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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De l'avis du juge Henry, il convenait davantage d'appliquer la loi du lieu du délit ou la loi appropriée (c.‑à‑d. celle du lieu qui avait le lien le plus important avec le délit) qui était un concept américain. Il a formulé l'espoir, réitéré depuis dans maintes affaires, y compris celles dont nous sommes saisis, que la question soit abordée par les tribunaux d'appel ou par le législateur.
The law as enunciated in McLean v. Pettigrew has remained the basic rule in Canada ever since.  However, its fundamental weaknesses began to be revealed in a series of Ontario cases beginning in the 1980s.  The first requiring discussion is Going v. Reid Brothers Motor Sales Ltd. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 201 (H.C.).  There the plaintiffs were seriously injured in a collision with the defendant's vehicle in Quebec owing to the negligence of the defendant.  All the parties resided in Ontario.  In an action in Ontario, Henry J. held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages in accordance with Ontario law despite the fact that the no-fault scheme in Quebec, where the accident took place, extinguished any action in respect of bodily injuries arising out of the accident.  Had there been no breach of Quebec law of any kind the action would not have been maintainable in Ontario; see Walpole v. Canadian Northern Railway Co., [1923] A.C. 113 (P.C.).  However, in Going, the defendant had been in breach of the Quebec Highway Traffic Code, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-24.  Thus the action was not "justifiable" in Quebec so, following the rule in McLean v. Pettigrew, the plaintiffs could recover under Ontario law.  Henry J. noted that the effect was that the defendants, who had no relationship with the plaintiffs apart from the accident, were deprived of the protection of the law accorded them in Quebec where the action occurred; moreover, he added, the rule encouraged forum shopping.  Had either the British rule in Chaplin v. Boys, supra, or the American rule (which applied the proper law of the tort), been in effect, that would not have been the case.  I note in passing that in this and the cases that followed, reference is made to rules in other countries, but in none of these cases was the rule approached on the basis of Canadian constitutional imperatives.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
7(1) Nonobstant toute autre loi, le montant du salaire n’excédant pas $2,000, dû et payable par un employeur à un employé, constitue une créance privilégiée sur les biens et l’actif de l’employeur, payable à l’employé par préférence à toute autre dette ou créance, y compris celles de Sa Majesté du chef du Manitoba et, sans limiter la portée de ce qui précède, ce privilège prévaut contre toute cession, y compris une cession de créance, absolue ou non, toute hypothèque sur biens réels ou personnels, et toute obligation.
7(1) Notwithstanding any other Act, the amount of wages due and payable by an employer to an employee not exceeding $2,000.00 constitutes a lien and charge on the property and assets of the employer in favour of the employee, and is payable in priority to any other claim or right, including those of the Crown in right of Manitoba, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing that priority extends over every assignment, including an assignment of book debts, whether absolute or otherwise, every mortgage on real or personal property, and every debenture.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’Adoption Act n’est pas une loi relative à ceux qui sont «Indiens en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens» et ses dispositions, y compris celles de l’art. 10, ne modifient pas «le statut, les droits, les privilèges, les incapacités et les restrictions… acquis à titre d’Indien en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens».
The Adoption Act is not a statute enacted in relation to Indians “under the Indian Act” and its provisions, including those of s. 10, do not affect the “status, rights, privileges, disabilities and limitations… acquired as an Indian under the Indian Act”. The Adoption Act only applies to Indians by reason of their character as citizens of the Province of British Columbia and there is no conflict between that statute and the Indian Act. It followed that the newly added subs. (4a) to s. 10 of the Adoption Act made no change in the law. It was ineffective rather than ultra vires.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Même si les règles relatives à l’admissibilité des confessions y compris celles du «voir-dire» n’y sont pas énoncées, elles font indubitablement partie des dispositions à suivre dans la procédure par acte d’accusation.
Provisions concerning trials by jury are in Part XVII, headed Procedure by Indictment. Although the rules concerning the admissibility of confessions, including those for voir dire, are not spelled out there, they definitely form part of the provisions to be followed in the procedure by indictment. In my opinion, it can therefore be stated without risk of error, that those same rules should be applied mutatis mutandis in a trial without jury, “in so far as they are not inconsistent” with the provisions of Part XVII. I find nothing that might be said to be inconsistent. Consequently, we need only consider what changes may be necessary because there is no jury. I fail to see how it could be argued that one of such necessary changes would be the exclusion of any voir dire. There is definitely nothing which prevents a judge sitting alone from proceeding in this regard exactly as if there were a jury. Of course, the result will be that he will also have to decide at the end of the trial whether the confession was actually made, after previously deciding whether it is admissible in evidence. But there is nothing to prevent him from dealing with these two stages separately and from holding on the admissibility of the confession in evidence the “trial within the trial”, which is held
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
D'une façon générale, en ce qui concerne la responsabilité criminelle, une personne morale n'est pas différente d'une personne physique et peut être déclarée coupable d'infractions de common law et d'infractions à la loi, y compris celles qui exigent la mens rea.
34. Corporations. In general, a corporation is in the same position in relation to criminal liability as a natural person and may be convicted of common law and statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. There are, however, crimes which a corporation is incapable of committing or of which a corporation cannot be found guilty as a principal....
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] 7(1) Nonobstant toute autre loi, le montant du salaire n’excédant pas $2,000, dû et payable par un employeur à un employé, constitue une créance privilégiée sur les biens et l’actif de l’employeur, payable à l’employé par préférence à toute autre dette ou créance, y compris celles de Sa Majesté du chef du Manitoba et, sans limiter la portée de ce qui précède, ce privilège prévaut contre toute cession, y compris une cession de créance, absolue ou non, toute hypothèque sur biens réels ou personnels, obligation et garantie enregistrée ou non, faite, donnée, acceptée ou émise avant ou après l’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi.
7(1) Notwithstanding any other Act, the amount of wages due and payable by an employer to an employee not exceeding $2,000.00 constitutes a lien and charge on the property and assets of the employer in favour of the employee, and is payable in priority to any other claim or right, including those of the Crown In Right of Manitoba, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing that priority extends over every assignment, including an assignment of book debts, whether absolute or otherwise, every mortgage on real or personal property, debenture and security, whether registered or not, made, given, accepted or issued before or after the coming into force of this Act.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Comme on le verra plus loin, je suis convaincu que l’Adoption Act n’est pas une loi relative à ceux qui sont «Indiens en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens» et que ses dispositions, y compris celles de l’art.
As will hereafter appear, I am satisfied that the Adoption Act is not a statute enacted in relation to Indians “under the Indian Act” and that its provisions, including those of s. 10, do not affect the “status, rights, privileges, disabilities, and limitations… acquired as an Indian under the Indian Act”. The Adoption Act only applies to Indians by reason of their character as citizens of the Province of British Columbia and I can find no conflict between that statute and the Indian Act.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
(1) [TRADUCTION] Nonobstant toute autre loi, le montant des salaires indiqué au certificat délivré en vertu de l’article 5 constitue une créance privilégiée payable à la Commission par préférence à toute autre dette ou créance, y compris celles de la Couronne du chef de la province, et, sans limiter la portée de ce qui précède, ce privilège prévaut sur toute cession, y compris une cession de créance, absolue ou non, toute hypothèque sur biens réels ou personnels et toute obligation.
5A. (1) Notwithstanding any other Act, the amount of wages set forth in a certificate issued under section 5 constitutes a lien and charge in favour of the Board payable in priority over any other claim or right, includ­ing those of the Crown in right of the Province, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such priority shall extend over every assignment, including an assignment of book debts, whether absolute or otherwise, every mortgage of real or personal property, and every debenture.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
265(2) stipule qu'en règle générale l'art. 265 s'applique à toutes les espèces de voies de fait, y compris celles causant des lésions corporelles. Par conséquent, étant donné qu'il est fait mention de l'absence de consentement au par.
The controversy in this appeal stems from the apparent contradiction between the holding of the Ontario Court of Appeal in the instant appeal and the wording of s. 265(1)(a).  By that wording, once the trial judge found that the deceased had consented to a fight with Jobidon, it appears as if he could not have committed the unlawful act of assault since s. 265(2) states a general rule that s. 265 applies to all forms of assault, including assault causing bodily harm.  Consequently, given the reference to absence of consent in s. 265(1), proof of consent to a fist fight in which force is intentionally applied and which results in bodily harm would seem to serve as a defence for Jobidon.  In that way, ss. 265(1) and 265(2) also appear to support the appellant's position that absence of consent is a requirement to be proved by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt, in each and every instance of assault.  (This understanding of the burden of proof, as distinct from the issue of the universal applicability of the requirement, is not explicit in s. 265, but it has been so interpreted by the courts, and is supported by some of the most recent academic literature.  See, for example, A. W. Bryant, "The Issue of Consent in the Crime of Sexual Assault" (1989), 68 Can. Bar Rev. 94.)  Given the prima facie appearance of support for the appellant's position, one might question how the Ontario Court of Appeal could hold that the deceased's consent to a fair fight did not preclude commission of the offence of assault.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
A l’époque de la promulgation de ce règlement, toutes les licences de radio, y compris celles des stations de télévision et des réseaux de STAC étaient délivrées en vertu de la Loi sur la radio. Mais lorsque la Loi sur la radiodiffusion fut promulguée, en 1968 (1967-1968 (Can.), c.
When this regulation was enacted, all radio licences including those of TV stations and CATV networks were issued under the Radio Act. However, when the Broadcasting Act was enacted in 1968 (1967-1968 (Can.) c. 25), it was provided that licences to broadcasting undertakings, an expression which includes CATV as well as TV stations, would be issued by the Commission with the Department of Transport issuing a "technical construction and operating certificate". Rogers' submission is that, as a result of this change, they are not licensees within the meaning of Regulation 11. In my view, such technical construction of the Regulation is unjustified. The word "licensee" is not defined in the General Radio Regulations or
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
O’Reilly (1979), 23 O.R. (2d) 776, où l’absence de biens autres que familiaux qui se prêtaient au partage et le fait que la femme avait assumé les charges familiales, y compris celles d’ordre administratif et financier en plus du soin des enfants et de l’entretien du foyer, justifiaient l’attribution d’une plus grande part des biens familiaux à la femme.
Much to the same effect as Weir v. Weir, supra, is O’Reilly v. O’Reilly (1979), 23 O.R. (2d) 776 where there were no non-family assets appropriate for division and the wife’s assumption of the burden of family responsibilities, including administrative and financial responsibilities in addition to child and home care, warranted a larger division of family assets.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Les États participants respectent l'égalité de droits des peuples et leur droit à disposer d'eux‑mêmes, en agissant à tout moment conformément aux buts et aux principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et aux normes pertinentes du droit international, y compris celles qui ont trait à l'intégrité territoriale des États.
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
719 était destiné à conférer un droit général d'appel dans les procédures d'habeas corpus, y compris celles découlant d'une demande d'extradition, et que ce droit ne se limite pas aux procédures d'habeas corpus engagées en vertu du Code criminel.
Having regard to the history of the amendment of the Code, we think it is clear that s. 719 was intended to give a general right of appeal in habeas corpus proceedings, including proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus arising out of a claim for extradition, and is not restricted to habeas corpus proceedings under the Criminal Code. We hold, therefore, that the appellant has the right to appeal to this court.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Dans nombre de décisions, y compris celles des juridictions inférieures dans la présente affaire, les tribunaux ont tout simplement retenu le critère de la fin véritable en s’appuyant sur certaines remarques incidentes faites par le juge en chef Dickson dans l’arrêt Bronfman Trust, précité.
47 In this case, three different tests have been advanced for determining whether the requisite income earning purpose is present; they are:  the bona fide purpose test, the dominant purpose test, and the reasonable expectation of income  test.  In several decisions, including those of the lower courts in the case at bar,  courts have simply adopted the bona fide purpose test on the strength of some obiter dicta by Dickson C.J. in Bronfman Trust, supra.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
(1) Les plaintes, y compris celles reçues par le procureur général, le Comité, la commission ou, lorsqu’il n’y a pas de commission, le conseil, portant sur la conduite ou l’exercice des fonctions de tout membre d’un corps de police excepté le chef de police sont transmises en premier lieu au chef de police ou au commandant divisionnaire en Alberta de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, selon le cas, pour qu’il mène une enquête et prenne les mesures qu’il estime appropriées.
This brings me to the key provision s. 33 upon which the submissions in this appeal were centered. It is necessary to reproduce the whole section because of the submissions and counter-submissions on whether it does distinguish between mere investigation and imposition of discipline (as is alleged by the appellants and supporting interveners) or whether this is a purely artificial distinction which is not made and, indeed, cannot be made under the terms of s. 33. The section reads as follows:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Eu égard à l'évolution qu'a suivie cette disposition, il ne fait pas de doute qu'elle est destinée à conférer aux tribunaux d'appel et à cette Cour un droit général d'entendre des appels en matière d'habeas corpus, y compris celles découlant d'une demande d'extradition.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to s. 719(5) of the Criminal Code. Having regard to the history of the section, it is clear that it was intended to give to the courts of appeal and to this Court a right of appeal in habeas corpus proceedings, including proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus arising out of a claim for extradition. In enacting this provision, Parliament obviously overlooked s. 40 of the Supreme Court Act. It must, however, be taken to have been superseded by s. 719. To the extent that there is a conflict between s. 40 of the Supreme Court Act and s. 719 of the Code, then, s. 40 has been impliedly repealed.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
52(1) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, il s’ensuivra qu’à compter de la date du présent jugement, les juges seront obligés de libérer dans la société toutes les personnes acquittées pour cause d’aliénation mentale, y compris celles qui pourraient fort bien présenter un danger pour le public.
If, based on the reasons given above, s. 542(2) is simply declared to be of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, it will mean that as of the date this judgment is released, judges will be compelled to release into the community all insanity acquittees, including those who may well be a danger to the public. Because of the serious consequences of finding s. 542(2) to be of no force and effect, there will be a period of temporary validity which will extend for a period of six months.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
15(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés pour le motif qu’il crée de la discrimination à l’endroit des personnes souffrant de troubles mentaux -- y compris celles atteintes de déficiences mentales -- qui, pour cette cause, font l’objet d’un verdict de non‑responsabilité criminelle?
14 Finally, after the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Bese was absolutely discharged by the Review Board.  His counsel has requested that his appeal be nonetheless maintained, relying on this Court’s discretion to do so outlined in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342.  In the circumstances of this case, I consider it to be appropriate for this Court to exercise its discretion to address Mr. Bese’s appeal on its merits.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
59. (1) Les règles de la common law, y compris celles du droit commercial, s'appliquent aux contrats de vente d'objets, sauf lorsqu'elles sont incompatibles avec les dispositions expresses de la présente loi.
(2) Where, under a contract of sale, the price is payable on a day certain, irrespective of delivery, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay the price, the seller may maintain an action for the price, although the property in the goods has not passed and the goods have not been appropriated to the contract.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne limite aucunement le pouvoir du législateur fédéral de laisser la mise en {oe}uvre de programmes de mesures de rechange à la discrétion des procureurs généraux provinciaux. Les provinces ont accepté la responsabilité à l'égard des poursuites, y compris celles contre les jeunes contrevenants (art.
Section 4 of the Act is not an unconstitutional delegation of Parliament's authority over criminal law and procedure.  There is no limitation imposed by the Constitution Act, 1867 on Parliament's ability to leave the implementation of alternative measures programmes to the discretion of the provincial Attorneys General. The provinces have accepted a delegation of responsibility from Parliament in respect of prosecutions, including the prosecution of young offenders (s. 2 of the Criminal Code and s. 2(4) of the Act).  The discretion to establish alternative measures programmes is clearly incidental to that legitimate delegation.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
D’une part, se continue devant la Cour supérieure du Québec un recours collectif contre la Société. D’autre part, celle-ci a obtenu un jugement de la Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario qui déclare réglées les réclamations présentées contre elle, y compris celles des résidants du Québec.
[11] In the meantime, the judgments rendered by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and the Quebec Superior Court had created an unavoidable legal conflict.  On the one hand, a class action against the Corporation was continuing in the Quebec Superior Court.  On the other hand, the Corporation had obtained a judgment from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declaring that the claims against it had been settled, including the claims of Quebec residents.  To break the impasse, the Corporation applied to the Quebec Superior Court in June 2004 to have the judgment of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized and declared enforceable.  To this date, more than four years later, the Ontario judgment has not yet been recognized in Quebec, and the class action authorized by the Quebec Superior Court has not yet been heard.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Non seulement le libellé de la disposition a été changé, mais la Cour, compte tenu de son rôle de dernier ressort d’appel au Canada, a interprété plus largement sa compétence pour entendre des pourvois dérogeant ainsi à de nombreuses décisions antérieures, y compris celles sur lesquelles s’était fondée la Cour dans Hind.
[5] As noted in Hill v. The Queen, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 827, and subsequently in R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368, the changes made in 1949 to what is now s. 40 resulted in large part from the change in the role of this Court when appeals to the Privy Council were abolished. Not only was the wording of the provision changed, but the Court, in light of its role as the final court of appeal for Canada, took a broader approach to the interpretation of its appellate jurisdiction which was inconsistent with many earlier decisions, including the cases relied upon by the Court in Hind.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Tout régime qui favorise le fractionnement des recours est en fait incompatible avec le principe bien établi selon lequel un tribunal administratif se prononce sur toutes les questions, y compris celles de nature constitutionnelle, dont le caractère essentiellement factuel relève de la compétence spécialisée que lui confère la loi.
Moreover, the jurisprudential evolution affirms the practical advantages and the constitutional basis for allowing Canadians to assert their Charter rights in the most accessible forum available, without the need for bifurcated proceedings between superior courts and administrative tribunals.  Any scheme favouring bifurcation is, in fact, inconsistent with the well‑established principle that an administrative tribunal is to decide all matters, including constitutional questions, whose essential factual character falls within the tribunal’s specialized statutory jurisdiction.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
48 Cependant, cet aspect ne présente aucun intérêt à l'étape de la contraignabilité. Si la personne assignée est contrainte à témoigner, alors elle sera contrainte relativement à toutes les communications, y compris celles liées à la production de documents.
48               This aspect of the matter is, however, not of concern at the compellability stage.  If the person subpoenaed is compelled to testify, then all communications including those arising from the production of documents will be compelled.  If not compelled, the communications arising from production of documents would also not be compelled.  The communicative aspects of the production of documents may, however, be of significance at the derivative evidence stage at which the witness seeks to exclude all evidence which would not have been obtained but for the compelled testimony.  We are not, however, at that stage in this case and it would not be useful to try to elaborate on this aspect of the matter until it arises.  We also leave for future consideration the relevance of the regulatory context in determining the scope of s. 7 protection against self-incrimination in a case where the documents do not pre-exist the statutory compulsion to produce, but rather have been created by statutory compulsion.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De même, le document de clôture de la rencontre de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe tenue à Vienne en 1989, qui faisait suite à l'Acte final d'Helsinki, fait mention du droit des peuples de déterminer «leur statut politique interne et externe» (nous soulignons), mais cette déclaration est immédiatement suivie par la reconnaissance expresse que les États participants agiront à tout moment «conformément aux buts et aux principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et aux normes pertinentes du droit international, y compris celles qui ont trait à l'intégrité territoriale», comme l'énonce l'Acte final d'Helsinki (nous soulignons).
129 Similarly, while the concluding document of the Vienna Meeting in 1989 of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe  on the follow-up to the Helsinki Final Act again refers to peoples having the right to determine "their internal and external political status" (emphasis added), that statement is immediately followed by express recognition that the participating states will at all times act, as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, "in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States"  (emphasis added).  Principle 5 of the concluding document states that the participating states (including Canada):
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Et lorsqu'il s'est rendu sur place, il a fait face à une situation qui, si elle n'était pas corrigée, risquait manifestement de mettre en danger la santé et la sécurité du public, y compris celles des voisins et du constructeur propriétaire.
My colleague takes the view that the failure of the owners to give timely notice made it "impossible for the city to fulfill its duty to inspect".  In my respectful view, however, it is necessary to take a broader view of the question and not simply focus on the fact that the negligence of the owners made it difficult to conduct one particular inspection.  The key question, it seems to me, is whether it is reasonable to conclude that despite the negligence of the owners, the inspector was still in a position to acquit himself of the responsibility that the by-law placed on him, i.e., to take reasonable care to ensure that all building was done in accordance with the applicable standards of the by-law.  In other words, is it reasonable, in the circumstances to conclude that a due exercise by the inspector of his powers, even though he was summoned late, could have avoided the danger?  See the formulation of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Curran v. Northern Ireland Co-Ownership Housing Association Ltd., [1987] A.C. 718, at pp. 727-28.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Selon lui, une demande de nullité aurait [traduction] « l’effet pervers d’annuler la perception de toutes les taxes levées par l’intimée, y compris celles qui ont été perçues et payées validement » (mémoire, par. 73).
[24] The appellant seeks only a declaration of inconsistency, as he considers some of the taxes imposed and collected to be valid.  Lacoursière J. rightly observed that a simple declaration of inconsistency would not be a sufficient basis for the remedy — a partial refund — being sought.  In this Court, the appellant seeks the same conclusion, which he describes as “creative”.  In his opinion, a declaration of nullity would have “the perverse effect of annulling the collection of all taxes collected by the Respondent, including taxes validly collected and paid” (factum, at para. 73).  Should the conclusion be found to be inappropriate, the appellant would like to leave it to the trial judge to reframe it.  As in the Superior Court, he has not offered to do so himself.  Moreover, this is consistent with his position that, since a portion of the taxes paid is valid, he does not wish to “impoverish the Respondent any more than [is] legally justified” (para. 78).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Par ailleurs, selon une interprétation large et libérale de la Charte, le législateur voulait étendre la protection de l’art. 18.2 à toutes les personnes ayant obtenu un pardon, y compris celles dont le dossier judiciaire est mis sous scellés à la suite d’une absolution.
[54] As explained by Deschamps J., the sealing of a criminal record of a person who has received a discharge under s. 6.1 of the Criminal Records Act is the functional equivalent of a pardon.  Indeed, there is no mechanism under that Act for a person who has received a discharge to apply for a pardon — the criminal record is automatically sealed with the simple passage of time. While this automatic sealing of the criminal record is not technically defined as a pardon, it is apparent from reading the provision in  context and having regard to the legislative intent in passing this provision that it is functionally equivalent to other forms of pardon.  In turn, a large and liberal approach to the Charter would suggest that the legislature intended to extend the s. 18.2 protection to all persons who have received a pardon, including those whose criminal records have been sealed following a discharge.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Dans le contexte de l’extradition, la règle exigeant que les éléments de preuve obtenus au Canada respectent le droit canadien de la preuve risque peu de susciter des difficultés particulières en ce qui concerne la plupart des règles de preuve, y compris celles relatives au privilège, à l’opinion d’expert ou à la preuve de mauvaise réputation.
[25] In my view, the approach adopted in these decisions not only accords with a combined reading of ss. 32 and 33 of the Act as I have explained above, it achieves a proper balance between the liberty interests of the person sought and the international principle of comity.  It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that in interpreting domestic legislation, courts should strive to arrive at a construction which conforms with Canada’s treaty obligations:  see, e.g., R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at para. 53.  In the extradition context, the requirement that Canadian‑gathered evidence comply with Canadian rules of evidence is unlikely to give rise to particular difficulties with respect to most evidentiary rules, including privilege, the expert opinion rule, or the rule against bad character evidence.  The same cannot be said, however, of the hearsay rule.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Elle a souligné que, si la désignation d'un bénéficiaire en vertu d'une police d'assurance était jugée ne pas opérer transfert de propriété en faveur du bénéficiaire, alors toutes les désignations de bénéficiaires effectuées dans les polices d'assurance au cours des cinq années précédant une faillite seraient inopposables au syndic par l'application du second volet du par. 91(2), y compris celles ayant été faites de bonne foi lorsque le failli était solvable.
13               Jackson J.A.'s conclusion that the property passing requirement had been met was further reinforced by her view that any other conclusion would be contrary to bankruptcy policy and the purpose of RRIFs.  She noted that if the designation of a beneficiary under an insurance policy were not found to pass property to the beneficiary, then all insurance beneficiary designations made within five years of bankruptcy would be void against the trustee in bankruptcy by operation of the second branch of s. 91(2), including those made in good faith when the bankrupt was solvent.  Jackson J.A. was of the view that s. 91 BIA should be interpreted to avoid such an absurd result.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En fait, le procureur général du Québec a soutenu que la question primordiale à trancher en l'espèce concerne le pourvoir du législateur provincial de fixer le programme d'études de toutes les écoles publiques de la province, y compris celles en faveur desquelles joue la garantie confessionnelle énoncée au par.
It is the third submission to which the parties devoted their significant energies at the hearing of this appeal. Indeed it was the position of the Attorney General of Quebec that the question central to the resolution of this appeal turns on the jurisdiction of the province to determine the programme of study in all public schools in the province, including those schools which operate under the protection of the denominational guarantee in s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867. I agree that the issue as to whether the province can establish uniform curriculum across the province is to be determined solely on the basis of legislative jurisdiction. Whether or not the constitutional limits placed on the provincial jurisdiction in s. 93(1) leave the Quebec government the power to make the Regulations is an issue logically distinct from the question of precisely who benefits from the constitutional protection.  My conclusion in this case allows me to assume without deciding that these appellants are a "class of persons" to which s. 93(1) refers.  Determining whether the province has the legislative authority under s. 93 to adopt s. 16(7) of the Education Act and to make the Elementary School and Secondary School Regulations will be sufficient to dispose of this appeal.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La position du droit anglais ancien selon laquelle l’employeur était responsable de toutes les fautes de son employé (y compris celles de son épouse et de ses enfants) constituait un choix de politique générale, bien que non exprimé clairement, quant à savoir qui devait assumer la perte causée par l’acte fautif et quant au meilleur moyen de dissuasion.
26 Vicarious liability has always been concerned with policy:  Fleming,  supra, at pp. 409 et seq.   The view of early English law that a master was responsible for all the wrongs of his servants (as well as his wife’s and his children’s) represented a policy choice, however inarticulate, as to who should bear the loss of wrongdoing and how best to deter it.  The narrowing of vicarious responsibility with the expansion of commerce and trade and the rise of industrialism also represented a policy choice.  Indeed, it represented a compromise between two policies __ the social interest in furnishing an innocent tort victim with recourse against a financially responsible defendant, and a concern not to foist undue burdens on business enterprises:  Fleming, ibid.  The expansion of vicarious liability in the 20th century from authorization-based liability to broader classes of ascription is doubtless driven by yet other policy concerns.   “[V]icarious liability cannot parade as a deduction from legalistic premises, but should be frankly recognised as having its basis in a combination of policy considerations” (Fleming, at p. 410).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Moge démontre clairement que nous devons recourir à la Loi sur le divorce pour assurer son application dans toutes les affaires de divorce où un conjoint demande une pension alimentaire, y compris celles où une convention de séparation a été négociée afin de régler l'obligation alimentaire.
In my opinion, Moge v. Moge clearly demonstrates that we must turn to the Divorce Act to ascertain its application in all divorce cases where spousal support is sought, including those where a separation agreement has been negotiated to regulate spousal support.  Under subsection 15(5) of the Divorce Act, an agreement is only one of many factors that must be considered in determining the right to, amount and duration of spousal support.  Furthermore, all four of the objectives of spousal support orders under subsection 15(7) must be considered; their application is not excluded simply because a final agreement or settlement has been negotiated.  There is no requirement or causal connection built into subsection 15(5) of the Divorce Act, although the notion of causal connection is recognized in subsections 15(7) and 17(7) of the Divorce Act.  It is doubtful whether the principles defined in Pelech, Caron and Richardson, which were enunciated in the context of the Divorce Act, 1968, can survive.  Although the Supreme Court of Canada trilogy was intended to provide more definitive guidelines that legal practitioners could apply with respect to the right to, amount and duration of spousal support, it has generated more confusion than precision and for that reason, if for no other, is unlikely to survive when the Supreme Court of Canada reviews the question.  [Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.]
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
265 énonce que toutes les espèces de voies de fait, y compris celles causant des lésions corporelles, sont visées par la règle générale, il ne définit pas les circonstances, les formes de conduite ni les conséquences éventuelles qui seront légalement reconnues comme étant des objets légitimes de consentement pour les fins de l'infraction.
Per La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ.:  Section 265 of the Code should be read in light of the common law limitations on consent. Section 265 sets out a general rule that one cannot commit assault if the other person agrees to the application of force.  However, while s. 265 states that all forms of assault, including assault causing bodily harm, are covered by the general rule, it does not define the situations or forms of conduct or eventual consequences which the law will recognize as being valid objects of consent for the purpose of the offence. The common law has generated a body of law to illuminate the meaning of consent and to place certain limitations on its legal effectiveness in the criminal law.  It has also set limits on the types of harmful actions to which one can validly consent, and which can shelter an assailant from the sanctions of the criminal law. Section 8 of the Code indicates that common law principles continue to apply to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Code or other Act of Parliament and have not been altered by them. In particular, s. 8(3) of the Code expressly provides that exculpatory defences continue so to operate to exclude criminal liability.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le 6 avril 2006, l’avocat de l’appelant a demandé des renseignements supplémentaires au sujet de M. Friedman ainsi que les notes des policiers qui l’ont rencontré, y compris celles des agents Semo et Gillespie.
[7] On March 21, 2006, the Crown advised the appellant’s counsel that disclosure of evidence concerning an accomplice was to be forthcoming.  On March 24, 2006, the appellant re-elected for trial by judge alone.  On March 29, 2006, the Crown disclosed a transcript of a videotaped KGB statement, taken on December 16, 2004, from one Robert Friedman, and indicated that Friedman would be called as a witness.  On April 6, 2006, counsel for the appellant requested additional information pertaining to Friedman and the notes of the officers who dealt with Friedman, including the notes of Constable Semo and Constable Gillespie.  On April 19, 2006, the Crown advised that it was aware of information concerning Constable Gillespie that was potentially relevant to the officer’s credibility, character and ability to perform his duties during his involvement in the investigation of this matter and invited the appellant to bring an O’Connor application for access to this information.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Certes, l'application de l'expérience américaine doit être considérée à la lumière du principe de la "question politique" suivant lequel les tribunaux accordent une grande déférence à certaines décisions de l'exécutif, y compris celles relevant du domaine des relations étrangères, question qui n'a pas encore été réglée au Canada, bien qu'elle ait fait l'objet de certains commentaires de cette Cour: voir les observations du juge Wilson dans l'arrêt Operation Dismantle Inc.
52.              That the approach I have suggested is not unreasonable is evident from the experience of the United States, with its rather similar constitution. The application of that country's experience, it is true, must be viewed in light of the "political question" doctrine under which wide judicial deference is accorded to certain executive decisions, including those in the field of foreign relations, an issue not yet resolved in this country although it has been the subject of some discussion in this Court; see the remarks of Wilson J. in Operation Dismantle Inc., supra, at p. 464. However, the courts of that country, while recognizing the pre‑eminent role of the executive in this area, have noted that all branches of government are subject to the supremacy of the Constitution and that the judiciary may have a useful role to play: see Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972), certiorari denied 409 U.S. 869. In particular, they have stated that an extradition hearing must conform to the requirements of due process: see Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960), certiorari denied 364 U.S. 851.
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D'après certains témoignages, on ne disait jamais clairement aux femmes qui sollicitaient un emploi quelles étaient les conditions à remplir pour obtenir les emplois manuels disponibles. Un autre obstacle imposé à certaines candidates, y compris celles sollicitant un poste de préposé au nettoyage des wagons, consistait à exiger une expérience de la soudure.
The markedly low rate of female participation in so-called "non-traditional" occupations at Canadian National, namely occupations in which women typically have been significantly under-represented considering their proportion in the work force as a whole, was not fortuitous. The evidence before the Tribunal established clearly that the recruitment, hiring and promotion policies at Canadian National prevented and discouraged women from working on blue-collar jobs. The Tribunal held, a finding not challenged in this Court, that CN had not made any real effort to inform women in general of the possibility of filling non-traditional positions in the company. For example, the evidence indicated that Canadian National's recruitment program with respect to skilled crafts and trade workers was limited largely to sending representatives to technical schools where there were almost no women. When women presented themselves at the personnel office, the interviews had a decidedly "chilling effect" on female involvement in non-traditional employment; women were expressly encouraged to apply only for secretarial jobs. According to some of the testimony, women applying for employment were never told clearly the qualifications which they needed to fill the blue-collar job openings. Another hurdle placed in the way of some applicants, including those seeking employment as coach cleaners, was to require experience in soldering. Moreover, the personnel office did not itself do any hiring for blue-collar jobs. Instead, it forwarded names to the area foreman, and Canadian National had no means of controlling the decision of the foreman to hire or not to hire a woman. The
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
21(4), "de choisir ou faire publier" les livres dont on se servira à l'exclusion de tous autres dans les écoles, y compris celles qui relèvent des commissaires d'écoles, la source du pouvoir sur le contenu du programme d'études suivi dans ces écoles.
In my view the plain meaning of s. 21(3) and (4), when read in conjunction with s. 65(2), is that the Council and the school commissioners and trustees had distinct roles in the administration of education in the province at Confederation, and particularly with respect to the curriculum followed in the schools in the province. The power of the central authority, exercised by the Council pursuant to s. 21(3) and (4), was broad but not unfettered.  Thus to borrow the language employed by Wilson J. in the Separate Schools Reference, it was a power to regulate, but not to prohibit.  Our focus in this case is the authority over matters of curriculum. I see the authority of the Council in s. 21(4) to "select or cause to be published" the books to be used to the exclusion of others, in schools including those under the control of the school commissioners, as the source of authority over the content of the curriculum followed in those schools. Needless to say, in 1861 books represented the central and indeed controlling feature for content of school curriculum. (This remains true today; as we have seen, the province gives substance to its power to set curriculum under the impugned Regulations by retaining the power to approve textbooks and teaching materials.)  The link between the substantive content of school curriculum and school books is made plainer by the exception to the Council's authority over books. The power to choose books "having reference to religion or morals" was to be made not by the central authority but rather by the "Curé, Priest or officiating Minister" pursuant to s. 65(2), presumably because this was seen as too dangerously close to what would eventually become the constitutionally  protected right of the religious minority to set the denominational aspect of school curriculum.
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