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les testaments que contre les donations entre vifs, car le testament se faisant dans le secret et n’étant connu qu’après le décès du testateur, les artifices et les ruses y ont plus libre jeu, et, partant, on y a plus souvent recours.
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raised against wills than against gifts inter vivos, because wills are made in secrecy and only known after the death of the testator, so that schemes and stratagems can be more freely employed, and are therefore more often used. However, such stratagems may well occur in connection with any gift, whether made inter vivos or mortis causa, and they may result in its nullity in either case; it is essential for the donor to act freely, and the gift which he makes to be the result of a deliberate intent.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
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[90] La Cour a énuméré des circonstances courantes qui sont susceptibles de vicier le caractère volontaire d’une confession : menaces ou promesses, oppression, absence d’un état d’esprit conscient et autres ruses policières (Oickle, par. 47-71).
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[91] Accordingly, even though compliance with the informational and waiver requirements are factors considered in determining the voluntary nature of the statement, that does not have the effect of modifying the evidentiary threshold required by criminal law — namely, that all the evidence, when considered together, must give rise to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, the enquiry as to compliance with the statutory preliminary matters in s. 146(2)(b) and (4) is separate and is to be decided, as other preliminary matters, on a standard of proof on a balance of probabilities.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
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Qu’il ait été question de menaces ou de promesses, de l’absence d’un état d’esprit conscient ou encore de ruses policières qui privent injustement l’accusé de son droit de garder le silence, la jurisprudence de notre Cour a invariablement protégé l’accusé contre l’admission en preuve d’une confession non volontaire.
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The doctrines of oppression and inducements are primarily concerned with reliability.  However, as the operating mind doctrine and Lamer J.’s concurrence in Rothman, supra, both demonstrate, the confessions rule also extends to protect a broader conception of voluntariness “that focuses on the protection of the accused’s rights and fairness in the criminal process”:  J. Sopinka, S. N. Lederman and A. W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (2nd ed. 1999), at p. 339.  Voluntariness is the touchstone of the confessions rule.  Whether the concern is threats or promises, the lack of an operating mind, or police trickery that unfairly denies the accused’s right to silence, this Court’s jurisprudence has consistently protected the accused from having involuntary confessions introduced into evidence.  If a confession is involuntary for any of these reasons, it is inadmissible. [Emphasis added; para. 69.]
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
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Appliquant la norme établie dans l’arrêt Oickle, le juge du procès a conclu que M. Singh était dans un état d’esprit conscient et que sa volonté n’était pas ébranlée par des menaces ou des promesses, par de l’oppression ou par des ruses policières qui choqueraient la collectivité.
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74 As Justice Charron notes, the scope of the common law confessions rule is not in issue in this appeal.  Applying the standard set out in Oickle, the trial judge found that Mr. Singh had an operating mind, and that his will was not overborne by threats or promises, by oppression, or by police trickery that would shock the community.  On these findings of fact, he was entitled to conclude, as he did, that Mr. Singh’s inculpatory statements were voluntary, within the meaning of Oickle.  This conclusion was not appealed.
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Comme je l’ai déjà souligné, suivant le critère de l’arrêt Oickle, une déclaration est admissible en common law lorsque le détenu était dans un état d’esprit conscient et que la confession ne résultait pas d’encouragements, d’une oppression ou de ruses policières qui choqueraient la collectivité.
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79 The Court held in Hebert, as we have seen, that the s. 7 right to silence “must be interpreted in a manner which secures to the detained person the right to make a free and meaningful choice as to whether to speak to the authorities or to remain silent” (p. 181).  Under the Oickle test, as noted earlier, a statement is admissible at common law where the detainee had an operating mind and the confession did not result from inducements, oppression, or police trickery that would shock the community.  Clearly, however, a confession that meets these common law standards does not invariably represent a “free and meaningful choice” for the purposes of the Charter.  A choice that has been disregarded, and “unfairly frustrated” (Hebert, at p. 186) by relentless interrogation “in an effort to get [a detainee] to confess, no matter what”, is, once again, neither “free” nor “meaningful”.  And it is a choice not born of  “legitimate means of persuasion” within the meaning of Hebert (p. 177).
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68 Dans le cadre de la règle des confessions prévue par la common law, les tribunaux doivent se demander si les policiers ont utilisé des ruses en vue d’obtenir la confession. Dans l’arrêt Oickle, précité, par.
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68 As part of the common law confessions rule, courts must consider whether police used trickery to obtain a confession.  In Oickle, supra, this Court held, at para.  65, that the more specific objective of the analysis “is maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system” (emphasis added), a concept introduced by Lamer J. (as he then was) in Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640.  In Rothman, Lamer J. held that “[i]t is of the utmost importance to keep in mind that the inquiry is not concerned with reliability but with the authorities’ conduct as regards reliability” (p. 691 (emphasis added)), concluding that “[w]hat should be repressed vigorously is conduct on [the authorities’ part] that shocks the community” (p. 697).  Building on the principle, in Oickle, Iacobucci J. held that “the confessions rule . . . extends to protect a broader conception of voluntariness ‘that focuses on the protection of the accused’s rights and fairness in the criminal process’” (para. 69 (emphasis added)).
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Une déclaration est admissible en common law lorsque le détenu était dans un état d’esprit conscient et que la confession ne résultait pas d’encouragements, d’une oppression ou de ruses policières qui choqueraient la collectivité.
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Per Binnie, LeBel, Fish, and Abella JJ. (dissenting):  The impugned statements were obtained in violation of the accused’s s. 7 right to silence.  The interrogator understood very well that the accused had chosen not to speak with the police but nonetheless disregarded the accused’s repeated assertions of his right to silence.  In his relentless pursuit of a confession “no matter what”, the interrogator urged the accused, subtly but unmistakably, to forsake his counsel’s advice.  The accused was thus deprived not only of his right to silence, but also, collaterally, of the intended benefit of his right to counsel.  Detainees left alone to face interrogators who persistently ignore their assertions of the right to silence and their pleas for respite are bound to feel that their constitutional right to silence has no practical effect and that they in fact have no choice but to answer.  Where continued resistance has been made to appear futile to one person under the dominance or control of another, as it was in this case, ultimate submission proves neither true consent nor valid waiver.   Furthermore, nothing in this Court’s jurisprudence permits the police to press detainees to waive the Charter rights they have firmly and unequivocally asserted, or to deliberately frustrate their effective exercise.  This is true of the right to counsel and true as well of the right to silence.  While detainees who have asserted their right to silence are entitled to change their minds, they cannot be compelled to do so by the persistent disregard of that asserted choice.  The right to silence, like the right to counsel, is a constitutional promise that must be kept.  There is no evidence to support the proposition that requiring the police to respect a detainee’s right of silence, once it has been unequivocally asserted, would have  a “devastating impact” on criminal investigations anywhere in this country.  [59‑60] [62] [66] [71] [81] [88] [95] [97] [99]
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Conformément à l’interprétation large moderne de la règle des confessions, il a aussi ajouté un dernier facteur à considérer pour déterminer si une confession est volontaire ou non — le recours par la police à des ruses qui « choquer[aient] la collectivité », dans le but d’obtenir une confession (par. 66).
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35 Ten years later, this Court in Oickle made express reference to the analysis in Hebert and embraced this modern expansive view of the confessions rule which, significantly for our purposes, clearly includes the right of the detained person to make a meaningful choice whether or not to speak to state authorities:  see paras. 24-26. Iacobucci J. then reviewed the various components of the contemporary confessions rule, stressing, of course, that “[t]he application of the rule will by necessity be contextual” and that “all the relevant factors” must be considered (para. 47).  He went on to describe the more common circumstances that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession using the well-known headings: (a) threats or promises, (b) oppression, and (c) operating mind.  In keeping with the broader modern approach to the confessions rule, he also added a final consideration in determining whether a confession is voluntary or not — the police use of trickery to obtain a confession that would “shock the community” (para. 66).  He explained that:  “Unlike the previous three headings, this doctrine is a distinct inquiry.  While it is still related to voluntariness, its more specific objective is maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system” (para. 65).  Finally, it is noteworthy that, in summarizing the parameters of the confessions rule, Iacobucci J. made express reference to the right to silence as a relevant facet of the rule: