a dû faire – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Imperial a réclamé également le remboursement des paiements qu’elle a dû faire à la Caisse des réclamations de la pollution maritime, établie le 15 février 1972, en vertu d’une modification de la Loi sur la marine marchande du Canada, S.R.C. 1970, c.
A second claim of Imperial related to payments which it was required to make in respect of the Maritime Pollution Claims Fund Levy established on February 15, 1972, pursuant to an amendment to The Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9, amended by R.S.C. 1970, c. 27 (2nd. Supp.). This imposition required Imperial to pay, at the rate of
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il est donc manifeste que la valeur marchande établie et admise ne représente que le prix auquel on pourrait s’attendre à vendre la propriété, et ne tient aucunement compte des dépenses que la Compagnie a dû faire pour s’assurer que l’endroit se prêtait à l’exploitation d’une carrière.
There is, however, another element which should be taken into consideration, namely the amount of $15,000 that was spent in drilling and testing. It is clear that this was not taken into account in the market value as established in this case. The report of the expert who found this value was filed as an exhibit. It includes a list of the sales used in the estimating. The subject property is included in this list and the price mentioned in the amount paid to the vendors only. Similarly, the Moodie Drive property is included at the price paid without any addition for the drilling and testing expenses that were incurred. It is, therefore, apparent that the market value as established and admitted reflects only the price for which the property could be expected to be sold, without in any way taking into account the expenses that were necessarily made by the Company for ascertaining whether it was fit for quarrying. It is equally obvious that by the expropriation the Company was deprived of the benefit of this expenditure. It should therefore be compensated. In Irving Oil Company Ltd. v. The King[2], Kerwin J. said:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La valeur marchande ne représente que le prix auquel on pourrait s’attendre à vendre la propriété, et ne tient pas compte des dépenses de forage et d’analyse que l’intimée a dû faire pour s’assurer que l’endroit se prêtait à l’exploitation d’une carrière.
provided that the damage, loss or expense for which compensation is claimed was directly attributable to the taking of the lands. The market value reflects only the price for which the property could be expected to be sold, without taking into account the drilling and analysis expenses necessarily made for ascertaining whether it was fit for quarrying. By the expropriation respondent was deprived of the benefit of this expenditure, the amount of which must be added to the market value. Further, after receiving appellant’s letter respondent was obliged to bear carrying charges on the property for just about a full year while being prevented from deriving any benefit therefrom, because appellant delayed filing the notice of expropriation until June 14, 1961. Interest on the compensation runs from that date.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je vois mal pourquoi cet entrepreneur, qui a dû faire des travaux supplémentaires pour empêcher qu’un accident ne se produise, ne pourrait pas recouvrer de l’architecte les dommages que lui cause le délai qui découle de l’erreur dans les plans.
when he knew that passers-by could be affected by it. He thus neglected to fulfil a duty toward the injured party. Why should this duty of the architect be limited, as a general principle, to “another” in no way connected with the design and execution of the undertaking? In the case at bar the trial judge found the architect at fault but imputed no blame to the contractor. I fail to see why this contractor, who had to carry out additional work to prevent an accident from occurring, could not recover from the architect the damage caused it by the delay resulting from the error in the plans.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La Cour d’appel fédérale a statué qu’il était original en ce que sa compilation exigeait habilité et effort. C’est également mon avis. L’auteur de l’index a dû faire un tri initial pour repérer les affaires décisives en matière de TPS. À lui seul, ce tri appelle l’exercice du talent et du jugement.
32 The topical index is part of the book Canada GST Cases (1997).  It provides a listing of cases with short headings to indicate the main topics covered by the decision and very brief summaries of the decisions.  The Federal Court of Appeal held that the index was original in that it required skill and effort to compile.  I agree.  The author of the index had to make an initial decision as to which cases were authorities on GST.  This alone is a decision that would require the exercise of skill and judgment.  The author also had to decide which headings to include and which cases should fall under which headings.  He or she had to distill the essence of the decisions down to a succinct one-phrase summary.  All of these tasks require skill and judgment that are sufficient to conclude that the topical index is an “original” work in which copyright subsists.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Treize femmes sont venues raconter devant le tribunal leurs expériences comme candidates ou employées du CN. L'une des témoins, Mlle Carla Nemeroff, a exposé en détail certains des problèmes auxquels elle a dû faire face en tant qu'unique femme dans son milieu de travail:
Thirteen women testified before the Tribunal as to their experience as candidates or employees with CN. One of the witnesses, Ms. Carla Nemeroff, detailed some of the problems she faced as the only woman in her work place:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ce doute est sans fondement. Dans le passé, la Cour a dû faire appel plusieurs fois au droit international pour déterminer les droits et les obligations d'un acteur donné au sein du système juridique canadien.
22 This concern is groundless.  In a number of previous cases, it has been necessary for this Court to look to international law to determine the rights or obligations of some actor within the Canadian legal system.  For example, in Reference re Powers to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioners' Residences, [1943] S.C.R. 208, the Court was required to determine whether, taking into account the principles of international law with respect to diplomatic immunity, a municipal council had the power to levy rates on certain properties owned by foreign governments.  In two subsequent references, this Court used international law to determine whether the federal government or a province possessed proprietary rights in certain portions of the territorial sea and continental shelf (Reference re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792; Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ce serait nier l'histoire que de ne pas reconnaître que pendant de nombreuses années l'individu et l'église ont joué un rôle beaucoup plus important que l'état en matière d'éducation des jeunes. Et lorsque l'état a commencé à assumer un rôle dominant, il a dû faire des compromis pour répondre aux besoins et à la volonté de ceux qui avaient des opinions divergentes.
21.              The trial judge's finding may, however, be interpreted as falling short of a finding that the appellant did not sincerely have a religious conviction that he could not apply for certification; he did deal with the case on the basis that the appellant had such a conviction. I shall, therefore, assume the sincerity of the appellant's belief. I might perhaps first say that, while a religious belief that a person has the right to educate his own children is not as strongly asserted nowadays, it is really not that unusual. It would be to negate history to fail to recognize that for many years the individual and the church played a far more significant role in the education of the young than the state. And when the state began to take the dominant role, it had to make accommodations to meet the needs and desires of those who had dissentient views. The provisions regarding separate schools in the Constitution are an example. But our historical experience is by no means confined to these arrangements. One need only refer to the serious social and political crises that developed in this country in the latter part of the 19th century when governments sought to establish common schools in the various provinces. These attempts gave rise to major political issues, and compromises inevitably followed. Many of these continue to this day. Nonetheless, the appellant's claim is rather unusual in its specific setting and its intensity.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Lorsqu'il a dû faire face à un changement subit de circonstances et à la possibilité que le suspect quitte la ville, il a pris le temps de téléphoner au juge de paix afin d'obtenir la permission de remplacer les deux personnes nommées dans le mandat.
51.                     Constable Bisceglia's earlier conduct over the search warrant is an important factor to consider in judging the overall situation. When faced with a sudden change in circumstances and the possibility that the suspect would leave town, he took the time to telephone the justice for permission to substitute the two people on the warrant. That is not the action of a police officer likely to ignore or shortchange Charter rights. It is the careful action of a police officer aware of the limitations on his authority who appreciated the need for prior permission for searches. While Constable Bisceglia erred later in his denial of counsel to the accused, that denial of counsel does not appear to have been part of a pattern of abuse of Charter rights.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Cité de Hull[15], je ne puis admettre que la victime d’un quasi-délit n’ait pas le droit de recouvrer comme dommages en résul­tant, les débours qu’elle a dû faire pour établir l’étendue du préjudice qu’elle a souffert.
Despite the consistent line of cases in the Court of Appeal since Proulx v. Cité de Hull[15], I cannot accept that the victim of a quasi-offence should not have the right to recover as damages the disbursements he had to make to establish the extent of his injury. The trial judge appears to have exercised his discretion judiciously, weighing the evidence on this point in a manner that is unlikely to favour the abuses feared by the Court of Appeal.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
925.—La jurisprudence a dû faire un effort particulier pour préciser les contours de la notion de sanction disciplinaire, pour l’opposer aux mesures de service et pour retrouver la réelle portée de la décision parfois déguisée sous une apparence administrative.
925.—The courts have made a special effort to define the parameters of the concept of disciplinary action, as distinct from administrative measures, and to determine the actual meaning of a decision which may at times be disguised in administrative form.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le rejet de l’appel de Bilodeau impliquait le rejet des prétentions qu’il pouvait et a dû faire valoir pour soutenir la réserve faite en Cour supérieure, au cas où ses prétentions sur la question de sa responsabilité envers Bergeron ne seraient pas admises.
of Appeal (record no. 8261) rendered on the appeal which he had lodged against the trial judgment. Dominion Ready Mix has not appealed from the Court of Appeal judgment pronounced on its appeal (record no. 8265) from the trial judgment. All the parties to the litigation are before the Court, as was the case in the two provincial Courts. The issues disputed before the Court are the same as those which were disputed in these two Courts and include, among others, the question whether, in respect of A. Bergeron & Fils Ltée, Bilodeau as well as Dominion Ready Mix Inc. should be condemned to make compensation for the damage and, in the affirmative, the question of the nature and extent of the liability of Bilodeau and Ready Mix, as between themselves. The reasons for judgment given in the Court of Appeal in support of the judgment rendered in the Bilodeau appeal, as well as in the Ready Mix appeal, are identically the same. Dismissal of Bilodeau’s appeal implied dismissal of the submissions which he could make and must have made in support of the reserve made in the Superior Court judgment, in case his submissions on the matter of his liability to Bergeron were rejected. The parties before us have made the joint record, the factums and arguments as if the two Court of Appeal judgments were but one; they were free to so conduct their case and it would be unwarranted, in my opinion, to object to the application, in the circumstances, of the rule that parties to a litigation are bound by the manner in which they conducted their case. The Century Indemnity Company and W.G. Rogers and Anna Fitzgerald[2], at p. 536; City of Verdun v. Sun Oil Company Ltd.[3], at p. 231.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
À cause de sa mauvaise santé, elle a souvent été incapable de travailler et elle a dû entamer le capital de son fonds alimentaire pour survivre. En avril 1982, le fonds était épuisé et Mme Pelech a dû faire une demande d'aide sociale.
5.                At the time of the divorce in 1969 Mr. Pelech's net worth was $128,000. Fifteen years later, when the current application to vary the original order was heard, that net worth had increased to $1,800,000. The intervening years were not so kind to Mrs. Pelech. She invested most of the money she received for maintenance and endeavoured to live on the interest from it supplemented by income she was able to earn from temporary work as a bookkeeper and sales clerk. However, over the years her psychological problems increased and were compounded by severe physical problems. Because of her bad health she was often unable to work and she encroached on the capital of her maintenance fund in order to survive. In April 1982 the fund was depleted and Mrs. Pelech applied for social assistance. Later that same year she received an inheritance which enabled her to make a $15,000 down payment on a bachelor apartment. The balance of the purchase price was financed with a $16,000 mortgage. The judge at first instance summarized the state of Mrs. Pelech's affairs at the time of this application as follows:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’appelante ayant vendu son terrain «débarrassé de tous bâtiments», le prix de vente représentait à notre avis le prix du terrain et aucune partie ne peut en être considérée comme une «compensation» à l’égard d’un bâtiment que l’appelante a dû faire démolir entre la signature du contrat de vente et son exécution dans les conditions stipulées.
In so far as section 20(5)(c)(ii) is concerned, in our view, it has no application. As we read it, the “compensation” for property “damaged”, “destroyed”, “taken” or “injuriously affected” there referred to is an amount received or receivable from a third person who has damaged, destroyed, taken or injuriously affected property of the taxpayer[1]. When the appellant sold land “clear of all buildings”, the sale price, in our view, was payment for the land and no part of it can be regarded as “compensation” for buildings that the appellant had to remove between the making of the agreement for sale and its completion in order to carry out the agreement in accordance with its terms.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
juge de première instance a eu raison d’accorder au mari les débours qu’il a dû faire pour établir l’étendue du préjudice souffert par son épouse.
considers that the trial judge was right in granting the husband the right to recover the disbursements he had to make to establish the extent of the injury suffered by his wife.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La légère collision survenue entre son automobile et celle de M. Green a dû faire surgir cet affaiblissement des facultés de sorte que pendant le court laps de temps qui s’est écoulé entre la collision et le moment du décès, l’affaiblissement latent est devenu marqué et semble avoir véritablement privé Mme Brown de toute raison et de tout jugement.
At some time on that Sunday, the late Mrs. Brown must have consumed what the technician estimated was about five pint bottles of beer or seven and a half ounces of alcohol but on the only evidence before the Court and evidence which the learned trial judge did not expressly disbelieve, she gave no appearance of impairment, and surely Mr. Green’s observation was most accurate. The impairment which, of course, must have existed, had not been plain to either the other witnesses or the late Mrs. Brown herself and the slight impact between her automobile and Mr. Green’s automobile must have caused that impairment to surge up so that in the very few moments between the impact and the time of her death all the impairment which had previously existed became active and in truth seemed to deprive the late Mrs. Brown of any intelligence or judgment whatsoever. So in the light of those circumstances and in the light of that situation, was the collision between the late Mrs. Brown’s automobile and that building on the east side of Yonge Street an accident?
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De plus, comme il était prisonnier, le ministère public devait être en mesure d’en vérifier l’exactitude et puisqu’il n’a pas apporté de preuve à l’encontre de cette affirmation, ce fait doit être aujourd’hui tenu pour prouvé. La conclusion c’est que le constable a dû faire erreur quant au délai et que l’avis n’a pas été de sept jours francs.
On the whole, in my view, the police officer’s affidavit does not remedy the defect in the record and it does not show that proper notice was given. This is no doubt an omission which could have been easily remedied if the accused had raised the point instead of admitting without protest what he was asked to admit. Once again, in a civil case this would no doubt amount to a waiver but, in my view, it cannot be so in a criminal case as against an imperative require-
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pour obtenir une déclaration de culpabilité de meurtre imputé par suite d’une séquestration, il faut porter une accusation de meurtre au premier degré. Il n’y a pas eu d’accusation de meurtre au premier degré et l’accusé soutient qu’il a subi une injustice parce qu’il a dû faire face à une accusation de meurtre au premier degré fondé sur l’al.
The respondent Farrant argues that constructive murder pursuant to a forcible confinement is first degree murder. Therefore an instruction with respect to s. 213 must necessarily be an instruction with respect to first degree murder, a charge which does not appear in the indictment. The wording of s. 214(5)(a), according to the respondent, is not permissive, but mandatory and conclusive. In order to convict on constructive murder pursuant to forcible confinement, first degree must be charged. First degree murder was not charged, and the accused says he was prejudiced by having to answer to a first degree murder test under s. 214(5)(a).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il y eut encore une fois une contradiction restée sans explication dans ce qu’il a dit au sujet de la demande par l’accusé d’emprunter la fourgonnette, il a d’abord dit mardi (on a dû faire comparaître la sténographe officielle lorsque Penoffio a nié ce qu’il avait dit à l’enquête préliminaire) et au procès, il a dit dimanche.
There was again an unexplained contradiction (the Court reporter had to be called when Penoffio denied what he said at the preliminary enquiry) as to his story of the accused’s request to borrow the van, first saying Tuesday and then, at the trial, Sunday. Moreover, Penoffio testified at the trial that he had only allowed the accused to borrow the van when he had said at the preliminary enquiry that Matthews used it. Once again the Court reporter was called to verify this when Penoffio first denied it in testifying at the trial.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Quoi qu’il en soit, à cause du mauvais temps, le navire a dû faire escale à Greenoch, le 19 octobre, pour être réparé; mais à nouveau, des vents d’une violence de quasi-ouragan l’ont forcé à chercher refuge à Plymouth et à Falmouth en Angleterre, port qu’il a finalement quitté le 5 novembre.
Various difficulties attributable to heavy weather and other marine hazards which need not be detailed, were encountered on the voyage from Finland although the trial judge made no finding as to perils of the sea. In any event, the weather which was encountered forced the vessel to put in to Greenoch for repairs on October 19, and once again gales of near hurricane force made it necessary for the ship to seek refuge at Plymouth and Falmouth in England, from which latter port she finally sailed on November 5. In the result, a voyage commenced at Koverhar in Finland on October 4, 1967, did not terminate until arrival at Montreal, Quebec, on the 22nd of November of that year, at which time it was found necessary to discharge some of the plywood-veneer cargo in order to lighten the vessel which was overloaded for Seaway transit. This unloading, and the intervention of a strike, resulted in Worldwide notifying the shippers of the veneer that it would not deliver that cargo as agreed but would offload it in Montreal. A dispute arose as to whether Worldwide or the shipper should defray the cost of offloading and this culminated in the plywood cargo owners arresting the ship. A further dispute then arose between Aris, Worldwide and the insurer as to which would post a bond to allow the vessel to proceed thus causing added delays resulting in arrangements having to be made for as much of the pig iron as possible to be shipped to its proper destination by other vessels. A substantial part of the pig iron cargo could not however be shipped in this fashion and it was necessary for the shipper to arrange for the transportation of this remaining cargo to its destination by rail. It is the cost of this latter arrangement which is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim for damages in the present case.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il y eut encore une fois une contradiction restée sans explication dans ce qu’il a dit au sujet de la demande par l’accusé d’emprunter la fourgonnette, il a d’abord dit mardi (on a dû faire comparaître la sténographe officielle lorsque Penoffio a nié ce qu’il avait dit à l’enquête préliminaire) et au procès, il a dit dimanche.
There was again an unexplained contradiction (the Court reporter had to be called when Penoffio denied what he said at the preliminary enquiry) as to his story of the accused’s request to borrow the van, first saying Tuesday and then, at the trial, Sunday. Moreover, Penoffio testified at the trial that he had only allowed the accused to borrow the van when he had said at the preliminary enquiry that Matthews used it. Once again the Court reporter was called to verify this when Penoffio first denied it in testifying at the trial.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La faute a été commise en septembre 1968 et le préjudice a commencé à se manifester dès le mois suivant. On ne peut considérer comme point de départ de la prescription le moment où on a dû faire la désarticulation du membre en janvier 1970.
If the 1974 Act had not been passed, the action would have been prescribed when it was brought in August 1970. The fault was committed in September 1968 and the injurious consequences became apparent in the following month. The starting date for the prescription cannot be considered as the time when the limb had to be amputated in January 1970. However, if these provisions of the Act are applied, the appeal must be dismissed. By making para. 2 of art. 2262 inapplicable to actions pending before the courts, s. 5 in effect provides that only the two-year prescription or the thirty-year prescription may apply in the case at bar.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
LE JUGE ESTEY—Le litige qui fait l’objet du présent pourvoi résulte d’une collision entre des véhicules automobiles sur une route provinciale de l’Ontario, collision dont il est admis que l’intimé est le seul responsable. Cet accident a occasionné des dépenses à l’appelant qui a dû faire nettoyer la chaussée afin d’empêcher que la route ne subisse d’autres dommages et afin de la rouvrir à la circulation.
ESTEY J.—The issue in this appeal arises out of a motor vehicle collision on a provincial highway in Ontario, for which the respondent is admittedly solely responsible. The accident occasioned expense by the appellant in cleaning up the roadway in order to prevent further damage to the road and to open the highway to traffic.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
(5) Au moment de traiter à l’usine, une fois celle-ci agrandie, le minerai du gisement Jersey, on a dû faire face à des difficultés qui ne s’étaient pas présentées pour le minerai du gisement East Jersey, et qu’on a pu résoudre avec l’aide d’experts-conseils.
(5) When Jersey ore was brought to the expanded mill, problems not encountered with East Jersey ore arose which had to be solved by consultants. The mill had to be expanded to make production from Jersey economically feasible.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Imperial a réclamé également le remboursement des paiements qu’elle a dû faire à la Caisse des réclamations de la pollution maritime en vertu de la Loi sur la marine marchande du Canada, S.R.C. 1970, c.
Imperial also claimed payments which it was required to make in respect of the Maritime Pollution Claims Fund levy under The Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9, as amended by R.S.C. 1970, c. 27 (2nd Supp.) and this claim was upheld by the trial judge. On appeal “Nova Scotia” contested by cross-appeal its liability in respect of the levy on imports of crude oil by Imperial to its refinery. The Appeal Division allowed the cross-appeal holding that these deliveries of crude oil
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
19 Ces erreurs doivent être considérées comme graves, car elles sont survenues pendant l'exposé supplémentaire qu'a dû faire le juge du procès pour clarifier ce qui était déjà une source de confusion pour les jurés.
19               These errors must be viewed seriously as they were made during the trial judge’s recharge, which was required to clarify what was already a source of confusion for the jurors.  The issue of the amount of force used was essential to the success of the appellant’s self‑defence argument.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
étant donné que, de toute évidence, ce n'est pas là son objectif, il n'y a aucun motif d'exiger que l'accusé prouve qu'un préjudice réel a été causé à sa défense pour démontrer que le délai auquel il a dû faire face était déraisonnable, comme la Cour d'appel l'a fait en l'espèce.
120.            It seems to me, however, that to do so would be to ignore a legitimate distinction between foreseeable prejudice and actual prejudice, and at the same time to draw what I have suggested is an unnecessary distinction between s. 11(b) and ss. 7 and 11(d). It is true that an unreasonable delay cannot be regarded as reasonable simply on the basis that it caused no actual prejudice to the accused's defence. Were it otherwise, only delays that impaired that defence would be prohibited, and s. 11(b) would thereby be converted from a right against delay into a right to a fair trial. Since that is clearly not its purpose, there is no basis for requiring the accused to prove actual prejudice to his defence in order to establish that the delay he faced was unreasonable, as the Court of Appeal in fact did here. Prejudice to the right of the accused to a fair trial may help to justify a s. 11(b) claim, but it cannot be regarded as essential to it. I note that the United States Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion: see Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973), at p. 26. Conversely a reasonable delay will not become unreasonable simply because a key defence witness disappeared during the course of it, despite the fact that it could be argued that the resulting prejudice to the defence would not have occurred but for the delay.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pourquoi a‑t‑il changé d’avis? Est‑ce à cause des difficultés auxquelles il a dû faire face pendant l’instance? Il est important de souligner ici que le droit de l’accusé d’être informé de son droit prévu au par.
37 In order to determine the proper definition that is applicable, the object of s. 530 must again be considered.  Since the rule is the automatic access to a trial in one’s official language when an application is made in a timely manner, and a discretionary access when such an application is not timely, the trial judge should therefore consider, foremost, the reasons for the delay.  The first inquiry that comes to mind is directed at the knowledge of the right by the accused.  When was he or she made aware of his or her right?  Did he or she waive the right and later change his or her mind?  Why did he or she change his or her mind?  Was it because of difficulties encountered during the proceedings?  It is worth mentioning at this point that the right of the accused to be informed of his or her right under s. 530(3) is of questionable value because it applies only when the accused is unrepresented.  The assumption that counsel is aware of the right and will in fact advise his or her client of that right in all circumstances, absent a duty to do so, is unrealistic, as confirmed by the report of the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada, The Equitable Use of English and French Before the Courts in Canada (1995), at p. 105.