a conclusion – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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. dans les circonstances de la présente affaire, il faut appliquer un critère subjectif. Je souscris également à [l]a conclusion que McKnight [le policier en civil] n’était pas une personne ayant autorité parce que l’appelant ne le considérait pas comme tel.
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.  . . a subjective test should be applied in the circumstances of this case. I also agree with [the] conclusion that McKnight [the undercover police officer] was not a person in authority because he was not regarded as such by the appellant.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
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670, «[l]a conclusion que l’enrichissement est “sans cause” ne découle pas de notions abstraites de moralité et de justice, mais vient directement de la conclusion qu’il y a eu manquement à une obligation juridique à l’égard duquel les tribunaux accordent une réparation».
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49 This lower threshold of knowledge is sufficient to establish the “unjust” or “unjustified” nature of the recipient’s enrichment, thereby entitling the plaintiff to a restitutionary remedy.  As I wrote in Lac Minerals, supra, at p. 670, “[t]he determination that the enrichment is ‘unjust’ does not refer to abstract notions of morality and justice, but flows directly from the finding that there was a breach of a legally recognized duty for which the courts will grant relief”.  In “knowing receipt” cases, relief flows from the breach of a legally recognized duty of inquiry.  More specifically, relief will be granted where a stranger to the trust, having received trust property for his or her own benefit and having knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable person on inquiry, actually fails to inquire as to the possible misapplication of trust property.  It is this lack of inquiry that renders the recipient’s enrichment unjust.
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[traduction] [L]a conclusion [du juge Borins] que le dépliant est inadéquat  repose non pas sur une divergence d’opinion entre lui et les experts au sujet d’une question médicale, mais plutôt sur son appréciation de la question de savoir si le message que transmet le dépliant suffit pour dissuader les individus particulièrement vulnérables au VIH de donner du sang.
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[Borins J.’s] finding that the pamphlet was inadequate did not turn on any disagreement with the experts on a medical issue, but rather on his evaluation of whether the message conveyed by the pamphlet was sufficient to deter those at high risk of having the HIV virus from donating blood.  The finding that the pamphlet did not meet that purpose turned on his evaluation of how that pamphlet would be read and understood by possible donors and not on the application of any medical expertise.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
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Malgré la portée générale que semble avoir le texte, il ne fournit à mon avis aucun fondement à l’al. e) de l’art. 7 lorsqu’il y a conclusion, comme en l’espèce, qu’il n’y a pas violation de la propriété
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Sweeping as this text might appear, it does not in my view afford any support to s. 7(e) when there has been a finding as here that respondent’s industrial property (other than unfair competition)
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La conclusion énoncée dans le dernier paragraphe peut être interprétée comme une conclusion de causalité déduite des circonstances et en l'absence d'éléments de preuve contraires qui auraient permis au défendeur de s'acquitter du fardeau de preuve qui lui incombait.
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The finding in the last paragraph can be read as a finding of causation inferred from the circumstances and in the absence of evidence to the contrary in satisfaction of the evidential burden cast upon the defendant.  Or it could be interpreted as accepting Lord Wilberforce's formulation in McGhee which reverses the ultimate burden upon finding that a risk was created and an injury occurred within the area of the risk.  If the former was intended, I am of the opinion that such an inference was fully warranted on the evidence.  On the other hand, if the latter is the interpretation to be placed on that statement, and I am inclined to think that it is, then I am satisfied that had the trial judge applied the principles referred to above he would have drawn an inference of causation between the appellant's negligence and the injury to the respondent.
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Il faut faire une distinction entre la situation où un client ne paie pas dans le délai prévu, par inadvertance, par choix ou parce qu’il n’a pas d’argent, et celle où il y a conclusion d’une entente aux termes de laquelle le prêteur d’argent ou le fournisseur de biens accepte de retarder sa demande de paiement en contrepartie de frais supplémentaires.
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I accept the plaintiff’s argument that a deferral of payment constitutes credit.  However, I do not agree that just because a customer does not pay on time [this] means that there has been a deferral of payment or that credit has been advanced, particularly where the company has done what it could to encourage the customer to pay on time.  A distinction must be drawn between the situation in which a customer fails to pay within a stipulated time, because of inadvertence, choice or because he does not have the money, and the situation in which an agreement is entered into whereby the lender of money or issuer of goods agrees to delay its demand for payment, in exchange for the consideration of an additional charge.  In my view, s. 347 is applicable only to the latter situation.  The facts before me reveal the former situation.