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Ausgangssprachen Zielsprachen
Keybot 168 Ergebnisse  scc.lexum.org  Seite 7
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
À ce moment-là, la police n’avait pas encore discuté avec l’appelant de la façon dont son épouse était décédée et celui-ci ne l’avait encore appris de personne d’autre. Le jury aurait pu en déduire que l’appelant savait comment son épouse était décédée parce qu’il était présent au moment de son décès et, de surcroît, parce qu’il avait lui-même causé sa mort.
9 The Crown also presented evidence that the appellant had premature knowledge of the manner of his wife’s death.  Three days after the deceased died, the police interviewed the appellant by telephone.  The appellant stated in that conversation that the deceased had complained about being short of money, being sick, and forgetting things.  He told police that she was in poor health and abused drugs.  The appellant then volunteered that the deceased had complained to him about falling asleep in the bathtub sometimes for an hour or two, and that the deceased had told him she almost drowned on a couple of occasions.  At that point in the conversation, the police had not yet discussed how the deceased had died, and the appellant had not yet heard from another source.  The jury could have inferred that the appellant knew of the manner of his wife’s death because he was present when she died, and further, because he caused her death.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Si la voiture du défendeur mineur avait pu dévier même légèrement vers sa droite en traversant la voie surélevée, alors inévitablement après avoir dépassé celle-ci, le gravier du côté nord de la route aurait crépité sous les ailes du côté droit de la voiture. Rien de grave n’aurait pu en résulter mais il semblerait que ce garçon inexpérimenté et très fatigué a été si effrayé par ce bruit qu’il a posé un geste qui a rendu l’accident presque inévitable.
asphalt widened out right to the guard rail. If the infant defendant’s vehicle had been allowed to drift even slightly to its right as it crossed that overpass then it would be inevitable that having proceeded beyond it the gravel at the north edge of the road would rattle against the fenders on the right side of the car. Nothing serious could result but it would seem that this inexperienced and very fatigued boy was so frightened at this sound that he proceeded to take such action as resulted almost inevitably in the accident which did occur. Surely, a learned trial judge who heard the evidence which I have summarized could well conclude that that driver had been guilty of gross negligence, and I cannot accept the view that his opinion should be interfered with on appeal.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ils l’ont interrogée sur la présence d’armes à feu dans la maison. Elle a confirmé qu’il y en avait deux, mais elle a pu en trouver qu’une seule, qu’elle leur a montrée. Les policiers ont ultérieurement obtenu des mandats qu’ils ont exécutés à la résidence de C.  Ils ont découvert une carabine de calibre .22, soit le calibre du projectile retiré du crâne de H.
Around 9 p.m. on July 22, 2006, C called 9‑1‑1 to report that her spouse, H, had been injured.  The attending physician at the hospital established that H was suffering from head injuries and confirmed the presence of a metal object in H’s skull, and communicated this information to the police.  The police attended at C’s home around midnight.  The lights of the house were off and the house was calm.  C answered the door in her pyjamas.  The police explained that they were there to find out what happened and to make sure the premises were safe, but they did not tell C that they believed that H was suffering from a gunshot wound.  The police, accompanied by C, inspected the interior and the exterior of the residence, as well as a gazebo.  The police questioned C about the presence of firearms in the house.  She confirmed the presence of two firearms but could only locate one, to which she led the police.  The police later obtained warrants which were executed at C’s residence.  A .22 calibre rifle, of the same calibre as the bullet recovered from H’s skull, was located by the police.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Si le réclamant s’était dissocié des commentaires et des actes de M. Wilson le 28 septembre et si une preuve avait indiqué qu’il était simplement un participant passif, j’aurais pu en déduire que son rôle dans l’arrêt de travail était substantiellement différent de celui de MM.
absence of evidence to the contrary and in the circumstances of this case, to have acted in concert with the bargaining committee as a whole. Had the grievor disassociated himself from Mr. Wilson’s comments and actions on September 28th and had evidence been adduced to indicate that he was merely a passive participant, I might have been prepared to infer that his role in the work interruption was substantially different than was proved against both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Benjamin. Where members of a union bargaining committee are proved to have the necessary knowledge and act in concert to achieve an unlawful result, it is not unreasonable to find that the culpability of individual members of the committee flows to all members of the committee. This is especially true where it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain detailed evidence of the activities of each and every member of such a committee. If I were to apply the criminal onus of proof I would be compelled to find that there was insufficient evidence to support the discharge of the grievor. However, I must apply the civil onus in this case.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
6.                       Les faits ayant donné lieu à cette accusation ne sont pas contestés.  Le 7 mai 1982, l’appelant a pêché la perchaude dans les marais de la portion sud‑ouest du lac Saint‑François, partie du fleuve Saint‑Laurent située à environ 95 km à l’ouest de Montréal et à quelque 15 km de l’actuel village d’Akwesasne (la «zone de pêche»).  L’appelant, qui pêchait pendant la période de frai, a capturé 300 livres de perchaude.  Il utilisait une seine fait de mailles très serrées et mesurant plusieurs centaines de pieds de longueur.  L’appelant pêchait sans permis.  De fait, il n’était pas possible de se procurer de permis en vertu du Règlement de pêche du Québec, l’appelant aurait cependant pu, en vertu du par. 5(9) du Règlement, demander au ministre d’exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour l’autoriser à pêcher pour se nourrir.  L’appelant n’a pas demandé cette autorisation.
6 The facts giving rise to this charge are not in dispute.  On May 7, 1982 the appellant was fishing for perch in the marshes of the southwest portion of Lake St. Francis, a part of the St. Lawrence River approximately 95 km west of Montreal and some 15 km from a current Akwesasne village (the “fishing area”).  He was fishing during the spawning season and caught 300 pounds of perch with a seine net made of very fine mesh several hundred feet in length.  The appellant was fishing without a licence; under the Quebec Fishery Regulations a licence was in fact unavailable, although under s. 5(9) of the Regulations he could have applied for an exercise of Ministerial discretion permitting him to fish for food.  The appellant did not apply for such permission.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il est possible que le pistolet lui ait été volé à sa résidence par le meurtrier. Si c’est le cas, il aurait pu en témoigner et le jury aurait pu accepter cette explication. Il aurait pu être capable d’expliquer comment il se fait que le chargeur, qui était apparemment tombé du pistolet pendant qu’il était dans la pièce, se trouvait là.
It may be that the evidence is very largely circumstantial, but the actual facts are known to the accused, and he has the right, under the laws as they now exist, to explain them away by his own evidence.  For example, he is not directly shown to have been in possession of his gun at the time of the murder.  He was in possession of it at an earlier date.  It may have been a mere coincidence that the victim was shot by this gun, and that the accused was at the time of the murder only a few yards away.  It is possible that the gun had been stolen from his residence by the murderer.  If so, he could have testified to the fact, and the jury might have accepted his explanation.  He might have been able to explain how the cartridge, which apparently fell from the revolver while he was in the room, came to be there.  He may have a satisfactory explanation as to how blood-stained overalls came to be found in his room.  He might be able to deny that he made the compromising statements to the gaol inmates, and the jury might readily have believed that the stories told were incredible; but, notwithstanding all the damning chain of evidence, he chooses to maintain silence.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Si la somme intégrale de 31 millions de dollars était incluse dans le produit de disposition de DMI, on ferait abstraction du fait que DMI n’avait pas un bien valant 31 millions de dollars à vendre. DMI n’aurait pu en aucun cas recevoir 31 millions de dollars pour la tenure forestière.
[31] The effect of Alberta’s scheme is to embed the reforestation obligations into the forest tenure, such that the obligations cannot be severed from the property itself.  As such, the reforestation obligations are simply a future cost tied to the tenure that depresses the value of the tenure.  A prospective purchaser of the tenure would take into account the income-earning potential of the tenure as well as the expected future costs associated with ownership of the tenure.  The existence of reforestation obligations, a future cost that cannot be severed from the tenure, would decrease the amount such a prospective purchaser would be willing to pay;  see J. Frankovic, “Supreme Court to Hear Daishowa Appeal — Back to Basics on Basis and Proceeds”, (July 12, 2012), CCH Tax Topics Newsletter No. 1205, at pp. 2-3.  Here, for instance, the record establishes that Tolko valued the High Level Division’s forest tenure at $31 million less the $11 million estimated cost of future reforestation obligations.  The forest tenure thus had a value of $20 million.  To include the full $31 million in DMI’s proceeds of disposition would disregard the fact that DMI did not have $31 million of value to sell.  Under no circumstances could DMI have received $31 million for the forest tenure.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il reste cependant que le commissaire, déjà au courant des faits, ayant possiblement entendu des experts et ayant rendu jugement, ne saurait avoir la même objectivité qu’un expert ordinaire, c’est-à-dire le spécialiste qui aborde le problème litigieux sans idées préconçues, afin de renseigner la Cour sur une matière technique ou scientifique. Aussi la Cour n’attache-t-elle pas autant d’importance qu’elle aurait peut-être pu en accorder au témoignage de Gilles Vandry, s’il n’avait été que l’expert ordinaire.
[TRANSLATION] The fact remains, however, that a member of a Commission, already aware of the facts and possibly having heard expert witnesses and given judgment, could not have the same objectivity as an ordinary expert, that is to say a specialist who approaches the problem at issue without any preconceived ideas, in order to inform the Court on a technical or scientific matter. Accordingly, the Court does not attach as much importance as it might otherwise have to the testimony of Gilles Vandry, if he had merely been an ordinary expert witness. This applies also to his fellow members of the Commission.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ce droit, le prévenu n’a pu en jouir quand la poursuite a refusé à l’avocat le droit de prendre connaissance des déclarations écrites qu’avaient déjà faites la dénonciatrice et l’autre témoin et de les utiliser en contre-interrogatoire.
I take it as firmly established and need cite no further authority that the right of cross‑examination conferred by s. 453(1)(a) is a right to full, detailed and careful cross‑examination, and, as pointed out in the two cases which I have cited, a failure to permit that cross-examination is a failure to accord the accused an important right granted him by the provisions of the Criminal Code and, as I wish to extend hereafter, a denial of jurisdiction by the magistrate. That right could not be exercised when the Crown refused to permit counsel for the accused to peruse and use in his cross-examination of the complainant and the second witness the statements in writing which they had previously signed.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La Loi sur l’expropriation prévoit le droit à une indemnité pour l’effet préjudiciable qui survient lorsque les activités du défendeur portent atteinte à l’occupation ou à la jouissance du bien‑fonds par le demandeur, si ce dernier satisfait à trois exigences : (i) les dommages doivent résulter d’une mesure autorisée aux termes d’une loi; (ii) la mesure engagerait la responsabilité si elle n’était pas autorisée aux termes de cette loi; et (iii) les dommages doivent résulter de la construction et non de l’utilisation des ouvrages.  En l’espèce, la seule question non résolue est de savoir si l’appelante aurait pu, en vertu du droit relatif à la nuisance privée, obtenir des dommages‑intérêts si la construction de l’autoroute n’avait pas été effectuée aux termes d’une loi.
The Expropriations Act provides a right to compensation for injurious affection, which occurs when the defendant’s activities interfere with the claimant’s occupation or enjoyment of land, if the claimant can meet three requirements:  (i) the damage must result from action taken under statutory authority; (ii) the action would give rise to liability but for that statutory authority; and (iii) the damage must result from the construction and not the use of the works.  In this case, the only unresolved question is whether, if the highway construction had not been done under statutory authority, the appellant could have successfully sued for damages caused by the construction under the law of private nuisance.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le promoteur n’a pas offert de « rallonge » pour obtenir une chose qu’il avait déjà. Il l’a fait en contrepartie d’un engagement tacite que la Ville a pu en fin de compte répudier. Les parties s’attendaient raisonnablement à ce que le coût des travaux et des améliorations soit prélevé sur les profits tirés des volets du projet de la phase II que le promoteur n’a pu mener à terme à cause de la municipalité.
Equity looks to substance rather than to form.  A characteristic of the doctrine of unjust enrichment is the flexibility of remedies.  Here the substance of the problem to be remedied is clearly identified.  The City is sitting on $1.08 million worth of improvements which have been found to be the fruits of an ultra vires demand.  The remedy sought is simply to reverse the wrongful transfer of wealth by ordering reimbursement of that amount to the developer.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
«Par conséquent, si vous venez à la conclusion qu’un accusé savait qu’une infraction était en cours et qu’il a intentionnellement omis d’accomplir quelque chose en vue d’aider quelqu’un à commettre l’infraction, chose qui, si elle avait été faite, aurait pu en empêcher ou arrêter la perpétration, alors vous pouvez peut-être conclure que l’accusé était partie à l’infraction. Mais si l’omission n’atteint pas ce niveau, vous ne pouvez conclure qu’il était partie à l’infraction.»
"So that if you find an accused person knew that an offence was being committed and intentionally omit­ted to do something, for the purpose of aiding another to commit the offence, that if he had done it might have hindered or actually prevented the offence, then presumably you can find that the person was a party to the offence. But unless it reaches that level, then you cannot find him a party."
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Comme il a assisté à tout le procès, jusqu’à la libération du jury, il est en meilleure position que les tribunaux d’appel pour déterminer la cause probable de l’erreur et apprécier le préjudice qui a pu en résulter.
72 In my opinion, the trial judge is, as is frequently the case, in the best position to select the appropriate remedy based on the particular circumstances of the case.  Having seen the trial through to the discharge of the jury, the trial judge is in a superior position vis-à-vis appellate courts to determine the probable reason for the error and to assess the resulting damage, if any.  The trial judge should have the discretion to settle upon the proper remedy for the irregularity that occurred under his or her supervision.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
40 Dans les deux cas, la question aurait été pleinement débattue et toutes les circonstances susceptibles d'avoir une incidence sur l'ordonnance de communication demandée auraient été examinées, en particulier la nécessité de taire l'identité de l'indicateur de police. Le fait que la défense ait plutôt choisi de demander l'arrêt des procédures ne lui confère pas plus de droits qu'elle aurait pu en revendiquer si elle avait suivi la démarche appropriée.
40               In both cases, the matter would have been fully argued and, in particular, the need to protect the identity of the police informer, as well as any other circumstances which may have had a bearing on the requested disclosure order, would have been dealt with.  The fact that the defence chose, rather, to move for a stay of proceedings does not give it greater rights than it could have claimed had it followed the proper route.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Par conséquent, si vous venez à la conclusion qu’un accusé savait qu’une infraction était en cours et qu’il a intentionnellement omis d’accomplir quelque chose en vue d’aider quelqu’un à commettre l’infraction, chose qui, si elle avait été faite, aurait pu en empêcher ou arrêter la perpétration, alors vous pouvez peut-être con­clure que l’accusé était partie à l’infraction.
But when you are considering what I have said, going back to that middle section of the definition I read, everyone is a party to an offence who does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding another person to commit it, I should say the phrase omitting to do anything, that phrase, omitting to do anything means intentionally omitting to do something for the purpose of aiding another to commit an offence, that if it had been done, would have been prevented or hindered the person from committing an offence. Intentionally omitting to do something for the purpose of aiding another to commit the offence, that if it had been done, would have prevented or hindered the person from committing the offence.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Les dispositions de l’art. 492(2)(b) doivent se lire de façon disjonctive et présentent deux façons différentes d’énoncer l’acte d’accusation de manière à permettre de coucher l’accusation soit «dans les termes mêmes de la disposition qui décrit l’infraction», ou dans les termes de celle qui «déclare que le fait imputé est un acte criminel». L’accusation en l’espèce est conforme au Code criminel en ce qu’elle est conçue dans les termes de l’art. 280 qui déclare le «vol» un acte criminel. L’omission de l’intimé de rendre compte à son employeur était un «vol» au sens de l’art. 276(1). S’il avait existé un doute quant à la conduite visée par l’inculpation, on aurait pu, en vertu de l’art. 497(1)(f) du Code, demander que
The provisions of s. 492(2) (b) are to be read disjointly and envisage two alternative methods in which an indictment may be phrased so that a charge may be laid either “in the words of the enactment that describe the offence” or those of the enactment which “declares the matters charged to be an indictable offence”. The charge in the present case complied with the Criminal Code in that it was in the words of s. 280 which declares “theft” to be an indictable offence. The respondent’s failure to account to his employer was “theft” within the meaning of s. 276(1). If there had been any doubt as to the conduct to which the charge related, further particulars describing the means by which the offence was
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Maintenant si vous me demandez plus directement comment ça s’fait qu’il a pu en prendre après des poursuites, ben j’vous répondrais, encore là j’ai aucun moyen de pouvoir le faire, le dire de façon certaine.
A.   Listen, once again, the transition in terms of those symptoms [from the subacute phase to the chronic phase], it didn’t take place, it didn’t take place in March eighty‑eight.  I think that, what I said at that time is that he was incapable of bringing an action until then.  Now if you ask me more directly how he was able to bring an action afterwards, my answer, once again, would be that there’s no way I can do it, give you a definite response.  However, one hypothesis that I consider highly likely is that, once he learned that the police officers had been convicted following the trial, at that point, especially if there were people who reassured him . . . at that point he may have been able to control his anxiety sufficiently to be able to take action. [Case on Appeal, at pp. 277‑78 (emphasis added).]
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Si l’appelant avait intenté une action en replevin ou engagé une contestation fondée sur la Charte devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine, plutôt que de présenter une requête reconventionnelle sous le régime du par. 490(2), il aurait pu en être autrement.
42 I add this.  It is regrettable that an improper seizure of money which even today the Crown cannot say is connected to any crime, has occasioned so much expense and consumed so much energy.  Both parties took the wrong procedures.  Had the appellant brought an action for replevin or Charter review to the Court of Queen’s Bench instead of his cross-motion under s. 490(2), things might have been otherwise.  The fault of the Crown is even greater: first it seized the money, and then when an order was made for its return, followed a non-existent route of appeal.  The point is not to cast blame, but to seek to improve this aspect of the administration of justice.  Parliament may well wish to consider whether s. 490 should be amended to provide a clear route of challenge and appeal where it is alleged that property is seized in an unlawful manner.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De même, elle supplante les art. 22 et 57 de la Civil Service Act si des questions de sécurité d’emploi ou de protection de l’employé résultent d’une décision du conseil d’arbitrage de la Fonction publique lorsque le Conseil mixte n’a pu en venir à un accord et qu’on a demandé l’arbitrage à cette fin.
Service Act in respect of any concluded agreement by the Joint Council on security of employment or protection of employees against discharge unless for just cause. Equally, it would displace ss. 22 and 57 of the Civil Service Act if such security or protection arose as a result of a decision of the Civil Service Arbitration Board where the Joint Council was unable to reach agreement and arbitration was invoked to establish an agreement. Force is lent to this arrangement by the obligation laid upon the Nova Scotia Civil Service Association by s. 10 of the Civil Service Joint Council Act not to sanction, encourage or support, financially or otherwise, a strike by its members or any of them.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Parce qu'il s'agit d'un jugement par défaut, on aurait pu en examiner le bien‑fondé si le défendeur avait choisi de le faire, mais il a délibérément choisi de ne pas le faire, préférant faire valoir les moyens de défense fondés sur l'"absence du ressort" et le "fait de ne pas se soumettre à la compétence du tribunal".
Reason would suggest that inside the Confederation of Canada the principle of reciprocity of jurisdiction should apply.  The action was concerned, and only concerned, with a judgment of a next-door province, not a foreign state but a partner in Confederation, which could not be registered as a domestic judgment because the defendant never submitted to the jurisdiction of the Alberta court.  Because the judgment was a default judgment, it could have been opened up on the merits had the defendant chosen to do so, but he deliberately chose not to do so, preferring to rest his defence on the grounds of "no presence" and "no submission".  In those circumstances, there being as between Alberta and British Columbia reciprocity of jurisdiction, it was appropriate to apply the principle that our courts should recognize a jurisdiction which they themselves claim.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[traduction] Si, au procès, l’appelant avait continué de nier toute participation à l’assassinat de la victime, le jury aurait été en droit ‑‑ en se fondant sur la preuve relative à la fuite de l’appelant, à ses déclarations mensongères et à la destruction d’éléments de preuve ‑‑ de tirer une conclusion de conscience de culpabilité sur la base de laquelle il aurait pu en outre conclure que l’appelant était coupable du crime.
If, at the trial, the appellant had persisted in his earlier denial of non-involvement in the killing of the deceased, the jury would have been entitled -- from the evidence of the appellant’s flight from the scene, the appellant’s false statements, and the destruction of evidence -- to draw an inference of consciousness of guilt from which a further inference of culpability in the crime could also have been drawn.  Once the appellant had admitted at trial that he had caused the death of the deceased, however, such evidence had very limited application.  It had no application in determining whether the offence committed by the appellant was either murder or manslaughter.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
59 Même si j’avais pu en arriver à une conclusion différente si j’avais entendu moi‑même l’ensemble de la preuve, je ne puis dire que le juge du procès a agi de façon déraisonnable en concluant que la seule présence, sur le siège arrière, de quelques sacs à déchets contenant, sur le dessus, des vêtements neufs ne constituait pas objectivement des motifs raisonnables et probables d’effectuer la fouille de ces sacs.
80 Although I might have come to a different conclusion had I heard all the evidence myself, I cannot say that the trial judge acted unreasonably in finding that  the mere presence in a back seat of some garbage bags with new clothing on top did not alone constitute objectively reasonable and probable grounds supporting the search of those bags.  While the presence of clothing in bags might suggest that the clothing had recently been stolen, it could also suggest that the appellants had simply been shopping.  I would defer to the trial judge in this regard.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il a cependant été déposé au greffe de la Cour supérieure après le jugement de la Cour supérieure, mais plusieurs mois avant l'audition en Cour d'appel. Le juge de la Cour supérieure n'a donc pas pu en prendre connaissance.
20.                     This report is dated March 5, 1982 and precedes the Surperior Court judgment by five days.  It was however filed with the Registry of the Superior Court after the Superior Court judgment, but several months before the Court of Appeal hearing.  The Superior Court judge therefore was unable to take it into consideration.  The report was also not drawn to the attention of the Court at the hearing of the application for leave to file a cross-appeal made by the C.S.S.T. and inspector Courtois.  The parties then agreed on incorporating the report into the appeal case.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’Alberta a pu en outre réduire sensiblement les taux d’imposition des sociétés dans les secteurs autres que celui des ressources, et ses citoyens jouissent du fardeau fiscal le moins lourd et du revenu disponible le plus élevé au Canada.
Under existing arrangements, the Government of Alberta is enjoying rapid increases in its oil and gas revenues. Its revenues have grown faster than its expenditures, even though those expenditures have risen faster than those in any other province. Alberta has been able, moreover, to reduce substantially its tax rates for non-resource corporations, and its citizens enjoy the lowest tax burden, and the highest disposable incomes, in Canada. With rising oil and gas prices, the revenues accruing to the province are sufficient to allow the Government of Alberta to have growing budgetary surpluses for the foreseeable future.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Attorney-General of Canada, [1930] A.C. 124, elle aurait pu en arriver à une conclusion différente de celle tirée dans l’arrêt Johannesson [Johannesson et autre c. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul et autres], [1952] 1 R.C.S. 292.
Relaxation of some of the strictures thought to limit resort to the peace, order and good government power was seen in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373. That case laid to rest once and for all the idea that the general power could be invoked (apart from its purely residual scope) only in time of a war emergency. Economic stringency might also support reliance on the general power but it must be conceded that in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference the Court was concerned with temporary legislation directed to combatting a conjunction of high inflation and high unemployment. Nonetheless, the considerations actually present in that case and offered in support of the federal legislation cannot be taken to be in themselves limiting factors respecting resort to the general power of Parliament.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le 30 avril 1971 la construction de cet ensemble résidentiel était à ce point avancée que les fonctionnaires de la municipalité intimée ont pu en hausser l’évaluation parce qu’il était devenu «raisonnablement habitable» au sens de cette expression à l’al.
During the years 1970 and 1971 the appellant owned certain lands in the Town of Burlington on which it was building a condominium project. By April 30, 1971, this project had reached the point where the officials of the respondent municipality were able to increase the assessment with respect to this development because it had become “reasonably fit for occupancy”, within the meaning of that term in s. 43(1)(a) of The Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 32, as it stood in April 1971. On July 23, 1971, The Assessment Act was amended retroactively to January 1, 1971, so as delete the words “or reasonably fit for occupancy”, following the words “becomes occupied”, in s. 43(1)(d). The premises in question were in 1971 unoccupied. The appellant disclaimed liability for tax and in November 1971 appealed to the Assessment Review Court, which dismissed the appeal. The appellant then appealed to the county court and the Ontario Municipal Board, both of which also dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the appellant appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which, on May 3, 1974, dismissed the appeal.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
49 L’appelante n’a pas offert de « rallonge » pour obtenir une chose qu’elle avait déjà.  Elle l’a fait en contrepartie d’un engagement tacite que la Ville a pu en fin de compte répudier.
49 The appellant did not offer a “sweetener” for something it got.  It offered consideration for an implied undertaking it turned out the City was able to repudiate.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Auparavant, la parcelle de la rue Napier avait servi pendant de nombreuses années à des fins reliées au transport. Si ce n’avait été de son expropriation, on aurait pu en faire le même usage à l’avenir.
The Napier Street block had been used for many years before for uses in connection with transport. Apart from its expropriation, it could have been so used in the future. It did have the advantage of access both from Napier Street and from the vacant lot also owned by the appellants on York Street and that feature would be an advantage to any garage type of use. Its use by the appellants was simply to drive into it at one end the buses which had arrived from Toronto at the terminal, discharge the passengers and then proceed to this depot to grease and wash those buses in the building and then store them in that building or in the vacant lot overnight and then drive them out onto York Street the next morning back to the terminal to pick up the passengers and depart for Toronto. As was Kelly J.A., I am quite unable to find that that kind of a use was the devotion to a purpose of such a nature that there was no general demand or market for the land for that purpose.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pour appuyer sa conclusion selon laquelle le règlement n’était pas intervenu conformément au jugement, le juge Kellock a fait remarquer que si M. Armstrong avait convenu d’acheter une maison à son ex‑épouse en contrepartie d’une renonciation, il n’aurait pas pu en déduire la valeur, car une [traduction] « telle dépense effectuée pour ne plus avoir à verser une somme payable périodiquement en vertu du jugement aurait constitué un paiement de capital non visé par la loi » (p. 448).
10 As noted by Kerwin C.J., Armstrong was under no obligation under the divorce judgment to pay a lump sum for future support payments.  His obligation was to pay ongoing support at a rate of $100 per month.  Hence it could not be said that the lump sum was paid “pursuant to” the judgment.  To emphasize the fact that the settlement was not made pursuant to the underlying court order, Kellock J. pointed out that if Armstrong had agreed to purchase a house for his ex-wife in return for a release, he could not deduct the value of the house because “[s]uch an outlay made in commutation of the periodic sums payable under the decree is in the nature of a capital payment to which the statute does not extend” (p. 448).  In Kellock J.’s view, the payment of a lump sum for future benefits would, like the house, be characterized as a capital payment.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Les avocats des intimés ont prétendu qu’un procureur général d’une province peut intenter des procédures déclaratoires, mais ils n’ont pu citer aucun précédent à l’appui et je n’ai pu en trouver aucun moi-même.
Short of a reference either to a provincial appellate Court by the Lieutenant Governor in Council or to this Court by the Governor General in Council, is there any other way in which the validity of a statute like the Official Languages Act can be determined in a judicial proceeding when the federal Attorney General has declined to act? Counsel for the respondents contended that a provincial Attorney General could take declaratory proceedings, but he could cite no authority for this proposition nor could I find any. However, want of authority is not an answer if principle supports the submission. I am unable to appreciate upon what principle this submission stands. Can it be said that one Attorney General of one Province is in any different position than any others of other Provinces, or is it suggested that an Attorney General class action be taken? Even if a provincial Attorney General might validly be authorized by provincial legislation to take such declaratory proceedings, I am unaware of any such legislation. As an ordinary common law matter, I do not think a provincial Attorney General is in as strong a position in a case such as the present one as is a federal taxpayer bringing a class action. The provincial Attorney General would be representing the public interest of his Province only, and, moreover, the invalidation of the Official Languages Act would not result in any accretion to, or vindicate any legislative power of the Province.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La Loi établit donc un régime de responsabilité civile rattaché à la commission de certains actes fautifs qualifiés par ailleurs de criminels, en créant un recours permettant aux victimes d'être indemnisées des pertes ou dommages qui ont pu en résulter.
The Act thus creates a scheme of civil liability associated with the commission of certain wrongful acts also categorized as criminal, by creating a right of action which enables victims to be compensated for loss or damage which may result therefrom.  In the rules of evidence the main difference from the general civil law provisions, essentially a minor one, is contained in s. 31.1(2), under which the record containing the conviction of a person for an offence under the Act suffices to establish under the civil liability scheme, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the person was engaged in conduct contrary to the Act.  At the same time, it is not stated that an acquittal under criminal law will have an exonerating effect in an action for damages.  The limitation period is also two years, but under s. 31.1(4) it runs from the conduct alleged or the day on which any criminal proceedings were finally disposed of, whichever is the later.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Toute modification des conditions essentielles de l’appel d’offres au moment de l’adjudication du contrat B est inéquitable à l’égard des autres soumissionnaires, qui auraient pu en bénéficier au début.
125 To hold the owner to the material terms of its tender call in awarding Contract B is a corollary to the duty to accept only a compliant bid and is necessary to ensure fairness throughout the process.  A variation from the essential requirements of the tender call at the time of awarding Contract B is unfair to the other bidders who could have benefited from such variation earlier on in the process.  This obligation does not mean that the parties have no freedom to negotiate on informal or non-material requirements at the time they enter into Contract B.  Since variations of non-material terms could not have the effect of turning a non-compliant bid into a compliant one, other bidders would have no cause for complaint if such variations were made.  Likewise, the parties are at liberty to amend the terms of Contract B after it has been entered into to address circumstances that may arise during the course of its performance.  Since any of the bidders could be faced with changing circumstances that require an amendment to the contract, there could be no allegation of unfairness.  However, where, as here, the City failed to take reasonable steps to evaluate the terms of the bid to ensure compliance, its waiver of the essential age requirement effectively turned a non‑compliant bid into a compliant one and cannot be condoned.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Après avoir mis la requête en délibéré, le juge de première instance a rédigé des motifs de jugement dans lesquels il déclare que la conclusion sur la question 2a) est si manifestement déraisonnable et injuste qu’aucun jury qui aurait examiné la preuve dans son ensemble et agi de façon judiciaire n’aurait pu en arriver là.
moved that the finding of the jury on question 2(a) be set aside as being perverse. After reserving his decision on this motion, the learned trial judge prepared and delivered written reasons for judgment in which he concluded that the finding on question 2(a) was so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached it and he accordingly set that finding aside saying:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Un autre juge aurait certainement pu en décider autrement, mais je suis également d’accord qu’il était loisible à la juge du procès, compte tenu de la preuve et des renseignements dont elle disposait, de refuser d’imposer une amende à M. Topp.
[8] I agree with the Court of Appeal that this was a “close call” (para. 1).  While another judge might well have decided differently, I agree as well that it was open to the trial judge, on the evidence and the information placed before her, to decline to impose a fine.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le vicomte Jowitt a souligné que les réparations non essentielles aux machines du navire n'auraient pu, en l'absence des avaries causées par le gros temps, empêcher le propriétaire de réclamer des dommages‑intérêts pour la période de dix jours au cours de laquelle les avaries imputables à l'abordage étaient réparées.  Plusieurs décisions et d'ouvrages de doctrine ont été cités à l'appui de la proposition selon laquelle, bien que des procédures facultatives exécutées au cours de la réparation des avaries imputables à l'abordage ne réduiraient pas la responsabilité de l'auteur du délit, les réparations nécessaires apportées à d'autres éléments du navire empêcheraient le propriétaire de faire une réclamation pour la période d'arrêt.
Viscount Jowitt noted that the non‑essential repairs to the engines of the ship would not, in the absence of the heavy‑weather damage, have served to bar the owner from recovering damages for the ten‑day period during which the collision damage was being repaired.  A number of authorities were cited for the proposition that while elective procedures performed during the repair of collision damage would not reduce the liability of the tortfeasor, necessary repairs to other elements of the ship would serve as a bar to recovery for the time of detention.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Par conséquent, si vous venez à la conclusion qu’un accusé savait qu’une infraction était en cours et qu’il a intentionnellement omis d’accomplir quelque chose en vue d’aider quelqu’un à commettre l’infraction, chose qui, si elle avait été faite, aurait pu en empêcher ou arrêter la perpétration, alors vous pouvez peut-être conclure que l’accusé était partie à l’infraction.
So that if you find an accused person knew that an offence was being committed and intentionally omit­ted to do something, for the purpose of aiding another to commit the offence, that if he had done it might have hindered or actually prevented the offence, then presumably you can find that the person was a party to the offence. But unless it reaches that level, then you cannot find him a party."
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
afin qu’elle soit recevable, le juge n’aurait pu, en l’espèce, modifier la conclusion recherchée pour y joindre une demande de remboursement, puisque l’appelant lui-même, dans ses procédures, s’oppose expressément à tout remboursement.
make it admissible, the judge could not, in the case at bar, have amended the conclusion sought by attaching a claim for reimbursement, since in his pleadings appellant expressly rejected any reimbursement.
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