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Keybot 88 Results  scc.lexum.org  Page 9
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] Il me semble presque banal de rappe­ler qu’une personne ne peut être excusée d’un crime parce qu’elle était ivre. Si c’était le cas, on pourrait immédiatement fermer les tribunaux de juridiction cri­minelle, car l’ivresse est la cause d’un grand nombre de crimes; cependant, bien que l’ivresse ne constitue pas’ une excuse à un crime, le fait que la personne était ivre au moment du crime est pertinent pour déterminer si elle a formé l’intention nécessaire pour constituer le crime dans les cas où l’intention est un élément essentiel du crime perpétré.
It is almost trivial for me to observe that a man is not excused from crime by reason of his drunkenness. If it were so, you might as well at once shut up the criminal courts, because drink is the occasion of a large propor­tion of the crime which is committed; but, although you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Conjointement accusés d’avoir illégalement commis un «meurtre punissable de mort» en tuant un policier agissant dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, les deux appe­lants, à l’issue de leur procès, ont été condamnés à mort conformément aux par. 214(2) et 218(1) du Code cri­minel.
On a joint charge of unlawfully committing "murder punishable by death" in the killing of a policeman while acting in the course of his duties, the two appellants were convicted at trial and sentenced to death pursuant to ss. 214(2) and 218(1) of the Criminal Code. On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of s. 2(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights and that, accordingly, ss. 214(2) and 218(1) of the Code were not inoperative by virtue of the application of the said s. 2(b) of the Bill of Rights. Following the hearing of the appeals to this Court, the Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 2), 1976, was enacted, whereby, inter alia, the death penalty provisions of the Criminal Code were repealed. Section 25(2) provides that if "after the coming into force of this Act, an appeal against conviction by a person under a sentence of death upon the coming into force of this Act for murder punishable by death is dismissed, that sentence thereupon becomes a sentence of imprisonment for life for first degree murder without eligibility for parole until he has served twenty-five years of his sen­tence." The Act came into force on July 26, 1976.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
12 Mme Ghyslaine Pomerleau, qui résidait à proximité du domicile de Laurent Taillefer, a témoigné avoir entendu un cri « anormalement long » d’une adolescente provenant des environs de la résidence de Laurent Taillefer durant la nuit du 9 au 10 mars 1990.
12 Ghyslaine Pomerleau, who lived near Laurent Taillefer’s apartment, testified that she had heard the [translation] “unusually long” scream of a teenaged girl coming from around Laurent Taillefer’s home during the night of March 9 to 10, 1990.  She said that she had heard the scream after seeing an unpleasant scene in a movie on television.  The evidence further established that the scene in question had aired at midnight.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’autre cri de ralliement à la réunion du dimanche était la fausse rumeur relative au renvoi imminent de 125 autres employés. Il n’y a eu aucune tentative, ni de la part de Bédard, ni de celle de Gagné de contrôler la véracité de cette rumeur auprès de la direction.
The other rallying cry at the Sunday meeting was the false rumour relating to the imminent discharge of an additional 125 men. There was no effort on the part of Bédard or Gagné to verify this with management.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Les traités et les lois qui concernent les Indiens doivent être interprétés de façon libérale, et toute incertitude ou ambiguïté doit profiter aux Indiens. En outre, le tribunal qui examine un traité doit tenir compte du contexte dans lequel les traités ont été négociés, conclus et couchés par écrit.
52               Third, the applicable interpretative principles must be borne in mind.  Treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and any uncertainties, ambiguities or doubtful expressions should be resolved in favour of the Indians.  In addition, when considering a treaty, a court must take into account the context in which the treaties were negotiated, concluded and committed to writing.  The treaties, as written documents, recorded an agreement that had already been reached orally and they did not always record the full extent of the oral agreement:  see Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North‑West Territories (1880), at pp. 338‑42; Sioui, supra,  at p. 1068; Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (1991); Jean Friesen, Grant me Wherewith to Make my Living (1985).  The treaties were drafted in English by representatives of the Canadian government who, it should be assumed, were familiar with common law doctrines.  Yet, the treaties were not translated in written form into the languages (here Cree and Dene) of the various Indian nations who were signatories.  Even if they had been, it is unlikely that the Indians, who had a history of communicating only orally, would have understood them any differently.  As a result, it is well settled that the words in the treaty must not be interpreted in their strict technical sense nor subjected to rigid modern rules of construction.  Rather, they must be interpreted in the sense that they would naturally have been understood by the Indians at the time of the signing.  This applies, as well, to those words in a treaty which impose a limitation on the right which has been granted.  See Nowegijick, supra, at p. 36; Sioui, supra, at pp. 1035‑36 and 1044; Sparrow, supra, at p. 1107; and Mitchell, supra, where La Forest J. noted the significant difference that exists between the interpretation of treaties and statutes which pertain to Indians.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
témoigner à l’enquête sur la cause de ce décès, a été jugé ultra vires de la législature provinciale même si la disposition attaquée donnait à cette personne la protection accordée par l’art. 5 de la Loi sur la preuve au Canada, s’il le demandait, à l’occasion de toute question dont la réponse pou­vait tendre à l’incriminer.
In my opinion, the fact that contempt issues arising out of statutory compellability to give evi­dence (and thus raising questions touching the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10 and especially s. 5 thereof) may call for decision is peripheral to the larger question in this case, namely, whether s. 19 of the Police Act is invalid as a whole. As both Batary and Faber show, such peripheral issues may be decided without touching the larger question. I am prepared to consider all the supporting provisions in this case as to compellability and contempt, and enforcement thereof by imprisonment, as neutral provisions which could be found in valid provincial legislation as well as in valid federal legislation. The matter then is s. 19 itself and not any ancillary provisions.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ainsi, dans l’affaire québécoise Re Ireland, précitée, le syndic avait intenté une procédure pour faire décider qui avait droit au produit des polices d’assurance qu’il avait souscrites relativement à des biens faisant partie de l’actif du failli.
36 Despite the fact that England is a unitary state without the constitutional limitations imposed by our division of powers, the courts in Canada have generally hewn ever since 1874 to the basic dividing line between disputes related to the administration of the bankrupt estate and disputes with “strangers to the bankruptcy”.  The principle is that if the dispute relates to a matter that is outside even a generous interpretation of the administration of the bankruptcy, or if the remedy is not one contemplated by the Act, the trustee must seek relief in the ordinary civil courts.  Thus in the Quebec case of Re Ireland, supra, the trustee brought proceedings to determine who had the right to proceeds of insurance policies taken out by the trustee on properties of the bankrupt estate.  Bernier J. concluded that the Quebec Superior Court sitting in Bankruptcy lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute.  The controversy raised purely civil law questions and nothing in the Act conferred on the bankruptcy court a special jurisdiction to entertain these matters.  Similar arguments prevailed in Cry-O-Beef Ltd./Cri-O-Bœuf Ltée (Trustees of) v. Caisse Populaire de Black-Lake (1987), 66 C.B.R. (N.S.) 19 (Que. C.A.); In re Martin (1953), 33 C.B.R. 163 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 169; In re Reynolds (1928), 10 C.B.R. 127 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 131; Re Galaxy Interiors Ltd. (1971), 15 C.B.R. (N.S.) 143 (Ont. S.C.); Mancini (Trustee of) v. Falconi (1987), 65 C.B.R. 246 (Ont. S.C.), and Re Morris Lofsky, supra, at p. 169.
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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
. . . le tribunal qui examine un traité doit tenir compte du contexte dans lequel les traités ont été négociés, conclus et couchés par écrit. En tant qu’écrits, les traités constataient des accords déjà conclus verbalement, mais ils ne rapportaient pas toujours la pleine portée de ces ententes verbales:  voir Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North‑West Territories (1880), aux pp. 338 à 342; Sioui, précité, à la p.
13 The narrow approach applied by the Court of Appeal to the use of extrinsic evidence apparently derives from the comments of Estey J. in R. v. Horse, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 187, where, at p. 201, he expressed some reservations about the use of extrinsic materials, such as the transcript of negotiations surrounding the signing of Treaty No. 6, except in the case of ambiguity.  (Estey J. went on to consider the extrinsic evidence anyway, at p. 203.)  Lamer J., as he then was, mentioned this aspect of Horse in Sioui, supra, at p. 1049, but advocated a more flexible approach when determining the existence of treaties.  Lamer J. stated, at p. 1068, that “[t]he historical context, which has been used to demonstrate the existence of the treaty, may equally assist us in interpreting the extent of the rights contained in it”.
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