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ÿWPCÙM 5 Sp¨žnXm«¯S³ ° 3 … ‘R 6Ѫ_Õ — EøǬ£èơٍ–Æû Ž³ÊtŒngÂsh”aQ îê è +ü¤–TŽë²CÐP§"AgÁ\! ê² Ç£Êd‹rbë Ä ›Ü\’ç®E]°zwЖrÈ+P±Ö¯Û³s ~‹\°çκJx"§™²XÅqŽT¢D·r^Y v–Œ" öë¹ðÍÛP@ /÷lä6ú³^h.Ëu2 ‡ O²yä˜ .Ý v»¥†5û¢ ‹5 j¸XÕg.
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ÿWPCI Þ ž V ß % 7d …Š Éy-¢Dó † Wÿï ( æ #Âjj0ÚOŸé½å/̾Û FqL™¼>‚¡Ô¶ RPäÿ%…ð»t}ø¥>‹·ù`Jþ€Ehí 9 ] w°¦óy ’m b Ðyñšÿ1MòL|˜I`Ü6»nxã†õhXG Ÿâ©÷Ÿ7òne­#©- ÿnìã$ \± ÙÀ;ži « @Å ß ˆœ† 7$7Ë ¥½Üƒd`¯©ê ßÓŽdq ¤ÛÂ’eƒ >RŽ n¡ NF8 "G Ã^Cà½Už‚
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le terrain ici en cause dans une nouvelle zone de façon à en augmenter la valeur aux fins d’aménagement, la défenderesse l’avait établi dans une zone qui lui aurait fait perdre de la valeur et si les propriétaires l’avaient ensuite vendu, aurait-on pu obtenir alors, quand le rè­glement de nouveau zonage aurait été déclaré invalide pour les mêmes motifs que le règlement n° 177, que les propriétaires avaient le droit de se faire indemniser de leurs pertes par la municipalité?
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development value, the defendant had rezoned so as to reduce its value and the owners had sold it thereafter, could it be successfully contended, when the rezoning by-law was declared invalid on the same ground as By-law No. 177, that the owners were entitled to recoup their losses from the municipality? I think not, because the risk of loss from the exercise of legislative or adjudicative authority is a general public risk and not one for which compensation can be supported on the basis of a private duty of care. The situation is different where a claim for damages for negligence is based on acts done in pursuance or in implementation of legislation or of adjudi­cative decrees.
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à ce qu’un avis soit donné à l’association en tant que partie intéressée, qu’elle savait avoir un in­térêt. La défenderesse avait omis de donner un avis, ce qui était contraire à ses propres règles de procédure en la matière, et le règlement était donc invalide.
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To complete the framework of facts within which that question must be resolved I note that soon after the agreement to lease the Ginsburg land was made with its assignor, the plaintiff engaged architects and a firm of solicitors and embarked on necessary preparations (including demolition of existing structures) to comply with building requirements. A building permit was not sought until shortly after the Wiswell action was instituted, and it was refused by the designat­ed officer because of, inter alia, the pending litigation on the validity of the rezoning by-law. An appeal was taken immediately to the Board of Adjustment which, in a decision on December 17, 1963, directed the officer to issue the requested permit for a twelve-storey building. Following the issue of the permit, a contract was executed by the plaintiff and a construction firm for the erection of the building. The trial judg­ment in the Wiswell case declaring By-law No. 177 to be invalid was handed down on. January 28, 1964, and the building permit was thereupon revoked. Save for some subsequent protective construction, all work on the apartment project was then stopped.
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City of Toronto[13] et Waterous Engine Works Co. v. Town of Palmerston[14] ne s’appliquent donc pas, car il s’agissait de cas où, d’après la législation pertinente, des pouvoirs municipaux ne pouvaient être exercés que par un rè-glement municipal.
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Three things are plain from the Towns Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 309, which governs the respondent’s capacity and powers. First, s. 3 (2) declares it to be “capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name and of purchasing, acquiring and holding… all kinds of real and personal property for the use of the town”. This is reinforced by s. 19 (2) which empowers a town to make and carry out any contract within its powers. Second, the streets and sidewalks in a town are, under s. 145, vested in the town and are under the control of its council. By s. 171 the town council is empowered at the town’s expense to make provision for clearing away snow and ice from its sidewalks and thoroughfares. Third, the Towns Act does not prescribe any particular formalities which must be satisfied before a town can become contractually bound in a matter within its powers. Cases such as John Mackay and Company v. City of Toronto[13] and Waterous Engine Works Co. v. Town of Palmerston[14], where a by-law was imperative, under applicable legislation, for the exercise of municipal powers, are hence inapplicable. The Towns Act does not even prescribe a writing, and it was not contended that there is any surviving common law requirement of a sealed instrument, at least not in a case like the present one where the municipality has enjoyed the benefit of the goods for which payment is sought.
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Pour mieux étudier cette affaire en ce qui concerne l’obligation continue de diligence qu’on dit exister et son inexécution, il conviendrait d’abord de passer en revue les étapes de l’adoption du rè­glement n° 177 et de voir les motifs pour lesquels cette Cour, dans l’arrêt Wiswell, l’a déclaré invalide.
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A district home owners' association had oppos­ed the extension of the Zoning Board orders to April 30, 1963, but without success. The consid­eration of the further application to rezone Dr. Ginsburg's land from R1 to R4A followed the prescribed procedures, including the giving of public notice, through newspaper advertisements, of the date of hearing of the application, but there was a failure to provide the applicant with notices to be posted on his premises. The association did not in fact see the newspaper notices because its secretary, who had the responsibility for such matters, was away on vacation at the time. No express notice was given to the association of the rezoning hearing (although such notice was given to Dr. Ginsburg's solicitors), nor were any of the officers of the association aware of the pendency of the hearing. In the result, no one appeared on its behalf to oppose the enactment of what became By-law No. 177. On November 28, 1963, more than eighteen months after that by-law was passed, the association instituted a declaratory action to impeach its validity and, as already noted, it succeeded finally in this Court.
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ÐÌFile€No.:26081.ÌÌ1998:December2;1999:October15.ÌÌÓ ÓPresent:Ô_ ÔLð ðHeureuxÔ_ Ô-Ô_ ÔDub Ô_ Ô,€Ô_ ÔGonthierÔ_ Ô,€CoryÙ * ƒ É ! Ù,× ƒ ×Ý ƒ #à Ýò òÚ Ú*Ú Úó óÝ Ý× ×€Ô_ ÔMcLachlinÔ_ Ô,€Ô_ ÔIacobucciÔ_ Ô,€Ô_ ÔBastaracheÔ_ Ô€andÐ Ì ÐÔ_ ÔBinnieÔ_ ԁJJ.Ó ÓÌÌon€appeal€from€the€court€of€appeal€for€Ô_ ÔalbertaÔ_ ÔÌÌò òà Q àReceivership€„„€Wrongful€appointment€of€receiver€„„€Bank€obtaining€order€forÐ ø"H & Ðappointment€of€receiver€„„€Misleading€material€placed€before€Master€„„€Receiver€seizingÏand€liquidating€debtorð ðs€assets€„„€Whether€bank€liable.ó óÐ (&x!* ÐÌà Q àò òContracts€„„€Notice€€„„€Contract€with€no€provision€as€to€notice€€„„€Demand€forÐ X)¨$. Ðrepayment€of€loan€made€with€no€or€minimal€notice€„„€Whether€creditor€liable€for€breachÏof€contract.ó óÐ ˆ,Ø'2 ÐÔ_ Ô‡à Q àò òDamages€€„„€Exemplary€damages€„„€Master€misled€in€application€for€orderÐ h Ðof€receivership€„„€Misconduct€not€on€level€of€fraud,€malicious€prosecution€or€abuse€ofÏprocess€„„€Whether€exemplary€damages€warranted.ó óÐ ˜ 0 ÐÌà Q àThe€bank€granted€Got€a€revolving€line€of€credit€margined€to€its€accountsÏreceivable€and€as€security€obtained€a€floating€charge€debenture,€a€general€assignment€ofÏbook€debts€and€a€personal€guarantee€of€its€president.€€Got€exceeded€the€line€of€credit,€andÏnegotiations€ensued.€€The€security€promised€by€Got€was€not€produced€and€the€otherÏmeasures€Got€agreed€to€were€not€acted€upon.€€The€bank€finally€Ô ‡ X m„ X X X m„ Ôcut€off€contact€with€theÐ ( À Ðrespondents,€and€intentionally€avoided€telling€them€that€it€would€be€calling€in€theÏdebenture€and€would€be€seeking€to€appoint€a€receiver.€€A€notification€of€accountsÏreceivable€and€a€letter€of€demand€were€served.€€The€following€day,€the€bank€brought€aÏmotion€to€appoint€a€receiver.€€The€lawyer€for€the€respondents€attended€withoutÏinstructions€from€his€clients.€€A€receiver€was€appointed,€€took€control€of€the€company€Ô # † X m„ X X X m„ # ÔandÐ ¸ Ðsubsequently€was€granted€further€powers€by€the€court.€€The€court€later€approved€the€saleÏof€Gotð ðs€assets.ÌÌÔ ‡ X m„ X X X m„ Ôà Q àThe€bank€sued€for€its€debt.€€The€respondents€defended€the€claim€and€Got€filedÐ €! " Ða€counterclaim€alleging€breach€of€contract€and€conversion,€based€on€the€bankð ðs€lack€ofÏnotice€in€calling€its€loan€and€appointing€a€receiver.€€Prior€to€the€trial,€Got€also€brought€aÏmotion€to€set€aside€the€receivership€order,€but€this€was€later€withdrawn,€and€GotÏultimately€co„operated€with€the€receiver€pursuant€to€an€agreement€that€it€be€permitted€toÏcounterclaim€ag
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Ðconstitute€a€difference€between€the€partiesð ð.€€Prior€to€the€expiry€of€her€probationaryÐ Ô/p)4 Ðterm,€O€went€on€maternity€leave.€€Within€a€few€days€of€returning€to€work,€the€employerÐ d Ðdischarged€her.€€O€filed€a€grievance.Ð ü ˜ ÐÌà œ àThe€majority€of€the€Board€of€Arbitration€found€that€s.48(12)(j)€of€theÐ , È ÐOntario€ò òLabour€Relations€Act,€1995ó ó€(ð ðò òLRAó óð ð),€empowers€a€board€of€arbitration€toÐ Ä ` Ðinterpret€a€collective€agreement€in€a€manner€consistent€with€the€ò òHuman€Rights€Codeó óÐ \ ø Ðand€imports€the€substantive€rights€of€the€ò òHuman€Rights€Code€ó óinto€a€collectiveÐ ô  Ðagreement€over€which€an€arbitrator€has€jurisdiction.€€The€Board€ruled€that€it€wasÐ Œ ( Ðentitled€to€consider€whether€O€had€been€a€victim€of€discrimination€under€the€ò òHumanÐ $ À ÐRights€Codeó ó.€€The€Divisional€Court€granted€the€employerð ðs€application€for€judicialÐ ¼ X Ðreview,€holding€that€s.48(12)(j)€confers€power€on€a€board€of€arbitration€to€interpretÐ T ð Ðand€apply€the€ò òHuman€Rights€Code€ó ówhen€and€if€it€already€has€jurisdiction€to€hear€aÐ ì ˆ Ðgrievance,€but€not€otherwise.€€Because€the€grievance€was€not€a€difference€arising€outÐ „ Ðof€the€collective€agreement,€the€Board€did€not€have€the€jurisdiction€to€resolve€theÐ ¸ Ðdispute.€€The€Court€of€Appeal€set€aside€the€decision.€€Although€the€court€was€inclinedÐ ´ P Ðto€the€view€that€the€Divisional€Court€erred€in€its€application€of€s.48(12)(j)€of€the€ò òLRAó ó,Ð L è Ðit€preferred€not€to€express€a€concluded€opinion€on€this€question.€€The€court€decided€theÐ ä € Ðmatter€with€reference€to€the€ò òEmployment€Standards€Actó ó€(ð ðò òESAó óð ð),€noting,€first,€that€s.44Ð |! " Ðof€the€ò òESAó ó€provides€that€an€employer€shall€not€dismiss€an€employee€because€theÐ #° $ Ðemployee€takes€ð ðpregnancy€leaveð ð€and,€second,€that€under€s.64.5(1)€of€the€ò òESAó ó,€theÐ ¬$H & Ðterms€and€conditions€of€the€ò òESAó ó€are€enforceable€against€the€employer€as€if€they€wereÐ D&à ( Ða€part€of€the€collective€agreement.€€The€Court€of€Appeal€concluded,€therefore,€that€theÐ Ü'x!* ÐBoard€had€jurisdiction€to€consider€whether€Oð ðs€dismissal€was€inconsistent€with€s.44.Ð t) #, ÐÌà œ àò òHeldó ó€(Major€and€LeBel€JJ.€dissenting):€€The€appeal€should€be€dismissed.Ð ¤,@&0 Ðâ âÐ