bres – -Translation – Keybot Dictionary

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Si le nombre de membres du comité le permet, le comité peut siéger en divisions composées de trois mem­bres, dont le président ou une personne désignée par celui-ci parmi une liste d’avocats dressée par le gouver­nement, après consultation du Barreau.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	If the number of members of the committee so per­mits, the committee may sit in divisions consisting of three members, one of whom shall be the chairman or a person chosen by him from a list of advocates prepared by the Gouvernement, after consultation with the Bar­reau du Québec.

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Il me paraît inutile de revoir toute la jurispru­dence sur cette question puisqu’elle vient d’être examinée dans la décision unanime de sept mem­bres de la Chambre des lords, dans l’arrêt Director
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	I find it unnecessary to review the numerous authorities available on the point seeing that they have just been fully dealt with by a unanimous seven-member House of Lords in Director of

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Il prétend que le titre et la lettre tendent à ternir sa réputation aux yeux des mem­bres bien pensants de la société en général et des citoyens de Saskatoon en particulier et que les termes utilisés sont diffamatoires.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The writers of the letter were not called to give evidence, and so there was no evidence to prove that the letter was an honest expression of their views. The only evidence available was that the editor said, with refer­ence to the writers of the letter, "we figured that was their opinion or their view or their observations".

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

58(3), et en temps voulu, l'appel est venu à audience à une réunion ordinaire du conseil d'administration composée de dix mem­bres dont le président du conseil (l'honorable T. A. Dohm, c.r.) et le président de l'Université dont l'art.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

Professor Kane exercised the right of appeal to which he was entitled under s. 58(3) and in due course the appeal came on for hearing before a regular meeting of ten members of the Board of Governors which included the Chairman (The Honourable T. A. Dohm, Q.C.) and the President whose presence was required by s. 61 of the Act. This meeting of the Board was also attended by the Dean of Science, the Dean of Geology and the Dean of Graduate Studies together with three other faculty members. Professor Kane together

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	LE JUGE DICKSON—L’appelant est un poseur de lignes au service de la Commission d’énergie électrique du Nouveau-Brunswick et est membre du local 1733 de la Fraternité internationale des ouvriers en électricité. En février 1976, les mem­bres du local 1733 ont été impliqués dans une grève illégale et ont organisé un piquet de grève à l’entrée principale de la propriété de la Commission
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	DICKSON J.—The appellant is a lineman employed by the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission and member of Local 1733 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. In February, 1976, the members of Local 1733 were involved in an illegal walkout and were pick­eting the main entrance to a Commission property known as the Marysville Service Centre and

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

Dans les chambres du parlement du Canada et les chambres de la législature de Québec, l’usage de la langue française ou de la langue anglaise, dans les débats, sera facultatif; mais dans la rédaction des archi­ves, procès-verbaux et journaux respectifs de ces cham­bres, l’usage de ces deux langues sera obligatoire; et dans toute plaidoirie ou pièce de procédure par-devant les tribunaux ou émanant des tribunaux du Canada qui seront établis sous l’autorité du présent acte, et par-devant tous les tribunaux ou émanant des tribunaux de Québec, il pourra être fait également usage, à faculté, de l’une ou de l’autre de ces langues.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

133. Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

bres avaient été dûment convoqués. A cette première séance, les cinq membres du Conseil présents s’étaient à bon droit considérés saisis de l’appel interjeté contre la décision du Comité de discipline.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

members were duly convened. The five members of the Council present at this first sitting rightly considered that they were seized of the appeal brought against the decision of the Committee on Discipline. They cannot be criticized for having “continued the sitting” to March 20 owing to the absence of respondent and the withdrawal of his counsel. The notice of hearing sent to the members who were present at the sitting of February 27 did not mean that they had relinquished the case.

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

D’autre part, je suis d’avis que l’arrêt Hedley Byrne représente l’avis réfléchi de cinq mem­bres de la Chambre des Lords selon lequel une déclaration inexacte faite par négligence peut donner naissance à une action en dommages-intérêts pour la perte économique qu’elle occa­sionne, sans qu’interviennent des blessures ou des dommages matériels et indépendamment de rapports contractuels ou fiduciaires, et que, dans les circonstances de cette affaire-là, la demanderesse aurait eu le droit de recouvrer sa perte économique si ce n’avait été de l’avertissement qui était implicite dnas [sic] la stipulation expresse d’irresponsabilité de la défenderesse.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

On the other hand, I am of opinion that the case of Hedley Byrne represents the considered opinion of five members of the House of Lords to the effect that a negligent misrepresentation may give rise to an action for damages for economic loss occasioned thereby without any physical injury to person or property and apart from any contract or fiduciary relationship, and that under the circumstances of that case the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover its economic loss had it not been for the warning which was implicit in the defendant's express denial of responsibility.

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

On peut considérer que la seconde partie de l’alinéa est à deux tranchants: elle pro­tège les grévistes en interdisant à l’employeur d’at­tribuer temporairement leurs postes à d’autres et elle protège en même temps les «employés» mem­bres d’autres unités de négociation qui travaillent pour le même ministère ou pour un autre, en ce qu’ils ne peuvent être obligés de remplir les postes normalement occupés par les grévistes.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

Hence, the enactment of s. 102 (3). On the one hand, the striking employees are barred from pick­eting "in or near any place of business of the employer." On the other hand, the employer is barred either from "replacing" the striking employees, or from "filling their positions with any other employee." Both branches are purely tempo­rary in nature, i.e. "during the continuance of the strike." The latter branch of the clause can be seen as cutting two ways: for the benefit of the striking employees, it bars the employer from temporarily filling the positions of the striking employees, and at the same time protects the "employees" in other bargaining units, who are still at work in the same government department or some other government department, from being required to fill the posi­tions of their striking fellow employees during the period of the strike. The first branch ensures simi­lar protection to the striking employees in a more general manner, in that they cannot be "replaced" by any person and not simply "with any other employee."

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

Ils soutiennent que les juges enquêteurs ne sont pas mem­bres d’un tribunal, mais plutôt des agents enquê­teurs impartiaux assimilables à des enquêteurs policiers, même s’ils s’appellent juges-commissai­res extraordinaires ou magistrats enquêteurs.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

The appellants attack this argument. They sug­gest that the examining judges are not members of any court, but rather are impartial investigating officers similar to police investigators despite their designation as "extraordinary investigating judges" or "examining magistrates". That conten­tion is incorrect in that it fails to have regard to the differences between the continental systems of criminal justice and our own.

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

La présente affaire pourrait s’apparenter à celles-là si (comme je l’ai souligné tantôt) les dispositions de la convention collective pouvaient s’appliquer de façon à protéger les mem­bres permanents du corps professoral de tout licen­ciement, à l’exception des licenciements justifiés ou pour cause de personnel excédentaire.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

This brings me to the final point of the cross-appeal, namely, the quantum of damages. I have no doubt that there may be, and have been, cases where damages are fixed on the basis of a wrong­ful termination of a permanent employment. Counsel for the cross-appellants cited Cooke v. CKOY Ltd.[19]; Salt v. Power Plant Co. Ltd.[20], and Lucy v. Commonwealth[21] as illustrative. The present case could come within this line of cases only if (as I indicated above) the collective agreement provisions applied so as to protect a tenured member of the academic staff against termination of employment save for just cause or for redundan­cy. Those provisions are not, however, available to the cross-appellants which did not even purport to rely on them. True, they made their submissions in this Court on the basis that the collective agreement provisions applied but they did not attempt

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

Il est peut-être bon de souligner ici que ni le Juge en chef, à qui les requêtes ex parte relatives à la formulation des questions constitutionnelles sont généralement soumises, ni les autres membres de la Cour, qui peuvent être appelés à ce faire, ne cherchent à empêcher un appelant de poser ces questions à moins qu’il ne soit évident que le litige ne soulève aucun débat constitutionnel.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

The Attorney General of Quebec had intervened in the Court of Appeal and he was joined in interven­tion here by the Attorney General of Alberta and the Attorney General of Saskatchewan. The admissions of fact aforementioned and the course of argument before this Court made it clear that the issue here was much narrower than that set out in the constitutional question propounded at the request of the appellant. It may perhaps be useful to point out here that neither the Chief Justice, before whom ex parte applications to state consti­tutional questions usually come, nor the other members of the Court who may be asked to set such questions, seek to thwart an applicant in posing such questions unless it is very clear that there is no constitutional issue that arises in the litigation. The members of the Court do assist in formulating the questions sought to be put but simply as a matter of insisting on clarity. The responsibility rests initially on the applicant who is, of course, aware that once a constitutional question is propounded for the consideration of the Court notice thereof must be given to the Attorney General of Canada and to the Attorneys General of the Provinces.

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

[27], entendue par le même banc quelques jours après que cette Cour eut rendu sa décision dans l’arrêt Faubert and Watts, ne portait pas non plus sur la révision d’une sentence rendue sur une question de droit précise (elle concernait l’indemnité à accorder pour des dommages causés à certains biens), et parlant pour trois autres mem­bres de cette Cour, le juge Locke a repris les paroles du vicomte Cave sans aucune référence à la distinction quant au type d’arbitrage choisi par les parties.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

When this Court came to consider the reviewa­bility of awards of consensual arbitrators in the Faubert and Watts case, supra, Chief Justice Kerwin, for the Court, adverted to the distinction in the nature of the submission to arbitration, as above-mentioned, and relied on what was said in the Absalom case on the reviewability of awards under a reference of a specific question of law, namely, that in such a case there can be no interference by the Courts with an award on the ground of an error of law on the face of the award. There was no mention of the Kelantan case, but I am bound to say that it may have been because this Court was concerned with an award on a whole question and not with an award on a refer­ence of a specific question of law. City of Vancou­ver v. Brandram-Henderson of B.C. Ltd.[27], heard a few days after this Court's decision in the Faub­ert and Watts case and by the same Bench, likewise did not involve review of an award on a specific question of law (it related to proper indemnity for damage to certain property), and Locke J.'s reference there to Viscount Cave's words, in speaking also for three other members of this Court, was made without any reference to the distinction in the types of consensual arbitration.

  document  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

(i)à0 ø ˜ Ð ˜ Ð àò òLa€d finition€du€mariage€nð ðest€pas€fig e€par€la€ConstitutionÐ \ ø ø Ð ø Ð Ðó óÌÝ ‚ 0 Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ 0 Ñýš  Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú21Ú ÚÛ € z Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà ˜ àPlusieurs€intervenants€affirment€que€la€ò òLoi€constitutionnelle€de€1867ó óÐ Œ ( Ðconstitutionnalise€la€d finition€que€la€common€law€attribuait€au€ð ðmariageð ð€en€1867.€Ð $ À ÐLð ðun€des€ nonc s€les€plus€c l bres€de€cette€d finition€se€trouve€dans€lð ðarr t€ò òHyde€c.Ð ¼ X ÐHydeó ó€(1866),€L.R.€1€P.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

ø Ð ø Ð ÐÐ Ô/p)4 ÐÝ ‚ 0 Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ 0 ÑýŠ• Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú20Ú ÚÛ € z Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà « àSome€interveners€nevertheless€suggested€that€s.€91(26)€cannot€be€interpretedÐ d Ðas€granting€legislative€competence€over€same„sex€marriage€to€Parliament.€Any€lawÐ ü ˜ Ðallowing€same„sex€marriage€is€alleged€to€exceed€the€bounds€of€s.€91(26)€in€two€keyÐ ” 0 Ðrespects:€€(i)€the€meaning€of€ð ðmarriageð ð€is€constitutionally€fixed,€necessarilyÐ , È Ðincorporating€an€opposite„sex€requirement;€and€(ii)€any€such€law€would€trench€uponÐ Ä ` Ðsubject€matters€clearly€allocated€to€the€provincial€legislatures.Ý ƒ 0 ÑýŠ• ¥• ݌Р\ ø ÐŒÝ Ý€Ìà « à(i)à0 ø àò òThe€Meaning€of€Marriage€Is€Not€Constitutionally€Fixedó óÐ Œ ( ø Ð ø Ð ÐÌÝ ‚ 0 Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ 0 Ñý ™ Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú21Ú ÚÛ € z Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà « àSeveral€interveners€say€that€the€ò òConstitution€Act,€1867€ó óeffectively€entrenchesÐ ¼ X Ðthe€common€law€definition€of€ð ðmarriageð ð€as€it€stood€in€1867.€That€definition€was€mostÐ T ð Ðnotably€articulated€in€ò òHyde€v.€Hyde€ó ó(1866),€L.R.€1€P.€&€D.€130,€at€p.€133:Ý ƒ 0 Ñý ™ %™ ÝŒÐ ì ˆ ÐŒÝ ÝÌÓ Óà0 « àWhat,€then,€is€the€nature€of€this€institution€as€understood€in€Christendom?Ð ¸ ÐIts€incidents€may€vary€in€different€countries,€but€what€are€its€essentialÐ è „ Ðelements€and€invariable€features?€€If€it€be€of€common€acceptance€andÐ ´ P Ðexistence,€it€must€needs€(however€varied€in€different€countries€in€its€minorÐ € Ðincidents)€have€some€pervading€identity€and€universal€basis.€€I€conceive€thatÐ L è Ðmarriage,€as€understood€in€Christendom,€may€for€this€purpose€be€defined€asÐ ´ Ðthe€voluntary€union€for€life€of€one€man€and€one€woman,€to€the€exclusion€ofÐ ä € Ðall€others.Ó ýš ÓÐ ° L ! « Ð « Ð ÐÌÝ ‚ 0 Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ 0 Ñýô Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú22Ú ÚÛ € z Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà « àThe€reference€to€ð ðChristendomð ð€is€telling.€ò ò€Hydeó ó€spoke€to€a€society€of€sharedÐ à#| % Ðsocial€values€where€marriage€and€religion€were€thought€to€be€inseparable.€€This€is€noÐ x% ' Ðlonger€the€case.€€Canada€is€a€pluralistic€society.€€Marriage,€from€the€perspective€of€theÐ '¬ ) Ðstate,€is€a€civil€institution.€€The€ð ðfrozen€conceptsð ð€reasoning€runs€contrary€to€one€of€theÐ ¨(D"+ Ðmost€fundamental€principles€of€Canadian€constitutional€interpretation:€€that€ourÐ @*Ü#- ÐConstitution€is€a€living€tree€which,€by€way€of€progressive€interpretation,€accommodatesÐ Ø+t%/ Ðand€addresses€the€realities€of€modern€life.€€In€the€1920s,€for€example,€a€controversy€aroseÐ p- '1 Ðas€to€whether€women€as€well€as€men€were€capable€of€being€considered€ð ðqualifiedÐ /¤(3 Ðpersonsð ð€

  Cour suprême du Canada ...  

Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL

Harrison[7]. Dans cette affaire-là, le demandeur souffrait, à la suite d’un accident, de paralysie permanente du tronc et des quatre mem­bres. Le juge de première instance a conclu que le demandeur était de caractère très indépendant et devrait, si possible, vivre dans sa propre maison avec l’aide d’une gouvernante et d’infirmiers.

Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain

The Appellate Division relied upon Cunningham v. Harrison[7]. In that case, as a result of an acci­dent, the plaintiff was permanently paralyzed in his body and all four limbs. The trial judge found that the plaintiff was a self-opinionated person who should, if possible, live in some dwelling of his own where he would be looked after by a housekeeper and the persons who did the nursing. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff's enti­tlement to reasonable expenses for nursing and accommodation appropriate to a normal person should not be increased by reason of his exceptional personality. The Court of Appeal in reducing the award from £72,616 to £59,316 took into account three factors: (i) the difficulty of obtain­ing a housekeeper and nurses; (ii) that ground floor flats specially designed for handicapped persons were being built in the Borough; (iii) that the plaintiff might accept the aid of statutory and voluntary organizations at much less cost. None of these factors is significant in the present case. Although it reduced the award, the Court never­theless affirmed that the award included provision for a housekeeper and nursing services and also for extra accommodation. The case does not stand for the proposition that though home care is better, it will not be provided because the cost is excessive. In the present case, the Appellate Division asked: "If Andrews does have a home of his own, however, should he not so locate that orderly service from existing hospitals could be available to him at night and in the daytime for his hygienic and getting-up periods? Is it to be assumed that in a province such as Alberta, orderly services could not be given outside the four walls of an institution if the subject of the service is a nearby resident?" The respondents did not raise the possibility about which the Court speculated. There was no evi­dence as to the feasibility of such a proposal, no evidence as to the availability or cost of outpatient care.