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b)pour manquement à des exigences, y compris celles touchant les avis, imposées par la présente loi, une autre loi out toute autre règle de droit.
(b)the breach of any requirements, including notice requirements, imposed by this or any other Act or otherwise by law,
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Cela ressort clairement des termes de l'article 12a) de la Loi qui, en établissant le pouvoir de prendre des règlements, parle notamment des «conditions, y compris celles qui concernent les documents d'expédition ou autres, auxquelles des licences,
The words in section 8, "in such quantity and of such quality, by such persons, from such places or persons and subject to such other terms and conditions as are described in the permit or in the regulations", do not refer to conditions defining a right or entitlement to a permit but to the terms and conditions to which an issued permit may be subject. This is clear from the terms of section 12(a) of the Act, which, in conferring the power to make regulations, speaks, inter alia, of "the terms and conditions, including those with reference to shipping or other documents, upon which permits, certificates
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Cette obligation est claire de par son libellé et aussi en raison de l’endroit où elle figure dans le Code. Elle comprend toutes les formes de présentation, y compris celles en usage dans un atelier fermé.
In our opinion this argument misconstrues the scope of section 161.1. The duty of fair referral “includes assignment, designation, dispatching, scheduling and selection”. This duty is clearly intended by its language and its placement in the Code to extend to all forms of referral, including the simple closed-shop situation. If a union may in any manner effect a referral of a person to employment, pursuant to a collective agreement, the section is applicable. If union membership is part of the assignment, designation, dispatching, scheduling, selection, etc. of a person then there must be rules including rules with respect to acquisition, retention and loss of union membership.
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[TRADUCTION] 7(1) Nonobstant toute autre loi, le montant du salaire n’excédant pas $2,000, dû et payable par un employeur à un employé, constitue une créance privilégiée sur les biens et l’actif de l’employeur, payable à l’employé par préférence à toute autre dette ou créance, y compris celles de Sa Majesté du chef du Manitoba et, sans limiter la portée de ce qui précède, ce privilège prévaut contre toute cession, y compris une cession de créance, absolue ou non, toute hypothèque sur biens réels ou personnels, obligation et garantie enregistrée ou non, faite, donnée, acceptée ou émise avant ou après l’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi.
7(1) Notwithstanding any other Act, the amount of wages due and payable by an employer to an employee not exceeding $2,000.00 constitutes a lien and charge on the property and assets of the employer in favour of the employee, and is payable in priority to any other claim or right, including those of the Crown In Right of Manitoba, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing that priority extends over every assignment, including an assignment of book debts, whether absolute or otherwise, every mortgage on real or personal property, debenture and security, whether registered or not, made, given, accepted or issued before or after the coming into force of this Act.
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Il est donc manifeste que, dans la partie IV.1, le Parlement légifère à l'égard de l'utilisation de tout matériel ou de toute méthode faisant appel au spectre électromagnétique (lequel s'étend des ondes radio jusqu'aux ondes lumineuses), aux vibrations acoustiques à basse ou à haute fréquence, y compris celles que peut saisir l'oreille humaine, et à des dispositifs mécaniques, en vue d'intercepter une communication orale (ou autre) dans un endroit quelconque.
Part IV.1 contemplates at least three fundamental processes or devices which may be employed in the interception of a private communication: electromagnetic (radio, telephone and optical), acoustic and mechanical devices. There is no particular provision relating to each of these special types or forms of communication. All are embraced in the same general provisions. It is therefore clear that Parliament, in Part IV.1, is legislating with reference to the employment of any equipment or procedure relating to the electromagnetic spectrum (ranging as it does through the spectrum from radio waves to light waves), the acoustic vibrations above or below and including the range of the human ear, and to mechanical devices, for the purpose of intercepting oral (and other) communication occurring anywhere.
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Les parties ne nous ont pas suggéré de le faire, mais je veux ajouter que, si l’occasion propice se présente, nous devrions reconsidérer le bien-fondé de certains des postulats mis de l’avant pour justifier la règle; et ce d’autant plus que certains de ces postulats sont encore plus difficiles à accepter depuis que la règle a été étendue aux victimes des deux sexes et à toutes les infractions sexuelles, y compris celles où le consentement n’est pas en litige (cf. R. v. Lillyman[8] et R. v. Osborne[9]).
There are today suggestions (see amongst others the Eleventh Report by the Criminal Law Revision Committee of England and Wales and comments by Schiff, in vol. 1 of Evidence in the Litigation Process, at pp. 574 et seq.), that the need for the rule is doubtful and should be reconsidered. We have not been invited by the parties to do so, but I should like to add here that, given the proper opportunity, we should seriously reconsider the soundness of some of the assumptions that are made in order to justify the rule; furthermore, some of those assumptions are even more difficult to accept since the extension of the rule to victims of both sexes and to all sexual offences, including those where consent is not in issue (cf. R. v. Lillyman[8] and R. v. Osborne[9]).[10]
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. lorsqu’il s’est rendu sur place, il a fait face à une situation qui, si elle n’était pas corrigée, risquait manifestement de mettre en danger la santé et la sécurité du public, y compris celles des voisins et du constructeur propriétaire.
. . . when he attended at the site, [the inspector] was confronted with a situation which, if left unremedied, manifestly stood to pose a threat to the health and safety of the public, including the neighbours and the owner builder.  Of course, the cause of the problem would have been evident if the inspector had been asked to come at the proper time.  But this does not absolve the inspector of his duties.  It must be remembered that the inspector was, at the time, armed with all the powers necessary to remedy the situation.  As I see the matter, it was incumbent on the building inspector, in view of the responsibility that rested on him, to order the cessation of the work, and the taking of whatever corrective measures were necessary to enable him to ensure that the structure was up to standard.
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En outre, son témoignage, dont l'admissibilité est incontestable et qui, considéré avec les autres dépositions, y compris celles d'Ochs et de Simpson, a lié ces derniers au complot et a fourni la preuve du mobile et de la réalité de l'homicide.
17.                     This question was said to be of particular importance in this case. Dumoulin pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit the crime which was, in fact, committed, and with which her co‑conspirators were charged. In addition she gave evidence, the admissibility of which was incontestable, which, taken with other evidence including that of Ochs and Simpson, tied Ochs and Simpson into the conspiracy and furnished evidence of motive and of the actual killing. It was argued that it would have been a very natural mistake for the jury to consider that, since she had pleaded guilty to entering into an agreement to procure the killing of Brousseau, she could only have done so with Ochs and Simpson. This they might naturally consider as cogent evidence of guilt of the murder of Brousseau by Ochs and Simpson. It is for this reason that it has been considered necessary to warn juries of the danger of misapplying evidence in this fashion.
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28(2) permettait d’accorder des droits pour des périodes qui ne sont pas censées prendre fin à une date déterminée:  (1994), 89 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 41 B.C.A.C. 241, 66 W.A.C. 241, [1994] 5 W.W.R. 594, [1994] 4 C.N.L.R. 68. Le juge Taylor, s’exprimant au nom de la cour, a examiné les modifications de 1956, y compris celles apportées au par.
3 The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, concluding that s. 28(2) allowed grants of interests for periods having no predetermined termination date: (1994), 89 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 41 B.C.A.C. 241, 66 W.A.C. 241, [1994] 5 W.W.R. 594, [1994] 4 C.N.L.R. 68.  Taylor J.A., for the court, considered and concluded that the 1956 amendments, including those to s. 28(2), significantly changed the pre-existing scheme by giving band councils increased authority to speak and act on behalf of their members.  The Court of Appeal found that s. 28(2) created a third method of alienation, over and above the traditional surrender method (s. 37) and expropriation (s. 35).  The Minister was authorized to grant rights of use and occupation under s. 28 that could also be granted under ss. 35 or 37 provided that grants under s. 28  did not amount to “transfer of title to, or ownership of, the land” (p. 155 B.C.L.R.).
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Selon l’art. 62, l’ordre d’entreprendre des travaux en vertu de l’art. 61 n’est pas assujetti aux formalités habituelles, y compris celles prescrites par la Loi de la Commission municipale. Voici cet article:
Two routes exist for the commencement of purification works. The municipality may initiate such works, or the Board may initiate them. If the municipality initiates them, the plans must be approved by the Board; control of expenditure is achieved through scrutiny by the Quebec Municipal Commission as required by s. 24 of the Municipal Commission Act. If the Board initiates the works, it has the power to make investigations and order the preparation of plans under s. 61 (i.e. after investigation, the Board “may order what is necessary to be done”). Section 62 provides that an order to carry on any work under s. 61 will be excepted from the formalities, including those of the Municipal Commission Act, otherwise necessary. It reads:
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Dans la seconde hypothèse, il est difficile de concevoir de quelle façon on déterminerait les dispositions applicables; de fait, il est difficile de voir comment la plupart des dispositions, y compris celles qui ont trait aux rapports d'initié, s'appliqueraient jamais à la Couronne.
21.                     A question which immediately comes to mind is whether by taking advantage of one right conferred by the Act (e.g., voting the shares) the Crown would subject itself to all or only some of the other provisions of the Act. If only some, it is difficult to conceive how it could be determined which provisions would apply ‑‑ indeed it is hard to see how most provisions, including those relating to insider reports, would ever apply to the Crown. If, on the other hand, all of the Act would apply upon the Crown taking affirmative advantage of one provision, then it is difficult to see why this result should not follow from the purchase of the shares alone. Upon purchasing the shares certain rights, e.g., the right to vote the shares and the right to receive dividends, accrue immediately to the purchaser. As will be discussed, the aggregate of these rights and their attendant obligations are indeed definitive of the notion of a share. With respect, I cannot see why some affirmative act with regard to one right acquired by the purchaser of a share changes the situation in any relevant way.
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Des objections supplémentaires, y compris celles relatives au traitement par le juge du procès de la provocation et ses directives sur l'évaluation des éléments de preuve et de la crédibilité, ont été jugées sans fondement.
The other major issue on appeal related to the sufficiency of the jury charge, and in particular the judge's instructions on the offence of murder. The majority of the Appeal Division concluded that the charge could not have confused the jury on the issue of the requisite intent for first and second degree murder.  It also rejected the argument that the judge's reference to criminal negligence in the charge required a new trial.  While the reference was unnecessary, the majority was satisfied that reading the charge as a whole, the jury could not have been confused on the essential issues -- provocation and drunkenness.  Additional objections, including those relating to the trial judge's treatment of provocation and his instructions on weighing evidence and assessing credibility, were held to be without merit.  Jones J.A. concluded (at p. 113):
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Canada (Procureur général), [1998] 1 R.C.S. 877). Cette participation est futile sans les renseignements que la presse peut fournir sur les pratiques du gouvernement, y compris celles de la police. À mon sens, une interdiction de publication limitant l’accès du public à l’information relative à l’organisme gouvernemental qui manie publiquement des instruments de force et qui recueille des éléments de preuve en vue d’emprisonner des présumés contrevenants aurait un effet préjudiciable grave.
51 As this Court recognized in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at p. 976, “participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged”, a principle fundamental to a free and democratic society.  See Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.  Such participation is an empty exercise without the information the press can provide about the practices of government, including the police.  In my view, a publication ban that restricts the public’s access to information about the one government body that publicly wields instruments of force and gathers evidence for the purpose of imprisoning suspected offenders would have a serious deleterious effect. There is no doubt as to how crucial the role of the police is to the maintenance of law and order and the security of Canadian society.  But there has always been and will continue to be a concern about the limits of acceptable police action.  The improper use of bans regarding police conduct, so as to insulate that conduct from public scrutiny, seriously deprives the Canadian public of its ability to know of and be able to respond to police practices that, left unchecked, could erode the fabric of Canadian society and democracy.
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De l'avis du juge Henry, il convenait davantage d'appliquer la loi du lieu du délit ou la loi appropriée (c.‑à‑d. celle du lieu qui avait le lien le plus important avec le délit) qui était un concept américain. Il a formulé l'espoir, réitéré depuis dans maintes affaires, y compris celles dont nous sommes saisis, que la question soit abordée par les tribunaux d'appel ou par le législateur.
The law as enunciated in McLean v. Pettigrew has remained the basic rule in Canada ever since.  However, its fundamental weaknesses began to be revealed in a series of Ontario cases beginning in the 1980s.  The first requiring discussion is Going v. Reid Brothers Motor Sales Ltd. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 201 (H.C.).  There the plaintiffs were seriously injured in a collision with the defendant's vehicle in Quebec owing to the negligence of the defendant.  All the parties resided in Ontario.  In an action in Ontario, Henry J. held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages in accordance with Ontario law despite the fact that the no-fault scheme in Quebec, where the accident took place, extinguished any action in respect of bodily injuries arising out of the accident.  Had there been no breach of Quebec law of any kind the action would not have been maintainable in Ontario; see Walpole v. Canadian Northern Railway Co., [1923] A.C. 113 (P.C.).  However, in Going, the defendant had been in breach of the Quebec Highway Traffic Code, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-24.  Thus the action was not "justifiable" in Quebec so, following the rule in McLean v. Pettigrew, the plaintiffs could recover under Ontario law.  Henry J. noted that the effect was that the defendants, who had no relationship with the plaintiffs apart from the accident, were deprived of the protection of the law accorded them in Quebec where the action occurred; moreover, he added, the rule encouraged forum shopping.  Had either the British rule in Chaplin v. Boys, supra, or the American rule (which applied the proper law of the tort), been in effect, that would not have been the case.  I note in passing that in this and the cases that followed, reference is made to rules in other countries, but in none of these cases was the rule approached on the basis of Canadian constitutional imperatives.
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De toute manière, pour déterminer si la preuve était suffisante, il fallait considérer toute la preuve et, plus particulièrement, les motifs justifiant toutes les conclusions relatives à la crédibilité, y compris celles visant l’enfant et les témoins entendus à l’appui de sa version des faits, et non seulement celles se rapportant à l’accusé et à ses témoins.
19 This Court has consistently admonished trial judges to explain their reasons on credibility and reasonable doubt in a way that permits adequate review by an appellate court.  Having encouraged these expanded reasons, it would be counterproductive to dissect them minutely in a way that undermines the trial judge’s responsibility for weighing all of the evidence.  A trial judge’s language must be reviewed not only with care, but also in context. Most language is amenable to multiple interpretations and characterizations.  But appellate review does not call for a word-by-word analysis; rather, it calls for an examination to determine whether the reasons, taken as a whole, reflect reversible error. The task is to assess the overall, common sense meaning, not to parse the individual linguistic components. In re‑examining the evidence piece by piece, the Court of Appeal in this case confused the need for sufficiency of reasons with the examination of sufficiency of the evidence, the latter being central to the disposition of the case in Burke, Burns and R. (D.) on which it relied. In our view the reasons were sufficient.  In any event, any consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence had to be founded on consideration of all of the evidence and especially the justifications for all findings of credibility, including those referable to the child and witnesses who testified in support of her, not just referable to the accused and those supporting him.
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D'une manière générale, les textes en cause accordaient aux sociétés constituées sous le régime de la loi provinciale un traitement différent de celui accordé aux autres sociétés, y compris celles constituées sous le régime de la loi fédérale.
33.              I am further confirmed in this view by one of the examples chosen by Dickson J. to illustrate, with an analogy, when a law is not one of general application. At page 110, he mentioned the case of Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91, where Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan statutory provisions were held ultra vires so far as they paralysed the status and capacities of federal companies. Those provisions generally discriminated between provincially incorporated companies and extra‑provincial companies including federal ones. They were clearly not laws of general application and on that ground they were prima facie suspicious from a constitutional point of view. I find it significant that Dickson J. abstained from referring to another "company case", that of Attorney‑General for Manitoba v. Attorney‑General for Canada, [1929] A.C. 260, where two Manitoba statutes prohibiting companies from selling their own shares within the province without the consent of a provincial commissioner or board were held not to apply to federal companies. Unlike the provisions considered in the Great West Saddlery Co. case, these two Manitoba statutes were clearly laws of general application and they were in fact "read down" although this is not what was explicitly said since the expression does not seem to have then been in use and the case was a reference stating a specific constitutional question.
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Ces dispositions de la Loi doivent être appliquées de manière à assurer la réalisation des objectifs du législateur. Pour protéger les propriétaires, le législateur a prévu certaines procédures, y compris celles énoncées à l’art.
In pursuance of the expressed purpose of the Act, the Legislature set up a detailed scheme of procedure which, if followed, would achieve the objects of the enactment and at the same time protect the landowners to the extent prescribed by the Legislature. To protect the heritage of Ontario the municipalities were given power to designate property of their choice and to suspend thereby many of the rights of private ownership. These provisions of the Act should be given force and effect to secure the goals of the Legislature. To protect landowners, the Legislature provided certain procedures including those set out in s. 34, together with the provisions of s. 67, which are the ones with which we are concerned. These provisions, too, must have their effect.
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L’Adoption Act n’est pas une loi relative à ceux qui sont «Indiens en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens» et ses dispositions, y compris celles de l’art. 10, ne modifient pas «le statut, les droits, les privilèges, les incapacités et les restrictions… acquis à titre d’Indien en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens».
The Adoption Act is not a statute enacted in relation to Indians “under the Indian Act” and its provisions, including those of s. 10, do not affect the “status, rights, privileges, disabilities and limitations… acquired as an Indian under the Indian Act”. The Adoption Act only applies to Indians by reason of their character as citizens of the Province of British Columbia and there is no conflict between that statute and the Indian Act. It followed that the newly added subs. (4a) to s. 10 of the Adoption Act made no change in the law. It was ineffective rather than ultra vires.
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(1) [TRADUCTION] Nonobstant toute autre loi, le montant des salaires indiqué au certificat délivré en vertu de l’article 5 constitue une créance privilégiée payable à la Commission par préférence à toute autre dette ou créance, y compris celles de la Couronne du chef de la province, et, sans limiter la portée de ce qui précède, ce privilège prévaut sur toute cession, y compris une cession de créance, absolue ou non, toute hypothèque sur biens réels ou personnels et toute obligation.
5A. (1) Notwithstanding any other Act, the amount of wages set forth in a certificate issued under section 5 constitutes a lien and charge in favour of the Board payable in priority over any other claim or right, includ­ing those of the Crown in right of the Province, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such priority shall extend over every assignment, including an assignment of book debts, whether absolute or otherwise, every mortgage of real or personal property, and every debenture.
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Comme on le verra plus loin, je suis convaincu que l’Adoption Act n’est pas une loi relative à ceux qui sont «Indiens en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens» et que ses dispositions, y compris celles de l’art.
As will hereafter appear, I am satisfied that the Adoption Act is not a statute enacted in relation to Indians “under the Indian Act” and that its provisions, including those of s. 10, do not affect the “status, rights, privileges, disabilities, and limitations… acquired as an Indian under the Indian Act”. The Adoption Act only applies to Indians by reason of their character as citizens of the Province of British Columbia and I can find no conflict between that statute and the Indian Act.
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Vu toutes les autres preuves, y compris celles auxquelles je ne me suis pas spécialement reporté, un jury pouvait conclure que l’accusé était la seule personne à avoir eu l’occasion d’allumer l’incendie, même s’il lui était loisible d’en arriver à une conclusion contraire.
On the evidence, it was open to the jury properly instructed to have concluded that the accused did in fact have the exclusive opportunity to set this fire. It was open to them to reject the evidence of the witness who testified as to the open window and the presence of lights at a material time. On all the other evidence, including evidence to which I have not specifically referred, a jury could conclude that the accused was the only person who had the opportunity to set the fire, even though it was open to them to find to the contrary.
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Nous sommes tous d’avis que, dans l’ensemble, les directives du juge du procès relativement au moyen de défense fondé sur l’intoxication, y compris celles données dans ses deuxième et dernier exposés supplémentaires, n’étaient ni erronées ni de nature à induire en erreur, quoiqu’il ne fût pas nécessaire de traiter de l’intoxication dans le cas d’infractions requérant une intention générale.
1                 Gonthier J. ‑‑ This appeal comes to us as of right.  We are all of the view that the trial judge’s instructions as to the defence of intoxication taken as a whole, including the second and the last recharge, were not in error nor misleading, though it was unnecessary to cover intoxication in general intent offences.  We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeal in dismissing the issues raised as to unanimity and the judge’s remarks said to be inflammatory, and agree with its comments on the latter.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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(1) Nonobstant toute autre loi, le montant du salaire indiqué au certificat délivré en vertu de l’article 5 constitue une créance privilégiée payable à la Commission par préférence à toute autre dette ou créance, y compris celles de la Couronne du chef de la province, et, sans limiter la portée de ce qui précède, ce privilège prévaut sur toute cession, y compris une cession de créance, absolue ou non, toute hypothèque sur biens réels ou personnels et toute obligation.
5A. (1) Notwithstanding any other Act, the amount of wages set forth in a certificate issued under section 5 constitutes a lien and charge in favour of the Board payable in priority over any other claim or right, including those of the Crown in right of the Province, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such priority shall extend over every assignment, including an assignment of book debts, whether absolute or otherwise, every mortgage of real or personal property, and every debenture.
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QUE ledit comité, le 22 novembre 1974 ou vers cette date, a décidé de continuer à recueillir des signatures d’électeurs de façon à obtenir un nombre de signatures, y compris celles des bourgeois, égal à 5% de la population de Regina selon le rencensement fédéral de 1971; le motif de cette décision étant que le conseil municipal ne tenait pas compte des observations du Comité et que ce dernier craignait que le conseil prétende rejeter la pétition des bourgeois en alléguant qu’il s’agit d’une question à soumettre au vote des électeurs et non des bourgeois.
THAT the said Committee on or about November 22, 1974 decided to continue to canvas for additional elector signatures to obtain sufficient signatures which together with the burgess signatures would be equal to 5% of the population of Regina according to the 1971 Federal Census figures; the reason for the decision being that the said City Council was ignoring the representations of the Committee, and the Committee was of the view that the Council might attempt to reject the burgess petition on the grounds that the matter was a question to be referred to the electors for a vote and not the burgesses.
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26.1 Nonobstant toute disposition inconciliable avec la présente, le produit de polices d’assurance, y compris celles émises ou appliquées suivant la Loi de l’assurance des maris et des parents (chap. 296), dû par un assureur en raison ou à l’occasion du décès de la personne sur la tête de qui l’assurance a été contractée, est réputé un bien dont la propriété, la jouissance ou l’usufruit est transmis par ce décès et est sujet au paiement des droits prévus par l’article 9, suivant le degré de parenté existant entre le bénéficiaire et la personne sur la tête de qui repose l’assurance, même lorsque cette dernière n’a pas personnellement contracté l’assurance et n’en a pas acquitté les primes.
26. (1) Notwithstanding any provision inconsistent herewith, the proceeds of insurance policies, including those issued or appropriated pursuant to the Husbands and Parents Life Insurance Act (Chap. 296), due by an insurer by reason or on account of the death of the person on whose life the insurance was effected, shall be deemed to be property whereof the ownership, usufruct or enjoyment is transmitted owing to such death and shall be subject to payment of the duties provided for by section 9, according to the degree of relationship which existed between the beneficiary and the person on whose life the insurance was effected, even when the latter did not himself take out the insurance or pay the premiums thereon.
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D'une façon générale, en ce qui concerne la responsabilité criminelle, une personne morale n'est pas différente d'une personne physique et peut être déclarée coupable d'infractions de common law et d'infractions à la loi, y compris celles qui exigent la mens rea.
34. Corporations. In general, a corporation is in the same position in relation to criminal liability as a natural person and may be convicted of common law and statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. There are, however, crimes which a corporation is incapable of committing or of which a corporation cannot be found guilty as a principal....
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Alors que la Loi de 1861 autorisait toutes les commissions scolaires, y compris celles de Montréal et de Québec, à prélever toute somme additionnelle (art. 74), par l'effet de la Loi de 1979 une commission scolaire peut encore prélever toute somme qu'elle estime nécessaire mais au‑delà du plafond déjà indiqué, la taxe requise doit être soumise à l'approbation des électeurs par voie de référendum.
57.              The fourth objection relates essentially to the referendum. While the 1861 Act authorized all school commissions, including those of Montréal and Québec, to levy any additional sum (s. 74), under the 1979 Act a school board may still levy any amount which it considers necessary, but beyond the ceiling indicated above the tax required must be submitted to the electors for approval in a referendum.
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Les opérations bancaires de CP Hôtels, y compris celles de Flight Kitchen, faisaient partie des arrangements bancaires généraux conclus avec la Banque par Canadien Pacifique Limitée ("CP") pour elle‑même, pour ses filiales et pour ses sociétés affiliées.
3.                The cheques in issue were drawn during the period April 1976 to July 1977 inclusive on the chequing account, at the respondent Bank of Montreal ("the Bank"), of the operating unit or division of the appellant Canadian Pacific Hotels Limited ("CP Hotels"), at the Toronto International Airport, known as the Chateau Flight Kitchen (sometimes referred to as the "Malton Flight Kitchen" and hereinafter referred to as the "Flight Kitchen"). The banking operations of CP Hotels, including those of the Flight Kitchen, were part of the over‑all banking arrangements made with the Bank by Canadian Pacific Limited ("CP") for itself and its subsidiary and associated companies. CP operated a centralized banking arrangement known as Treasury under which the Flight Kitchen maintained separate deposit and disbursement accounts with the Bank and a Treasury account with CP. Deposits were transferred on a daily basis to the Treasury account, and an amount was transferred daily from the Treasury account to the disbursement account to restore the balance in that account to zero. Disbursements by the Flight Kitchen to other participants under the Treasury banking arrangement were made by intercompany payment orders (ICPO's), which were non‑negotiable cheques drawn on the Treasury account. The Bank submitted a daily bank statement with vouchers to the Flight Kitchen. The CP Hotels procedure manual required the accountant of the Flight Kitchen to prepare monthly bank reconciliations with a list of outstanding cheques and to forward them to the assistant accountant of the head office of CP Hotels.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
15(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés pour le motif qu’il crée de la discrimination à l’endroit des personnes souffrant de troubles mentaux -- y compris celles atteintes de déficiences mentales -- qui, pour cette cause, font l’objet d’un verdict de non‑responsabilité criminelle?
1.                Does s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, infringe the rights and freedoms guaranteed by s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the ground that it discriminates against people with a mental disorder, including people with a mental disability, who have been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder?
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
133 de l’A.A.N.B. s’applique aux mesures de nature législative qui émanent du gouvernement de la province, y compris celles qui émanent d’un groupe de ministres, membres du gouvernement, comme le «Conseil du Trésor» (Loi sur l’administration financière, L.R.Q. 1977, chap. A-6, art. 18) ou d’un ministre.
Appellant and the Attorney General of Manitoba conceded, properly so in our view, that s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act applies to enactments of a legislative nature issued by the Government of the province, including enactments issued by a group of ministers being members of the Government, such as the “Conseil du Trésor” (Treasury Board) (Financial Administration Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-6, s. 18) or by a minister.
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