (3) Amax can be distinguished from this case.
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85 L’appelant Garland sollicite une ordonnance de conservation de « type Amax » pour le motif que les PPR à un taux criminel continuent d’être perçues pendant la présente instance et que, n’eût été les délais inhérents au litige, les sommes en question n’auraient jamais été payées (Amax Potash Ltd. c. Gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576).
85 The appellant, Garland, requests an “Amax-type” preservation order on the basis that the LPPs continue to be collected at a criminal rate during the pendency of this action, and these payments would never have been made but for the delays inherent in litigation (Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576).  In my view, however, a preservation order is not appropriate in this case.  Consumers’ Gas has now ceased to collect the LPPs at a criminal rate.  As a result, if a preservation order were made, there would be no future LPPs to which it could attach.  Even with respect to the LPPs paid between 1994 and the present, to which such an order could attach, a preservation order should not be granted for three further reasons: (1) such an order would serve no practical purpose, (2) the appellant has not satisfied the criteria in the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, and (3) Amax can be distinguished from this case.
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Le juge Esson a rejeté le point de vue selon lequel l'arrêt Amax établit que les sommes versées à titre d'impôt conformément à une loi déclarée ultra vires par la suite ne peuvent jamais être conservées et que des considérations de droit privé comme celles retenues dans l'affaire Nepean ne sont pas pertinentes.
Esson J.A. disagreed with the view that Amax stands for the proposition that any money paid as taxes under a statute later held to be ultra vires can never be retained, and that private law considerations such as were relied upon in Nepean are irrelevant.  Rather, Amax simply stood for the proposition that an attempt by a legislature to enact a statute barring access to the courts would be struck down as attempting by covert means to impose illegal burdens.  Amax held that fundamental principles of federalism preclude a province from barring access to the general law where the issue is whether the province has exceeded its powers and whether, if it has, the taxpayer is entitled to a remedy.  However, where the legislature has not created such a bar, there is no reason why the province should not be able to rely on ordinary principles of justice and fairness in defending itself against a taxpayer's claim for repayment of moneys.  The airlines should be entitled to recover only if they could satisfy the requirements of the action for money had and received which are rooted in principles of justice and equity.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que le principe posé dans l'arrêt Amax fixe des limites à ce que le législateur peut faire pour restreindre le remboursement d'impôts à un contribuable qui y a juridiquement droit, rien ne semble limiter le pouvoir du législateur de prévoir leur remboursement.
If recovery in all cases is to be the general rule, then that is best achieved through the route of statutory reform.  If there are limits to the extent to which, because of the Amax principle, a legislature may limit recovery of taxes by a taxpayer who is at law entitled to recoup them, there would appear to be no limit to the legislature's providing for their recovery.  This could take into account the types of variables already mentioned, the nature of the tax, the amounts involved, the times within which a claim may be made, the situation of those who are in a position to recoup themselves from others, and so on.  Considerable study has gone into the nature of such legislation in the United States, where several jurisdictions have adopted this expedient: see Pannam, supra, at pp. 504 et seq.  In Canada, see the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia's Report on Benefits Conferred Under a Mistake of Law (1981).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pour ce qui est de la nouvelle taxe, le juge Macdonald a conclu que, comme il s'agissait de taxation directe, rien ne s'opposait à ce qu'elle soit adoptée rétroactivement. À son avis, c'est à tort que les lignes aériennes ont invoqué l'arrêt rendu par cette Cour dans l'affaire Amax Potash Ltd. c.
So far as the fresh tax was concerned, Macdonald J. held that since the tax was direct, there was no impediment to enacting it retroactively.  In his view, the airlines' reliance on this Court's decision in Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576, (hereinafter Amax), to challenge the validity of this new tax was misplaced.  In the present case, a fresh tax was being levied retroactively pursuant to a valid re-enactment. Amax applied to a situation where there was no consitutional basis for the impugned legislation.  It did not apply to invalidate a taxing statute where there is a constitutional power to enact such a measure provided it is done in proper form, as in the present cases.  Sections 25(1) to (4) were, therefore, valid, and each of the airlines was in consequence obliged to pay a fresh tax pursuant to these provisions.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pour ce qui est de la nouvelle taxe, le juge Macdonald a conclu que, comme il s'agissait de taxation directe, rien ne s'opposait à ce qu'elle soit adoptée rétroactivement. À son avis, c'est à tort que les lignes aériennes ont invoqué l'arrêt rendu par cette Cour dans l'affaire Amax Potash Ltd. c.
So far as the fresh tax was concerned, Macdonald J. held that since the tax was direct, there was no impediment to enacting it retroactively.  In his view, the airlines' reliance on this Court's decision in Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576, (hereinafter Amax), to challenge the validity of this new tax was misplaced.  In the present case, a fresh tax was being levied retroactively pursuant to a valid re-enactment. Amax applied to a situation where there was no consitutional basis for the impugned legislation.  It did not apply to invalidate a taxing statute where there is a constitutional power to enact such a measure provided it is done in proper form, as in the present cases.  Sections 25(1) to (4) were, therefore, valid, and each of the airlines was in consequence obliged to pay a fresh tax pursuant to these provisions.
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L'argument qui précède repose, à mon avis, sur une conception erronée de l'arrêt Amax et de la place occupée par la règle de l'erreur de droit dans ce contexte. Dans Amax, la province avait, au moyen d'une loi inconstitutionnelle, perçu des impôts que le contribuable, d'après les faits présumés, avait payés par contrainte et qu'il avait donc le droit de recouvrer.
The foregoing argument seems to me to rest on a misconception of the Amax case and of the place of the mistake of law rule in this context.  The facts in Amax were that the province had by an unconstitutional statute levied taxes which the taxpayer had, on the assumed facts, paid under compulsion and which, therefore, it was entitled to recover.  What the statute there impugned did was to bar actions for taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute that were otherwise recoverable.  The legislature was, in essence, giving effect to the unconstitutional statute.  It was doing indirectly what it could not do directly.  Air Canada v. British Columbia (Attorney General), supra, is of a similar nature.  The actions of the province there would have had the effect, by the exercise of the power to grant or refuse a trial, of indirectly giving effect to an unconstitutional statute.  Whether, and within what limits, the province may regulate recovery of unconstitutional taxes is really not in issue here.  The issue is the very different one of the effect of action taken pursuant to an ultra vires or unconstitutional statute.
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Si les taxes prélevées en vertu d'une loi ultra vires pouvaient être gardées, ce serait faire fi de la Constitution. Dans cette optique, les arrêts Nepean et Amax sont parfaitement conciliables. De l'avis du juge Lambert, le paiement effectué conformément à une loi ultra vires résulte d'une contrainte effective irrésistible, même en l'absence de toute protestation ou plainte de la part du contribuable.
Lambert J.A., too, found that even if the common law principles applicable to recovery of taxes would preclude restitution, they must be subject to a constitutional exception.  If money taxed under an ultra vires statute could be retained, the Constitution would be flouted.  Thus, the Nepean and Amax cases were perfectly reconcilable.  In his view, payment pursuant to an ultra vires statute amounted to irresistible practical compulsion even in the absence of protest or complaint by the taxpayer.  He was also of the view that retention by the Crown of taxes collected under an ultra vires statute would be ultra vires.
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Par conséquent, si ce refus est constitutionnellement permis, ce que l'arrêt Amax a déclaré impossible a été en fait, quoique indirectement, accompli par l'exercice du pouvoir de prérogative de Sa Majesté de refuser l'autorisation.
11.              Let us examine the present situation in the light of these principles. Until the passage of the Crown Proceeding Act, the traditional way to sue the Crown, we saw, was by petition of right, but no court would take cognizance of a case until the Lieutenant Governor had issued his fiat. This traditional procedure has been retained in British Columbia in respect of causes of action against the Crown that arose before August 1, 1974. The present is such an action. The Lieutenant Governor has refused his fiat. Thus, if this refusal is constitutionally permissible, what Amax declared was not possible has been effectively, if indirectly, accomplished by the exercise of the Crown's prerogative to refuse a fiat.
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25(5) ultra vires. Il portait confiscation de taxes payées en vertu d'une loi qui était ultra vires et le raisonnement adopté dans l'arrêt Amax s'y appliquait. Tout en reconnaissant que la province pouvait être en mesure de compenser avec l'obligation des lignes aériennes découlant des par.
Macdonald J., however, found s. 25(5) ultra vires.  It purported to confiscate taxes paid pursuant to the ultra vires legislation and, therefore, fell within the reasoning in Amax.  He recognized that the province might well be in a position to set off the liability of the airlines arising under ss. 25(1) to (4) against its obligation to repay taxes improperly collected under the Act as it existed between 1974 to 1976, but, he stated, that matter was not before him.
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La loi de 1981 ne viole pas le principe posé dans Amax Potash Ltd. c. Gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576. L'arrêt Amax visait une situation où la province cherchait à éviter d'avoir à rembourser une taxe alors qu'elle était tenue en droit de le faire.
The 1981 legislation does not violate the principle enunciated in Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576.  Amax concerned a situation where the province sought to avoid repaying a tax it was bound by law to pay.  It simply sought in an indirect way to give effect to an invalid statute.  Here the Legislature did directly what it was empowered to do -- impose a direct tax and give it retroactive effect.
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Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. c. Le gouvernement de la Saskatchewan
Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. v. The Government of Saskatchewan
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Décisions > Jugements de la Cour suprême > Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. c. Le gouv...
Decisions > Supreme Court Judgments > Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. v. The Gov...
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Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. c. Le gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576
Amax Potash Ltd. Etc. v. The Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576
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De même, le professeur Hogg, commentant l'arrêt Amax dans son traité intitulé Constitutional Law of Canada (2e éd. 1985), écrit, à la p. 349:
Likewise, Professor Hogg commenting on Amax in his treatise Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed. 1985) said at p. 349:
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Amax Potash Ltd. c. Gouvernement de la Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 R.C.S. 576; Bilbie v. Lumley (1802), 2 East 469, 102 E.R. 448; Hydro Electric Commission of Nepean c. Ontario Hydro, [1982] 1 R.C.S. 347.
Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576; Bilbie v. Lumley (1802), 2 East 469, 102 E.R. 448; Hydro Electric Commission of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 347.
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27 La disposition législative en cause dans Amax Potash était le par. 5(7) d’une loi de la Saskatchewan intitulée Proceedings against the Crown Act, R.S.S. 1965, ch. 87, qui disposait :
27 The legislation at issue in Amax Potash was s. 5(7) of the Saskatchewan Proceedings against the Crown Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 87, which provided:
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88 Enfin, le recours de l’appelant à l’arrêt Amax, précité, pour justifier le type d’ordonnance sollicité n’est pas fondé. L’appelant a cité cet arrêt de manière très sélective. Dans sa version intégrale, la partie de l’arrêt que l’appelant cite dans ses observations écrites est ainsi rédigée (p. 598) :
88 Finally, the appellant’s use of Amax, supra, as authority for the type of order sought is without merit.  The appellant has cited the judgment very selectively.  The portion of the judgment the appellant cites in his written submissions reads in full (at p. 598):
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À mon avis, il est extrêmement difficile d'établir son invalidité. Il se peut qu'on puisse soutenir que, prise isolément, cette disposition viole le principe énoncé dans l'arrêt Amax. Comme on ne peut la considérer isolément, je n'ai pas à examiner ce point.
That, of course, raises the issue whether s. 25(5) is itself ultra vires.  There are, in my view, some serious difficulties in establishing its invalidity.  It may be, if the provision stood alone, that it could be successfully maintained that it violates the principle in the Amax decision.  I need not consider that situation because it does not stand alone.  It is the fifth of five subsections, the first four of which impose a valid direct tax, and it must obviously be read in that context.  It must also be read in light of the well known principle that it must be assumed that the Legislature intended to stay within the confines of its constitutional competence.  While, as Esson J.A. notes, the expression "confiscated" is distasteful, one should not permit it to mislead us regarding the purpose of s. 25(5).  The function of the courts is not to give the Legislature lessons in tact.  Their function, rather, is to attempt to discern what the Legislature, however clumsily, was attempting to achieve by the language it used, a task that should, as already noted, be informed by the presumption that the Legislature intended to stay within its constitutional powers.
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Dans l’arrêt Amax, la Cour a refusé de prononcer l’ordonnance sollicitée. Donc, bien que l’appelant ait raison d’affirmer que, dans cet arrêt, la Cour n’a pas écarté la possibilité de prononcer une telle ordonnance à l’avenir, il me semble qu’en l’espèce, comme dans l’affaire Amax, une telle ordonnance ne serait d’aucune utilité.
The Court in Amax went on to refuse to make the order.  So while the appellant is right that the Court in Amax failed to reject the hypothetical possibility of making such an order in the future, it seems to me that in this case, as in Amax, such an order would serve no practical purpose.  For these reasons, I find there is no basis for making a preservation order in this case.
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Dans l’arrêt Amax, la Cour a refusé de prononcer l’ordonnance sollicitée. Donc, bien que l’appelant ait raison d’affirmer que, dans cet arrêt, la Cour n’a pas écarté la possibilité de prononcer une telle ordonnance à l’avenir, il me semble qu’en l’espèce, comme dans l’affaire Amax, une telle ordonnance ne serait d’aucune utilité.
The Court in Amax went on to refuse to make the order.  So while the appellant is right that the Court in Amax failed to reject the hypothetical possibility of making such an order in the future, it seems to me that in this case, as in Amax, such an order would serve no practical purpose.  For these reasons, I find there is no basis for making a preservation order in this case.
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