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To summarize, none of the three impugned passages, taken in context, were misdirections. If I am wrong and one or more of these passages constitutes an error of law, then I believe that any such error was cured by the rest of the charge. As I have noted, the jury was instructed some fourteen times to consider the evidence as a whole. As well, MacIntosh J. explicitly directed the jury to evaluate the accused's statements in light of the other evidence before them. I cannot believe that the solitary instructions in question, placed as they are in a sea of contrary statements, would mislead a jury into a flawed process of considering evidence in a piecemeal fashion. As was stated in R. v. Demeter (1975), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 417, at p. 436, there will "probably never be a perfect charge or one that cloistered appellate counsel cannot find objectionable after minute scrutiny." Simply put, the charge to the jury must be read as a whole, bearing in mind the heavy onus that rests with the Crown to establish that the jury's verdict may have been affected by the impugned passage: Vézeau v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 277. In that light it is clear to me that MacIntosh J.'s charge, when viewed as a whole, was not misleading to the jury.
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