eue – -Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	g) «grief»—toute mésentente relative à l’interprétation ou à l’application d’eue convention collective;
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	(g) “grievance”—any disagreement respecting the interpretation or application of a collective agreement.

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[TRADUCTION]  En l'absence de toute autre circonstance reliant l'appelant au fait d'avoir mis le feu, il incombait au ministère public, pour appuyer la déclaration de culpabilité, de démontrer que l'occasion qu'il a eue d'allumer un incendie exclut toute autre possibilité.

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Since there were no other circumstances connecting the appellant with the setting of the fire, it was incumbent upon the Crown to establish that he had exclusive opportunity to set the fire in order to support a conviction. There was evidence from which the jury could draw the conclusion that the appellant had the exclusive opportunity of setting the fire, but the evidence was not so compelling as to require that conclusion. The trial Judge instructed the jury that the Crown's case against the appellant was based on opportunity and motive and in our view this instruction may have caused the jury to conclude that those circumstances were suficient in the absence of a clear direction as to the necessity for proof of exclusive opportunity to warrant a conviction.

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La nature du travail accompli en vertu de la Convention exigeait que les représentants mettent leur jugement personnel et leurs propres aptitudes à contribution, au profit du projet conjoint, tout en gardant en vue les intérêts des compagnies qu’ils représentaient et sous réserve évidemment des directives que celles-ci pouvaient leur donner. Comme les représentants étaient tous des cadres supérieurs des compagnies, ils pouvaient participer aux décisions avec une latitude que n’aurait pas eue un employé subalterne.

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Study Group. Nowhere in the Study Group Agreement nor in the minutes of proceedings of the Management Committee is there any indication that the representatives came to the meetings with fixed instructions from which they could not depart without a reference back. The nature of the exercise carried on under the Study Group Agreement required the representatives to apply their own judgment and their own talents to the joint project, with of course concern for the interests of the companies that they represented and subject, of course, to such directions as the companies might give. Since the representatives were all high officials of the companies, they had latitude in their participation that would not have been open to a junior employee.

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La famille a soupé vers 18 h 30 et ensuite Yebes et son épouse sont allés dans la chambre à coucher et ont parlé pendant une demi‑heure de leur situation familiale. Au procès, Yebes a décrit dans son témoignage la conversation qu'il a eue avec son épouse de la manière suivante:

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4                 This was the state of affairs on February 23, 1982. According to the evidence, Mr. Yebes and his wife had planned a supper for the whole family at the town house that night. Mr. Yebes picked the boys up at the day care centre at about 6:00 p.m. and took them home to the town house. Mrs. Yebes and the two girls arrived at about 6:10 p.m. The family had supper at about 6:30 p.m. and then Yebes and his wife went to the bedroom and talked for half an hour about the domestic situation they were facing. Yebes described the conversation with his wife in his testimony at trial in these words:

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Quoique je pourrais en arriver à la conclusion que la perception des faits qu'a eue la cour à la majorité est préférable, il s'agissait là d'une question qu'il appartenait au juge du procès de trancher et, en l'absence d'erreur de droit, la Cour d'appel n'aurait pas dû intervenir.

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Second, there was no misdirection in respect of any legal principle.  The trial judge referred to the evidence which in her opinion was important.  This was part of the weighing process, and stressing one item over another was not the result of the misapplication of any legal principle.  Finally, there is no basis for concluding that the trial judge failed to consider the evidence in its totality in arriving at the ultimate result.  In summary, the majority of the Court of Appeal had a different theory of the facts and the inferences that could be drawn from those facts.  While I might agree that the majority's view of the facts is preferable, this was a matter for the trial judge to determine and, absent an error of law, the Court of Appeal should not have interfered.  In accordance with the order made at the conclusion of the appeal, the appeal is allowed and the acquittal restored.

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On ne peut que spéculer sur le fait qu'en agissant ainsi, il obéissait aux directives de l'avocat. Cependant, l'intention qu'il a eue subséquemment ne peut affecter la recevabilité de ses déclarations du simple fait qu'il ait choisi ou ait reçu le conseil de ne pas révéler ces faits plus tôt.

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Huband J.A. also raised s. 56(2)(d) relating to the "reasonable opportunity to make the statement in the presence" of his lawyer and felt that was not complied with as "the accused formed no intention to make a statement during the time that his lawyer was present".  Yet that is not the thrust of the provision.  The accused knew of those facts when the lawyer was present and could have easily revealed them at that time.  However, the accused was not so inclined.  We can only speculate whether this was a manifestation of counsel's instructions. Yet his subsequent intention cannot defeat the admissibility of the statements simply because he had chosen or was advised not to disclose them at an earlier time.

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De l’avis du Dr Butler, basé sur l’entrevue qu’il a eue avec l’appelant, sur les détails de la preuve que lui ont fournis les avocats et sur les déclarations faites par l’appelant à la police, ce dernier souffrait de dissociation mentale lorsqu’il a poignardé sa femme.

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The appellant did not give evidence on his own behalf at the trial. The only evidence presented by the defence was that of Dr. Butler, a psychiatrist, who had interviewed the appellant for about an hour and a half on May 3, 1973, almost six months after the appellant’s wife’s death. His opinion, based upon his interview with the appellant, the details of the evidence in the case given to him by counsel, and the statements made by the appellant to the police, was that the appellant was in dissociated state of reaction at the time of the stabbing which lasted from about 2:30 a.m. to 8 a.m. He stated that this reaction is a reaction to particular circumstances and particular stresses in a certain environment. It represented a gross personality disorganization. There would be an acute breakdown. He attributed the dissociated state to the reaction resulting from the threat made by the appellant’s wife to abort herself. He also stated that alcohol had been a factor, but not the major factor.

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La plaignante a juré qu'elle n'a consenti aux rapports sexuels que dans le seul but de le calmer et d'éviter de subir d'autres actes de violence. C'est quelque chose que, dit‑elle, elle avait appris de l'expérience antérieure qu'elle avait eue avec lui.

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5.                By about 5:30 a.m., after an hour of such behaviour by the appellant, she tried to calm him down. She pretended again that there was some hope of a reconciliation if the appellant would settle down and get a job. This had the desired effect. He calmed down and after some conversation he joined her on the bed and they had intercourse. The complainant swore that her consent to the intercourse was solely for the purpose of calming him down, to protect herself from further violence. This, she said, was something she had learned from earlier experience with him. In her evidence she said:

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LE JUGE HALL (dissident)—Je suis d’accord avec mon collègue le Juge Pigeon, mais veux ajouter quelques observations au sujet de l’intention qu’a eue le Parlement en édictant les art. 46 et 151 de la Loi sur les prisons et les maisons de correction, S.R.C. 1952, c.

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HALL J. (dissenting)—I am in agreement with my brother Pigeon but wish to add some observations as to the intention of Parliament in enacting ss. 46 and 151 of the Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 217. Section 151 applies to British Columbia only and specifically to “any male person over the age of sixteen years and under the age of twenty‑three years.” (lowered to 22 years by 17-18 Eliz. II, c. 38, s. 115). In my view this limited age application is of profound significance, obviously being aimed at young offenders. The institutions named in the section, “that portion of Oakalla Prison Farm

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Je crois que la Cour fait face à un problème réel, vu la conversation que vous avez eue avec elle il y a quelques minutes, je ne suis pas sûr—je crois que le sténographe pourrait le vérifier, lorsqu’elle a commencé à s’expliquer, je crois qu’elle a dit quelque chose comme non coupable, ce qui signifie tenter de le tuer, mais coupable soit de deux ou B, parce que cela signifie simplement lui faire peur.

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MR. COTTRELL: I believe she said Count 1, the main charge of wounding or to try and kill him, I would say that from what she said before Your Honour, before you retired the jury the second time, it appears she has no comprehension of the charges. Coupled with the fact again with no dis-respect of that particular juror, she obviously has a difficulty in communicating in the English language. There is also that substantial possibility, she may have had difficulty understanding the evidence. I think that is a reasonable problem before the court, giving that the conversation that Your Honour has had with her a few minutes ago, I can’t say for sure—I believe the reporter could verify that, when she first started to explain, I believe she used the word to the effect not guilty, that means trying to kill him, but guilty of either two or B, because that means just to scare him. That might indicate she is saying not guilty completely of count 1, but guilty of count 2.

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Ceci me semble amplement suffisant comme allégation «d’impossibilité d’agir plus tôt», mais seulement en regard de la définition fort large que donnait cette Cour à cette condition de fond dans Cité de Pont Viau, précité, et surtout dû au fait que, par cette décision, la possibilité d’agir qu’auraient peut-être eue les avocats des appelants ne peut être opposée aux appelants eux-mêmes.

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A general review of the allegations contained in the motion indicates that applicants stated that they could not foresee that the Clerk of Appeals would keep the Superior Court record in Quebec City even after the suspension order had been handed down on May 27, 1980, rather than returning it to the Rimouski registry; that accordingly, the duplicate and two copies of the inscription in appeal entered in the record would remain in Quebec City, and that the written pleadings would accordingly be beyond their control. This would appear to be quite sufficient as an allegation that it was "impossible for [them] to act sooner", but only in light of the very wide definition given to this substantive condition by this Court in Cité de Pont Viau, supra, and especially because, as decided in that case, the opportunity for action which counsel for the appellants might have had cannot be opposed to appellants personally.

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Le juge Wilkins a conclu, en première instance, à la résiliation fautive du contrat par OWB et a accordé des dommages‑intérêts correspondant aux versements qui auraient été effectués pendant toute la durée de 36 mois du contrat, moins 25 pour 100 : [2000] O.J. No. 5004 (QL). La déduction de 25 pour 100 reflétait la possibilité qu’OWB aurait éventuellement eue d’exercer d’une manière valide son droit de résilier le contrat en donnant un préavis.

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7 Hamilton subsequently commenced an action against OWB and its  chief executive officer, Gail Agasi, in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  OWB counterclaimed against Hamilton.  At the outset of the trial the action against Agasi was dismissed on consent, as was the counterclaim.  The matter proceeded as an action for general damages in breach of contract against OWB.  The trial judge, Wilkins J., held that OWB wrongfully repudiated the contract and awarded damages reflecting the payments that would have been made under the full 36-month term of the contract, less an allowance of 25 percent: [2000] O.J. No. 5004 (QL).  The discount reflected the possibility that OWB might at some later point have validly exercised its right to terminate the contract with notice.

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123 Sawyer désire produire, comme élément de preuve nouveau, un affidavit décrivant la teneur d’une conversation téléphonique qu’il a eue avec l’un des jurés après le verdict. L’essentiel de la conversation porte que la jurée lui a dit que le verdict [traduction] « la tourmentait » et qu’on avait exercé sur elle des pressions indues pour qu’elle arrive à ce verdict, et en particulier que d’autres membres du jury lui avaient dit qu’ils devraient rester isolés pendant au moins trois semaines avant que le tribunal ne déclare que le jury était dans l’impasse.

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123 Sawyer seeks to adduce as fresh evidence an affidavit  setting out the substance of a telephone conversation he had with one of the jurors after the verdict.  The gist of the conversation was that the juror told him that the verdict was “eating her inside” and that she had been subjected to undue pressure in coming to the verdict and, in particular, was told by other members of the jury that they would have to be sequestered for at least three weeks before a hung jury could be declared.  The juror also allegedly told the appellant that racial slurs were made by some jurors in the course of the deliberations.  The majority of the Court of Appeal concluded, in my view correctly, that this evidence fell within the scope of the common law rule of jury secrecy and was inadmissible on appeal.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal was correct in rejecting Sawyer’s application to adduce fresh evidence.

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Le caporal Murray a fourni un témoignage très important au sujet d’une conversation qu’il avait eue avec l’accusé lors de l’enquête préliminaire lorsque l’accusé avait demandé au caporal Murray pourquoi il voulait un certificat d’analyse qui indiquât que quelques-unes des capsules étaient vides puisque toutes les capsules étaient pleines, et pourquoi aussi le nom de l’accusé apparaissait sur le

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Another rebuttal witness was Corporal Murray. He had given evidence upon the Crown’s case and he was fully cognizant of the order excluding witnesses because part way through his testimony he noticed that another constable, Meggison, was present despite the order excluding him and pointed out this fact so that Meggison was directed personally by the judge to leave the court-room. Corporal Murray was also recalled in rebuttal and although Sinclair J.A. has come to the conclusion that he had been present during the defence evidence there was no reference to that fact during the course of the trial. I would presume that neither the learned trial judge nor the defence counsel realized that Murray had been present during that period. Corporal Murray gave very important evidence of a conversation which he had with the accused man at the preliminary hearing when the accused had asked Corporal Murray why he wanted a certificate of analysis that indicated there were some empty capsules since the capsules had all been full, and also why the accused’s name appeared on the certificate of analysis. Despite a very long cross-examination during his evidence given upon the Crown’s case in-chief, Corporal Murray had not referred

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Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (1973). Dans cette affaire, un certain Marburger avait autorisé l'enregistrement d'une conversation téléphonique qu'il avait eue avec Holmes. Le juge Hufstedler, aux pp. 71 et 72, fait remarquer au départ qu'il est aberrant d'introduire la notion de risque dans l'appréciation de la constitutionnalité de la surveillance "participative":

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I turn first to a decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska in State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (1978), in which the court, in interpreting that state's constitutional right to privacy, held that a person who engages in a private conversation is entitled to assume that his words will not be broadcast or recorded, absent his consent or the existence of a warrant.  In reaching his decision, Boochever C.J. quoted at length from the dissenting judgment of Hufstedler J. in Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (1973).  In the latter case, one Marburger had permitted his telephone conversation with Holmes to be recorded.  Hufstedler J., at pp. 71-72, makes the initial observation that it is aberrant to import the notion of risk in assessing the constitutionality of "participant" surveillance:

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La réponse du juge à cette question a donc pu entraîner le jury à écarter tout le climat de terreur qui, selon l'intimée, régnait dans sa maison. Or, il est évident qu'on ne saurait apprécier la conduite qu'aurait eue une personne raisonnable en faisant abstraction de ces circonstances cruciales.

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The judge was in fact here repeating almost exactly the wording of s. 265(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.  Although it is true that the previous threats can help the jury to decide whether threats were made immediately before the respondent shot Edsell and Raymond, they are also very relevant in determining what the respondent believed, not only concerning the existence of the threats, but also concerning her apprehension of the risk of death and her belief in the need to use deadly force.  By failing to mention these two elements in his answer, the trial judge seriously limited the relevance of the earlier threats.  In explaining how these threats could be used he should actually have referred not only to s. 265(1)(b) but also, most importantly, to s. 34(2) of the Code.

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Il me semble que la possibilité qu’il aurait eue de se défendre n’en est pas une puisqu’il s’agissait d’une défense devant une personne, le chef de police, qui, de l’aveu général, n’a aucun pouvoir de renvoi.

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It was the learned Justice’s view that s. 9 of the collective agreement went beyond the compass of s. 29, above quoted, and that it was not a “working condition”. Hence, it could not be relied on (as Brooke J.A. thought) to empower the discharge of a probationary constable without the Nicholson requirement of notice of reason and a fair opportunity to respond. However, Thorson J.A. concluded that Proctor knew why he was being discharged, that it was unnecessary to spell it out formally and that he had an opportunity to make a response. It seems to me that the opportunity allegedly given to respond was no opportunity when it was to a person, the chief of police, who, concededly, had no power to effect a dismissal. It is by no means clear that Proctor knew of the reason for dismissal at the time. The learned Justice does not say what the reason was, whether it was the fact that Proctor was with Archer when the latter was involved in a disturbance in a tavern, or whether it was the post facto assertion of the chief of police, made not to Proctor but in the chiefs evidence, and based on a report from others, that Proctor had lied under oath at the Archer hearing. Nonetheless, he concluded (in agreement with Brooke J.A.) that the evidence supported the view that the Board had made a decision to discharge Proctor and that it was an effective decision.

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Le juge de première instance dit que M. McMurtrie a pu parler de ce projet à la société en question et, après un examen attentif, il conclut qu’il doit accepter l’affirmation de M. Baird voulant que ce dernier ait donné suite à l’idée qu’il avait d’abord eue en 1954, et commandé les croquis à M. Madeyski sans que M. McMurtrie l’ait poussé à le faire.

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As Jackett P. pointed out, there was a conflict in the evidence of Baird and McMurtrie as to when and, indeed, whether the latter told Baird that a bracket should be designed to enable the conductors to be put on a line parallel with the bottom skirt of the lowest insulator. The occasion was said to be a meeting on December 10, 1958, at which an associate of Baird, one McDermid who was not called as a witness, was also present. McMurtrie had also had discussions with an American manufacturer seeking Ontario Hydro’s business. The trial judge said that McMurtrie might have spoken of such a design to that firm and after anxious consideration he concluded that he should accept Baird’s assertion that the latter had acted on the revived idea he first had in 1954 and ordered the sketches by Madeyski without any prompting from McMurtrie.

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La prétention que DV n’était en droit de recevoir, à titre de dommages, que la différence entre la valeur que les terrains auraient eue si les travaux avaient été exécutés, et leur valeur sans ces travaux, et qu’il n’y avait aucune preuve qui permettait d’établir un dommage sur cette base, n’est pas un juste critère pour fixer les dommages.

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The submissions made on behalf of S failed to persuade the Court that, in the circumstances of the case, the Courts below were in error in awarding to DV damages equivalent to the expense involved in performing the Schedule “A” work which S contracted to perform and deliberately failed to carry out. The contention that DV was only entitled to receive, by way of damages, the difference between the value of the premises if the work had been performed, and their value with the work unperformed, and that there was no evidence to establish any damage upon this basis, was not, in the circumstances of this case, a proper test for ascertaining damages.

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Suivant les faits en l’espèce, la seule connaissance que les appelants ont eue du rejet de leur demande dans le délai de quatre‑vingt-dix jours est celle à laquelle ont conclu les cours d’instance inférieure.

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The appellants here made application under s. 34(1) for approval of demolition. The application was denied. No notice in the sense of a written notice was given to the appellants by the respondent within the ninety-day period nor did the respondent cause any notice of its decision to be published in a newspaper in the City of Ottawa. In the facts of this case we have only the knowledge of the appellants of the refusal of the application as so found by the courts below, within the ninety-day period. Problems immediately arise relative to the effect:

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biens lui soient rendus. Si c’est impossible, l’estimation la plus exacte du préjudice subi par le demandeur correspond alors à la valeur qu’auraient eue les biens à leur restitution, soit à la fin du procès.

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the value of those goods when they would have been recovered, that is, at the end of trial. In addition, an award must compensate the plaintiff for damages flowing from the wrongful detention of his property, which it seems must be assessed on the basis of the highest value of the goods between the date at which the plaintiff ought to have recovered possession and the end of trial. In McGregor on Damages, supra, at p. 699, the case is put this way:

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Q. Vous souvenez-vous d’autre chose au sujet de la conversation que vous avez eue avec Dr Hughes?
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	Q. Do you remember anything else with respect to the conversation which you had with Dr. Hughes?

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Q. Si je comprends bien, comme vous l’avez décrit, après ce moment-là, après la conversation que vous avez eue avec le Dr Hughes, vous avez parlé avec d’autres patients dans la chambre?
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	Q. I take is that, as you have described, after that time, after the discussion with Dr. Hughes, you got talking with other patients in the room?

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Après avoir fait état de la réunion qu’ont eue Emms, McKee et F.A. Clark, directeur régional, le 26 mars 1971, à Regina, afin de discuter de l’appréciation, le juge de première instance a dit (à la p. 106):
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	The trial judge referred in his reasons to the meeting that Emms had with McKee and F.A. Clark, Regional Director, in Regina, on March 26, 1971, to discuss the Report, and said (at p. 106):

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Le fait de sortir de l’Hôtel St-Louis, le fait de marcher jusqu’à chez lui, le fait d’armer sa carabine, de revenir vers l’Hôtel St-Louis, d’après vous n’a pas calmé l’exaspération qu’a eue l’accusé, lorsque Jimmy Massey lui a dit de sortir?
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	[TRANSLATION] In your opinion the fact that he left the Hôtel St-Louis, the fact that he went home, the fact that he assembled his gun and returned to the Hôtel St-Louis, did not succeed in quelling the irritation he felt when Jimmy Massey told him to leave?

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	L’avocat de Sunshine a soutenu que Dolly Varden n’était en droit de recevoir, à titre de dommages, que la différence entre la valeur que les terrains auraient eue si les travaux avaient été exécutés, et leur valeur sans ces travaux, et qu’il n’y avait aucune preuve qui permettait d’établir un dommage sur cette base.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	It was contended, for Sunshine, that Dolly Varden was only entitled to receive, by way of damages, the difference between the value of the premises if the work had been performed, and their value with the work unperformed, and that there was no evidence to establish any damage upon this basis. In the circumstances of this case

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Il faut donc retenir comme règle générale le principe de l'appréciation in abstracto. Pour cela il convient d'évaluer l'attitude d'une personne poursuivie par rapport à celle qu'aurait eue dans les mêmes circonstances de temps et de lieu un bon professionnel.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	[translation] Hence the general rule must be the principle of assessment in abstracto.  That principle requires that the attitude of a party being sued be evaluated in relation to that which a competent professional would have had at the same time and in the same place.  But who is this competent professional?

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Quelle que puisse être la connaissance que Logan ait eue de la pratique d’Amerada, il n’en a pas avisé l’appelante. Le texte du télex ne révèle aucunement que le pouvoir de Kurtz de vendre du soufre au nom de l’intimée a été restreint; il indique seulement, qu’à ce stade, les négociations n’étaient pas encore définitives.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	Whatever may have been Logan’s understanding of the practice of Amerada, he did not communicate it to the appellant. The statement in the telex did not disclose any limitation on the authority of Kurtz to sell sulphur for the respondent, but only indicated that, at that stage, the negotiations were not yet final.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	40 Lorsqu'elle est arrivée à la maison, sa fille, Catrina, l'a trouvé très bouleversé. Il lui a alors révélé l'aventure qu'avait eue sa mère. À environ 23 h, Mme Thibert a appelé son mari, à la maison, pour lui faire part de sa décision de le quitter.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	40               The daughter, Catrina arrived home to find her father very upset.  He told her of her mother's affair.  At approximately 11:00 p.m., Mrs. Thibert telephoned her husband at home to tell him of her decision to leave him.  At his request, she agreed to meet him the next morning, at Smitty's Restaurant in St. Albert, a suburb of Edmonton at 7:00 a.m.

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29 Pour accorder au demandeur des dommages‑intérêts équivalant à la valeur qu’aurait eue le contrat s’il avait été exécuté dans le délai prévu, la cour doit tout d’abord déterminer la valeur financière de la promesse faite au demandeur au moment où l’obligation aurait dû être exécutée, puis appliquer le taux d’intérêt et le mode de calcul appropriés pour tenir compte de la période pendant laquelle le demandeur a été privé de son dû.

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29 To award the plaintiff damages equal to the value of the contract as if it had been performed on time, the court must first determine the dollar value of the promise to the plaintiff at the time the obligation was to have been performed, and then apply the appropriate interest rate and method of calculation to account for the time during which the plaintiff was not paid what was rightfully due.