étant donné que ce dernier – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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Keybot 7 Results  scc.lexum.org  Page 6
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION]…sur la base des conclusions que j’ai tirées, au sujet de l’intention constante de ceux qui l’on prise les premiers, et de l’intention constante de Lafrance lorsqu’il a pris le volant, soit l’intention de la retourner, et étant donné que ce dernier a en réalité privé le propriétaire de son véhicule uniquement pour quelques heures, non pas pour une période si longue que j’en arriverais à une conclusion différente de la conclusion qu’il avait réellement l’intention de la retourner, et en l’absence de toute preuve, de la part de celui qui l’a prise le premier, c.
...on the basis of the findings that I have made, that is about the intentions at all times of the people who took it originally and Lafrance when he did take over the control, i.e. of the intention of returning it, and in view of the fact that he actually did deprive the owner for only a few hours of the possession of this motor vehicle, not for such a lengthy period as would lead me to a different conclusion than the one that he actually intended to return it, and in the absence of any evidence on the part of the original taker, that is Trudel, that he intended at that time to
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[8] Le juge du procès a fait une mise en garde de type Vetrovec aux jurés; il leur a conseillé de faire montre d’une [traduction] « très grande prudence » avant d’accepter le témoignage de M. Niemi, étant donné que ce dernier avait admis avoir été condamné à deux reprises pour voies de fait et souffrir de pharmacodépendance.
[8] The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning; he advised the jury to be “extremely cautious” in accepting Mr. Niemi’s evidence because he admitted to two criminal convictions for assault and to having a drug addiction or dependence. The trial judge further advised the jury that it was “unsafe” and “dangerous” for them to rely on Mr. Niemi’s testimony unless they found some support for it in the rest of the evidence. These instructions clearly communicated to the jury that it was dangerous to rely on Mr. Niemi’s evidence absent other evidence supporting it.  However, the trial judge’s explanation of the reasons for the caution was incomplete.  He did not tell the jury that caution was required because Mr. Niemi was a jailhouse informant, that he was facing charges himself, or that he was aware a reward was offered for information about the killing. Although these facts were included in the trial judge’s summary of Mr. Niemi’s evidence, at no point in the jury charge were they linked to the need for extreme caution in relying on his evidence.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La cour a en outre conclu que le demandeur «ne pouvait pas» solliciter la protection du gouvernement libanais, étant donné que ce dernier avait presque littéralement cessé d'exister pendant la guerre civile au Liban.
This would appear to be an entirely reasonable reading of the current definition.  With respect to "unable", it would appear that physical or literal impossibility is one means of triggering the definition, but it is not the only way.  Thus ineffective state protection is encompassed within the concept of "unable" and "unwilling", and I am left with the conclusion that the appellant here could have pursued his claim under either category.  As such, the distinctions made in the court below were really of no great importance for the purposes of this case.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La commission d'enquête a jugé qu'il était difficile de comprendre pourquoi le conseil scolaire avait alors simplement réprimandé l'intimé au lieu de le renvoyer, étant donné que ce dernier avait reçu une lettre au ton énergique, accompagnée d'un exemplaire de la politique no 5006, dans laquelle le but de cette nouvelle politique lui était très clairement exposé.
53               In March 1989, the School Board adopted Policy No. 5006, intended to ensure that students were offered a positive and safe learning environment, in which they were taught respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual.  In September 1989, the School Board decided to remove the "gag order" from the respondent's file.  Two months later, the respondent appeared on television to express and discuss his views.  The School Board responded by ordering a severe reprimand to the respondent, by way of letter, requesting that he refrain from "publicly assailing" another religion.  The Board of Inquiry found it difficult to understand why the School Board only gave the respondent a reprimand at this time as opposed to terminating his employment, given that the respondent had been sent a strongly worded letter along with a copy of Policy No. 5006 making the intention of the new policy very clear to him.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
281; sur la base des conclusions que j’ai tirées, au sujet de l’intention constante de ceux qui l’ont prise les premiers, et de l’intention constante de Lafrance lorsqu’il a pris le volant, soit l’intention de la retourner, et étant donné que ce dernier a en réalité privé le propriétaire de son véhicule uniquement pour quelques heures, non pas pour une période si longue que j’en arriverais à une conclusion différente de la conclusion qu’il avait réellement l’intention de la retourner, et en l’absence de toute preuve, de la part de celui qui l’a prise le premier, c.
Not only am I bound by this decision, but I agree entirely with the judgment of Mr. Justice Roach in his approach to the distinction which surely must exist between Sec. 280 and Sec. 281, and on the basis of the findings that I have made, that is about the intentions at all times of the people who took it originally and Lafrance when he did take over the control, i.e. of the intention of returning it, and in view of the fact that he actually did deprive the owner for only a few hours of the possession of this motor vehicle, not for such a lengthy period as would lead me to a different conclusion than the one that he actually intended to return it, and in the absence of any evidence on the part of the original taker, that is Trudel, that he intended at that time to deprive the owner in such circumstances as is called for under Sec. 280, then I must conclude in view of these findings that the accused at no time, either as a party to the commission of the offence or as the main offender himself, ever intended to commit an offence under the circumstances contemplated by Sec. 280. Sec. 281 not being an included offence under Sec. 280, the charge will accordingly be dismissed.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le juge du procès n’a pas averti les jurés qu’ils devaient se méfier du témoignage de N étant donné que ce dernier pouvait avoir intérêt à mentir afin d’obtenir un quelconque avantage à l’égard de ses propres problèmes juridiques ou de recevoir la récompense.
A jury, in order to assess the risk of accepting testimony from an unsavoury witness, must understand the reasons for special scrutiny.  The characteristics of the witness which bring his or her credibility into serious question must therefore be identified for the jury.  Here, the trial judge’s warning did not point out to the jury that they should be cautious with N’s evidence because of his possible motive to lie in order to get some advantage for himself in his own legal troubles or to collect the reward.  While it was debatable whether this omission in the judge’s direction was sufficiently serious in the context of this trial so as to require appellate intervention, the new evidence clearly made a new trial necessary.  The new evidence met all the relevant criteria for its admission; in particular, it may reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.  The Crown effectively conceded in its closing argument to the jury that the accused could not be convicted unless the jury accepted N’s evidence.  The new evidence showing the accused’s DNA on three items in the hotel room could have an impact not only on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of N, whose evidence was bolstered by the evidence of cleaning, but also on the portion of the trial judge’s Vetrovec warning where he specifically instructed the jury that the absence of DNA evidence in the room could be considered as supporting N’s evidence about his jail cell conversation with the accused.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le juge du procès a conseillé aux jurés de faire montre d’une « très grande prudence » avant d’accepter le témoignage de N, étant donné que ce dernier avait admis avoir des condamnations antérieures et souffrir de pharmacodépendance, et les a également prévenus qu’il était « risqué » et « dangereux » d’ajouter foi au témoignage de N, à moins qu’ils estiment qu’il était corroboré par d’autres éléments de preuve.
The accused was charged with second degree murder and tried before a jury.  The Crown’s evidence indicated that at least two individuals had been in the hotel room with the victim and there was no dispute that the accused was one of them.  Critical to the Crown’s case was the testimony of a jailhouse informant, N, who testified that the accused had told him that he had cleaned the hotel room in order to remove DNA evidence of his presence.  The accused acknowledged talking with N but denied speaking with him about DNA, fingerprints, or wiping down surfaces.  The trial judge advised the jury to be “extremely cautious” in accepting N’s evidence because he admitted to previous convictions and to having a drug dependence, and advised them that it was “unsafe” and “dangerous” for them to rely on N’s testimony unless they found some support for it in the rest of the evidence.  However, he did not tell the jury that caution was required because N was a jailhouse informant, that he was facing charges himself, or that he was aware a reward was offered for information about the killing.  The accused was convicted, but the Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge’s Vetrovec warning was inadequate.  The Crown then conducted additional forensic testing and DNA analysis which resulted in  reports that more of the accused’s DNA was found in the hotel room.  The Crown appealed to this Court as of right, and the accused sought to adduce this new evidence.