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Une fois de plus, cette décision ressortissait au pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge du procès. Certes, un autre juge aurait pu en décider autrement, mais je ne saurais conclure qu'une erreur a été commise en l'occurrence.

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It will be recalled that Ross appeared in court after counsel for the Crown and Mitchell had completed their final submissions.  The trial judge refused to permit Ross to be called as a witness at this stage.  Once again, this is a matter that came within the trial judge's discretion.  Although another trial judge might have come to another decision, I cannot find that an error was committed in this case.

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Les avis prescrits n’ayant donc pas été transmis là où ils auraient dû légalement l’être, soit dans la division d’enregistrement de Baie-Comeau, district judiciaire de Hauterive, le shérif adjoint, Charlotte Bergeron, n’a pu en prendre connaissance et n’en a effectivement pas pris connaissance avant de procéder à la vente.

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It appears that the immovable in question is located at Gallix, a municipality situated between Sept-Iles and Port-Cartier and in fact in the judicial district of Mingan, but in the registry division of Baie-Comeau, judicial district of Hauterive. As the prescribed notices were not sent where they legally should have been, that is in the registry division of Baie-Comeau, judicial district of Hauterive, the deputy sheriff, Charlotte Bergeron, was unable to learn of them and in fact did not learn of them before proceeding with the sale.

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Il ressort de la plaidoirie de l’intimé que, même si le Parlement a conféré au commissaire le pouvoir d’édicter des règles (pouvoir assorti, selon les prin­cipes régissant les pouvoirs délégués, de restric­tions en accord avec sa portée), ces règles n’ont pas valeur de loi parce qu’aucune sanction n’est prévue pour leur violation (à la différence des règlements établis par le gouverneur en conseil). En fait, on prétend que le commissaire aurait pu établir les directives suo motu même en l’absence d’une disposition habilitante comme le par. 29(3), et qu’il aurait pu, en toute impunité, ne pas en tenir compte, et que le par. 29(3) n’ajoute rien à son pouvoir administratif.

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It appeared to be the contention of the respondent that although Parliament has prescribed a rule-making authority for the Commissioner (carrying, in accordance with the ordinary view of delegated powers, limitations thereon according to their scope) the fact that no penalty has been prescribed for breach of the rules (in contrast to the position respecting breach of regulations made by the Gov­ernor in Council) denudes the rules of any legal authority; indeed, the suggestion is that the Com­missioner could have prescribed the directives suo motu if there had been no such provision as s. 29(3), and could have disregarded them with impunity, and that s. 29(3) added nothing to his administrative authority.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 R.C.S. 636, l'al. 213a) est invalide. Étant donné que cet article a été soumis à l'appréciation du jury et que celui‑ci a pu en tenir compte, il y a lieu d'ordonner un nouveau procès.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	For the reasons I gave in R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 000, it is unnecessary to decide whether subjective foresight is an essential requirement of the offence of murder.  On the basis of R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, s. 213(a) is invalid.  Since it was put to the jury and may have been acted upon, there must be a new trial.

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dommages ont été causés par la réalisation d’un risque non assuré et non par des mesures prises en raison de l’imminence d’un risque assuré «réel». De plus, l’assurée n’a pu, en fermant le tampon de regard, transformer le risque non assuré de dommages résultant d’une réaction chimique en risque assuré d’explosion. En dernier lieu, que les pompiers aient été ou non les mandataires de l’assurée, elle ne peut tout de même pas être dans une meilleure position quant à la fermeture du tampon de regard que si elle avait elle-même pris la décision de le laisser ouvert ou de le fermer.

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sured risk and not by measures taken because of an “operating” imminent insured risk. Further, insured could not have converted the uninsured risk of damage from chemical reaction into the insured risk of explosion by closing the hatch. Finally, whether or not the firemen were the insured’s agents, the insured still could be in no better position as to the closing of the hatch than if the insured itself had made the decision to leave the hatch open or closed.

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La Cour d'appel n'a pas confirmé le verdict de culpabilité et, n'eût été de l'erreur de la Cour d'appel d'annuler son acquittement pour meurtre en ordonnant la tenue d'un nouveau procès sur cette accusation, l'accusé n'aurait pu en vertu de l'art.

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Though it made no appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Crown could have appealed in this Court, against the order for a new trial made by the Quebec Court of Appeal.... In addition to the limitations imposed on us by the nature of the accused's appeal, the jurisdiction of this Court is also limited by the Crown's decision not to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the acquittal for murder by the jury, and further by its decision not to appeal against the order for a new trial made by the Court of Appeal.

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[TRADUCTION]  Je conclus que si Annie Pierce n'avait pas largement contribué à l'élevage du bétail, à l'utilisation de matériel lourd, à la culture des terres, à la gestion de la ferme et du foyer et à soigner le propriétaire, Weldon Timmons, dont la santé était fragile, celui‑ci se serait vu dans l'obligation de dépenser une somme très considérable au cours de deux décennies. En fait, étant donné qu'il avait tendance à boire et que toute sa famille l'avait abandonné, et non sans raison, pendant bien des années, il est tout à fait possible que ce soit uniquement grâce à Annie Pierce que Weldon Timmons a pu, en dépit d'une maladie grave et d'une incapacité qui allait en empirant, conserver ses biens pendant si longtemps. La fidélité, le désintéressement ainsi que le dévouement et les services constants d'Annie Pierce ont permis à Clarence Timmons de recevoir des biens meubles et immeubles d'une valeur nettement supérieure à 100 000 $.

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I find that without the significant contributions of Annie Pierce in animal husbandry, in the operation of heavy equipment, in crop cultivation, in farm and house management, and in personal care and nursing of an ailing farm proprietor Weldon Timmons would have been required to expend a very large sum of money and over a period of two decades. Indeed, bearing in mind his propensity to drink, and the abandonment of Weldon by all of his family for many years, and for good cause, it is entirely possible that Annie Pierce is the sole reason that Weldon Timmons was able, despite serious illness and growing physical incapacity to hold his assets together for so long. Clarence Timmons was enabled to harvest a very substantial windfall in realty and chattels, substantially in excess of $100,000 because of the loyalty, the unselfishness and the continued devotion and service of Annie Pierce.

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La Cour a conclu en outre que la négligence du client ne l'empêcherait pas d'invoquer les faux si la banque s'était elle‑même montrée négligente en payant les chèques contrefaits ou falsifiés. Le juge Harlan a dit, à la p. 112: [TRADUCTION]  "Bien sûr, si les employés de la défenderesse, avant de payer les chèques falsifiés, avaient pu, en faisant preuve d'une diligence et d'une habilité raisonnables, découvrir les faux, elle ne saurait porter à son crédit le montant de ces chèques, même dans l'hypothèse où le déposant n'aurait soumis son compte à aucun examen."

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The Court further held that the customer would not be estopped by negligence from setting up the forgeries if the bank had itself been negligent in paying the forged or altered cheques. Harlan J. said at p. 112: "Of course, if the defendant's officers, before paying the altered checks, could by proper care and skill have detected the forgeries, then it cannot receive a credit for the amount of those checks, even if the depositor omitted all examination of his account."

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A mon avis, le Conseil privé n’aurait pu en arriver à la décision qu’il a rendue dans l’affaire Windsor s’il avait estimé que la répartition effectuée par la corporation n’était pas susceptible de révision sur appel à la Cour de révision.

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It should be noted that the judgment of the Appellate Division itself concedes the right of the appellant in this case to appeal from the notice. The question in issue is as to whether the validity of the notice can be considered by the Court of Revision, or whether, once made, it is immune from attack save by an action in the courts. In my opinion the decision of the Privy Council in the Windsor case could not have been made if it had considered that the allocation made by the company was not subject to review on appeal to the Court of Revision.

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[TRADUCTION] Un aveu de culpabilité ayant été inscrit, cette Cour peut seulement connaître d’un appel de la déclaration de culpabilité s’il appert (1.) que l’appelant n’a pas compris la nature de l’accusation, ou n’avait pas l’intention d’avouer sa culpabilité à l’égard d’icelle, ou (2.) que d’après les faits reconnus, il n’aurait pu, en droit, être déclaré coupable de l’infraction dont il était accusé.

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A plea of Guilty having been recorded, this Court can only entertain an appeal against conviction if it appears (1.) that the appellant did not appreciate the nature of the charge or did not intend to admit he was guilty of it, or (2.) that upon the admitted facts he could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	S’il avait existé un doute réel quant à la conduite visée par l’inculpation, on aurait pu, en vertu de l’art. 497(1)(f) du Code, demander que soient fournis d’autres détails décrivant les moyens par lesquels il est allégué que l’infraction a été commise, mais ce n’est pas la ligne de conduite qu’on a adoptée.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	If there had been any genuine doubt as to the conduct to which the charge related, further particulars describing the means by which the offence was alleged to have been committed could have been sought under s. 497(1) (f) of the Code, but this was not the course which was followed.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Si ce registraire local n'a pas reçu de demande de certificat d'enregistrement, alors personne d'autre n'aurait pu en recevoir.
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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Les pièces ont été produites au procès et le public a pu en prendre connaissance et en discuter, de sorte qu'il y a eu respect de l'exigence de transparence des procédures judiciaires.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The exhibits were produced at trial and open to public scrutiny and discussion so that the open justice requirement had been met.

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f) le 6 octobre 1961, Lewis Brothers, ayant payé trois des dividendes promis dans la proposition et n’ayant pu en payer le quatrième, fit cession de ses biens, cession qui fut suivie de différentes procédures, en particulier d’un jugement du 20 mars 1962 reconnaissant la validité de la réclamation de $167,247.55 produite par l’appelante; toutefois, aucun jugement n’est intervenu pour annuler la proposition.

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(f) on October 6, 1961, Lewis Brothers, having paid three of the dividends promised in the proposal and having been unable to pay the fourth, made an assignment of its property, which was followed by various proceedings, in particular a judgment of March 20, 1962, recognizing the validity of the claim of $167,247.55 filed by appellant; however, no judgment was made annulling the proposal.

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Sur l’ordre du juge du procès, cet exposé de faits n’a pas été déposé à titre de pièce à conviction et n’a pas été mis à la disposition du jury, de sorte que nous n’avons pu en prendre connaissance en l’espèce; les faits doivent donc être extraits des remarques préliminaires du substitut du procureur général qui sont censées contenir tout ce dont il a été convenu.

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The procedure adopted at the trial before His Honour Judge Graburn was unusual in that the case for the Crown was composed entirely of a statement of facts agreed to by both counsel for the Crown and counsel for the accused (the respondent). By order of the presiding judge this statement of facts was not marked as an exhibit in the case and was not available to the jury with the result that it was not before us in this appeal and the facts must accordingly be garnered from the opening address of the Crown Prosecutor which purports to incorporate all that was agreed upon.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Le fondement de la plainte, il me semble, était que cet acte était de loin hors de toute fonction ou de tout devoir qui lui avaient été confiés, à tel point qu'il n'a pu être fait qu'exclusivement à titre privé, malgré l'importance de l'influence qu'ont pu en fait exercer sur lui la charge et le pouvoir publics réels.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Was the act here, then, done by the respondent in the course of that exercise [of his functions]?  The basis of the claim, as I have found it, is that the act was quite beyond the scope of any function or duty committed to him, so far so that it was one done exclusively in a private capacity, however much in fact the influence of public office and power may have carried over into it.

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[TRADUCTION] Un aveu de culpabilité ayant été inscrit, cette Cour peut seulement connaître d’un appel d’une déclaration de culpabilité s’il appert (1) que l’appelant n’a pas compris la nature de l’accusation, ou n’avait pas l’intention d’avouer sa culpabilité à l’égard d’icelle; ou (2) que d’après les faits reconnus, il n’aurait pu, en droit, être déclaré coupable de l’infraction dont il était accusé.

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A plea of guilty having been recorded, this Court can only entertain an appeal against conviction if it appears (1) That the appellant did not appreciate the nature of the charge, or did not intend to admit that he was guilty of it; or (2) That upon the admitted facts he could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged.

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Le juge Davey, à l’époque juge d’appel, fonda sa décision sur le seul article 682(b) du Code criminel, en disant que l’appelant aurait pu en appeler de la sentence de détention préventive et ne l’avait pas fait.

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The appellant appealed from the decision of Branca J. The appeal was heard on March 24 and 25, 1966, and judgment was given at the conclusion of the hearing. Davey J.A., as he then was, based his judgment solely on s. 682(b) of the Criminal Code, holding that an appeal from the sentence of preventive detention might have been taken by the appellant but was not taken. Lord J.A. agreed. Bull J.A. expressed his agreement as follows:

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Au moment de l’expropriation de ces biens-fonds, le locataire, c’est-à-dire l’appelante, en avait l’usage en vertu d’un bail à terme fixe, et un droit de reconduction pour cinq ans, après l’expiration du terme fixe, ce qui signifie que son droit sur le fonds était celui d’un locataire en possession pour une durée déterminée et avec un droit exigible à la reconduction du bail. A ce titre, le locataire a droit à une indemnité équivalant à ce qu’il aurait, en homme avisé, payé au moment de l’expropriation pour ce fonds, plutôt que d’en être évincé. En application de ce critère de l’homme avisé, le locataire, au moment de l’expropriation, devait donc évaluer ce qu’il paierait plutôt que d’être évincé des locaux, en tenant compte du fait que son bail pouvait encore courir environ sept ans après l’expropriation, mais que le propriétaire aurait pu, en vendant les lieux loués, l’évincer avec préavis d’un an. Par conséquent, ce qu’il serait disposé à payer ne devrait pas être l’accroissement de ses frais d’exploitation dans une nouvelle installation, pour chacune de ces sept années, mais une somme inférieure à ce chiffre, eu égard à la possibilité de son éviction durant les cinq dernières années. Dans cette affaire, d’après

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At the time of the expropriation of these lands, the tenant, the appellant here, held the lands under a lease for a term certain and had a right of renewal for five years after the end of the term, that is, his interest in the land was that of a tenant holding under a term certain with an enforceable right of renewal. For that interest, the tenant was entitled to the compensation which he, as a prudent man, at the moment of expropriation, would pay for the property rather than be ejected from it. Applying that test of the prudent man, the tenant then, at the moment of expropriation, would consider what he would pay rather than be ejected from the land having reviewed the facts that his tenancy ran for some seven years after the expropriation but that the landlord upon making a sale of the premises could evict him on one year’s notice. Therefore, what he would be willing to pay would not be the increased cost of operating in the new plant for each one of the seven years but something less in order to make allowance for the possibility of his eviction during those last five years. In the present case, on the evidence of the tenant, it was perfectly ready to occupy the premises to

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Notre Cour à la majorité (le juge en chef Laskin et les juges Spence, Pigeon et Dickson étaient dissidents) a confirmé la décision du juge du procès et a conclu que, bien qu'aucun des éléments de preuve n'ait pu en soi fournir la corroboration, la preuve dans son ensemble pouvait établir chacun des éléments de l'infraction et accroître considérablement la crédibilité du témoignage de la plaignante.

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In this Court the appellants argued that there were three separate issues, namely intercourse, consent, and identity, in respect of each accused, and that the trial judge had erred in failing to distinguish which pieces of evidence were capable of corroborating the evidence of the complainant on each issue.  The majority of this Court (Laskin C.J. and Spence, Pigeon and Dickson JJ. dissenting) affirmed the trial judge's decision and concluded that, while none of the items on their own could have provided corroboration, taken together the evidence was capable of establishing each of the elements of the offence and greatly enhanced the credibility of the complainant's evidence. De Grandpré J., for the majority, rejected the view that the identity of each accused had to be corroborated separately in the case of a gang rape.  He wrote at p. 379:

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Selon le juge Thurlow, Helsing n’aurait pas agi comme doit le faire un bon marin s’il avait tenté de s’écarter de la route du voilier en effectuant un virage beaucoup plus prononcé, tandis que le juge Heald conclut que «s’il avait changé de route à n’importe quel moment entre le point n° 1 et le point n° 4 (le point où il a modifié sa route), il aurait pu en changer par 30° ou plus et aurait placé à la fois le remorqueur et la péniche complètement à l’écart du voilier».

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The difference of opinion between these two judges concerns the actions of Captain Helsing after first sighting the sailboat and appreciating that it was coming towards him. The 505 was then about 4/10ths of a mile away at a position marked 1 on the chart which was about four cables from the point of collision. Helsing took no action at this point but waited until the sailboat was about 1,000 feet away at which point he altered a mere 15° to port fearing, as he said, that a further alteration might bring him into “foul ground”. Mr. Justice Thurlow took the view that it would have been bad seamanship for Helsing to attempt to get out of the way of the sailing vessel by making a further alteration, whereas Mr. Justice Heald made the finding that “if he had altered any time between position 1 and position 4 (the point where he made the alteration) he could have altered 30° or more and been completely clear of the sailboat with both tug and tow”. Rule 20(a) of the Regulations provides:

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Les membres du conseil devaient donc se demander si, agissant en toute honnêteté, un administrateur qui doit considérer collectivement un groupe d’employés et tenir compte des intérêts de la compagnie, aurait pu en arriver à la même conclusion?

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that of management in the circumstances of this case. If this kind of review is to be given to a board under s. 3.03, it should be given in express terms, namely, that the management's authority to demote, suspend or discharge will be subject to full review by the board of arbitration. Management would then understand what its position would be. But as the agreement is presently drawn, the board's power is limited to a determination whether management went beyond its authority in this case. The question before them was, could an honest management, looking at the group of employees as a whole and at the interests of the company, have reached the conclusion that they did? In other words, did man­agement go beyond its rights? There is only one answer to this question and the answer is "No". It was the board that exceeded its authority in reviewing the deci­sion of management by purporting to exercise a full appellate function. [emphasis added]

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Sur le second moyen d’appel, une personne qui est simplement témoin d’un acte ne devient pas par là un complice. L’avocat de l’appelant, dans son plaidoyer au jury, bien qu’il ait attaqué très vigoureusement la crédibilité de C.T., n’a pas laissé entendre que celui-ci a pu participer aux sévices infligés à la victime. Il reste que les déclarations de C.T. aux policiers: [TRADUCTION] «Oh! elle va bien, elle dort» et «Il ne s’est rien passé» étaient fausses et qu’elles ont été faites en vue de dissimuler une preuve et d’exonérer l’appelant; C.T. l’a effectivement reconnu en contre-interrogatoire. C.T. est, par conséquent, complice après le fait. Puisqu’un complice après le fait est un «particeps criminis» et, partant, un complice, le juge aurait dû servir au jury la «mise en garde concernant la complicité». Compte tenu du fait qu’il a été démontré que C.T. était un témoin très peu digne de foi, et compte tenu de l’effet de son témoignage, il est possible de dire qu’un jury ayant reçu la mise en garde appropriée n’aurait pas pu, en agissant judiciairement, ne pas reconnaître l’appelant coupable. Sur ce moyen, le pourvoi doit être accueilli et un nouveau procès ordonné.

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As to the second ground of appeal, a person merely witnessing an act does not thereby become an accomplice. Indeed counsel for the appellant in his address to the jury, although he attacked most vigorously C.T.’s credibility did not imply that C.T. might have taken any part in beating the victim. Nonetheless C.T.’s statements to the police officer, “Oh, she’s alright, she’s just sleeping” and “nothing happened” were false statements serving to conceal evidence and exonerate the appellant and C.T. in effect so admitted in his cross-examination. C.T. was therefore an accessory. As an accessory after the fact is “particeps criminis”, and so an accomplice, the judge should have given an “accomplice warning”. In view of the fact that C.T. was demonstrably a most unreliable witness, and of the thrust of his evidence, it was possible to say that a jury given the proper warning could not, acting judicially, have failed to convict the appellant. Upon this ground the appeal should have been allowed and a new trial directed.

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Or, il n'était manifestement pas question d'une valeur et, étant donné la décision relative à l'accusation de vol, il ne pouvait pas s'agir d'un bien. Le ministère public a fait valoir que l'hôtel avait été privé d'argent parce qu'il aurait pu en théorie réaliser un profit s'il avait décidé de vendre la liste des noms et adresses des employés.

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6.                       On the charge of counselling to commit fraud Krever J. applied R. v. Olan, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175, which established that s. 338(1) of the Code requires proof of "dishonesty" and "deprivation". The element of dishonesty was clearly made out, but s. 338(1) specifies deprivation of "property, money or valuable security". The last was clearly inapplicable, and the first ruled out by the decision on the theft charge. The Crown argued that the hotel had been deprived of money because it could potentially make a profit should it choose to sell the list of employees' names and addresses. Krever J. rejected this submission as artificial, because the undertaking by the hotel to maintain the confidentiality of the employees' information entirely negated that suggestion. In the absence of the element of deprivation, there is no fraud. Krever J. found the accused not guilty on all counts.

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[TRADUCTION] Le mot «fonctionnaire» revient dans chaque citation. Cela signifie que la personne ayant donné des instructions d’appeler occupait au ministère un poste tel qu’on aurait pu en conclure qu’elle agissait en vertu d’instructions reçues du Ministre.

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The word "official" is used in each of these quota­tions. This would imply that the person who gave the instructions to appeal held such a position in the Department that it could be implied that he was performing this duty on the instructions of the Minister. I am not suggesting that such a person must hold any specific office in the Department. The present case illustrates the type of person who would be included as an "offi­cial". The criminal law section is charged with the responsibility for all criminal litigation conducted by the Government of Canada. As director of that section, Mr. J. A. Scollin, Q.C. would have the implied authority to authorize these appeals. Mr. Bentley, as the person next senior to Mr. Scollin and authorized to act as director in his absence, would unquestionably have similar author­ity. A similar inference could be drawn from other officials, who, because of their position in the Department, it could be assumed, had been authorized to act for the Minister in such cases. The preliminary objection is dismissed.

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Si peu sympathique que tout cela ait rendu la cause de l’accusée, si déplorable que soit l’attitude de l’avocat qui a participé à ces manoeuvres, rien de tout cela ne pouvait cependant justifier une ordonnance de dédommagement. Il est vrai que vu la nature discrétionnaire de la sentence, on se permet traditionnellement, pour la prononcer, de se fonder largement sur des renseignements plutôt que sur de la preuve. Mais, la nature particulière des ordonnances de dédommagement et de restitu­tion exige qu’elles soient fondées sur l’aveu ou autre preuve. Ce qu’a dit l’avocat de l’accusée en suggérant le sursis aurait pu, en soi, être pris pour un consentement au prononcé des ordonnances. Mais la déclaration subséquente du second avocat indiquait clairement l’intention définitive de l’ac­cusée de ne pas reconnaître sa dette et de contester l’action civile. C’était une attitude fort mal conçue: il ne s’agit pas d’une réclamation en dommages-intérêts où l’on peut admettre la responsabilité et contester le montant; il s’agit du vol de sommes et de marchandises déterminées, et l’adjudication d’intérêts ou de dépens ne pourra jamais réparer qu’une partie infime du préjudice additionnel causé par une défense obstinée au civil. Si l’accu­sée a été induite à croire qu’elle pouvait obtenir un sursis de sentence tout en retardant la restitution par une défense au civil, elle a été bien mal conseillée et le choc qu’elle a ressenti en entendant sa condamnation à deux ans de prison est bien compréhensible. Cependant, rien de cela ne justifie le prononcé d’une ordonnance de dédommagement en l’absence d’une preuve claire de la somme due, par aveu ou autrement.

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However, no matter how much this made accused's case unsympathetic and also reflected against counsel who co-operated in such tactics, it could not constitute a proper foundation for a compensation order. It is true that on account of its discretionary nature the sentencing process is traditionally permitted to proceed largely on the basis of information rather than on the basis of evidence. But the special nature of orders for compensation and for restitution requires that they be made only on the basis of evidence by admission or otherwise. What counsel for the accused said when suggesting a suspended sentence might by itself have been taken as a consent to the making of the orders. However, what was subsequently said by the second counsel made it clear that the accused was definitely unwilling to admit any indebtedness and intended to defend the civil action. It was an ill-conceived position: this was not a claim for damages on which liability may be admitted and the quantum debated; it was a matter of theft of definite sums of money and merchandise and no award of interest and costs would ever cover more than a fraction of the additional injury inflicted by stubbornly defending the civil action. If the accused was led to believe she could expect a suspended sentence with the possibility of holding up restitution by defending the civil proceedings, she was extremely ill-advised and the shock she suffered when sentenced to two years is readily understandable. All this, however, cannot justify the making of a compensation order without clear evidence of a definite amount by admission or otherwise.

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Cela m’a fait beaucoup de peine que tu aies refusé de me voir au mois de décembre dernier, lorsque j’ai demandé à mon avocat de parler au tien, de sorte que le procès a dû avoir lieu en janvier. Je crois que nous aurions pu en discuter à ce moment-là et reprendre notre vie conjugale.

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At our ages there are many years ahead that we could enjoy together if we took up our marriage again. I am willing to come back and try, and I know we can make a go of it if we both work at it. I was very sorry that you wouldn’t meet with me last December when I asked my lawyer to speak to your lawyer so that the trial had to go ahead in January. I think we could have talked things over at that time and resumed our married life. It would really be more rewarding for both of us to have each other for the rest of our lives. Remember you told me when I tried so hard to get you to make up after a quarrel that if I hadn’t done it you never would. You said you just couldn’t give in, it was your nature. Well, I’m trying again and I’d like you to think about it seriously and to think what we are both missing by not being together. I will look forward to hearing from you in the meantime.

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La thèse du ministère public est l’existence d’une entente de partage du marché que les accusées ont maintenu pendant plusieurs années malgré des circonstances changeantes, et même si n’importe laquelle d’entre elles aurait facilement pu en obtenir une part plus importante par divers moyens, l’entente a eu pour effet de diminuer la concurrence.

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Per Estey J., dissenting: The Court was faced with two opposing explanations of the strange sight of the three accused sharing virtually all the eastern Canada sugar market in constant proportions for eleven years and thereafter sharing ninety per cent of the market in the same proportion for another fourteen years. The theory of the Crown is that there existed a market sharing agreement which was maintained by the accused for many years despite changing circumstances and the fact that any one of the accused could readily through various means have obtained a greater share of the market, and that the agreement had the effect of lessening competition. The theory of the defence is that the only way to increase sales of an homogeneous product in an oligopoly is to reduce prices, the result of which is either a depletion of supplies and depressed earnings by the firm lowering its prices or a price war. Since the results in either case are disastrous, the only alternative is for each member of the oligopoly to seek to maintain its traditional market share.

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Je crois qu’il s’ensuit nécessairement que la désignation des matériaux choisis (par hasard ou par habileté) par le prétendu inventeur pour la production de ces nouvelles substances est de l’essence de son invention. Il doit pouvoir, si l’on veut, être en mesure de réfuter les critiques en disant: «Vous prétendez qu’il n’y a pas de mérite à combiner les substances connues A et B pour produire la nouvelle substance C, parce que tout chimiste aurait pu, en se servant des manuels, faire la même combinaison et savoir qu’en vertu des principes de chimie la substance C en sortirait. Mais mon grand secret, ma découverte, consiste en ce que la combinaison des substances connues et précises A et B produit non seulement une nouvelle substance qui correspond au principe de la chimie (qui était à prévoir en vertu de la théorie chimique) mais produit, sous forme de la substance C, un remède de grande valeur.»

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I think it necessarily follows that the identity of the materials chosen (by luck or good management) by the supposed inventor for the production of his new substances is of the essence of his invention. He must, so to speak, be in a position to repel critics by saying: “You tell me that there is nothing in combining known substances A and B to produce my new substance C, because any chemist could have worked the combination from the books and would have known as a matter of chemical definition that C would be the result. But my great secret, my discovery, is that these particular known substances A and B when combined do not merely produce a new substance answering the chemical description C (which according to accepted chemical theory was a foregone conclusion) but produce in the shape of C a remarkably valuable drug.”

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il n’avait pas à se défendre, et, de plus, l’accusation n’était aucunement devant la Cour d’appel de façon qu’elle aurait pu en prendre connaissance. En effet, pour arriver à la conclusion que le prévenu était ainsi coupable, le juge d’appel Deschê­nes a dû tirer des conclusions de fait (sans passer par la phase normale du procès au cours duquel tes faits sont d’abord établis) et il me semble qu’en exprimant une dissidence basée sur de nouvelles conclusions de fait, le juge d’appel Deschênes ne peut pas être considéré comme ayant été dissident sur une question de droit conformément à l’al.

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obliged to offer any defence, and, moreover, which was not before the appellate court in any shape that would warrant cognizance thereof. Indeed, to come to the conclusion that the accused was so guilty, Deschênes LA. had to make findings of fact (without the usual trial in which facts are first found) and it seems to me that in expressing a dissent which is based on fresh findings of fact Deschênes IA. cannot be said to have dissented on a question of law under s. 621(1)(a). Equally, I do not see how his view can be regarded as raising a question of law under s. 621(1)(b).