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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[19] La Cour d’appel fédérale a traité brièvement de la question de la norme de contrôle applicable, précisant qu’« il n’y a[vait] pas lieu de l’examiner puisqu[’elle] estim[ait], essentiellement pour les motifs exposés par la Commission, que celle‑ci a[vait] correctement statué » (par. 9).
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	[19] The Court of Appeal dealt briefly with the standard of review, stating, “There is no need to dwell on this issue as, in my view, the Board came to the correct conclusion essentially for the reasons that it gave” (para. 9).

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Deuxièmement, l'interprétation fournie à l'appelant n'était pas fidèle. Non seulement était‑elle totalement absente dans le cas de l'échange avec le juge, mais encore les résumés en une phrase qui ont été effectués n'ont pas transmis tout ce qui avait été dit.

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First, the appellant did not receive continuous interpretation of all of the evidence at his trial.  Rather, the questions posed to and answers given by Mr. Nguyen were distilled and condensed into two, one-sentence summaries.  Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the interpreter's exchange with the judge was translated at all, not even in summary form.  In other words, the requirement of continuity was not complied with.

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Néanmoins, les membres de la majorité ont dit être d’avis que M. Bhadauria avait perdu tout sens des proportions en raison de la durée des procédures de la commission d’enquête, de la déception et de la frustration provoquées par l’absence de promotion et du stress en résultant.

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23 Nonetheless, the majority was of the view that the length of the proceedings before the Board of Inquiry, Mr. Bhadauria’s disappointment and frustration at his failure to receive a promotion, and the resulting stress caused him to lose perspective.  They then concluded that since the proceedings before the Board of Inquiry were no longer hanging over the grievor’s head, that “there is a good chance that the grievor will return to a calmer state”.  Further, the majority held that:

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[8] Le juge a conclu que les jurés avaient de la difficulté à comprendre la distinction entre un homicide involontaire coupable et un meurtre, malgré ce qu’il leur avait dit dans son exposé. Selon le juge, le fait que le jury ait demandé une définition de l’homicide involontaire coupable [traduction] « donn[ait] à penser qu’il a[vait] de la difficulté à établir si oui ou non c’en est un ».

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[8] The judge concluded that the jury was having difficulty understanding the distinction between manslaughter and murder, notwithstanding what he had said in his charge. That they had asked for a definition of manslaughter, the judge said, “would tend to suggest that they are wrestling as to whether or not it is”. He nonetheless refused to give them the definition they had requested, or to provide them with any instructions as to the essential elements of manslaughter.

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Comme pour l'accusée dans Simmons, on a cessé d'appliquer la procédure normale à l'égard de l'appelant et on l'a forcé à subir un interrogatoire; il y avait une «perception raisonnable qu'on n'a[vait] vraiment pas le choix» et «une privation involontaire de liberté» comme dans l'arrêt Simmons.

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Heald J.A. also held that this Court's decision in R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, supported the appellant's claim.  Heald J.A. rejected the majority's suggestion that the secondary examination was merely another form of routine questioning akin to that which every traveller is required to undergo upon seeking to enter Canada, and was held in Simmons not to constitute a detention in the constitutional sense.  Rather, Heald J.A. found the appellant's situation to be analogous to the inquisitorial strip search which the accused in Simmons was forced to undergo and which Dickson C.J. in that case held to give rise to a s. 10(b) detention.  Like the accused in Simmons, the appellant was taken out of the normal course and required to submit to interrogation; there was a "reasonable perception of suspension of freedom of choice" and an "involuntary restraint of liberty" as in Simmons.

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Le litige était entre un enseignant et son employeur, une commission scolaire. La convention qui les liait stipulait que l’une ou l’autre des parties pou­vait y mettre fin par préavis de trente jours.

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Concerning the decision of this Court in Acme Village School District v. Steele-Smith[10], I would point out that the situation was quite different. The dispute was between a school teacher and a school board which was his employer. The agreement between them provided for termination by either party giving thirty days notice in writing to the other. Subsequent to the making of the agreement, the Legislature amended the section of the School Act contemplating the termination of teachers' engagements by such notice. The amendment provided that except in the month of June, no such notice shall be given by a Board without the approval of an inspector previously obtained. This Court held that the teacher was entitled to the benefit of the amendment. Lamont J. said, speaking for the majority (at p. 52):

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28 En ce qui concerne le témoignage de Patricia, la juge de première instance a conclu que Patricia avait été [traduction] « évasive et a[vait] offert une preuve contradictoire » et qu’elle avait « volontairement donné une version inexacte des faits » (par. 51).

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28 As to Patricia’s testimony, the trial judge found that she “was evasive and gave conflicting evidence” and that “she purposely misrepresented events” (para. 51).  The trial judge observed that contrary to instructions given to her not to discuss her testimony while under cross-examination, she contravened that admonition.  The trial judge also noted that Patricia removed estate files from the estate’s solicitor without authorization and failed to return them despite requests to do so.  For these reasons, little weight can be accorded to Patricia’s evidence as to what her father understood at the time the joint accounts were opened about beneficial title to the assets in the accounts on his death.

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18 Le juge du procès n’a pas cru à l’importance du témoignage contradictoire relativement au divan rouge parce qu’il [traduction] «concern[ait] l’endroit où l’infraction a[vait] été commise, d’après une enfant de six ou sept ans, par opposition à l’identité de l’auteur et à la nature de l’infraction dont elle a[vait] été victime, c’est-à-dire à la question de savoir qui a[vait] fait quoi» (par. 26).

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18 The trial judge did not believe that the contradictory testimony in relation to the red couch was significant because it “relate[d] to the where of the offence as recounted by a six or seven-year-old as opposed to the what and the who, the who did-it and what-was-done to her by him” (para. 26).  He stated that he was considering the evidence in relation to the red couch in accordance with the “common sense approach” to children’s evidence prescribed by this Court in R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 57.

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Il a indiqué que huit années de discrimination avaient fait de lui [traduction] «un être de marbre, dépourvu de sentiments» et un «démon assoiffé de sang et de vengeance». Il a écrit que la «persécution a[vait] totalement détruit [s]a capacité d’enseigner, [s]a mémoire et [s]a gentillesse».

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64 It is significant that the grievor himself stated in his letters that he was unfit to be in a classroom.  He indicated that eight years of discrimination had turned him into “an emotionless human stone” and “a blood‑thirsty and revengeful devil.”  He wrote that “persecution has totally destroyed my teaching ability, my memory, and my gentleness”.  Furthermore, Mr. Bhadauria promised at the end of the second letter that he would “haunt”  Dr. McKeown, and remind him yearly at Christmas that he was the “funeral director” of Mr. Bhadauria’s career and that “there [would] be no escaping” this reminder.  The letters themselves suggest that his conduct will continue, and that he is therefore unfit to teach.

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[33] Dans l’affaire Burns, notre Cour devait trancher la question de savoir si l’art. 7 exigeait du ministre, avant qu’il ne prenne un arrêté d’extradition, qu’il obtienne de l’État requérant l’assurance que le fugitif ne serait pas condamné à mort s’il était reconnu coupable des actes reprochés.

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[33] In Burns, the issue was whether s. 7 requires that the Minister, before ordering surrender, seek assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed where the fugitive faces the possibility of being sentenced to death upon conviction in the requesting state. In concluding that such assurances are required in all but the most exceptional cases, the Court emphasized the serious philosophical and practical concerns regarding capital punishment that had been expressed by Canada and by the international community, noting in particular the fact that the death penalty is final and irreversible. In addition, the Minister was unable to “poin[t] to any public purpose that would be served by extradition without assurances that is not substantially served by extradition with assurances” (para. 125 (emphasis in original)). Burns thus serves as an example of the kind of critical circumstances in which a reviewing court will interfere with the Minister’s decision.

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18 La juge Van Melle a conclu qu’aucune preuve n’étayait les prétentions de Patricia selon lesquelles son père avait l’intention de lui faire don du solde des comptes conjoints — il n’existait aucun document en ce sens, aucune déclaration claire n’avait été faite à qui que ce soit et la conduite du père à l’égard des comptes conjoints, de son vivant, ne concordait pas avec les prétentions de Patricia.

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18 Van Melle J. found that there was no evidence to support Patricia’s position that her father intended to gift the contents of his joint accounts to her —  there was no documentation to that effect, there was no clear statement to anyone and the father’s conduct vis-à-vis the joint accounts while he was alive did not support this contention.  Indeed, she also did not believe much of Patricia’s evidence, finding that she was “evasive and gave conflicting evidence” and that she “purposely misrepresented events” (para. 51). Van Melle J. found that the father had sole control of the assets in the accounts during his lifetime and he declared and paid all income tax on the income generated from the joint accounts and investments.  She concluded that the joint account agreement was not determinative of the father’s intention. She could not find evidence of an intention to benefit Patricia financially over the other children.

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Toutefois, le savant Juge en chef a aussi conclu que la demande de conservation de biens ne rele­vait pas des Règles de procédure de la Saskatche­wan. Avec égards, je partage cet avis. Je ne puis imaginer que les règles 387 et 390 aient pu viser un cas comme celui-ci où des sommes d’argent sont versées sous contrainte et sous protêt au fisc en attendant que l’on décide de la validité d’une disposition fiscale.

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The learned Chief Justice concluded also, however, that the application for preservation was not one which came within the ambit of the Saskatch­ewan Rules of Court and, with respect, 1 agree. I cannot conceive that Rules 387 and 390 were ever intended for a case such as this where moneys are being paid under duress and protest to a taxing authority pending determination of the validity of a taxing enactment. Rules 387 and 390 pertain to the preservation of property which might be trans­ferred or destroyed or spirited away thereby caus­ing irreparable harm while litigation is in progress. The reference in Rule 390 to inspection of the property, permission to photograph, entry upon land and the taking of samples are clearly out of place when one is speaking of money. "Money" is in no way unique so as to require preservation. The dollars which the appellants pay to the respondent will not be the same dollars which the appellants will get back if they are successful. In the meantime, the respondent will have the use of the dollars. All of this is inapposite to the preservation of property with which Rules 387 and 390 are concerned.

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44 La contribuable a fait valoir que ce profit constituait un gain en capital réalisé sur un placement à court terme en monnaie étrangère. La Cour d’appel, qui n’était pas de cet avis, a estimé que le profit sur change était directement lié aux activités commerciales courantes de la contribuable et devait être inclus dans son revenu.

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44 The taxpayer argued that the profit was a capital gain realized on a temporary investment in foreign currency.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the foreign exchange gain was directly linked to the taxpayer’s ordinary commercial operation and that it should be included in income.  Lord Greene, M.R., stated that the company “ha[d] sold a surplus stock of dollars which it had acquired for the purpose of effecting a transaction on revenue account” (p. 121).  He added that in the circumstances, the U.S. dollars functioned as a commodity in that, like other commodities, their value in relation to sterling was a fluctuating one.  I doubt that this observation can, as the respondent suggests, be fairly interpreted to mean that foreign currency necessarily has the character of a commodity.  It seems to follow from the characterization of the foreign currency as inventory such that any profits arising out of its sale would be on income, not on capital, account.

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On doit noter que ni dans sa demande de certio­rari et de mandamus, ni dans son affidavit, l’appe­lant n’allègue ou jure que la faculté ou le comité du conseil était partial, avait agi de mauvaise foi ou était animé d’un motif répréhensible.

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It must be noted that neither in his application for certiorari and mandamus nor in his affidavit did appellant allege or swear that the faculty or the committee of the council were biased, acted in bad faith or were inspired by any improper motive. The sole basis of his application is that he was not heard by the committee of the council. Appellant's letter of February 2, 1976, in which he wrote that he was told that the reason why he was being asked to discontinue was not his marks but his tendency to be neurotic was filed on behalf of the university. It is an unsworn statement upon which appellant did not rely in his pleadings. This unsworn statement, although not specifically con­tradicted, is not consistent with several paragraphs of Professor Hanowski's affidavit according to which the reason why appellant might be asked to discontinue his studies was his failure to maintain an adequate academic standard. This reason was confirmed by the Dean's letter to appellant dated February 27, 1976. Furthermore, and in reply to questions asked by members of the Court in the course of argument, appellant's counsel answered that what appellant wanted, ultimately and basi­cally, was to have his marks revised after the committee of the council had determined in a properly held hearing, whether the evaluation process was rightly challenged by appellant.

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L’avocat de Pan a suggéré de rappeler les jurés afin de les exhorter gentiment à s’acquitter de leur tâche et précisé que l’autre façon de régler la question consistait à [traduction] « déclarer qu’il y a[vait] désaccord du jury ».

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Upon receipt of the note, O’Connell J. ordered the jury to cease their deliberations.  O’Connell J. reconvened court to discuss with counsel the implications of the note and the appropriate course to follow.  Counsel for Pan suggested that the jury be brought back in for a gentle exhortation, and stated that the other way of dealing with the matter was to “declare them a hung jury”.  Counsel for the Crown objected to declaring a mistrial and instead favoured bringing the jury back for a gentle exhortation.  O’Connell J. indicated to counsel that, in his view, there were only two options:  conducting an inquiry of juror #1 in the absence of the other jurors concerning the note or declaring a mistrial.  Both counsel strongly opposed conducting an inquiry of juror #1.  After retiring for 45 minutes to consider the matter, O’Connell J. returned to court, called in the jury and declared a mistrial.

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Je ne peux être d’accord avec le juge Morrow lorsqu’il dit, dans le dernier passage susmentionné de ses motifs, où il résume son opinion, que le juge de première instance a fait une erreur manifeste en acceptant le témoignage des experts portant que l’opération en cause pouvait être prati­quée aussi bien à Lethbridge qu’à Calgary, s’il n’y avait pas de complications.

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The present case is not one which calls for more refinement of issues touching the duty of disclo­sure and its extent. In my view, the findings of the trial judge make this unnecessary. There are, however, certain observations in the majority reasons of the Alberta Appellate Division to which I wish to refer. I cannot agree with Morrow J.A. when he said, in the concluding summarizing passage of his reasons, quoted above, that there was manifest error in the trial judge's acceptance of the expert evidence that the particular operation could be carried out in Lethbridge as well as in Calgary, if without complication. The appellant also so testi­fied and, on the whole evidence, including that which described the operation performed by the appellant as a routine disc operation, it was open to the trial judge to make the findings that he did make.

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18 Le juge du procès n’a pas cru à l’importance du témoignage contradictoire relativement au divan rouge parce qu’il [traduction] «concern[ait] l’endroit où l’infraction a[vait] été commise, d’après une enfant de six ou sept ans, par opposition à l’identité de l’auteur et à la nature de l’infraction dont elle a[vait] été victime, c’est-à-dire à la question de savoir qui a[vait] fait quoi» (par. 26).

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18 The trial judge did not believe that the contradictory testimony in relation to the red couch was significant because it “relate[d] to the where of the offence as recounted by a six or seven-year-old as opposed to the what and the who, the who did-it and what-was-done to her by him” (para. 26).  He stated that he was considering the evidence in relation to the red couch in accordance with the “common sense approach” to children’s evidence prescribed by this Court in R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 57.

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18 Le juge du procès n’a pas cru à l’importance du témoignage contradictoire relativement au divan rouge parce qu’il [traduction] «concern[ait] l’endroit où l’infraction a[vait] été commise, d’après une enfant de six ou sept ans, par opposition à l’identité de l’auteur et à la nature de l’infraction dont elle a[vait] été victime, c’est-à-dire à la question de savoir qui a[vait] fait quoi» (par. 26).

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18 The trial judge did not believe that the contradictory testimony in relation to the red couch was significant because it “relate[d] to the where of the offence as recounted by a six or seven-year-old as opposed to the what and the who, the who did-it and what-was-done to her by him” (para. 26).  He stated that he was considering the evidence in relation to the red couch in accordance with the “common sense approach” to children’s evidence prescribed by this Court in R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 57.

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20 Le juge Linden a conclu que la troisième condition n’était pas non plus remplie puisqu’«[i]l ressort[ait] d’un examen réaliste du fond de l’affaire qu’il n’y a[vait] eu aucune utilisation ni fin autre que celle d’éviter un impôt à l’égard de l’emprunt en $ NZ» (par. 60).

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20 Neither had the third condition been met, held Linden J.A: “[l]ooking realistically at the substance of the situation, there was no use and purpose other than the avoidance of taxation for borrowing NZ$” (para. 60).  This, he concluded, was not an eligible use.  Because only the US$ were used to earn eligible income, s. 20(1)(c)(i) permitted only the deduction of interest calculated at the rate of 9.1 percent per annum.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[19] La Cour d’appel fédérale a traité brièvement de la question de la norme de contrôle applicable, précisant qu’« il n’y a[vait] pas lieu de l’examiner puisqu[’elle] estim[ait], essentiellement pour les motifs exposés par la Commission, que celle‑ci a[vait] correctement statué » (par. 9).
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	[19] The Court of Appeal dealt briefly with the standard of review, stating, “There is no need to dwell on this issue as, in my view, the Board came to the correct conclusion essentially for the reasons that it gave” (para. 9).

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	En fait, le Comité judiciaire n’a fait que conti­nuer, en matière de dépens, la politique qu’il sui­vait avant l’arrêt Johnson: Russell v. The Queen[13]; Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mercer[14]; Hodge v.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	In fact, the Judicial Committee merely con­tinued, in the matter of costs, the policy which it followed before the Johnson case: Russell v. The Queen[13]; Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mercer[14]; Hodge v. The Queen[15]; Attorney-General for Quebec v. Reed[16]; Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick[17].

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[48] Dans Shilon, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a reconnu qu’une [traduction] « intervention humaine délibérée et indépendante dans une suite d’événements amorcée par l’accusé peut rompre le lien de causalité », mais elle a conclu que c’est l’accusé qui « a[vait] créé la situation très tendue et l’a[vait] fait perdurer » en plus d’avoir « provoqué » la conduite dangereuse du tiers, qui était donc « directement liée » aux actes de l’accusé (par. 43).

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[48] In Shilon, the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted that “independent voluntary human intervention in events started by an accused may break the chain of causation” but concluded that it was the accused who “created and continued the highly charged situation” and “provoked” the third party’s dangerous driving, which was therefore “directly linked” to the accused’s actions (para. 43).

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[48] Dans Shilon, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a reconnu qu’une [traduction] « intervention humaine délibérée et indépendante dans une suite d’événements amorcée par l’accusé peut rompre le lien de causalité », mais elle a conclu que c’est l’accusé qui « a[vait] créé la situation très tendue et l’a[vait] fait perdurer » en plus d’avoir « provoqué » la conduite dangereuse du tiers, qui était donc « directement liée » aux actes de l’accusé (par. 43).

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[48] In Shilon, the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted that “independent voluntary human intervention in events started by an accused may break the chain of causation” but concluded that it was the accused who “created and continued the highly charged situation” and “provoked” the third party’s dangerous driving, which was therefore “directly linked” to the accused’s actions (para. 43).

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION] Il a ensuite indiqué au jury qu’il pou­vait rendre les verdicts suivants: coupable de meurtre punissable de mort, coupable d’homicide involontaire coupable ou non coupable. Il n’a pas informé le jury qu’il pouvait rendre, dans le cas de Miller, un verdict de culpabilité de meurtre punissable d’emprisonnement à perpétuité et cela, comme je l’ai démontré, constitue une erreur.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	He later instructed the jury that the verdicts that it was open to them to find were guilty of murder punishable by death, guilty of manslaughter and not guilty. He said nothing about guilty of murder punishable by imprisonment for life being a verdict open to the jury in the case of Miller, and this was error, as I have shown.

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42 La promesse et la menace visaient toutes deux la petite amie de l’intimé, et il ressort clairement du dossier que leur lien était « important au point de soulever un doute raisonnable quant à la question de savoir si on a[vait] subjugué la volonté » de l’intimé (Oickle, par. 57).

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39 Unlike Justice Deschamps, I find that the British Columbia Court of Appeal gave appropriate weight to this “most important consideration”.  The trial judge, unfortunately, did not.  And, in my respectful view, his error resulted from a misapprehension of the applicable test of voluntariness.  An error of this sort is an error of law — and not an error of fact, or of mixed law and fact:  R. v. Morin, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 286.

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En l'espèce, contrairement à l'arrêt Kwok, [traduction] «[l]es autorités de l'Immigration [n'ont pas agi] de manière à indiquer que la restriction de la liberté [de l'appelant] a[vait] excédé ce qui est requis pour le traitement de sa demande d'admission et [était] devenue une entrave à la liberté comme celle envisagée par le juge Le Dain» dans l'arrêt Therens, précité.

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In this case, unlike in Kwok, there was no "action on the part of the immigration authorities to indicate that the restriction on [the appellant's] freedom ha[d] gone beyond that required for the processing of his application for entry and ha[d] become a restraint of liberty such as that contemplated by Le Dain J." in Therens, supra.  The questioning which occurred in this case was purely for the purpose of processing the appellant's application for entry and determining the appropriate procedures which should be invoked in order to deal with his application for Convention refugee status.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	vait être inéquitable envers l’accusé. J’ajouterai qu’en déterminant si la recevoir devait être inéquitable envers l’accusé, on doit certainement s’arrêter à la question de savoir si cette preuve a été obtenue de façon oppressive, par la force, ou contre le gré de l’accusé.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	add that in considering whether admissibility would operate unfairly against a defendant one would certainly consider whether it had been obtained in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of an accused person. That is the general principle.

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En l’espèce, le rapport a été dressé pour la gou­verne «d’une catégorie précise de personnes», à savoir des investisseurs éventuels, «pour une caté­gorie précise de transactions», à savoir un apport en , capital de $20,000. Le nombre d’investisseurs éventuels serait obligatoirement limité puisque la compagnie, à titre de compagnie privée, ne pou­vait, en vertu de l’al.

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In the case at bar, the accounts were prepared for the guidance of a "specific class of persons", potential investors, in a "specific class of transac­tions", the investment of $20,000 of equity capital. The number of potential investors would, of neces­sity, be limited because the company, as a private company, was prohibited by s. 3(o) (iii) of The Companies Act of Saskatchewan (R.S.S. 1965, c. 131) from extending any invitation to the public to subscribe for shares or debentures of the company.

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[55] M. Comeau a allégué que Halifax [traduction] « [les] a[vait] traités et continu[ait] de [les] traiter différemment, [ses] enfants et [lui], du fait de [leur] origine ethnique (acadienne), en les assujettissant à une taxe supplémentaire . . . sans verser au [Conseil] une partie des fonds ainsi prélevés » (d.a., p. 119).

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[55] Mr. Comeau alleged that Halifax had “treated, and continue[d] to treat, [him] and [his] children differentially on account of [their] ethnic origin (Acadian) by levying the supplementary tax . . . and by not providing any of the funds generated by the supplementary tax to the [Conseil]” (A.R., at p. 119).  Mr. Comeau contended that this differential treatment violated ss. 5(1)(a) and (q) of the Act.  (He also contended that it violated his s. 15 Charter rights, but the Commission has made clear that it does not intend to pursue this aspect of his claim.)

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En acceptant la fiducie, W assumait l’obligation d’exercer un jugement indépendant et se trouvait inves­tie à l’égard des légataires universels d’un devoir qu’elle a violé en omettant de vendre en temps opportun les actions de l’I.

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In accepting the trusteeship, W became obligated to exercise an independent judgment and she assumed a duty to the beneficiaries of the residuary estate which, in failing to sell the I shares in timely fashion, she breached. However, Canada Permanent could look to W for contribution and indemnity only if she was liable to the beneficiaries for breach of trust; she was not liable if the Court relieved her pursuant to s. 98. W should be so relieved as she had acted honestly and reasonably in the circumstances.