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On peut lire dans nombre d’arrêts que le crime d’importation de stupéfiants est une [TRADUCTION] «infraction continue», expression qui, dans Black’s Law Dictionary, 5e éd., est ainsi définie: [TRADUCTION] «un type de crime dont la perpétration s’étend sur une certaine période, par exemple un complot» et [TRADUCTION] «une opération ou une série d’actes, peu importe leur durée, mises en train par une seule impulsion et qui se déroulent sous l’effet d’une force non intermittente». Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, vol. 9) fournit notamment la définition suivante d’une infraction continue: [TRADUCTION] «une infraction crimi-
A number of judgments have referred to the crime of importing narcotics as a “continuing offence”, defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., as a “type of crime which is committed over a span of time as, for example, a conspiracy” and as a “transaction or a series of acts set on foot by a single impulse, and operated by an unintermittent force, no matter how long a time it may occupy”. Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, vol. 9) defines a continuing offence as, inter alia, a “breach of criminal law, not terminated by single act or fact, but subsisting for definite period and intended to cover or apply to successive similar
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moteur, était ultra vires de la province parce qu’il empiétait sur le domaine du droit criminel et était incompatible avec les dispositions du Code crimi­nel qui font de la conduite dangereuse une infrac­tion punissable sur déclaration sommaire de culpa­bilité.
The central point of this appeal is the appellant's submission that whenever Parliament chooses to attach penal consequences to negligence of whatever degree, then any provincial legislation relating to negligence with penal consequences attached to it must be legisla­tion in relation to criminal law. This submission assumes a complete identity of subject-matter which in my opin­ion does not exist. It is also founded, in part at least, upon a theory of the existence of a 'general area' or 'domain' of criminal law which has been considered and rejected by this Court.
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Le langage utilisé et la logique constituent le fondement de l’interprétation constitutionnelle et il faut y avoir recours pour examiner la portée qu’au-rait le par. 92(14) et la limitation correspondante de la procédure en matière criminelle prévue au par.
Language and logic inform constitutional inter­pretation, and they are applicable in considering the alleged reach of s. 92(14) and the allegedly correlative limitation of criminal procedure in s. 91(27). I find it difficult, indeed impossible, to read s. 92(14) as not only embracing prosecutorial authority respecting the enforcement of federal criminal law but diminishing the ex facie impact of s. 91(27) which includes procedure in criminal matters. As a matter of language, there is nothing in s. 92(14) which embraces prosecutorial author­ity in respect of federal criminal matters. Section 92(14) grants jurisdiction over the administration of justice, including procedure in civil matters and including also the constitution, maintenance and organization of civil and criminal provincial courts. The section thus narrows the scope of the criminal law power under s. 91, but only with respect to what is embraced within "the Constitu­tion, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts ... of Criminal Jurisdiction". By no stretch of language can these words be construed to include jurisdiction over the conduct of criminal prosecutions. Moreover, as a matter of conjunctive assessment of the two constitutional provisions, the express inclusion of procedure in civil matters in provincial Courts points to an express provincial exclusion of procedure in criminal matters speci­fied in s. 91(27).
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Avant comme après le 14 décembre 1973 on a fait des tentatives pour retrouver et appréhender les différents accusés en vue de les faire extrader au Canada pour répondre aux accusations crimi­nelles pendantes contre eux.
Prior to and following December 14, 1973 attempts were made to locate and apprehend the various accused persons with a view to having them extradited to Canada to face the criminal charges outstanding against them. Zingre and Reiser were, however, residents of Switzerland and, because of their citizenship, expressly exempted by treaty from extradition.
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Une fois que l’accusé a subi son procès pour une infraction, et qu’il en a été déclaré coupable, c’est la fin de sa responsabilité criminelle, et sa conduite ne peut pas servir de fondement à une seconde accusation pour le même crime.
As has been pointed out in a previous chapter, the plea of autrefois convict is the process by which the doctrine of merger in judgment becomes effective in criminal jurisdiction. Once the accused has been tried for an offence, and convicted of it, that is an end to his criminal liability, and his conduct cannot serve as the basis of a second accusation of the same crime. As in civil, so in criminal law—transit in rem judicatam: the criminal liability of the prisoner for the offence which he has committed is merged in his
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L’arrêt Lafleur ajoute que, si la matière est crimi­nelle, la Cour supérieure n’a pas juridiction, cel­le-ci appartenant alors exclusivement en première instance à la Cour du Banc de la Reine, juridiction criminelle.
The Lafleur decision also notes that if the subject-matter is of a criminal nature the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction, as the latter then belongs at first instance exclusively to the Court of Queen's Bench, Criminal Side.
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Dans les Statuts révisés du Canada de 1886, on trouve les mêmes dispositions essentiellement inchangées aux art. 92 et 93 du c. 174, Acte de procédure crimi­nelle, sous le titre «Devoirs des coroners et juges de paix».
61). In the Revised Statutes of Canada 1886, the same provisions essentially unchanged were s. 92 and 93 of c. 174, The Criminal Procedure Act, under the heading "Duties of Coroners and Justices".
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Le juge Matas a également mentionné un autre aspect, la doctrine plutôt vague selon laquelle on ne doit pas recourir au processus criminel pour obtenir un redressement civil. Je ne m’attarderai pas à la jurisprudence sur ce point.
Another aspect mentioned by Matas J.A. is the somewhat indefinite doctrine that the criminal process should not be resorted to for the purpose of seeking a civil remedy. I will refrain from review­ing authorities at this point. The cases are all cited in Wilson J.'s judgment Re State of Nebraska and Morris[33] on which I express no opinion. All I will say is that the present case, like several other previous decisions cited to us, shows that the pros­pect of obtaining in a summary way from the court of criminal jurisdiction an order of compensation equivalent to a judgment on a civil action is an open invitation to resort to the criminal process mainly for the purpose of obtaining the civil remedy, especially in cases of crime against prop­erty committed by persons against whom a civil condemnation is likely to be of some practical
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Les articles 653, 654 et 655 sont au Code crimi­nel depuis sa promulgation en 1892, mais sous une forme un peu différente: voir les art. 836, 837, 838. Le texte initial du présent art. 653, soit l’art.
The provision for compensation was not then tied expressly to the sentencing process as is now the case under s. 653. Under the original of the present s. 654, namely, s. 837, where property involved in the offence was sold to a bona fide purchaser and restored to the true owner, the purchaser could apply for compensation out of money of the accused taken from him on his apprehension. The present s. 654 clearly goes far­ther in providing for an order for a money payment, subject to the Court being able to direct that all or part of the compensation to the purchaser be paid out of money in the possession of the accused at the time of his arrest and which is indisputably his. Neither in ss. 836 or 837 was there any such express provision as now exists in ss. 653 and 654 for filing the order for compensation, with effect as a judgment enforceable as if it was a judgment in civil proceedings.
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Il a conclu que même si on a déjà décidé que la Loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions relevait de la compétence fédérale en matière de droit crimi­nel, les modifications apportées en 1975 en avaient étendu la portée au point d’en faire une loi fédérale relative à la réglementation des échanges et du commerce.
Medhurst J. considered, inter alia, the judg­ments of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Pelletier (1974), 4. O.R. (2d) 677, and of the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984. He concluded that although the Combines Investi­gation Act had previously been considered as validly authorized under the federal criminal law power, amendments in 1975 had enlarged its reach to make it supportable as federal legislation in relation to the regulation of trade and commerce. He adopted the approach taken in that respect by Linden J. in R. v. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. (1980), 14 C.R. (3d) 289, and rejected the application for prohibition. I shall return shortly to the judgments in Pelletier, Hauser and Hoffman-LaRoche.
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Il y a tout au plus, dans les débats préparatoires à la Confédération, des observations générales sur le droit criminel et la procédure en matière crimi­nelle. John A. Macdonald parle (à la p. 41) du principe selon lequel il appartient au gouvernement central de déterminer ce qui constitue un acte criminel et la peine relative à cet acte crimi­nel.
There are, at best, general observations in the Confederation Debates respecting criminal law and procedure. John A. Macdonald referred (at p. 41) to the principle that the determination of what is a crime and how crime shall be punished is to be left to the general government. References to the administration of justice were in such general terms (see pp. 69, 215, 248) as to be of no particu­lar significance. Mr. Hector Langevin, then Solici­tor General East, viewed what is now s. 92(14) as providing protection to Quebec civil law. Mr. Christopher Dunkin raised the question (at p. 508) that there is a special refinement of confusion as to criminal matters. He put the matter as follows (at p. 508 bottom):
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L’alinéa b) s’applique à toute infraction crimi­nelle et traite d’une situation où l’agent de la paix lui-même trouve une personne en train de commet­tre une infraction. Son pouvoir de procéder à une arrestation se fonde sur ses propres observations.
Paragraph (b) applies in relation to any criminal offence and it deals with the situation in which the peace officer himself finds an offence being com­mitted. His power to arrest is based upon his own observation. Because it is based on his own discov­ery of an offence actually being committed there is no reason to refer to a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.
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(1) et (2) en vertu desquels l’ordonnance de dédommagement devient un jugement civil. Le paragraphe (3) tire son origine d’un autre article de l’ancien Code criminel, l’art. 1049, qui remonte à l’ancienne Larceny Act.
I should further say that the provisions of s. 653(3) also appear to me to be of a different character than subss. (1) and (2) under which the compensation order becomes a civil judgment. Subsection (3) has its origin in a different section of the previous Criminal Code namely, s. 1049, traceable to the old Larceny Act. In so far as this deals with moneys found in the possession of the accused at the time of his arrest, it appears to nie to be properly incidental to criminal procedure. The arrest of a person suspected of crime, a search of his person and the detention of money found in his possession are all part of the normal criminal process. The proper disposition of money thus seized is therefore a necessary part of the criminal procedure, just as the adjudication on the guilt or innocence of the accused. I would therefore have no hesitation in holding valid a compensation order limited to what is contemplated in subs. (3).
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L’intimé allègue que Maisonneuve ne l’avait pas trouvé en train de commettre une infraction crimi­nelle puisqu’il a été acquitté de l’accusation porté contre lui. On s’appuie sur l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de la Saskatchewan dans Attorney General for Saskatchewan v.
It is submitted by the respondent that Maisonneuve did not find him committing a criminal offence because he was acquitted on the charge laid against him. Reliance is placed on the judg­ment of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan in Attorney General for Saskatchewan v. Pritchard[12].
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Et vu les motifs de la majorité dans l’arrêt Smith, je ne crois pas que cette affaire étaye la proposition que nous n’ayons en l’espèce aucun pouvoir discrétionnaire. Le verdict de délit a été rendu contre Smith par une cour et équivalait à une condamnation crimi­nelle (voir Morris v. Her Majesty The Queen[21]).
I am not prepared to construe s. 78(1)(c) of the Act as making compliance with the council com­mittee's duty to notify and hear appellant a condi­tion precedent to the council committee acquiring jurisdiction. And, given the reasons of the majority in Smith, I do not believe that case to stand as an authority for the proposition that we are deprived of our discretion in this case. The finding of delinquency against Smith was made by a Court and it was equivalent to a criminal conviction (see Morris v. Her Majesty The Queen[21]. Such a find­ing is quite unlike the conclusion of a university committee that a student has received due process in a university examination. Furthermore, Smith did not have a right of appeal but only the right to apply for leave to appeal to the same Court of Queen's Bench which had jurisdiction in certio­rari, so that his choice was between two discretion­ary remedies which were in effect nothing but two alternative procedures for seeking redress from the same Court. On the contrary, appellant was entitled to appeal to the senate committee as of right and this was an appeal to a domestic tribunal, not to a court, a very different remedy which he had no valid reason not to pursue directly.
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Le juge Hugessen, dans ses motifs, reprend ce que disait le juge en chef lord Parker dans une directive sur la pratique publiée dans 1962 Crimi­nal L.R. à la p. 160, lorsqu’il déclare que:
Mr. Justice Hugessen, in the course of his reasons for judgment, appears to adopt some lan­guage found in a practice direction given by Lord Parker, L.C.J., in 1962 Criminal L.R. at p. 160 where he says that:
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de la Constitution», qui, dans ledit arrêt, a empê­ché le Conseil privé, après qu’il eut conclu à sa validité en tant que législation en matière crimi­nelle, d’examiner si la nouvelle Loi des enquêtes sur les coalitions pouvait également se fonder sur la compétence en matière d’échanges et de commerce.
It was this admonition, whose object Lord Atkin described at p. 317 of the P.A.T.A. case as being "as far as possible to prevent too rigid declarations of the Court's from interfering with such elasticity as is given in the written constitution", which
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Cette Cour a appliqué la doctrine du pouvoir accessoire dans des affaires de procédure crimi­nelle. Dans Le procureur général du Québec c. Le procureur général du Canada[30], le juge Tasche­reau, alors juge puîné, a dit (à la p. 604) après avoir cité l’arrêt susmentionné:
This ancillary power doctrine was applied by this Court in procedural matters under the Crimi­nal Code. In Attorney General for Quebec v. Attorney General for Canada[30], Taschereau J., as he then was, said (at p. 604), after referring to the judgment I have just mentioned:
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2. Qu’il y ait une affaire civile, commerciale ou crimi­nelle «pendante» devant un tribunal étranger;
2. There must be a civil, commercial or criminal matter 'pending' before a foreign court or tribunal;
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L’article 715 du Code criminel, qui se trouve dans la Partie XXIII du Code ayant pour titre «Recours extraordinaires» s’applique aux procédures en matière crimi-
Section 715 of the Criminal Code, which is in Part XXIII of the Code, of which the heading is “Extraordinary Remedies” applies to proceedings in criminal mat-
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‘Les règles ordinaires de la preuve en matière crimi­nelle s’appliquent aux enquêtes tenues par un coroner’.
'The ordinary rules of evidence in criminal matters shall apply to coroners inquests.'
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En confirmant la décision de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario qui a annulé la déclaration de culpabilité prononcée en vertu de l’art. 122, cette Cour a d’abord invoqué l’opinion de la Cour d’appel selon laquelle les mots «un acte criminel» à l’art.
In the Quon case the accused, armed with a revolver, committed a robbery to which he pleaded guilty. He was also charged with having on his person a revolver contrary to s. 122. He was sentenced to a two-year term for the robbery and to a further two years under s. 122. The only material change to s. 122, effected in 1938, was the addition of the words “rifle” and “shot-gun” to the list of weapons and a re-arrangement of the penalty provisions. In upholding the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal quashing the conviction under s. 122, this Court adverted first to the Court of Appeal’s view that the words “any criminal offence” in s. 122 could, if viewed as exhaustive, encompass every offence under the Criminal Code. The Ontario Court of Appeal felt that this would give too broad a scope to s. 122 and that its
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Quant à la définition de «cour de juridiction crimi­nelle» contenue à l’art. 2(10) du Code criminel, elle n’implique aucunement que toutes les cours non énumé­rées ne possèdent pas de juridiction criminelle.
Concerning the definition of "court of criminal jurisdiction" in s. 2(10) of the Criminal Code, it in no way implies that all courts not enumerated have no criminal jurisdiction. All it means is that such courts have no jurisdiction to try indictable offences.
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[TRADUCTION] Si l’on devait admettre comme prin­cipe que cette conduite soit traitée comme criminelle parce que, bien qu’elle ne soit pas par ailleurs de nature criminelle, elle tend naturellement à provoquer la vio­lence en incitant à la vengeance, il me semble qu’il en résulterait beaucoup d’incertitude.
If it should be admitted as a principle that conduct may be treated as criminal because, although not otherwise criminal, it was a natural tendency to provoke violence by way of retribution, it seems to me that great uncertainty would result. I do not think it safe by the application of such a supposed principle to declare an act or acts criminal which have not, up to the present, been held to be criminal in any reported case.
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Le langage utilisé et la logique constituent le fondement de l’interprétation constitutionnelle et il faut y avoir recours pour examiner la portée qu’au-rait le par. 92(14) et la limitation correspondante de la procédure en matière criminelle prévue au par.
Language and logic inform constitutional inter­pretation, and they are applicable in considering the alleged reach of s. 92(14) and the allegedly correlative limitation of criminal procedure in s. 91(27). I find it difficult, indeed impossible, to read s. 92(14) as not only embracing prosecutorial authority respecting the enforcement of federal criminal law but diminishing the ex facie impact of s. 91(27) which includes procedure in criminal matters. As a matter of language, there is nothing in s. 92(14) which embraces prosecutorial author­ity in respect of federal criminal matters. Section 92(14) grants jurisdiction over the administration of justice, including procedure in civil matters and including also the constitution, maintenance and organization of civil and criminal provincial courts. The section thus narrows the scope of the criminal law power under s. 91, but only with respect to what is embraced within "the Constitu­tion, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts ... of Criminal Jurisdiction". By no stretch of language can these words be construed to include jurisdiction over the conduct of criminal prosecutions. Moreover, as a matter of conjunctive assessment of the two constitutional provisions, the express inclusion of procedure in civil matters in provincial Courts points to an express provincial exclusion of procedure in criminal matters speci­fied in s. 91(27).
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à la p. 347; Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown, vol. 2, à la p. 569, chap. 43; Stephen, History of the Crimi­nal Law of England, vol. 1, à la p. 303). Rien ne justifie cette interprétation.
4th ed., 1769, vol. 4, at p. 347; Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, vol, 2, at p. 569, c. 43; Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 1, at p. 303). There is no basis for this interpretation.
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Ils signifient simplement que le viol doit avoir été commis consciemment pour qu’existe «l’intention crimi­nelle qu’implique un meurtre», car le meurtre requiert toujours une intention spécifique ou particulière pour qu’il y ait préméditation, élément essentiel du crime.
In my opinion these passages do not indicate an opinion that rape is a crime of special intent. All that is meant is that conscious rape is required to supply "the felonious intent which murder involves". For the crime of murder special or particular intent is always required for the necessary malice aforethought. This may be intent to kill or intent to cause grievous bodily harm: or in a case such as Beard of constructive malice, this, required the special intent consciously to commit the violent felony of rape in the course and furtherance of which the act of violence causing death took place. Beard, therefore, in my opinion does not suggest that rape is a crime of special or particular intent.
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Il a été accusé d’avoir conduit un véhicule à moteur alors qu’il avait consommé une quantité d’alcool telle que la proportion d’alcool dans son sang dépas­sait 80 milligrammes d’alcool par 100 millilitres de sang, en contravention de l’art. 224 du Code crimi­nel.
The appellant was stopped while driving a motor vehicle and was taken to a local police station where he gave a sample of his breath into a breathalizer. He was charged with driving a motor vehicle having consumed alcohol in such quantity that the propor­tion thereof in his blood exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to s. 224 of the Criminal Code. Eight days after the breath sample was taken, the appellant's solicitor requested a sample of that breath. The reply received
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Je suis d’avis, avec déférence, que l’argument que l’appelant tire de cette disposition lui est plutôt défavo­rable. Si l’enquête du coroner était une matière crimi­nelle cet article 27 serait inutile.
With all due respect, I feel that, on the other hand, the argument that appellant derives from this provision is unfavorable to his case. If the coroner's inquest were a criminal matter s. 27 would be superfluous. Thus, the Canada Evidence Act, which applies to the entire coun­try, provides that Part I of the said Act, with which we are concerned here, applies to "all criminal proceedings" (R.S.C. c. 307, s. 2).
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Tout individu est à couvert de responsabilité crimi­nelle s’il fait avec un soin et une habilité raisonnables une opération chirurgicale sur quelqu’un et pour son bien, pourvu que l’accomplissement de cette opération soit raisonnable, en tenant compte de l’état du malade lorsqu’elle a lieu et de toutes les circonstances du cas.
to procure her miscarriage. Section 273 was a companion provision respecting a woman's pro­curement of her own miscarriage. The word "unlawfully" disappeared in the Criminal Code revision of 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51, and the anti-abortion provisions, then s. 237, were as follows:
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Il semble qu’il soit bien tard pour dépouiller les provinces de leur compétence sur la justice crimi­nelle, après qu’elles l’ont exercée sans contestation durant plus d’un siècle. Cela ne veut pas dire qu’une compétence proprement dite s’acquiert par consentement ou inaction; toutefois l’histoire et l’attitude du gouvernement peuvent nous fournir des indications utiles en matière d’interprétation.
Both the Act and the section have a legislative histo­ry, which is relevant to the discussion. Their Lordships entertain no doubt that time alone will not validate an Act which when challenged is found to be ultra vires; nor will a history of a gradual series of advances till this boundary is finally crossed avail to protect the ultimate encroachment. But one of the questions to be considered is always whether in substance the legislation falls within an enumerated class of subject, or whether on the contrary in the guise of an enumerated class it is an encroachment on an excluded class. On this issue the
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Devant cette situation, il ne m’est pas possible d’accepter les conclusions exprimées dans les déci­sions affirmant que le coroner constitue un tribu­nal ou une cour d’archives ayant juridiction crimi­nelle, d’autant plus que dans plusieurs de ces cas, cette mention est un obiter.
In view of this, I am unable to accept the conclusions stated in decisions holding that the coroner is a court, or a court of record, with criminal jurisdiction, especially as in many such cases the observation was made obiter. On the contrary, as I indicated above, I accept the conclu­sion of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. McDonald, cited above; and I extract this sen­tence from the reasons of Bull J. (at p. 305):
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Je suis d’opinion que l’enquête prescrite par l’article 14 de la Loi des coroners n’est pas une matière crimi­nelle. Au contraire, ‘son but est de découvrir s’il y a eu crime ou, plus précisément, s’il y a une matière crimi­nelle se rattachant au décès d’une personne. Elle est limitée aux ‘circonstances qui ont entouré un décès ...’.
In my view the inquest prescribed by s. 14 of the Coroners Act is not a criminal matter. On the contrary, its purpose is to determine whether there has been a crime, or more precisely, whether there was a criminal matter associated with the death of an individual. It is limited to the "circumstances of a death". The inquest is that of the coroner, and not of the ,Crown or of some other party. Before the coroner there is neither an accuser or an accused. The purpose of the inquest is not the prosecution or punishment of an accused.
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A mon avis, la censure concernant la politique partisane ne peut être autorisée dans une société libre où s’impose la liberté des débats sur les questions politiques, sous réserve bien sûr du droit crimi­nel, particulièrement des dispositions du Code criminel concernant la sédition, la trahison et l’incitation au crime.
The foregoing criteria are of the usual 'sex, morals and violence' type that are normally associated with film censorship. In the present case, however, the censorship criterion, being left to the Board to determine, could be much wider and encompass political, religious and other matters. In my opinion censorship relating to party politics cannot be tolerated in a free society where unfettered debte on political issues is a necessity, sub­ject, of course, to the criminal law, particularly those provisions of the Criminal Code, relating to sedition, treason and incitement to crime. [The emphasis is added.]
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(e) de la Déclaration des droits ne vise que les auditions destinées à définir les droits et obligations en matière civile et que c’est l’art. 2 (f) qui a trait à la responsabilité en matière criminelle. MM. les Juges Aylesworth et MacKay ne se sont pas prononcés sur ce point.
Notwithstanding the view which he expressed as to the application of s. 2(e), Jessup J.A. was of the opinion that both subs. (e) and (f) guarantee a fair hearing and that there was little difference between them in relation to the issue in the present case. He approached it as if both sections might be applicable.
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(1) On ne devrait généralement pas admettre une déposition qui, avec diligence raisonnable, aurait pu être produite au procès, à condition de ne pas appliquer ce principe général de matière aussi stricte dans les affaires crimi­nelles que dans les affaires civiles: voir McMartin c.
(1) The evidence should generally not be admit­ted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases: see McMartin v. The Queen[5].
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acte criminel. Cela est mis en évidence, en premier lieu, par le fait que cette définition ne comprend pas les cours des poursuites sommaires, bien que de telles cours existent et soient fréquemment mentionnées dans la Partie XXIV du Code crimi­nel, et, en second lieu, par la mention des cours présidées par un juge municipal dans les villes de Montréal et de Québec.
that this definition does not include summary con­viction courts, although such courts do exist and are mentioned frequently in Part XXIV of the Criminal Code. It is also apparent from the refer­ence to courts presided over by a municipal judge in the cities of Montreal and Quebec. Therefore, the definition of "court of criminal jurisdiction" in no way implies that all courts not enumerated have no criminal jurisdiction. All it means is that such courts have no. jurisdiction to try indictable offences.
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Je suis d’opinion que l’enquête prescrite par l’article 14 de la Loi des coroners n’est pas une matière crimi­nelle. Au contraire, ‘son but est de découvrir s’il y a eu crime ou, plus précisément, s’il y a une matière crimi­nelle se rattachant au décès d’une personne. Elle est limitée aux ‘circonstances qui ont entouré un décès ...’.
In my view the inquest prescribed by s. 14 of the Coroners Act is not a criminal matter. On the contrary, its purpose is to determine whether there has been a crime, or more precisely, whether there was a criminal matter associated with the death of an individual. It is limited to the "circumstances of a death". The inquest is that of the coroner, and not of the ,Crown or of some other party. Before the coroner there is neither an accuser or an accused. The purpose of the inquest is not the prosecution or punishment of an accused.
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[TRADUCTION] 1. L’alinéation [sic] mentale, qu’elle soit causée par l’ivresse ou autrement, constitue une défense contre une accusation criminelle. La jurisprudence maintient la différence entre le moyen de défense fondé sur l’aliénation mentale au sens propre, causée par un excès d’alcool, et le moyen de défense fondé sur l’ivresse rendant la personne incapable de former une intention spécifique.
1. That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged. The dis­tinction between the defence of insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drinking, and the defence of drunk­enness which produces a condition such that the drunk-en man's mind becomes incapable of forming a specific intention, has been preserved throughout the cases. The insane person cannot be convicted of a crime: Felstead v. The King [1914] A.C. 534; but, upon a verdict of insanity, is ordered to be detained during His Majesty's pleasure. The law takes no note of the cause of the insanity. If actual insanity in fact supervenes, as the result of alcoholic excess, it furnishes as complete an answer to a criminal charge as insanity induced by any other cause.
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C’est toute autre chose que d’autoriser un enquêteur à entrer clandestinement pendant la nuit dans une rési­dence privée qui est peut-être la propriété d’une personne qui n’a rien à voir avec l’activité crimi­nelle reprochée.
In my view, the provisions of Part IVA when read as a whole clearly contemplate, require and authorize, by necessary implication and unavoid­able inference, the placing of a radio device on the premises at which the intercept is to be made, where the use of radio equipment is authorized for the interception of a private communication. I therefore would answer the initial question, which arises at this point in the analysis of Part IV. 1, by concluding that Parliament has thus empowered a court to authorize the use of a radio device, such as was used here, for the purpose of intercepting a designated private communication. Since the device could not otherwise function as an intercep­tion "device", Parliament has cast the section broadly so as to empower the court in its discretion to authorize the placing of the "device" inside the premises designated in the authorization whether or not what would otherwise be a trespass to someone’s lands and premises may occur and whether or not the owner of such lands and prem­ises is the person whose private communication is to be intercepted. Once Parliament empowers a court to authorize such action, and the court does so, there is no trespass in law.
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25 du Code crimi­nel qui met le constable à l’abri de poursuites et sa seule façon de se soustraire aux dommages-intérêts résultant de la responsabilité civile est de pouvoir établir qu’il avait le droit de procéder à l’arresta­tion.
In my opinion this reasoning can properly be applied to the interpretation of s. 450(1)(b). It is true that the Wiltshire case was a civil action for damages, but it necessitated the judicial interpre­tation of a statutory provision which is substantial­ly the same. There being no English equivalent of s. 25 of the Criminal Code to provide the constable with protection from suit, he could only escape from civil liability for damages if he could estab­lish that he was entitled to make the arrest. His power to arrest without warrant arose in respect of "a person committing an offence under this sec­tion". The Court held that he was justified in making the arrest if the person arrested was appar­ently committing the offence.
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L’appelant prétend que la Cour supérieure mentionnée dans la disposition de l’article 23 (15-16 El. Il, ch. 19) qui a trait spécialement à la punition des témoins récalcitrants, est la Cour supérieure de juridiction crimi­nelle.
Appellant argues that the Superior Court referred to in the provision of s. 23 (15-16 Eliz. II, c. 19) dealing specifically with the punishment of recalcitrant wit­nesses is the superior court of criminal jurisdiction. In the province of Quebec this court is the Court of Queen's Bench, sitting as a criminal court of original jurisdiction (Cr. Code s. 2(14) and R.S.Q. e. 20, s. 61). The Superior Court is again mentioned in ss. 21 and 22. When in the Coroners Act the Quebec legislator refers to the Superior Court it is clear, in my view, that the intended reference is to the Superior Court, which was established by another Act of the aforesaid legislator (R.S.Q. c. 20, s. 21). If that legislator had wished to refer to a superior court of criminal jurisdiction in s. 23 of the Coroners Act, he would have spoken of the "Court of Queen's Bench, sitting as a criminal court of original jurisdiction" (R.S.Q. c. 20, s. 61). In short, the legislator said clearly what he meant to say.
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Cependant, puisqu’en l’espèce le litige porte uni­quement sur la compétence de la Cour du Banc de la Reine (juridiction criminelle) de délivrer un bref de prohibition, il n’y a pas lieu de se prononcer sur la constitutionnalité d’aucune partie de la Loi des Coroners du Québec.
However, because in the present case we are solely concerned with the jurisdiction of the Court of Queen's Bench (Crown side) to issue a writ of prohibition, no opinion has to be expressed respect­ing the constitutional validity of any part of the Quebec Coroners' Act. The Provincial Legislature undoubtedly has some jurisdiction, coroners are provincial appointees. Where should the line be drawn between Procedure in Criminal Matters which is within federal jurisdiction and the Administration of Justice in the Province which is within provincial competence does not come for decision today. However, one must remember that in matters which are in themselves of criminal law, the abstinence of the Federal Parliament from legislating to the full limit of its powers does not enlarge the field of provincial jurisdiction: Henry Birks & Sons Ltd. v. City of Montreal,[6] (at p. 811).
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Avec respect pour l’opinion contraire exprimée en Cour d’appel, je suis d’avis que toute législation tendant à faire le changement dans la loi décrit dans la première phrase du présent alinéa ou à abroger ou modifier les règles actuelles qui protègent une personne accusée d’un crime contre l’obligation de témoigner contre elle-même, est une législation sur le droit crimi­nel, y compris la procédure en matière criminelle, et relève donc de l’autorité législative exclusive du Parlement du Canada en vertu du par.
In 1968, the courts of British Columbia were called upon to decide whether the principle estab­lished in Batary is applicable to a person who may be, but has not been, charged with an offence under the Criminal Code. The reluctant witness was the driver of an automobile which collided with pedestrians. A child was killed in the mishap. At the coroner's inquest, it was contended that the unfortunate driver was not compellable because he was a person who might be charged with the commission of an offence related to the child's death. A writ of prohibition was granted by Munroe J. (R. v. Coroner of Langley[42]). On appeal, the writ was quashed it being held that a coroner’s court is not a criminal court in the sense of a court administering "the Criminal Law" or dealing with "Criminal Matters" within the mean­ing of s. 91 (27) of the B.N.A. Act (Reg. v. McDonald[43] )
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Cette règle est partie intégrante du droit criminel anglais et cana­dien depuis très longtemps, Avec respect pour l’opinion contraire exprimée en Cour d’appel, je suis d’avis que toute législation tendant à faire le changement dans la loi décrit dans la première phrase du présent alinéa ou à abroger ou modifier les règles actuelles qui protègent une personne accusée d’un crime contre l’obligation de témoigner contre elle-même est une législation sur le droit criminel, y compris la procédure en matière crimi­nelle, et relève donc de l’autorité législative exclusive du Parlement du Canada en vertu du par.
I think the conclusion inescapable that by enacting s. 15 in its present form the legislature intended to change the law and to render a person charged with murder compellable to give evidence at the inquest on the body of his alleged victim. Such legislation trenches upon the rule expressed in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare which has been described (by Coleridge J. in R. v. Scott, 1856, Dears & B. 47 at 61, 169 E.R. 909) as "a maxim of-our law as settled, as important and as wise as almost any other in it." This rule has long formed part of the criminal law of England and of this country. With great respect for the contrary view expressed in the Court of Appeal, I am of opinion that any legisla­tion, purporting to make the change in the law referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph or to abrogate or alter the existing rules which protect a person charged with crime from being compelled to testify against himself, is legislation in relation to the Criminal Law including the Procedure in Criminal Matters and so within the exclusive legislative authority of the Par­liament of Canada under head 27 of s. 91 of the British North America Act.
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Bolton c’est qu’on ne pourrait plus soutenir que le présent art. 251 du Code criminel est une loi de protection de la santé de la femme enceinte, et que par conséquent cette considération ne pourrait plus justifier la présence de l’art.
The wide scope of the exclusive federal criminal law power has been consistently asserted in the relevant case law in both the Privy Council, when it was Canada's ultimate appellate court, and in this Court. Parliament, in fastening upon certain behaviour or conduct or activity as criminal by proscribing it with penal sanctions, exercises a judgment which is not constitutionally impeachable simply because it may attract the opposition of a section of the population. The remedy or relief, as the case may be, lies with Parliament and not with this Court unless it is made plain to the Court that the use of the penal sanction was a colourable or evasive means of drawing into the orbit of the federal criminal law measures that did not belong there, either because they were essen­tially regulatory of matters within exclusive pro­vincial competence or were otherwise within such exclusive competence.
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a) S’introduit, par effraction, dans une maison d’ha­bitation avec l’intention d’y commettre un acte crimi­nel; ou
457. (1) Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life who
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Il y a tout au plus, dans les débats préparatoires à la Confédération, des observations générales sur le droit criminel et la procédure en matière crimi­nelle. John A. Macdonald parle (à la p. 41) du principe selon lequel il appartient au gouvernement central de déterminer ce qui constitue un acte criminel et la peine relative à cet acte crimi­nel.
There are, at best, general observations in the Confederation Debates respecting criminal law and procedure. John A. Macdonald referred (at p. 41) to the principle that the determination of what is a crime and how crime shall be punished is to be left to the general government. References to the administration of justice were in such general terms (see pp. 69, 215, 248) as to be of no particu­lar significance. Mr. Hector Langevin, then Solici­tor General East, viewed what is now s. 92(14) as providing protection to Quebec civil law. Mr. Christopher Dunkin raised the question (at p. 508) that there is a special refinement of confusion as to criminal matters. He put the matter as follows (at p. 508 bottom):
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On désigne par récusations pour cause celles qui sont fondées sur l’une des raisons sus-mentionnées. Le nombre en est illimité tant dans les procès civils que criminels. Mais, dans les affaires crimi­nelles, ou du moins les crimes punissables de mort, on doit, in favorem vitae, permettre au prisonnier de faire un certain nombre de récusations arbitraires et capri­cieuses, sans établir aucune raison; c’est ce que l’on appelle une récusation péremptoire, une disposition pleine de cette tendresse et de cette humanité pour les prisonniers qui, à juste titre, rendent nos lois anglaises célèbres.
353. Challenges upon any of the foregoing accounts are styled challenges for cause, which may be without stint in both criminal and civil trials. But in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is, in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is called a peremptory challenge; a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners for which our English laws are justly famous. This is grounded on two reasons. L As every one must be sensible what sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another, and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him, the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason for such his dislike. 2. Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if the reasons assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment, to prevent all ill consequences from which the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.
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Je n’ai pas à me demander en l’espèce si du fait que l’alinéa (f) de l’art. 2 vise expressément des accu­sations criminelles, il faut considérer que l’alinéa (e) du même article a trait aux procédures non criminelles.
In so far as s. 223, and especially s. 223(1), may be regarded as a procedural aid to the enforcement of the substantive offence created by s. 222, I do not find it obnoxious to s. 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. (am unable to ap­preciate what more can be rea into s. 1(a) from a procedural standpoint than is already compre­hended by s. 2(e) ("a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice") and by s. 2(f) ("a fair and public hearing by an in-dependent and impartial tribunal") I need not consider here whether the express concern of s. 2(f) with criminal charges indicates that s. 2(e) must refer to non-criminal proceedings. I would not read these two provisions as pointing to different standards of procedural fairness in their respective applications (if that be the case) to non-criminal and criminal proceedings, save as those standards spring from the nature of the proceeding.
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témoigner à l’enquête sur la cause de ce décès, a été jugé ultra vires de la législature provinciale même si la disposition attaquée donnait à cette personne la protection accordée par l’art. 5 de la Loi sur la preuve au Canada, s’il le demandait, à l’occasion de toute question dont la réponse pou­vait tendre à l’incriminer.
In my opinion, the fact that contempt issues arising out of statutory compellability to give evi­dence (and thus raising questions touching the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10 and especially s. 5 thereof) may call for decision is peripheral to the larger question in this case, namely, whether s. 19 of the Police Act is invalid as a whole. As both Batary and Faber show, such peripheral issues may be decided without touching the larger question. I am prepared to consider all the supporting provisions in this case as to compellability and contempt, and enforcement thereof by imprisonment, as neutral provisions which could be found in valid provincial legislation as well as in valid federal legislation. The matter then is s. 19 itself and not any ancillary provisions.
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