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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Sous l’ancien Code de procédure civile, un plai­deur qui, sans sa faute, avait été empêché de produire une opposition à jugement dans les délais prescrits, pouvait obtenir une prorogation de délai alors qu’il lui aurait été impossible, dans les mêmes circonstances, d’être relevé de la déchéance de son droit d’appel.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Under the old Code of Civil Procedure, a liti­gant who, through no fault of his own, had been prevented from filing an opposition to judgment within the prescribed time limits could obtain an extension of the time limit, whereas under the same circumstances it would have been impossible for him to be relieved of the foreclosure of his right of appeal.

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Incidemment, il faut préciser qu’au cours des plai­doiries du présent pourvoi et sur autorisation de cette Cour, l’avocat de l’université a eu la permis­sion de déposer les règlements relatifs à la procé­dure devant le comité d’appel du sénat approuvés par le sénat de l’université de Regina le 25 février 1978.

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Parenthetically, it should here be stated that during argument on this appeal and by leave of this Court, counsel for the university was permit­ted to file by-laws approved by the senate of the University of Regina on February 25, 1978, relat­ing to procedure before the senate appeals committee. The by-laws were passed at a date later than that of the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and, indeed, after leave to appeal to this Court was granted. The by-laws provide that the committee is to comprise three lay members and two student members of senate with the chancellor and vice-chancellor as ex officio members. The grievor is to receive notice of hearing and he has the right to be represented by counsel and present evidence through documents or witnesses. The grievor has the responsibility of presenting the initial case in support of the grievance set forth in his request for a hearing.

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La lettre de l’appelant du 2 février 1976 dans laquelle il a écrit qu’on lui avait demandé d’abandonner ses études non à cause de ses notes mais de ses tendances névrotiques a été déposée au nom de l’université. Il s’agit d’une déclaration non assermentée sur laquelle l’appelant ne s’est pas fondé dans sa plai­doirie.

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It must be noted that neither in his application for certiorari and mandamus nor in his affidavit did appellant allege or swear that the faculty or the committee of the council were biased, acted in bad faith or were inspired by any improper motive. The sole basis of his application is that he was not heard by the committee of the council. Appellant's letter of February 2, 1976, in which he wrote that he was told that the reason why he was being asked to discontinue was not his marks but his tendency to be neurotic was filed on behalf of the university. It is an unsworn statement upon which appellant did not rely in his pleadings. This unsworn statement, although not specifically con­tradicted, is not consistent with several paragraphs of Professor Hanowski's affidavit according to which the reason why appellant might be asked to discontinue his studies was his failure to maintain an adequate academic standard. This reason was confirmed by the Dean's letter to appellant dated February 27, 1976. Furthermore, and in reply to questions asked by members of the Court in the course of argument, appellant's counsel answered that what appellant wanted, ultimately and basi­cally, was to have his marks revised after the committee of the council had determined in a properly held hearing, whether the evaluation process was rightly challenged by appellant.

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Il y a une preuve indirecte qui appuie le plai­doyer de défense de croyance au consentement: (1) Le collier et les clés de sa voiture ont été décou­verts au salon. (2) Elle a confirmé le témoignage de l’appelant que le chemisier a été soigneusement suspendu dans le placard à vêtements.

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There is circumstantial evidence supportive of a plea of belief in consent: (1) Her necklace and car keys were found in the living room. (2) She confirmed his testimony that her blouse was neatly hung in the clothes closet. (3) Other items of folded clothing were found at the foot of the bed. (4) None of her clothes were damaged in the slightest way. (5) She was in the house for a number of hours. (6) By her version, when she entered the house the appellant said he was going to break her. She made no attempt to leave. (7) She did not leave while he undressed. (8) There was no evidence of struggle, and (9) She suffered no physical injuries, aside from three scratches.

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La loi en cause en l’espèce vise non seulement des biens personnels achetés pour être consommés, qualifiés dans la plaidoirie de choses consomptibles, mais également des biens personnels achetés pour être utilisés, qualifiés dans la plai-

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The appellant seeks to distinguish the Conlon decision and that of the Privy Council in Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Kingcome Navigation Company Limited ([1934] A.C. 45), on the grounds that the taxes in question in those cases related to goods purchased for the purpose of consumption by the buyer, tobacco in the Conlon case, fuel oil in the Kingcome case. The Act in question in the present case relates not only to personal property purchased for consumption, which were referred to in argument as non-durable goods, but also to personal property purchased for use, referred to in argument as durable goods. It was contended that the

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L’appelante a choisi d’axer l’essentiel de sa plai­doirie sur la compétence exclusive du Parlement en matière d’aéronautique et d’établir un parallèle avec d’autres cas de constructions liées à des opé­rations ou entreprises assujetties exclusivement au pouvoir législatif fédéral.

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The appellant in this Court pitched his argu­ment in the main on the exclusive federal power in relation to aeronautics, drawing at the same time on parallel situations arising in respect of construc­tion concerning other activities or enterprises within exclusive federal legislative authority. One such activity involving construction was considered by this Court in Campbell-Bennett Ltd. v. Com­stock Midwestern Ltd.,[4] where what was in issue was the right to assert a mechanic’s lien under provincial legislation against an oil pipe line extending from a point in Alberta to a point in British Columbia, and hence a work or undertak­ing falling within the excepting words in s. 92(10)(a) of the British North America Act so as to be subject to federal legislative authority. That case is, no doubt, distinguishable from the present one, if only because the enforcement of a mechan­ic’s lien, involving the possibility of sale, would involve dismemberment of an enterprise under fed­eral regulatory control. I point to it, however, because the fact that it may have been under construction did not make it any less within feder­al jurisdiction than it would have been if it had been in operation and was undergoing repairs.

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La principale question que le jury devait tran­cher était celle de savoir si la plaignante avait consenti aux rapports sexuels qui, cela n’est pas contesté, ont eu lieu. Au procès, cependant, l’avo­cat de l’appelant a fait valoir un «moyen de défense» subsidiaire qui, selon lui, aurait dû être soumis au jury.

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The principal issue the jury had to determine was whether the complainant consented to those acts of intercourse which, it is not disputed, took place. At trial, however, counsel for the appellant advanced an alternative "defence" which, in his submission, ought also to have been left with the jury. It was argued that even were the jury to decide that the acts transpired in the absence of consent, the appellant could, nonetheless, be excused from criminal responsibility if he had honestly, albeit mistakenly, believed that the complainant was a willing partner. Though the trial judge did not dismiss the defence as being unavailable at law, in the circumstances he disallowed the plea, ruling that there was insufficient evidential foundation to warrant an instruction on the issue. The point in this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in failing to put before the jury a defence of mistaken belief in consent, such failure being a non-direction amounting to misdirection.

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Puisqu’il avait établi des liens entre lui-même et ses invités par leur présence sur son yacht en tant que passagers, fussent-ils des passagers en plai­sance ou bénévoles, il était tenu de voir avec une diligence raisonnable à leur sécurité.

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The reason is obvious. MacLaren was not a random rescuer. As owner and operator of a boat on which he was carrying invited guests, he was under a legal duty to take reasonable care for their safety. This was a duty which did not depend on the existence of a contract of carriage, nor on whether he was a common carrier or a private carrier of passengers. Having brought his guests into a relationship with him as passengers on his boat, albeit as social or gratuitous pas­sengers, he was obliged to exercise reasonable care for their safety. That obligation extends, in my opinion, to rescue from perils of the sea where this is consistent with his duty to see to the safety of his other passengers and with con­cern for his own safety. The duty exists whether the passenger falls overboard accidentally or by reason of his own carelessness.

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Les demandeurs plai­daient qu’ils étaient membres du Barreau, qu’ils plaidaient devant les cours du Québec et devant les tribunaux quasi judiciaires et qu’ils représentaient des clients dont la langue habituelle est l’anglais.

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The position of doctors, hospitals and husbands under s. 251(4), (5) and (6) is not unlike the position of the plaintiffs in Blaikie, Durand and Goldstein v. Attorney General of Quebec[5]. This case was put forward by the plaintiff as a case where standing was granted in circumstances not too different from those here. There is, in fact, a considerable difference between the Blaikie case, the Bill 101 case, and the present case. It is true that the question of the plaintiff's interest or standing in attacking the validity of Chapter III of Title I of the Charter of the French Language, 1977 (Que.), c. 5, was put in issue by the Attorney General of Quebec in his defence. The plaintiffs had alleged in their declaration that they were members of the legal profession engaged in litiga­tion in the courts of Quebec and before quasi-judi­cial tribunals, and that they represented clients whose ordinary language was English. They were entitled, they said, to plead in English and to have the Statutes of Quebec published in English as well as in French, relying of course on s. 133 of the British North America Act. Deschênes C.J., in granting the declaration, dealt preliminarily with a number of points, including the question of standing.

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La Reine c. Major, un arrêt rendu par cette Cour le 25 février 1976 et apparemment non publié[8], est un jugement oral rendu après les plai­doiries. A mon avis, il traite seulement de la divergence d’opinion entre la majorité et la mino­rité de la Division d’appel de la Cour suprême de la Nouvelle-Écosse.

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The Queen v. Major, a judgment rendered by this Court on February 25, 1976, and apparently unreported[8], was an oral judgment delivered after the argument and, in my view, dealt only with the difference of opinion between the majority and minority in the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. That difference of opinion was, as my brother de Grandpré pointed out, upon the question of whether there had been sufficient evidence adduced to prove an essential element of the offence charged. In allowing the appeal, this Court, in my view, dealt only with that question of sufficiency of evidence so I am not ready in this appeal to express any view upon the effects of ss. 732 and 755 of the Criminal Code.

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La Haute Cour a déclaré, et le Conseil privé lui a donné raison, une telle loi «prohibitive» ultra vires, car elle portait atteinte aux dispositions constitutionnelles. Dans sa plai­doirie devant nous, l’intimé a cherché à faire une distinction entre Antill et le présent litige en se fondant sur l’art.

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affirmed by the Privy Council sub nom. Commissioner for Motor Transport v. Antill Ranger and Company[6]. In that case, the State of New South Wales enacted special legislation to bar claims arising out of the Privy Council's decision that a licensing statute, the State Transport (Coordina­tion) Act, 1931-1951 (N.S.W.), was ultra vires. The High Court held, and the Privy Council agreed, that such a "barring" statute was ultra vires, for otherwise the constitutional provisions would be undermined. In oral argument before us, the respondent sought to distinguish the Antill case on the basis of s. 78 of the Australian Consti­tution. That section was not the determining con­sideration in the decision of either the Australian High Court or the Privy Council. The section is merely a procedural provision to enable the federal Parliament of Australia to enact legislation allow­ing suit against the federal and state governments in specified courts.

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Le jury pouvait prendre en considération toute la preuve, y compris la réunion antérieure des «Spartans» au dépotoir (à laquelle assistaient Sylvester et Dunlop) lorsque Douglas a été présenté comme aspirant membre, la présence de membres du groupe au cabaret de l’hôtel Waldorf où se trouvaient la plaignante et son amie, le fait que Douglas a amené la plaignante au dépotoir, le retour d’un groupe de «Spartans» au même endroit (là où le viol a eu lieu), l’arrivée des accusés avec une quantité importante de bière et le fait que les deux accusés ont observé les rapports sexuels entre la plai­gnante et un homme, mais en présence d’autres hommes.

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The jury was entitled to consider all the evidence, including the earlier meeting of the Spartans at the dump (with Sylvester and Dunlop present) when Douglas was introduced as a prospect, the presence of mem­bers of the group at the Waldorf beverage room where the complainant and her friend were spending some time, bringing of the complainant by Douglas to the dump, the reappearance of a group of Spartans at the same location (where the gang rape took place), the arrival of the accused with a substantial quantity of beer, the observation by both accused of intercourse taking place by the complainant and one male but with other men nearby.

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Incidemment, il faut préciser qu’au cours des plai­doiries du présent pourvoi et sur autorisation de cette Cour, l’avocat de l’université a eu la permis­sion de déposer les règlements relatifs à la procé­dure devant le comité d’appel du sénat approuvés par le sénat de l’université de Regina le 25 février 1978.

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Parenthetically, it should here be stated that during argument on this appeal and by leave of this Court, counsel for the university was permit­ted to file by-laws approved by the senate of the University of Regina on February 25, 1978, relat­ing to procedure before the senate appeals committee. The by-laws were passed at a date later than that of the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and, indeed, after leave to appeal to this Court was granted. The by-laws provide that the committee is to comprise three lay members and two student members of senate with the chancellor and vice-chancellor as ex officio members. The grievor is to receive notice of hearing and he has the right to be represented by counsel and present evidence through documents or witnesses. The grievor has the responsibility of presenting the initial case in support of the grievance set forth in his request for a hearing.

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Il est vrai qu’au paragraphe 5 de sa déclaration, l’appelant, qui a rédigé lui-même ses procédures et plaidé sa propre cause en Cour supérieure et en Cour d’appel, «déclare que cette poursuite est basée partiellement sur les articles 1053, 1054, 1057 et 1058 du Code civil».

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It should be noted at once that no procedural obstacle exists to this contention. It is true that in paragraph 5 of his statement of claim, appellant, who prepared his pleadings himself and pleaded his own case in the Superior Court and in the Court of Appeal, stated [TRANSLATION] “that this action is based in part on articles 1053, 1054, 1057 and 1058 of the Civil Code”. However, in paragraph 102 he also referred expressly to art. 2242, and alleged that his action cannot be regarded as prescribed. In this Court, counsel for the appellant asked for leave to amend the statement

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LE JUGE DE GRANDPRÉ (dissident)—Nous avons à déterminer la responsabilité de deux plai­deurs qui sont devant nous à la suite d’un accident de la route impliquant trois véhicules, savoir le tracteur de l’intimé et l’automobile de l’appelant circulant du nord au sud, sur la route 13 à st.

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DE GRANDPRÉ J. (dissenting)—This Court has to determine the liability of the two litigants before us as a result of a traffic accident involving three vehicles, namely respondent's tractor, appel­lant's car, which was travelling from north to south on Route 13 in St-Célestin, and the pick-up truck belonging to one Lagacé, who was travelling in the opposite direction. The latter was the inno­cent victim of the collision between the tractor and the car, and no one has brought an action against him.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Je m’arrête pour faire remarquer que dans son plai­doyer, Me Harris a dit qu’il ne traitait pas M. Brabant de menteur mais simplement que toute divergence entre Lewis et Brabant devrait être résolue en faveur de M. Lewis à cause de la tendance de Brabant à faire usage d’alcool et aussi je suppose le fait qu’il avait un casier
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Now, I pause here to point out that in his address, Mr. Harris said he was not calling Mr. Brabant a liar but simply saying that any discrepancy between Lewis and Brabant should be resolved in Mr. Lewis' favour because of Brabant's propensity for liquor, and I suppose the fact that he had a long criminal record, which I

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(b) alors que l’assuré en tant que piéton est renversé par un véhicule à moteur quel qu’il soit conduit habituellement sur les routes ou dans les rues publiques. On entend par «voiture privée à passagers» toute voiture sans permis pour le transport de passagers payants et qui est du genre voiture de plai-

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3. Automobile and Pedestrian. (a) while driving, riding in, boarding or alighting from any private passenger automobile or (b) by being struck while a pedestrian by any motor vehicle ordinarily operated on the public streets and highways. A “private passenger automobile” means an automobile not licensed to carry passengers for hire and which is of the pleasure type (including a truck with a factory rating load capacity of one thou-

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C’était la situation dans l’affaire Morgan. La croyance au consentement y résultait de renseignements fournis par le mari de la plai­gnante, qui avait parlé des tendances sexuelles de son épouse. Le fondement du moyen de défense, si incroyable qu’il se soit avéré compte tenu de la violence, était les faux renseignements donnés par le mari.

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I do not think the defence of mistaken belief can be restricted to those situations in which the belief has been induced by information received from a third party. That was the situation in the Morgan case. In Morgan, the belief in consent was induced by information related by the complainant's hus­band, who spoke of his wife's sexual propensities. The foundation for the defence, incredible as it turned out to be, in view of the violence, was the misinformation of the husband. Had the defendants believed that information, and had the wife's overt conduct been relatively consistent with it, the defendants would have had a defence. That is the effect of the dicta of the House of Lords in the Morgan case.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	11. Les personnes morales s’adressent dans la langue officielle aux tribunaux et aux organismes exerçant des fonctions judiciaires ou quasi-judiciaires. Elles plaident devant eux dans la langue officielle, à moins que toutes les parties à l’instance ne consentent à ce qu’elles plai­dent en langue anglaise.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	11. Artificial persons addressing themselves to the courts and to bodies discharging judicial or quasi-judi­cial functions shall do so in the official language, and shall use the official language in pleading before them unless all the parties to the action agree to their pleading in English.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Avant de terminer, je tiens à souligner que l’avocat de l’appelant qui a invoqué dans sa plai­doirie l’arrêt de cette Cour dans Bernardin c, North Dufferin[11], a admis en réplique que la ques­tion de l’enrichissement sans cause ne se posait pas en l’instance.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Before concluding, I wish to point out that counsel for the appellant, who relied in argument on the decision of this Court in Bernardin v. North Dufferin[11], admitted in reply that unjust enrichment did not arise in this case. There is therefore no need to consider our decision in Olivier v. Wottonville[12], on that point.