être imposé par – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  www.asproseat.org  
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• Il est possible d'opérer sur le marché en toute liberté – la propriété d'actifs de propriété intellectuelle peut donner cette liberté aux PME et leur permettre aussi de créer un actif négociable et un monopole dont le respect peut être imposé par la loi.
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Saving of valuable resource - latest research from Thomson Derwent in the USA would suggest that up to 70% of R&D may be wasted effort, merely duplicating existing knowledge searchable within patent databases.
  www.coxandpalmerlaw.com  
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Bien que les électeurs peuvent choisir de profiter du scrutin par anticipation entre le 9 et le 12 octobre 2015, le choix de participer à ce dernier relève uniquement de l’employé et ne peut être imposé par l’employeur.
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While voters may choose to take advantage of advance voting between October 9 and 12, 2015, the choice to participate in the advance poll lies solely with the employee and cannot be imposed by the employer.
  2 Hits parl.gc.ca  
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M. Ian Shugart: Si vous le permettez, j'ajouterai brièvement que, dans toute analyse de conformité, nous devrons également tenir compte du fardeau de conformité qui pourrait être imposé par inadvertance à un autre palier de gouvernement, par exemple à une instance provinciale.
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Mr. Ian Shugart: I would just add very briefly, if I could, that in that kind of compliance analysis we would also have to take into account any compliance burden that could inadvertently be placed on another jurisdiction, such as the provincial regulator and so on. That has to be part of our analysis as well.
  3 Hits csc.lexum.org  
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5(2) de la Loi sur les stupéfiants est arbitraire parce qu'elle [TRADUCTION]  "doit être imposé par le juge de première instance sans égard au type ou à la quantité de stupéfiant importé ou exporté, ni à l'utilisation prévue, ni aux antécédents criminels de l'accusé".
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104.            In the present case, the appellant submits that the minimum sentence of seven years' imprisonment, under s. 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act, is arbitrary, because it "must be imposed by the trial judge without regard to the type or amount of narcotic imported or exported, nor its intended use, nor to the criminal history or background of the accused". In other words, the appellant is arguing that legislation which restrains the discretion of the trial judge to weigh and consider the circumstances of the offender and the circumstances of the offence in determining the length of sentence is arbitrary and, therefore, cruel and unusual. In my view, this proposition cannot be accepted. It would, under the guise of protecting individuals from cruel and unusual punishment, unduly limit the power of Parliament to determine the general policy regarding the imposition of punishment for criminal activity. It would, in effect, constitutionally entrench the power of judges to determine the appropriate sentence in their absolute discretion. It is true, in general, that when a judge imposes a sentence, he considers the nature and gravity of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the character and criminal history of the offender, all with an eye to the primary purposes of punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. But, as I noted earlier, sentencing is an imprecise procedure and there will always be a wide range of appropriate sentences. For some offences, the protection of the public will be paramount and little weight will be given to the possibility of rehabilitating the offender. On other occasions, the gravity of the offence alone may dictate that a severe punishment be imposed as, for example, in the case of first degree murder. There will still be other offences and circumstances where the punishment will be based primarily upon the possi‑ bility of rehabilitation. In setting the minimum sentence at seven years for importing narcotics, Parliament has determined that the gravity of the offence, the protection of the public, and the suppression of the drug trade are of paramount importance and that, consequently, the circumstances of the particular accused should be given relatively less weight. This legislative determination does not transform the sentencing procedure into an arbitrary process. Under s. 5(2) of the Act, punishment continues to be imposed for reasons which are rationally connecte
  3 Hits scc.lexum.org  
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5(2) de la Loi sur les stupéfiants est arbitraire parce qu'elle [TRADUCTION]  "doit être imposé par le juge de première instance sans égard au type ou à la quantité de stupéfiant importé ou exporté, ni à l'utilisation prévue, ni aux antécédents criminels de l'accusé".
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104.            In the present case, the appellant submits that the minimum sentence of seven years' imprisonment, under s. 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act, is arbitrary, because it "must be imposed by the trial judge without regard to the type or amount of narcotic imported or exported, nor its intended use, nor to the criminal history or background of the accused". In other words, the appellant is arguing that legislation which restrains the discretion of the trial judge to weigh and consider the circumstances of the offender and the circumstances of the offence in determining the length of sentence is arbitrary and, therefore, cruel and unusual. In my view, this proposition cannot be accepted. It would, under the guise of protecting individuals from cruel and unusual punishment, unduly limit the power of Parliament to determine the general policy regarding the imposition of punishment for criminal activity. It would, in effect, constitutionally entrench the power of judges to determine the appropriate sentence in their absolute discretion. It is true, in general, that when a judge imposes a sentence, he considers the nature and gravity of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the character and criminal history of the offender, all with an eye to the primary purposes of punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. But, as I noted earlier, sentencing is an imprecise procedure and there will always be a wide range of appropriate sentences. For some offences, the protection of the public will be paramount and little weight will be given to the possibility of rehabilitating the offender. On other occasions, the gravity of the offence alone may dictate that a severe punishment be imposed as, for example, in the case of first degree murder. There will still be other offences and circumstances where the punishment will be based primarily upon the possi‑ bility of rehabilitation. In setting the minimum sentence at seven years for importing narcotics, Parliament has determined that the gravity of the offence, the protection of the public, and the suppression of the drug trade are of paramount importance and that, consequently, the circumstances of the particular accused should be given relatively less weight. This legislative determination does not transform the sentencing procedure into an arbitrary process. Under s. 5(2) of the Act, punishment continues to be imposed for reasons which are rationally connecte