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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION] Le danger appelle le sauvetage. Le cri de détresse représente la demande pressante d’aide. Le droit ne met pas de côté ces réactions de
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its conse-

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Si l'on tient pour acquis que son état d'intoxication ne l'a pas empêché de former l'intention requise (ce sur quoi je reviendrai en examinant la troisième question), l'appelant avait l'intention d'utiliser le fusil pour expulser les policiers de la maison de sa mère. Cela ressort manifestement de son cri [TRADUCTION] "Vous sortez ou je vous sors".

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Section 85 requires proof of possession and proof that the purpose of that possession was one dangerous to the public peace.  There must at some point in time be a meeting of these two elements.  Generally, the purpose will have been formed prior to the taking of possession and will continue as possession is taken.  That is the case before us.  Assuming that the appellant was capable of forming the requisite intent notwithstanding his intoxication (a matter dealt with under the third issue), he intended to use the shotgun to expel the police officers from his mother's house.  This is evident from his shouting "You get out, or I'll get you out".  He then took possession of the gun.  At that point in time, the offence was complete.

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Des quatre témoins de cette conversation, seul Botham a déposé au procès; il a déclaré ignorer à ce moment l’importance de l’affaire cri­minelle sur laquelle il enquêtait et ne pas savoir que l’appelant serait arrêté peu après la conversa­tion.

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We know little about the circumstances of the conversation between Const. Botham and appel­lant. Of the four witnesses to this conversation, only Botham gave evidence; he said that at the time he did not know that he was investigating an important criminal operation and that appellant was to be arrested shortly after the conversation. There is no evidence as to the actions of the other constable prior to and during the conversation between appellant and Botham.

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12 Mme Ghyslaine Pomerleau, qui résidait à proximité du domicile de Laurent Taillefer, a témoigné avoir entendu un cri « anormalement long » d’une adolescente provenant des environs de la résidence de Laurent Taillefer durant la nuit du 9 au 10 mars 1990.

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12 Ghyslaine Pomerleau, who lived near Laurent Taillefer’s apartment, testified that she had heard the [translation] “unusually long” scream of a teenaged girl coming from around Laurent Taillefer’s home during the night of March 9 to 10, 1990.  She said that she had heard the scream after seeing an unpleasant scene in a movie on television.  The evidence further established that the scene in question had aired at midnight.

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[TRADUCTION] C’est une règle formelle du droit cri­minel anglais depuis longtemps établie qu’aucune décla­ration d’un accusé n’est recevable contre lui à titre de preuve, à moins que l’accusation ne prouve qu’il s’agit d’une déclaration volontaire, c’est-à-dire qu’elle n’a pas été obtenue par crainte d’un préjudice ou dans l’espoir d’un avantage dispensés ou promis par une personne ayant autorité.

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It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn [sic] by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority. The principle is as old as Lord Hale.

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intimée d’une ordonnance de prohibition interdi­sant toutes procédures ultérieures contre le présent appelant à la suite d’une dénonciation et d’une sommation l’inculpant d’une infraction prévue à l’art. 224 (maintenant l’art. 236) du Code cri­minel.

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present respondent from an order of prohibition, which prohibited any further proceedings against the present appellant under an information and summons charging him with an offence under s. 224 (now s. 236) of the Criminal Code. The order of prohibition was set aside. I will refer to the relevant sections of the Code by the num­bers which they bore at the time the offence charged is alleged to have been committed.

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De même je ne vois aucune raison de douter de la validité constitutionnelle de l’art. 655 qui traite de la disposition de biens qui sont devant la Cour au moment du procès criminel. C’est une partie accessoire du processus criminel que de présenter au tribunal l’objet du délit ou de le confier à sa garde.

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Similarly I see no reason for putting in doubt the constitutional validity of s. 655 dealing with the disposition of property that is before the Court at the time of a criminal trial. It is an incidental part of the criminal process to bring before the Court or to put within its control the corpus delicti. This makes it necessary to provide for the proper disposition of such things when the trial is over and I consider it clear that it is part of the proper scope of criminal procedure. Even if it could possibly be left to be determined by the action of a civil court, it would be unreasonable to deny the practical necessity for an immediate disposition by the criminal court which is properly seized of the question as an incident of the adjudi­cation over the criminal accusation.

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Peu de temps après l’accident, un pompier et un policier ont relevé l’intimé et l’ont tenu dans la position où il semblait souffrir le moins, car à chaque mouvement il poussait un grand cri de douleur.

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It should be pointed out, however, that the Respondent’s face had blood upon it to the extent that any visible injury would not be seen, that the Respondent was unconscious behind the wheel with his head bent forward on to his chest and hanging either on or near the steering wheel. Shortly after the accident the Respondent was held up by a fireman and a policeman in a position where it appeared he was suffering the least pain because if there was any movement he would let out a very loud scream. There was no other evidence as to the nature and extent of the Respondent’s injuries.

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Comme le souligne le juge Addy, le privilège ne peut être invoqué que pour chaque document pris individuellement, et chacun doit répondre aux cri­tères du privilège: (i) une communication entre un avocat et son client;

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As Mr. Justice Addy notes, privilege can only be claimed document by document, with each docu­ment being required to meet the criteria for the privilege—(i) a communication between solicitor and client; (ii) which entails the seeking or giving of legal advice; and (iii) which is intended to be confidential by the parties. To make the decision as to whether the privilege attaches, the letters must be read by the judge, which requires, at a minimum, that the documents be under the jurisdiction of a court. Finally, the privilege is aimed at improper use or disclosure, and not at merely opening.

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Ce facteur interposé a été le fait de quelques clients du restaurant qui sont devenus hystériques. Celui qui a lancé ce cri pourrait, à mon avis, être considéré comme un esprit idiot de ce genre. Mais cette situation est prévisible, la nature humaine étant plutôt instable dans les états d’urgence et devant être reconnue telle.

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Now it is said to me that even if this is negligence there is an intervening factor involved here that is not within the control of the restaurant owners. That intervening factor is applied by some customers of the restaurant who acted hysterically. Whoever yelled that out almost qualifies in my opinion for that type idiotic person. But this is a foreseeable, human nature is rather unstable in emergencies and must be recognized as being unstable in emergencies. The proprietors themselves were running around the restaurant rather excitedly. The only person that the evidence would indicate was not excited was Mrs. Emmons, and she shook after it was all over according to her story. The panic in the restaurant could have been foreseen.

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663(1), cette définition se trouve dans une partie du Code cri­minel qui traite des appels; et, deuxièmement, cette définition n’en détermine pas la validité, pas plus que la validité n’est établie parce qu’une ordonnance rendue en vertu de l’art.

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I find these reservations in turn diluted by the agreement of Matas J.A. with the view of Haines J. in Re Torek and The Queen[12] that compensat­ing victims of crime is a valid object in sentencing. I am unable to appreciate, therefore, why there should be any doubt about the validity of a com­pensation provision, tied to the sentencing process as is s. 653, unless refuge is taken in a renewal of a notion that there is a proper domain of criminal law which forecloses an extension of the scheme of sanctions, although, admittedly, there is a rational connection between that part of s. 653 which is challenged and that part which is valid: see Papp v. Papp[13], at p. 336.

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La première des deux questions soulevées dans le présent pourvoi comprend implicitement la pré­tention du procureur général du Canada que si la Loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions, et en particulier son al. 32(1)c), relevait de la compé­tence fédérale en matière d’échanges et de com­merce, la province ne pourrait revendiquer le pouvoir exclusif de poursuivre même si (ce qui est également contesté) il était possible de le faire pour des poursuites relatives à des infractions cri­minelles.

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Implicit in the first of the two questions raised in this appeal was the contention, pursued by the Attorney General of Canada, that if the Combines Investigation Act, and especially s. 32(1)(c) thereof, was supportable under the federal trade and commerce power, the assertion of exclusive provin­cial prosecutorial authority would be precluded even if (and this was also contested) it was sustainable in relation to the prosecution of criminal offences. I may say that I find it impossible to separate prosecution for offences resting on a vio­lation of valid trade and commerce legislation and those resting on a violation of the federal criminal law. If exclusive provincial authority rests in the latter, it must equally rest in the former. Indeed, counsel for the respondent Canadian National Transportation, Limited was bold enough—and I think he was logically right-to sweep all offences under federal legislation, enacted pursuant to fed­eral enumerated power under s. 91, into the exclu­sive care and authority of provincial prosecuting officers. In short, if the provinces are constitutionally in control of criminal prosecutions, they must equally be in control of other prosecutions resting on violation of federal legislation other than under the criminal law, at least so far as the prosecutions are brought in provincial courts. Any reading of s. 92(14) of the provincial catalogue of powers does not exhibit any special mention, indeed there is no

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Dans cette affaire, l’accusé, un Indien Cri, était un illettré (il n’avait que deux années de scolarité) et son avocat l’avait décrit comme un «primitif». Il avait été accusé de meurtre mais à l’ouverture du procès l’acte d’accusation fut modifié de façon à alléguer un «meurtre non qualifié», et de cela l’accusé s’est avoué coupable.

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That was a case where the accused, a Cree Indian, was illiterate (he had a grade 2 education) and was described by his counsel as a “primitive”. He had been charged with murder but at the opening of trial the indictment was amended to read “non-capital murder”, and to this the accused pleaded guilty. In his appeal to the provincial appellate Court he alleged that he was told by his lawyer that if he did not plead guilty to the charge he would be sentenced to hang, that he was scared and pleaded guilty although he was drunk at the time of the offence and drunk when he gave a statement to the police.

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[TRADUCTION] Il me semble presque banal de rappe­ler qu’une personne ne peut être excusée d’un crime parce qu’elle était ivre. Si c’était le cas, on pourrait immédiatement fermer les tribunaux de juridiction cri­minelle, car l’ivresse est la cause d’un grand nombre de crimes; cependant, bien que l’ivresse ne constitue pas’ une excuse à un crime, le fait que la personne était ivre au moment du crime est pertinent pour déterminer si elle a formé l’intention nécessaire pour constituer le crime dans les cas où l’intention est un élément essentiel du crime perpétré.

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It is almost trivial for me to observe that a man is not excused from crime by reason of his drunkenness. If it were so, you might as well at once shut up the criminal courts, because drink is the occasion of a large propor­tion of the crime which is committed; but, although you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime.

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Il est indiscutable, au stade actuel de notre évolution constitutionnelle que le Parlement fédéral a un pouvoir législatif exclusif en matière de procédure criminelle et de droit criminel qui ne saurait être diminué ou sapé par le prétendu exercice du pouvoir législatif ou exécutif en matière d’«administration de la justice dans la province».

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Holding as I do to the view that a Province may not in the guise of acting within its legislative authority under s. 92(14) invade the exclusive federal power under s. 91(27), I feel compelled to make the following observations with respect to those two authorities as they may apply to this appeal. There can be no debate at this stage of our constitutional development that the position of the federal Parliament with reference to the legislative power in relation to criminal procedure and crimi­nal law is exclusive and may not be eroded or undermined by a purported exercise of legislative or executive authority in relation to "the adminis­tration of justice in the Province". I do not read the Di Iorio case, supra, as going so far as to permit the invasion by provincial action of the sanctity of the right to remain silent during what is in truth and substance a criminal investigation. The investigation of the incidence of crime or the profile and characteristics of crime in a province, or the investigation of the operation of provincial agencies in the field of law enforcement, are quite different things from the investigation of a precise­ly defined event or series of events with a view to criminal prosecution. The first category may involve the investigation of crime generally and may be undertaken by the invocation of the pro­vincial enquiry statutes. The second category entails the investigation of specific crime, the procedure for which has been established by Par­liament and may not be circumvented by provin­cial action under the general enquiry legislation

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Des motifs pratiques en justifiaient le maintien et la confirmation de cette pratique, dans le Code cri­minel de 1892 et au cours des années suivantes, n’a nullement, selon mon interprétation de la jurispru­dence, mis en doute le pouvoir fédéral d’accorder aux provinces le pouvoir d’engager des poursuites en vue d’appliquer le droit criminel fédéral, et de réglementer ce pouvoir.

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was continued after 1867 into post-1867 by virtue of s. 129. It was a practical accommodation to allow this to continue, and the affirmation of this practice under the 1892 Criminal Code and in ensuing years did not, as I read the authorities, cast any doubt on federal authority to invest and regulate provincial prosecutorial power to enforce the federal criminal law. Re Public Inquiries Act (1919), 3 W.W.R. 115, does not disturb this view. One would have expected an attempt by the prov­inces, soon after Confederation, or even later at some point in constitutional evolution, to assert an independent provincial authority to control pros­ecutions of the criminal law. There was none, and there is still none, save for the objection taken to the inclusion of the federal Attorney General in the definition of s. 2.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Que les coroners ne constituent pas une cour et encore moins une cour d’archives d’après la légis­lation du Québec me semble une conclusion conforme aux données que l’on retrouve dans le Code criminel.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The conclusion that coroners do not constitute a court, even less a court of record, under the legisla­tion of Quebec, appears to me to be in accordance with the provisions found in the Criminal Code. A "court of criminal jurisdiction" is defined as follows in s. 2:

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	POURVOI contre un jugement de la Cour d’ap­pel de la Saskatchewan[1], qui a accueilli l’appel de l’intimé contre le rejet de son appel par procès de novo, après avoir été déclaré coupable d’avoir refusé de fournir un échantillon de son haleine et ce, en contravention du par. 235(2) du Code cri­minel.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan[1], allowing an appeal by the respondent from the dismissal of his appeal by way of trial de novo following his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 235(2) of the Criminal Code. Appeal allowed and conviction restored.

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Le fait qu’elle ait stationné sa voiture complètement sur le côté gauche de la route s’explique par l’état de la route après la collision, et le geste qu’elle a posé en cherchant du secours comme elle l’a fait et en tentant d’arrêter les voitures qui s’en venaient était, selon moi, une réaction parfaitement normale suscitée par le cri de détresse de l’homme blessé et la situation que j’ai décrite.

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In my opinion there was nothing wanton in Mrs. Corothers’ behaviour in face of the peril to the Hammerschmids. The fact that she parked her car on the far left side of the highway is explained by the state of the highway at the scene after the collision and her action in going for help as she did and in attempting to flag down the approaching traffic, were, in my view, perfectly normal reactions to the cry of distress from the injured man and the situation which I have described.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Lorsque la Cour d’appel a examiné les appels interjetés par les intimés contre la condamnation, elle a ordonné un nouveau procès. Deux des membres de la Cour ont souscrit à la prétention de l’avocat des accusés voulant que le par.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The Court of Appeal, on considering the respondents’ appeals from conviction, directed a new trial. Two of the members of the Court agreed with the submission of counsel for the accused that s. 3(4) is applicable only where it is necessary to interpret the word “possession” in a provision of the Criminal Code and they held that there had been an erroneous

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Les auteurs s’entendent généralement pour dire que l’expres­sion peut avoir deux sens. Dans son ouvrage Cri­minal Law, The General Part (2e éd., 1961) Glan­ville Williams établit une distinction entre ces deux sens:
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Difficulty arises, however, from the vagueness in law of the notion of "motive". There would appear to be substantial agreement amongst textwriters that there are two possible meanings to be ascribed to the term. Glanville Williams in his Criminal Law, The General Part (2nd ed., 1961) distin­guishes between these meanings:

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12 Mme Ghyslaine Pomerleau, qui résidait à proximité du domicile de Laurent Taillefer, a témoigné avoir entendu un cri « anormalement long » d’une adolescente provenant des environs de la résidence de Laurent Taillefer durant la nuit du 9 au 10 mars 1990.

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12 Ghyslaine Pomerleau, who lived near Laurent Taillefer’s apartment, testified that she had heard the [translation] “unusually long” scream of a teenaged girl coming from around Laurent Taillefer’s home during the night of March 9 to 10, 1990.  She said that she had heard the scream after seeing an unpleasant scene in a movie on television.  The evidence further established that the scene in question had aired at midnight.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	L’autre cri de ralliement à la réunion du dimanche était la fausse rumeur relative au renvoi imminent de 125 autres employés. Il n’y a eu aucune tentative, ni de la part de Bédard, ni de celle de Gagné de contrôler la véracité de cette rumeur auprès de la direction.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The other rallying cry at the Sunday meeting was the false rumour relating to the imminent discharge of an additional 125 men. There was no effort on the part of Bédard or Gagné to verify this with management.

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Ce pouvoir général est exprimé dans la définition précitée de «poursuivant», à l’art. 2 du Code. De tous les pouvoirs du procureur général, le plus frappant est son pouvoir d’intervention dans des poursuites cri-

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The Attorney General may also exercise a broader interventionist power, namely, the takeover of the conduct of proceedings from a private prosecutor, whatever the desires of that private prosecutor: Re Bradley and The Queen[21]. This general power finds expression in the definition of “prosecutor”, quoted earlier, in s. 2 of the Code. Of all the powers of the Attorney General, the power of intervention in criminal proceedings—

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34 Le témoin Ghyslaine Pomerleau, qui a déclaré au procès avoir entendu le « cri anormalement long [d’]une adolescente » durant la nuit du meurtre, avait fait plusieurs déclarations antérieurement au procès qui n’ont jamais été divulguées à la défense.

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34 Ghyslaine Pomerleau, the witness who stated at trial that she had heard the [translation] “unusually long scream of a teenaged girl” during the night of the murder, had made a number of statements prior to trial which were never disclosed to the defence.  The version of the facts that this witness gave changed over the course of her statements.  For instance, on March 20, 1990, she said that she had heard a woman’s scream.  The next day, she described the scream as being rather the scream of a teenaged girl.  On April 10, 1990, the scream became the scream of a person [translation] “surprised from behind”.  And at trial, she described the voice she had heard as the voice of a girl, not a small child or an adult.  In her testimony, in the presence of the jury, she also said that she had made only one statement to the police.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	(f) privant une personne accusée d’un acte cri­minel du droit à la présomption d’innocence jusqu’à ce que la preuve de sa culpabilité ait été établie en conformité de la loi, après une audition impartiale et publique de sa cause par un tribunal indépendant et non préjugé, ou la privant sans juste cause du droit à un cautionnement raison­nable;
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	(f) deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a fair and pub­lic hearing by an independent and impartial tri­bunal, or of the right to reasonable bail without just cause;

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Dans notre système juridique, on ne considère pas comme inéquitable ou oppressif le fait qu’un accusé, une fois sa condamnation annulée, ait à subir un nouveau procès, même à plusieurs reprises, sous la même accusation. En d’autres termes, on n’estime pas souhaitable qu’un cri-
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	In our legal system, it is not considered unfair or oppressive to have an accused undergo several trials on the same charge when his conviction is quashed even if this happens repeatedly. In other words, it is not considered desirable that a criminal should escape punishment for a misdeed

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À un moment donné au cours du procédé, la demanderesse s'est écriée:  [traduction] «Pour l'amour du ciel, arrêtez!»  Elle a fait valoir, non déraisonnablement, que cela constituait le retrait du consentement.

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For example, in Mitchell v. McDonald (1987), 40 C.C.L.T. 266 (Alta. Q.B.), the plaintiff was suffering from acute muscular pain in her chest.  She consented to receive a cortisone injection directly into the chest muscle.  Unfortunately, the injection punctured a lung resulting in its partial collapse.  At one point in the procedure, the plaintiff cried out "For God's sake, stop".  She argued not unreasonably, that this constituted a withdrawal of consent.  However, the trial judge, at p. 289, interpreted it as but a cry of pain:

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[traduction] En ce qui concerne l'argument voulant que son exclamation «Pour l'amour du ciel, arrêtez!» ait pu valoir retrait du consentement, il ne fait aucun doute que le préjudice avait déjà été subi avant qu'elle ne pousse son cri.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	With respect to the suggestion that the consent might have been withdrawn by her exclamation, "For God's sake, stop," it is beyond dispute that the damage had already been done before her cry.  On the evidence, in any event, such a cry could well have been interpreted to mean, "My God, stop hurting me."

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[TRADUCTION]  Huit Sachems, de différentes nations qui étaient récemment alliées à l'ennemi, se sont rendus en leur nom et en celui de leurs tribus au général Murray:  ces personnes, après avoir discuté avec Son Excellence et après que toutes les questions eurent été réglées à leur satisfaction, se sont rendus sur la rive opposée à Montréal, ont brandi leurs couteaux et leurs haches et ont lancé leur cri de guerre, indiquant aux Français qu'ils étaient maintenant devenus nos alliés et leurs ennemis.

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Eight Sachems, of different nations, lately in alliance with the enemy, have surrendered, for themselves and their tribes, to General Murray:  these fellows, after conferring with his Excellency, and that all matters had been adjusted to their satisfaction, stepped out to the beach opposite to Montreal, flourished their knives and hatchets, and set up the war‑shout; intimating to the French, that they are now become our allies and their enemies.  While these Chieftains were negotiating a peace, two of our Mohawks entered the apartment where they were with the General and Colonel Burton . . .  [Emphasis added.]