appa – -Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ma conclusion est que, selon une juste interprétation du par. (4) de l’art. 6, un constable est fondé à arrêter le conducteur d’un véhicule à moteur si celui-ci était appa­remment en train de commettre une infraction sous cet article.
My conclusion is that, on the true construction of s. 6(4), a constable is justified in arresting the driver of a motor car if the driver was apparently committing an offence under the section.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En effet, il est de notre opinion, que si les parties veulent réellement créer une société, que ces faits doivent appa­raître de façon explicite et expresse, que la manifesta­tion de cette volonté soit sans détour et conforme à ce qui est réellement vécu et représenté par les parties, ce qui n’est nullement le cas dans la présente cause.
[TRANSLATION] In our opinion, if the parties really wanted to create a partnership, these facts should appear explicitly and expressly and the demonstration of this intent should be unequivocal and consistent with what really occurred, and was represented by the parties, which is definitely not the case here.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] A la lecture de la Loi, du Plan et des ordonnances il me semble que c’est l’abattage des porcs au Manitoba que l’on vise et que, comme le dit M. le Juge en chef Tritschler dans son jugement en Cour du Banc de la Reine, «il s’agit là d’une question d’intérêt local». Il n’existe, dans le texte, aucun indice interne d’une préoccupation interprovinciale; au contraire le membre de phrase «dans la province» appa-
As I read the Act, the Plan and Orders, it seems to me that it is the slaughtering of hogs in Manitoba to which they are directed and, as Tritschler C.J.Q.B. said in the course of his judgment, “that is a local matter”. There are no internal indicia to be found in the written words to manifest an interprovincial concern; on the contrary the phrase “within the province” appears with great frequency. The legislation,
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le notaire Corriveau affirme qu’il ignorait tout jusqu’à ce que Sydney Wright lui fasse connaître quel devait être le contenu du testament. Les seules parties préparées à l’avance sont les formules usuelles du préambule et de la fin, qui appa­raissent à la machine à écrire sur le testament.
The will in fact was not prepared in advance. The notary Corriveau prepared it by hand in the hospital, on the spot, immediately after Sydney Wright told him of his wishes. The notary Corriveau stated that he knew nothing about it until Sydney Wright told him what the content of the will was to be. The only parts prepared in advance were the usual formulas of the introduction and the conclusion, which were typewritten on the will.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
D’autre part, le législateur est appa­remment d’avis qu’il s’agit là d’un domaine parti­culièrement vulnérable aux changements des politiques d’intérêt public et il l’a par conséquent réservé à l’Exécutif qui doit en dernier ressort les appliquer.
Indeed it may be thought by some to be unusual and even counter-productive in an organized socie­ty that a carefully considered decision by an administrative agency, arrived at after a full public hearing in which many points of view have been advanced, should be susceptible of reversal by the Governor in Council. On the other hand, it is apparently the judgment of Parliament that this is an area inordinately sensitive to changing public policies and hence it has been reserved for the final application of such a policy by the executive branch of government. Given the interpretation of
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La cour a jugé à l’unanimité que, par déduction nécessaire, une autorisation comporte le pouvoir de commettre une intrusion pour mettre en place l’appareil d’écoute et qu’en conséquence les interceptions en cause avaient été faites légalement.
As I read these decisions, they seem to turn on a narrow interpretation of the word "interception" so that the conduct of the police in installing monitoring devices is not part of the interception. I have difficulty in agreeing with the interpretation that "interception" does not include the method of its execution. Rather, I would respectfully adopt the dissenting view of Anderson, J.A. in the Lyons case that the "interception" of a private communication includes not merely the listening to or recording of a private communication but also the means used to acquire the private communication.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Des agents de police autorisés à intercepter les com­munications privées des appelants ont pénétré sans permission dans la résidence de l’un de ceux-ci pour y mettre en place un appareil d’écoute. Aucune des autori­sations ne mentionne la façon de mettre en place l’appa­reil.
Police officers, authorized to intercept appellants’ pri­vate communications, entered the residence of one of the appellants without consent to install a room monitoring device. None of the authorizations made reference to the manner of installing the device. Later, the appellants were tried and convicted on a charge of conspiracy to import a narcotic. Conversations intercepted by the monitoring device were introduced in evidence at trial and held admissible. The Court of Appeal dismissed appellants’ appeals but a dissenting judge concluded the evidence of the intercepted communications inadmissible in that the trespass made the interceptions not "lawfully made" within the meaning of s. 178.16(1) of the Crimi­nal Code. The appeals were based on this dissenting judgment.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’Exécutif national était appa­remment en mesure à cette époque de mener ses affaires en vertu de la Loi sur les chemins de fer, précitée, par réunions ou auditions au cours desquelles les parties comparaissaient devant le Cabi­net siégeant au complet ou en partie.
and P.C. 1170 dated 17/6/27). These proceedings do no more than illustrate the change in growth of our political machinery and indeed the size of the Canadian community. It was apparently possible for the national executive in those days to conduct its affairs under the Railway Act, supra, through meetings or hearings in which the parties appeared before some or all of the Cabinet. The population of the country was a fraction of that today. The magnitude of government operations bears no rela­tionship to that carried on at the federal level at present. No doubt the Governor in Council could still hold oral hearings if so disposed. Even if a court had the power and authority to so direct (which I conclude it has not) it would be a very unwise and impractical judicial principle which would convert past practice into rigid, invariable administrative procedures. Even in cases men­tioned above, while the order recites it to have been issued on the recommendation of the respon­sible Minister, there is nothing to indicate that the parties were informed of such a recommendation prior to the conduct of the hearing.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La situation du médecin, de l’hôpital ou de l’époux en vertu des par. 251(4), (5) et (6) s’appa­rente à celle des demandeurs dans Blaikie, Durand et Goldstein c. Procureur général du Québec[5]. Le demandeur a cité cette affaire dans laquelle la qualité pour agir a été accordée dans des circonstances assez semblables à celles en l’espèce.
The position of doctors, hospitals and husbands under s. 251(4), (5) and (6) is not unlike the position of the plaintiffs in Blaikie, Durand and Goldstein v. Attorney General of Quebec[5]. This case was put forward by the plaintiff as a case where standing was granted in circumstances not too different from those here. There is, in fact, a considerable difference between the Blaikie case, the Bill 101 case, and the present case. It is true that the question of the plaintiff's interest or standing in attacking the validity of Chapter III of Title I of the Charter of the French Language, 1977 (Que.), c. 5, was put in issue by the Attorney General of Quebec in his defence. The plaintiffs had alleged in their declaration that they were members of the legal profession engaged in litiga­tion in the courts of Quebec and before quasi-judi­cial tribunals, and that they represented clients whose ordinary language was English. They were entitled, they said, to plead in English and to have the Statutes of Quebec published in English as well as in French, relying of course on s. 133 of the British North America Act. Deschênes C.J., in granting the declaration, dealt preliminarily with a number of points, including the question of standing.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Quant à la question qui s’appa­rente davantage à la présente cause, la Cour a convenu qu’il existait une obligation d’assistance envers Dickie, mais elle a décidé que le fait que la méthode qui consiste à reculer avait été employée ne permettait pas de dire qu’il y avait eu manquement à cette obligation.
rescue. There, as here, the owner-operator, on hearing the cry "man overboard", reversed and backed astern towards the drowning man. He was then about 75 feet away from the boat. Two life-rings were thrown to Dickie, the drowning man, one falling within 20 feet and the other within 6 feet of him, but he paid no attention to them. A boat hook was then made ready for use, but Dickie disappeared when the boat was 20 to 25 feet away. The trial judge found negligence, inter cilia, in the failure to turn the boat and come bow on. On appeal the action was dismissed on several grounds. The appellate Court held that there was "an entire lack of evidence that anything appel­lant did or left undone caused his efforts at rescue to fail". This was enough to dispose of the case, as it was enough to dispose of the Matthews' action. On a question more germane to the pres­ent case, the Court agreed that there was a duty of rescue owed to Dickie, but held that a breach was not established by the backing-up procedure that was employed; and, if there was an error, it was one of judgment only in dealing with an emergency. The Court noted that there was a conflict of evidence on the issue of coming bow on or backing up, and this too distinguishes Hutchinson v. Dickie (which, moreover, was not an action by a rescuer's estate) from the present case which was decided more than twenty years later.