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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[traduction]  . . . bien que j'aie dit à Doug que je pouvais lui faire un prix pour le renouvellement de la police ayant pris connaissance du dossier je ne crois pas que nous puissions accéder à la demande STOP.
. . . although I mentioned to Doug that I would be able to quote renewal having now looked at the file I believe we will not be able to help  STOP.  Our contract is out of the question . . .
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il s'agit d'une modification fondamentale de la position que notre Cour a adoptée. Bien que je n'aie jamais changé d'avis en ce qui concerne ma position dissidente, j'appliquerai, comme il se doit, l'arrêt Askov aux faits de l'espèce.
Both of my colleagues in their reasons, McLachlin J. somewhat more so than Sopinka J., place the onus on the accused to prove prejudice.  This is a fundamental change to the position that this Court has taken.  While I have never changed my mind as regards my dissenting position, I will, as I should, apply Askov to the facts of this case.  Leaving the onus on the Crown, it has shown that Ms. Morin's liberty and fair trial interests have not been affected.  But it has not even attempted to show that her security interests have not been affected; by that I mean the kind of prejudice I described in Mills, supra, at p. 920, "stigmatization of the accused, loss of privacy, stress and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible disruption of family, social life and work, legal costs, uncertainty as to the outcome and sanction".  I conclude that this kind of prejudice has been suffered beyond the length of time that can be legitimately supported on the basis of limited institutional resources.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
28 Bien que j’aie mentionné la source des par. 26(10) et (11) des Règles, et ses répercussions sur leur libellé, ce n’était que pour démontrer l’objet de la communication préalable de documents, qui est de rendre le procès plus expéditif et équitable.
78 While I have referred to the source of Rules 26(10) and 26(11), and its reflection in their wording, this reference is meant to demonstrate the purpose of the discovery process, viz. to render the trial process more expeditious and fair. My primary focus is not the Rules of Court, however, but rather the discretionary approach or rule developed by the courts to govern the judicial exercise of the powers relating to discovery of documents. In my view, if we determine that the discretion as exercised by the Court of Appeal does not provide an adequate reflection of Charter values, it is incumbent upon this Court to alter that approach. Moreover, if the doctrine of privilege, while updated to reflect Charter values, provides an inadequate consideration of privacy interests asserted by the plaintiff, the traditional approach to discretion as exercised by the Master and Chambers judge must also be changed. Not only would such a result be appropriate, justice in these circumstances would require nothing less.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 537, est un exemple de cette approche. Bien que je n’aie pas souscrit à leur conclusion dans cette affaire, leur approche était correcte. Pour déterminer s’il y avait eu violation de la Charte, ils ont fait porter leur examen principalement sur la question de savoir si la conduite du ministère public avait «viol[é] les principes fondamentaux qui sous‑tendent le sens du franc‑jeu et de la décence qu’a la collectivité, et [. . .] constitu[ait] un abus des procédures de la cour» (au par. 121).
53                 It follows, therefore, that where disclosure is not properly made, even in cases where the accused cannot demonstrate that his or her right to make full answer and defence has been affected, there can be a Charter violation if the conduct by the Crown impacts upon the concerns outlined above.  One example of this approach can be seen in the joint dissenting opinion of Major and McLachlin JJ. in R. v. Curragh Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 537.  While I disagreed with their conclusion in that case, their approach was the correct one.  In determining whether a violation of the Charter had occurred, the focus (at para. 121) was whether the conduct of the Crown had “violate[d] the fundamental principles that underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency and constitute[d] an abuse of the court’s process”.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
19 Quoique j’aie dit précédemment que les décisions de politique générale n’engagent pas la responsabilité des organismes gouvernementaux qui les prennent, je tiens à préciser que, lorsqu’une inspection est prévue par la loi, l’organisme en cause ne pourrait se dégager de toute responsabilité simplement en arrêtant la décision de politique générale de ne jamais effectuer d’inspection.
19 While I have stated above that a government agency will not be liable for those decisions made at the policy level, I must emphasize that, where inspection is provided for by statute, a government agency cannot immunize itself from liability by simply making a policy decision never to inspect.  The decisions in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, supra, and Kamloops v. Nielsen, supra, establish that in reaching a policy decision pertaining to inspection, the government agency must act in a reasonable manner which constitutes a bona fide exercise of discretion.  In the context of a municipal inspection scheme, we must bear in mind that municipalities are creatures of statute which have clear responsibilities for health and safety in their area.  A policy decision as to whether or not to inspect must accord with this statutory purpose; see, for example, Kamloops v. Nielsen, at p. 10.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que j’aie été l’un des quatre juges dissidents sur la question du pouvoir de la cour d’appel, j’ai souscrit entièrement à l’avis du juge Pigeon selon lequel cette Cour avait compétence parce qu’elle était appelée à statuer non pas sur l’appel d’une sentence, mais sur la compétence de la cour d’appel provinciale.
tory authority has been Goldhar v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 60. It was distinguished, and in my opinion properly so, in Hill v. The Queen, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 827; and on a rehearing, Hill v. The Queen, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 827, which I will consider in due course. In the Hill cases, Pigeon J. spoke for the whole Court on the question of its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a determination of the provincial Court of Appeal that it had the power to increase a sentence imposed upon an accused upon a motion to that end by the Crown made during the hearing of a sentence appeal by the accused alone. Although I was in a minority of four on the question of the Court of Appeal’s power, I subscribed fully to the view expressed by Pigeon J. that this Court had jurisdiction because it was not called on to deal with a sentence appeal but with the legal authority of the provincial court of appeal. In the course of his reasons, Pigeon J. canvassed the cases on the issue now before us and he has, in so doing, relieved me of the necessity of going through them as meticulously as he did. Nonetheless, I do wish to review them to provide perspective for the present case.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La bonne foi des policiers ne saurait être mise en doute dans la présente affaire: le juge du procès a expressément conclu que les policiers étaient au courant de l'arrêt Kokesch de notre Cour et qu'ils avaient le sentiment que leurs actions, en s'approchant de la porte des Evans, étaient conformes à cet arrêt.
23               Turning next to the seriousness of the Charter violation, I would not characterize the violation of s. 8 in the instant case as particularly grave.  The good faith of the police in the present case cannot be questioned: the trial judge expressly found that the police were aware of this Court's decision in Kokesch and felt that their actions in approaching the Evans' door were consistent with that decision.  As a result, although the initial "olfactory" search of the Evans' home has now been found to have been constitutionally impermissible, the police were unaware that the search was beyond their investigatory powers.  The subsequent search of the Evans' home was undertaken in reliance on a warrant.  Although I have found that the warrant was invalid, the police (who at all times believed that they were acting in an appropriate manner), had no reason to doubt the validity of the warrant at the time that the search of the Evans' home was conducted.  This warrant was produced to the appellants before the search had progressed very far.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Plus tard dans la conversation, Papalia a dit: [TRADUCTION] «Je vais lui dire ce que je pense à ma façon», ce à quoi Violi a répondu: [TRADUCTION] «Hum, aie, aie, aie, de cette façon nous n’attraperons jamais, jamais, jamais ce type».
names, the people he gonna see me, he got the (…) money, when we got nothing.” Papalia suggested that they beat up Swartz and take the $260,000 from him, but Cotroni and Violi demurred. After further discussion Papalia said: “I tell him my own way, in my own back yard”, to which Violi responded: “Hum, eh, eh, eh, this way we never, we never, we never reach that guy.” Papalia replied: “Then you come, you come to Toronto then.” And so it was agreed that Violi would go to Toronto the following week. He was prepared to go “. . . any place, so long as we gonna straight up this thing.” It is only too clear that “straight up this thing” meant relieving Swartz of the money he had extorted or what was left of it. Violi assured Papalia: “That’s gonna save your life.” It was agreed that, pending the proposed meeting in Toronto, Papalia would say nothing to Swartz.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
11(1), le tribunal a le pouvoir d'inclure une clause d'indexation dans une ordonnance alimentaire. La seule affaire que j'aie trouvée où l'on dit que ce pouvoir n'existe pas est l'affaire Yeates v. Yeates (1982), 31 R.F.L. (2d) 71 (C.S.N.‑é.D.P.I.), à la p.
51.              The first issue to be determined is whether under s. 11(1) a court has the power to include an escalator clause in a maintenance order. The only case I have found that expresses the view that no such power exists is Yeates v. Yeates (1982), 31 R.F.L. (2d) 71 (N.S.S.C.T.D.), at p. 77. In Nathanson J.'s view in that case, this was inconsistent with the fact that such an order must be based on need. In Ursini v. Ursini (1975), 24 R.F.L. 261, at p. 263, it is true, Brooke J.A., speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, stated that generally an order for maintenance must be varied by a further court order, but he left the door open, simply holding that in the circumstances of the case an escalator clause was not appropriate. It may also be argued, I suppose, that an increasing amount is not a "periodic payment" within the meaning of s. 11 of the Divorce Act and that the proper method of varying a maintenance order is provided by s. 11(2).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’arbitre a effectivement examiné cette disposition de la convention comme il appert de la dernière phrase citée de ses motifs, et il ressort clairement de cette phrase qu’il ne croyait pas que la grève faisait partie de ce qu’il a appelé [TRADUCTION] «des situations dans la convention qui prolongent l’ancienneté.» Je n’ai pas à me demander, je crois, si je parviendrais à la même conclusion, il suffit que je n’aie pas de doute sur le caractère raisonnable de cette conclusion.
I cannot agree with MacKeigan C.J. that the Arbitrator in this case put the wrong question. With respect, the proper question was as the Arbi­trator stated it, namely, "Did the employees accumulate seniority during the strike?" Whether absence from work on the legal strike constituted a "justifiable reason" within the meaning of art. 9.04 just was something to be considered in answering the question, it was not the question. The Arbitrator did consider that provision of the agreement as appears from the last sentence I have quoted from his reasons, and from that sentence it is clear that he did not consider that the strike came within what he called "the situations in the Agreement which extend seniority". I do not think I need consider whether I would reach the same conclusion, it is enough that I have no doubt that this is not an unreasonable conclusion.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je ne souscris pas à l’observation du juge Pigeon dans les arrêts Hill, portant que l’arrêt Goldhar ne lie pas la Cour et ne doit pas être suivi. Bien que j’aie dit dans mes motifs relatifs à la première audition de l’affaire Hill, à la p.
Goldhar was an application for leave to appeal heard by a Bench of five. Fauteux J., as he then was, delivered the judgment of the Court (Cartwright J., as he then was, alone dissenting) and he held that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a sentence imposed on a conviction of an indictable offence. I disagree with Pigeon J.’s observation in the Hill cases that Goldhar was not binding and should not be followed. Although I said in my reasons in the first Hill hearing, at p. 830, that I agreed with Pigeon J. that Goldhar should be overruled, this was only in the context of the issue in the Hill case and only in so far as Goldhar might be taken as prohibiting an appeal to this Court on the legality of a sentence or on the power of a Court to increase a sentence against which no appeal was taken. I can agree that Goldhar was not binding (none of our decisions now are, theoretically, binding) but it was unnecessary to say that it should not be followed when the Hill cases were of a completely
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Plus tard dans la conversation, Papalia a dit: [TRADUCTION] «Je vais lui dire ce que je pense à ma façon», ce à quoi Violi a répondu: [TRADUCTION] «Hum, aie, aie, aie, de cette façon nous n’attraperons jamais, jamais, jamais ce type».
names, the people he gonna see me, he got the (…) money, when we got nothing.” Papalia suggested that they beat up Swartz and take the $260,000 from him, but Cotroni and Violi demurred. After further discussion Papalia said: “I tell him my own way, in my own back yard”, to which Violi responded: “Hum, eh, eh, eh, this way we never, we never, we never reach that guy.” Papalia replied: “Then you come, you come to Toronto then.” And so it was agreed that Violi would go to Toronto the following week. He was prepared to go “. . . any place, so long as we gonna straight up this thing.” It is only too clear that “straight up this thing” meant relieving Swartz of the money he had extorted or what was left of it. Violi assured Papalia: “That’s gonna save your life.” It was agreed that, pending the proposed meeting in Toronto, Papalia would say nothing to Swartz.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Plus tard dans la conversation, Papalia a dit: [TRADUCTION] «Je vais lui dire ce que je pense à ma façon», ce à quoi Violi a répondu: [TRADUCTION] «Hum, aie, aie, aie, de cette façon nous n’attraperons jamais, jamais, jamais ce type».
names, the people he gonna see me, he got the (…) money, when we got nothing.” Papalia suggested that they beat up Swartz and take the $260,000 from him, but Cotroni and Violi demurred. After further discussion Papalia said: “I tell him my own way, in my own back yard”, to which Violi responded: “Hum, eh, eh, eh, this way we never, we never, we never reach that guy.” Papalia replied: “Then you come, you come to Toronto then.” And so it was agreed that Violi would go to Toronto the following week. He was prepared to go “. . . any place, so long as we gonna straight up this thing.” It is only too clear that “straight up this thing” meant relieving Swartz of the money he had extorted or what was left of it. Violi assured Papalia: “That’s gonna save your life.” It was agreed that, pending the proposed meeting in Toronto, Papalia would say nothing to Swartz.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que j’aie dit en examinant la mise à pied de Gagné que je trouvais qu’elle avait été maladroite jusqu’à la stupidité, en tenant compte particulièrement de la situation de tension qui existait entre la Compagnie et le local n° 4881, je ne puis, du fait que je conclus que Gagné savait très bien à quoi s’en tenir sur sa situation, caractériser cette maladresse comme une faute, si faute il y a.
While I have said in discussing the lay-off of Gagné that I felt it had been mishandled, even stupidly, having particular regard to the strained relationship between the Company and Local 4881, I cannot, in view of my conclusion that there was no misunderstanding on Gagné’s part as to his status, categorize this mishandling as a contributory fault, if fault it is. After all Gagné was the party directly concerned and if he was prepared to allow a general misunderstanding to spread amongst his fellow workers that was not the fault of the Company. He knew perfectly well that he was slated to meet with the manager on Monday afternoon and the purpose of that meeting. The ostensible reason for the strike as given at the Local meeting on Sunday was a protest against his dismissal yet it was not long before the declared object of its continuation was union recognition and contract (see e.g. Local 4881, Strike Bulletin, March 27th, 1967—Ex. C‑189).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Carr souligne dans The Law of Electronic Surveillance, aux pp. 3 à 61, qu'aux États‑Unis, cette forme de surveillance constitue sans aucun doute [TRADUCTION] "le mode d'écoute clandestin le plus généralement et le plus souvent employé". Bien que je n'aie pu trouver de données sur la fréquence de son emploi au Canada, vu le nombre de cas, la pratique serait répandue ici également.
The importance of the issues can hardly be gainsaid.  Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance, points out, at pp. 3-61, that in the United States this mode of surveillance is without question "the most widely used and most frequently practiced [sic] mode of eavesdropping".  Though I have found no data on the relative frequency of this practice in Canada, the cases would indicate that it is also widespread here.  The extensive use of electronic surveillance in this country is documented.  The Law Reform Commission of Canada's working paper on Electronic Surveillance reports at p. 10 that on a relative basis, Canadian law enforcement authorities request twenty times more authorizations to conduct electronic surveillance than their American counterparts.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En résumé, aucun des trois passages attaqués, pris dans leur contexte, ne contient de directives erronées. À supposer que j'aie tort et qu'au moins l'un de ces passages constitue une erreur de droit, j'estime alors qu'une telle erreur a été corrigée par le reste de l'exposé.
To summarize, none of the three impugned passages, taken in context, were misdirections.  If I am wrong and one or more of these passages constitutes an error of law, then I believe that any such error was cured by the rest of the charge.  As I have noted, the jury was instructed some fourteen times to consider the evidence as a whole.  As well, MacIntosh J. explicitly directed the jury to evaluate the accused's statements in light of the other evidence before them.  I cannot believe that the solitary instructions in question, placed as they are in a sea of contrary statements, would mislead a jury into a flawed process of considering evidence in a piecemeal fashion.  As was stated in R. v. Demeter (1975), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 417, at p. 436, there will "probably never be a perfect charge or one that cloistered appellate counsel cannot find objectionable after minute scrutiny."  Simply put, the charge to the jury must be read as a whole, bearing in mind the heavy onus that rests with the Crown to establish that the jury's verdict may have been affected by the impugned passage:  Vézeau v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 277.  In that light it is clear to me that MacIntosh J.'s charge, when viewed as a whole, was not misleading to the jury.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le C.I.E. a été créé en 1956 et son mandat a été renouvelé successivement en vertu de dispositions des Accords internationaux sur l'étain, chacun d'une durée de cinq ans. C'est le sixième Accord international sur l'étain (AIE‑6) en date du 1er juillet 1982 qui nous concerne en l'espèce.
The appellant, Rudolf Wolff & Co. Ltd., is a subsidiary of Noranda Inc.  It carries on business as a metal commodities and futures broker.  The Federal Government, respondent, was a member of the International Tin Council (ITC).  This was an unincorporated association made up of 22 member states and the European Economic Community.  It was established in 1956 and has been continued by the provisions of successive five-year International Tin Agreements.  The relevant one was that dated July 1, 1982, the Sixth International Tin Agreement (ITA-6).  Pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement ITA-6, the ITC partners agreed to finance a buffer stock of tin which was to be used by the Buffer Stock Manager (BSM), an agent of the ITC members, to support the world market price for tin.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Devant nous, les avocats de la Banque ont essentiellement fait valoir l'existence d'une obligation d'application générale d'examiner les relevés bancaires avec une diligence raisonnable et de signaler les irrégularités dans un délai raisonnable, vu qu'il ressort de l'entrée en matière de leur plaidoirie orale que la Cour devrait reconnaître une obligation comparable à celle prévue par say §4‑406 de l'Uniform Commercial Code, quoique je n'aie pas l'impression qu'ils aient abandonné leur argument relatif à utilisation d'un système acceptable de contrôles comptables internes pour prévenir et minimiser les pertes imputables aux faux.
16.              In this Court counsel for the Bank contended chiefly for a duty of general application to examine bank statements with reasonable care and report discrepancies within a reasonable time, as indicated by his opening submission in oral argument that the Court should recognize a duty of the kind set out in §say 4‑406 of the Uniform Commercial Code, although I did not understand him to abandon reliance on a duty to maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls for the prevention and minimization of loss through forgery.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il est impossible de réduire leur application à des règles, l’un et l’autre étant limités, de façon à permettre aux juges d’aboutir à des résultats opposés à partir d’une norme commune. Le meilleur exemple que j’aie pu trouver est l’arrêt Little c.
The two views are simply generalities and, as such, they do not appear to depend on any particular case classifications. The application of the one or the other reflects attitudes that influence judgment. Reducing their application to rules is impossible, because each of them is qualified in a way which permits opposite results to be reached by judges who proceed from a common standard. As good an illustration as I have been able to find is Little v. Little[15] where, in a matrimonial case, this Court divided three to two in restoring the trial judge’s finding of fact, although all members of the Court avowed support for the view (emphasized in Watt or Thomas v. Thomas, supra, as especially appropriate to matrimonial cases) that the trial judge’s findings, based on his advantage of hearing and observing witnesses, should not be interfered with unless they are clearly wrong.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Au cours des premières années qui ont suivi la conclusion de l'Accord AIE‑6, le cours mondial de l'étain était très bas et a eu un effet désastreux sur le C.I.E. qui est devenu insolvable en octobre 1985.
In the course of his work, the BSM frequently bought and sold tin through the appellant Wolff.  During the first few years of the Agreement ITA-6, the world price of tin was very low.  The markedly reduced price had a disastrous effect upon the ITC which became insolvent by October of 1985.  The appellants allege that they have suffered severe losses as a result of the mismanagement of the buffer stock by the BSM for whom it is said the respondent, the Federal Government and the other members of the ITC were responsible.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
36 Bien que j'aie conclu que l'arrêt Gamble n'est d'aucune utilité à l'appelant puisqu'il confirme que l'habeas corpus ne peut être utilisé comme substitut à un appel contre une déclaration de culpabilité, on peut faire valoir que la contestation de l'appelant se fonde également sur le fait qu'il serait illégalement détenu.
36                      While I have concluded that the Court's judgment in Gamble is of no assistance to the appellant in that Gamble affirmed that habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal of conviction, it is arguable that the appellant's attack is also on his alleged unlawful detention.  The appellant submits that his detention is unlawful because he was wrongfully convicted.  I propose to deal with this submission on the assumption that this is an appropriate characterization of the appellant's application for habeas corpus.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que je n'aie pas examiné si la conduite d'un agent de police qui détient un automobiliste dans le cadre du programme R.I.D.E. peut être qualifiée de délictueuse, comme la conduite du policier l'a été dans l'arrêt Morris v.
42.              In the case at bar, the random stop was not authorized by statute, either federal or provincial. I have already given my reasons for concluding it was equally unauthorized at common law and that the police officer could not have been acting in the lawful execution of his duty. While I have not considered whether the conduct of a police officer who detains a motorist under the R.I.D.E. could be characterized as tortious, as the conduct of the police was considered to be in Morris v. Beardmore, it was nonetheless unlawful, due to the absence of legal authority.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Quoique j'aie conclu, suivant les règles d'interprétation des lois, que l'art. 269 exige la prévision objective des conséquences de l'acte illégal de l'accusé, l'appelant soutient que l'art. 7 de la Charte exige la prévision subjective de toutes les conséquences qui forment en partie l'actus reus d'une infraction.
Although I have concluded by means of statutory interpretation that s. 269 requires objective foresight of the consequences of an accused's unlawful act, the appellant argues that s. 7 of the Charter requires subjective foresight of all consequences which comprise part of the actus reus of an offence.  The appellant notes that in R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, Lamer C.J., speaking for the majority of the Court, discussed (at p. 645) a:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
46. Même à supposer que j'aie tort sur ce point et que la preuve n'ait pas dû être admise, la déclaration de culpabilité devrait, selon moi, être maintenue en vertu de la disposition réparatrice de l'al.
46.              Even if I am wrong in this and the evidence should not have been admitted, the conviction, in my view, should stand by virtue of the saving proviso of s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Code. Given the persuasive nature of the evidence in this case the jury's verdict would necessarily have been the same (see Colpitts v. The Queen, [1965] S.C.R. 739) even if the alleged error of law had not occurred.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
24 Ceci m’amène aux déductions faites par la Cour d’appel. Bien que j’aie certaines réserves quant au bien-fondé de ces déductions, l’intimé n’a formé aucun pourvoi incident à l’égard de l’attribution de dommages-intérêts.
24               This takes me to the deductions made by the Court of Appeal.  While I have some reservations about the propriety of these deductions, there was no cross-appeal by the respondent with respect to the award of damages.  No argument was presented with respect to these deductions.  My reservations relate to the basis upon which the Court of Appeal distinguished Rimes.  In this regard, the Court stated (at p. 481):
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que, dans les présents motifs, j’aie apporté une importante modification à l’ordonnance de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, la décision du pourvoi, en définitive, reste en faveur de l’intimé Sydney Sears et rien ici n’indique qu’il ne retirera pas tout le profit de cette décision.
Although in these reasons I materially altered the order of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the net result of the disposition of the appeal is still in favour of the respondent Sydney Sears and there is nothing in the material to indicate that he will not recover the full benefit of such judgment.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
5                 Bien que j'aie des réserves sur la façon dont le juge du procès a appliqué certains des facteurs, compte tenu des conclusions auxquelles j'ai fait allusion et de la pondération des facteurs pertinents, j'estime qu'il est arrivé à la bonne conclusion.
5                 In my view, although I have reservations about the application by the trial judge of some of the factors, having regard to the findings to which I have referred and balancing the relevant factors, the trial judge came to the right conclusion.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que je n’aie pas souscrit aux motifs du juge McLachlin dans cette affaire, je n’ai pas désapprouvé ce passage de ses motifs. Ce que j’y trouve à redire, c’est que le juge McLachlin ne dit à aucun endroit que la Charte a modifié le rapport entre l’exécutif et le législatif.
Although I did not concur with McLachlin J. in that case, I did not disapprove of this passage in her judgment.   What is critical about this passage is that McLachlin J. at no point says that the Charter has altered the relationship between the executive and the legislature.  The obvious implication is that this particular relationship was intended to remain the same after Patriation.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que j’aie initialement été en faveur de laisser un certain jeu au concept de persona designata dans l’application du par. 2g) de la Loi sur la Cour fédérale, dans l’espoir de concilier des décisions judiciaires relativement récentes, je suis maintenant d’avis que ce concept est davantage de nature à semer la confusion qu’à éclairer.
Although originally in favour of permitting some latitude for the play of persona designata in the operation of s. 2(g) of the Federal Court Act, in the hope of reconciling fairly recent judicial pronouncements, I am now of the view that the concept is a source of more confusion than enlightenment. As I pointed out in Herman (at pp. 741-42):
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] J'estime qu'en fonction du critère du caractère raisonnable, même dans son sens le plus strict, le règlement est raisonnable; mais, que j'aie tort ou raison à cet égard, je suis fermement d'avis qu'aucune cour de justice ne peut à bon droit le qualifier d'invalide.
In my opinion, judged by the test of reasonableness, even in its narrower sense, this is a reasonable By-law; but, whether I am right or wrong in this view, I am clearly of opinion that no Court of law can properly say that it is invalid.
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