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It should be noted, however, that this aspect of Lord Scarman's speech in Morgan has met with considerable disfavour in the academic community. A number of commentators have expressed the view that the imprecision of his inquiry is very unhelpful: see Malcolm Cope, "Undue Influence and Alleged Manifestly Disadvantageous Transactions: National Westminster Bank plc v. Morgan" (1986), 60 A.L.J. 87; David Tiplady, "The Limits of Undue Influence" (1985), 48 Mod. L. Rev. 579; and Editorial, "Bank securities allegedly obtained by undue influence", [1985] J. Bus. Law 191. Professor Ogilvie in her article, "Undue Influence in the House of Lords" (1986), 11 Can. Bus. L.J. 503, on the other hand, favours the open‑ended nature of the Morgan approach for more teleological reasons. She states that the test permits wider review by higher tribunals. She thinks this is a good thing. Some prefer Sir Eric's view in Bundy, supra (see Neil Andrews, "Undue Influence and Contracts of Loan", [1985] Cambridge L.J. 192), while others think that Lord Denning was on the right track when he suggested in obiter in Bundy that the courts should adopt the concept of inequality of bargaining power. With appropriate modification to the gifts context, power imbalances are a useful yardstick for equitable intervention: see Charles Reed, "Commentary" (1985), 19 Law Teacher 106; and R. D. Taylor, "Commentary" (1985), 19 Law Teacher 105. Still others have gone on to provide their own tests for this branch of the presumption inquiry. David Tiplady, supra, sees the constant feature in the cases as a circumstance whereby one party is led to believe that he can rely on another for disinterested advice and guidance and that the other will put his welfare first. Finally, Malcolm Cope, supra, in similar vein, says the test should be one of reliance upon guidance and advice.
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