et son effet – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	(5) L'article 20 est réputé être entré en vigueur le 1er août 1974 et son effet est rétroactif dans la mesure où cela est nécessaire pour qu'il s'applique à compter de cette date.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	(5) Section 20 shall be deemed to have come into force on August 1, 1974 and is retroactive to the extent necessary to give it effect on and after that date.

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58 Le juge Moldaver de la Cour d’appel a conclu que l’ampleur du problème des agressions sexuelles au sein de la société canadienne et son effet traumatisant et potentiellement permanent permettaient réalistement de croire que les victimes de ce crime peuvent nourrir des préjugés intenses et bien ancrés.

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58 Moldaver J.A. concluded that the prevalence of sexual assault in Canadian society and its traumatic and potentially lifelong effects, provided a realistic basis to believe that victims of this crime may harbor intense and deep-seated biases. In arriving at this conclusion, he expressly relied on an unpublished article by Professor David Paciocco, “Challenges for Cause in Jury Selection after Regina v. Parks: Practicalities and Limitations”, Canadian Bar Association - Ontario, February 11, 1995, which he quoted at para. 176 for the proposition that “[o]ne cannot help but believe that these deep scars would, for some, prevent them from adjudicating sexual offence violations impartially”.

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Même s'il s'agit d'un cas limite en matière de recevabilité de la preuve, notre Cour ne devrait pas intervenir dans la conclusion du juge du procès dont la tâche était de soupeser la valeur probante du témoignage et son effet préjudiciable en fonction de l'ensemble de l'affaire.

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Finally, it cannot be concluded from the similarities and dissimilarities between the evidence of the complainant and the similar fact evidence of M.H.S., and from the considerable lapse of time between the two alleged relationships, that the evidence necessarily fails the "high probative value" test.  The fact that in each case the accused established a father‑daughter relationship with the girl before the sexual violations began might arguably go to show, if not a system or design, a pattern of similar behaviour suggesting that the complainant's story is true.  The question then is whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  Even if the admissibility of the evidence is borderline, this Court should not interfere with the conclusion of the trial judge, who was charged with the task of weighing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect in the context of the case as a whole.  Where the law accords a large degree of discretion to a trial judge, appellate courts should be reluctant to interfere with the exercise of that discretion in the absence of a demonstrated error of law or jurisdiction.

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Un troisième aspect de la façon dont notre Cour a traité la règle de la preuve de faits similaires depuis l'arrêt Boardman est la tendance à largement respecter la décision du juge du procès, à qui revient la tâche délicate de soupeser la valeur probante de la preuve et son effet préjudiciable.

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A third feature of this Court's treatment of the similar fact rule since Boardman is the tendency to accord a high degree of respect to the decision of the trial judge, who is charged with the delicate process of balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.  In Morris, the Court affirmed that the task of determining whether the evidence possesses sufficient probative value is that of the trial judge.  Similarly, in Guay, Robertson, Morin, and D. (L.E.) this Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge with respect to similar fact evidence.   This deference to the trial judge may in part be seen as a function of the broader, more discretionary nature of the modern rule at the stage where the probative value of the evidence must be weighed against its prejudicial effect.  As a consequence of the rejection of the category approach, the admissibility of similar fact evidence since Boardman is a matter which effectively involves a certain amount of discretion.    As pointed out in Morris, the weight to be given to evidence is a question for the trier of fact.    Generally, where the law accords a large degree of discretion to a trial judge, courts of appeal are reluctant to interfere with the exercise of that discretion in the absence of demonstrated error of law or jurisdiction.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	L'appelant affirme que cet exposé est défectueux parce que le juge n'a pas fait de comparaison directe entre l'effet de l'intoxication sur la question de l'intention et son effet sur la question de la capacité de concevoir et d'exécuter un plan, nécessaire pour une déclaration de culpabilité de meurtre au premier degré.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	The appellant says this charge was deficient because it failed to make a direct comparison between the effect of intoxication on the issue of intent and its effect on the issue of capacity to form and carry out the plan required for a conviction of first degree murder.

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Smith, précitée, en fonction de l'extraordinaire faiblesse des identifications initiales de M. Faryna. Aux pages 195 et 196, il poursuit en décrivant ainsi la séance d'identification et son effet sur la preuve du ministère public:

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34.              In R. v. Faryna Huband J.A., with whom O'Sullivan J.A. concurred, was of the view that the use of an improper line‑up fatally weakened the Crown's case. As in the present appeal the entire case turned on eyewitness evidence. However, unlike the present appeal, the initial identifications given by the two complainants were extremely poor, consisting in one instance of two encounters lasting a total of ten seconds and in the other instance of one encounter lasting three seconds. In addition, subsequent descriptions given by the complainants had several inconsistencies and both picked the accused out of line‑ups in which the persons in the line bore no resemblance to the accused. Huband J.A. distinguished R. v. Smith, supra, on the basis of the extraordinary frailty of the initial identifications of Mr. Faryna. He went on to describe the line‑up and its impact on the Crown's case as follows at pp. 195‑96:

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Deuxièmement, «les modalités de la cession au bénéfice de créanciers étaient exactement les mêmes, que le cédant ait été insolvable ou non… La validité de la cession et son effet ne tiendraient aucunement à l’insolvabilité du cédant et, d’après leurs Seigneuries, il est clair que l’art. 9 s’appliquait, que le cédant fût ou non insolvable» (à la p. 199).

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The explanation for this result is found in two passages of the Privy Council’s reasons. First, “it is to be observed that an assignment for the general benefit of creditors has long been known to the jurisprudence of this country and also of Canada, and has its force and effect at common law quite independently of any system of bankruptcy or insolvency, or any legislation relating thereto” (at p. 198). Second, “the operation of an assignment for the benefit of creditors was precisely the same, whether the assignor was or was not insolvent… The validity of the assignment and its effect would in no way depend on the insolvency of the assignor, and their Lordships think it clear that the 9th section would equally apply whether the assignor was or was not insolvent” (at p. 199). What is evident, therefore, from that case is that, unlike the situation here, the operation of the provincial enactment did not depend on insolvency and the Privy Council was willing to treat s. 9 as having an object that was independent of it. This may even be a supportable view today, albeit there is a range of existing federal legislation dealing with bankruptcy and insolvency. I should note, however, that in the majority judgment of this Court in Reference re the Validity of the Orderly Payment of Debts Act, 1959 (Alta.)[11], at pp. 576-577, Kerwin C.J.C. referring to the Voluntary Assignments reference, said “it is doubtful whether in view of later pronouncements of the Judicial Committee it

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Compte tenu des graves conséquences qui découlent de la conclusion du jury que l'appelant a prémédité le meurtre de son épouse, il était impératif que le jury soit explicitement et clairement avisé de la distinction à faire entre l'effet de l'intoxication sur l'intention de tuer et son effet sur la préméditation.

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I cannot, therefore, agree with my colleague McLachlin J. that an instruction that a lesser degree of intoxication may suffice to negative planning and deliberation than to negative the intent to kill is not essential in a judge's charge to the jury.  First degree murder is, in terms of punishment, the most serious offence in the Criminal Code, calling for a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until a person has served twenty-five years of his or her sentence.  It is imperative, having regard for the serious consequences of a finding by the jury that the appellant planned and deliberated on the killing of his wife, that the jury be explicitly and clearly instructed on the distinction between the effect of intoxication on intent to kill as opposed to planning and deliberation.  This position was clearly stated by this Court in Mitchell, supra, and has since been followed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario as well as by my colleague L'Heureux-Dubé J. in her reasons in Howard, supra.

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Je partage l'avis que la déclaration faite antérieurement à la passation du contrat différait, de par sa portée et son effet, de l'obligation contractuelle. Ce n'est pas une simple question de sémantique.

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I agree that the pre-contractual representation was different in scope and effect from the contractual obligation.  The matter is not merely one of semantics. It turns on the plaintiff's assessment of the risk involved in leaving his employment and joining Cognos.  When a person is deciding to enter a contract with terms governing termination, he or she makes an assessment as to the risk of such termination occurring.  A stringent term as to termination may not deter the person from entering into the contract if he or she is satisfied that the risk of termination materializing is low.  The representation at issue in this case concerned the risk of termination coming about.  The representation was not that Cognos would not have the discretion to terminate or transfer the plaintiff on one month's notice.  Rather, by implying that the Multiview project was a reality, that it had the financial support of Cognos, and that it had passed through the feasibility and costing stage, Johnston on behalf of Cognos caused the plaintiff to be misled as to the level of the risk to the plaintiff that Cognos might at some point choose to exercise its termination power under the employment contract. The plaintiff, believing Johnston, concluded that the risk of being transferred or terminated was low.

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La plaignante a témoigné qu’il était [TRADUCTION] «assez ivre» et qu’ [TRADUCTION] «il a commencé à s’endor­mir» pendant l’incident. Le degré d’intoxication et son effet sur l’état mental de l’accusé sont des questions de fait qu’il appartient au jury de déter­miner.

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The question remains as to whether the curative provision of s. 613 (1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code should be applied. The appellant’s degree of intoxi­cation would not appear to have been excessive but there can be no doubt, as Mr. Justice Bull of the Court of Appeal observed, that he was intoxicated. The complainant testified that he was "pretty drunk" and midway through the acts alleged "started to fall asleep." The degree of drunkenness and its effect upon the mental state of the accused is a question of fact, determination of which rests with the jury. I am unable to say that a properly charged jury could have no reasonable doubt that the accused, at the critical time, had the mental element essential to culpability.

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Puisque le titre indien sur les réserves a un caractère sui generis, il serait fort malencontreux que les exigences de forme de la common law en matière de transfert foncier viennent frustrer l’intention des parties, tout particulièrement celle de la bande, à l’égard de leurs intérêts dans la R.I. 172. Voilà pourquoi le caractère juridique de la cession de 1945 et son effet sur celle de 1940 doivent être déterminés au regard de l’intention de la bande.

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In my view, principles of common law property are not helpful in the context of this case.  Since Indian title in reserves is sui generis, it would be most unfortunate if the technical land transfer requirements embodied in the common law were to frustrate the intention of the parties, and in particular the Band, in relation to their dealings with I.R. 172.  For this reason, the legal character of the 1945 surrender, and its impact on the 1940 surrender, should be determined by reference to the intention of the Band.  Unless some statutory bar exists (which, as noted above, is not the case here), then the Band members’ intention should be given legal effect.

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À la même époque, ce quadrant faisait l’objet d’un plan d’aménagement général de la ville. Une des questions soulevées par cet aménagement et le centre commercial projeté était le contrôle d’une circulation accrue et son effet sur les résidents de la région.

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For some time before 1969, Baxter and Waisman had projected a shopping centre development on a 45-acre tract of land in the northwest quadrant of Calgary. That quadrant was at the same time the subject of a general development plan by the municipality. One of the issues arising out of the development and out of the proposed shopping centre was the management of increased traffic and its effect on the residents of the area. An important east‑west artery in the area was 40th Avenue North West which, at the time, ran to the easterly side of 53rd Street, which was just northwest of the proposed shopping centre. The question of the extension of 40th Avenue across 53rd Street in a westerly direction was very much involved in the overall development.

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Le juge McLachlin:  Le fait que les parties en l'espèce ont conclu un contrat qui renfermait une condition portant expressément sur la cessation de l'emploi ne voue pas à l'échec l'action en responsabilité délictuelle de l'appelant pour déclaration inexacte faite par négligence relativement à l'emploi. La déclaration faite antérieurement à la passation du contrat différait, de par sa portée et son effet, de l'obligation contractuelle.

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Per McLachlin J.: The fact that the parties in this case entered into a contract which contained a specific term governing termination does not preclude the appellant's action in tort for negligent misrepresentation as to the employment.  The pre‑contractual representation was different in scope and effect from the contractual obligation.  The representation at issue in this case concerned the risk of termination coming about, and was not that Cognos would not have the discretion to terminate or transfer the appellant on one month's notice.  The appellant relied on that representation in deciding to enter into the contract.  It turned out to have been negligently made and false.  It follows that the appellant is entitled to damages for the loss suffered as a result of that representation.

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[. . .] Deuxièmement, on a fait valoir que « dans chacun des cas, nous devons [. . .] soupeser les avantages et les inconvénients en examinant l’historique de la règle, son objet et son effet, et en déterminant si son application rétroactive favorisera ou retardera la réalisation de ses objectifs. » [. . .]  Enfin, nous avons soupesé l’iniquité d’une application rétroactive, car « [l]orsqu’une décision de la Cour pourrait se révéler très inéquitable si elle s’appliquait rétroactivement, notre jurisprudence nous justifierait amplement d’éviter cette « injustice » en optant pour la non‑rétroactivité.

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First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. . . .  Second, it has been stressed that “we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” . . . Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”

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De plus, même si on pouvait établir un certain lien entre la non‑déduction des prestations d'emploi des sommes accordées à titre de dommages‑intérêts et son effet dissuasif sur les comportements négligents, la dissuasion n'est pas en soi un motif valable qui justifie l'augmentation des dommages‑intérêts.

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It is far from clear that the difference between the damages payable without deduction of collateral benefits received from employment plans and damages payable with deduction would have any effect on negligent conduct.  Moreover, even if some connection between non‑deduction of employment benefits from damage awards and deterring negligent conduct could be established, deterrence alone is not a valid basis upon which to justify increasing damages.  Since a plaintiff who has been compensated for lost earnings by an employment benefits plan has suffered no loss to the extent of those benefits, it is not a question of who will bear the loss.  Nor is this a case of the tortfeasor unjustly benefiting at the plaintiff's expense.  The plaintiff contributes regardless of whether or not the accident occurs, and the tortfeasor does not benefit, in any usual sense of the word, since he or she pays the actual measure of the plaintiff's loss.

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54 Deuxièmement, dans son analyse de l’effet de la législation, la Cour peut examiner à la fois son effet juridique et son effet pratique. Autrement dit, elle examine tout d’abord les effets directs des dispositions de la loi elle‑même, puis les effets « secondaires » de son application : voir R. c.

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54 Second, in looking at the effect of the legislation, the Court may consider both its legal effect and its practical effect.  In other words, the Court looks to see, first, what effect flows directly from the provisions of the statute itself; then, second, what “side” effects flow from the application of the statute which are not direct effects of the provisions of the statute itself: see R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, at pp. 482-83. Iacobucci J. provided some examples of how this would work in Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, 2000 SCC 21, at para. 23:

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Il se peut que dans certains cas (comme dans l'arrêt Greffe, où la question de la renonciation ne se posait pas parce que seule une preuve matérielle était en jeu) il soit utile d'établir une distinction entre l'effet de l'absence de renseignements sur la question de savoir s'il y a eu un avertissement suffisant et son effet sur la renonciation.

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The answer to that question in this case involves the same considerations as the second defence submission, namely, that the failure to advise the accused that his victim had died vitiated his waiver of his right to counsel.  The allegation that the accused was never effectively told of his right to counsel because of the lack of information as to the state of the victim subsumes the allegation that the lack of information deprived him of the power to appreciate his need for a lawyer.  The argument on waiver likewise rests on the subsumed allegation that the lack of information deprived the accused of the power to appreciate his need for counsel.  It may be that in some cases (like Greffe, where waiver never arose because only real evidence was at stake) it is useful to distinguish between the effect of lack of information on the question of whether there was a proper warning, and its effect on waiver.  In this case, however, the question comes to the same thing:  was the accused possessed of sufficient information to properly appreciate his need for counsel and to make a valid decision as to whether to waive counsel or not?

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Ces principes généraux ont cependant toujours été assujettis à la règle que lorsque l’enregistrement d’un acte ne donne pas lieu à la délivrance d’un nouveau certificat mais simplement à l’inscription d’une note à l’endos du certificat existant, il est possible, dans certaines circonstances, que l’acte conserve sa valeur et son effet.

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This Court reviewed this and other authorities to the same effect in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. Ltd. and Imperial Oil Limited v. Turta et al.[26], at pp. 443, 444 and 453. These general principles have, nevertheless, always stood subject to the proposition that, where registration of an instrument does not cause the issuance of a new certificate but rather leads to the endorsement of a memorandum or notation on an existing certificate, the instrument may in some circumstances retain its force and effect. Otherwise, the statutory direction in s. 149(1) of the Land Registry Act now before the Court “… which instrument shall be filed in the Land Registry Office….” serves no useful purpose and is accorded no meaning in the interpretation and application of the Act. A Court interpreting such a direction must, of course, attribute meaning to it if at all possible, in the same way that all words in the Act are to be given a meaning and taken into the interpretative process. (Vide In re Svenska Aktiebolaget Gas accumulator’s Application[27], per Lord Evershed M.R. at pp. 662, 663; Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company and Bithulitic and Contracting Limited v. Dearborn[28], per Davies C.J. at pp. 320, 321).

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7 ou de l'al. 11d) de la Charte que l'on aborde les préoccupations exprimées par l'appelant, la question demeure essentiellement de savoir si, par son objet et son effet, le par. 486(2.1) rend le procès fondamentalement inéquitable pour l'accusé.

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At the outset, I must say that I totally agree with the reasons of Morden A.C.J.O. at the Court of Appeal.  Whether one approaches the concerns raised by the appellant from s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter, the issue focuses primarily on whether the purpose and effect reflected in the provisions of s. 486(2.1) render the trial procedure fundamentally unfair to the accused.  In order to determine whether the legislative initiatives put in place by s. 486(2.1) violate the rights of the accused, however, one must first appreciate the real scope of the provision.  An order under s. 486(2.1) simply blocks the complainant's view of the accused and not vice versa.  The wording of s. 486(2.1) merely provides that the screen "would allow the complainant not to see the accused".  The screen does not obstruct the view of the complainant by the accused, his counsel, the Crown or the judge.  All are present in court.  The evidence is given and the trial is conducted in the usual manner, including cross-examination.  As a result, the issue before this Court, is, simply put, whether a witness's obstructed view of an accused, infringes the rights of such accused under s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.  I will first deal with the appellant's concerns with regard to the infringement of his rights under s. 7.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	(4) L’article 5 est réputé être entré en vigueur le 1er avril 1968 et son effet est rétroactif dans la mesure nécessaire pour donner plein effet à cette date ou après cette date aux dispositions qu’il modifie; il s’applique aux biens transmis lors du décès d’une personne morte à cette date ou après cette date.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	(4) Section 5 shall be deemed to have come into force on the first day of April, 1968, and is retroactive to the extent necessary to give full force and effect to the provisions it amends on or after that date, and applies to property passing on the death of a person dying on, from, and after that date.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	La procédure d'application de la règle interdisant les déclarations de culpabilité multiples et son effet sur la règle générale concernant la compétence d'appel
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	The Procedure Implementing the Rule Against Multiple Convictions and its Effect on the General Rule Regarding Appellate Jurisdiction

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…d’autre part, si la preuve n’amène pas cette certitude, si elle laisse subsister, dans l’esprit du juge, quelque doute sur le point de savoir qui, de la victime ou du conducteur, est en faute, alors la présomption vient au secours de la victime et cette présomption doit recevoir toute sa force et son effet; que, dans ce dernier cas, le conducteur doit succomber, non pas sous le poids de la preuve de sa faute mais par l’effet de la présomption; non pas parce que les faits ont établi sa responsabilité, mais parce qu’ils n’ont pas suffi à faire céder la présomption établie par la loi.

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[TRANSLATION] …on the other hand, if the evidence does not produce this certainty, if it leaves some doubt in the judge’s mind as to who is at fault, the driver or the victim, then the presumption is in favour of the victim, and that presumption must be given its full force and effect; in such a case, the driver must lose, not from the weight of the evidence of his fault but by the force of the presumption; not because the facts have established his responsibility, but because they were not sufficient to overcome the presumption set up by the law;

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	C’est un principe bien reconnu en droit que le verdict du jury doit être considéré avec respect et qu’il faut lui donner toute son importance et son effet sauf dans les circonstances les plus inhabituelles.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	It is a well established principle of law that a jury’s verdict must be given all deference and full weight and effect given thereto except in the most unusual circumstance. I need only cite one authority for this. Chief Justice Duff said, in McCannell v. McLean[1], at p. 343:

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	55 L’appelant prétend que l’ampleur du problème des agressions sexuelles et son effet potentiellement dévastateur autorisent la Cour à conclure que tout tableau de jurés comporte vraisemblablement des victimes ou des proches de celles-ci qui sont susceptibles de nourrir un préjugé préjudiciable par suite de leurs expériences.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	55 The appellant argues that the prevalence and potentially devastating impact of sexual assault permit the Court to conclude that any given jury pool is likely to contain victims or those close to them who may harbour a prejudicial bias as a consequence of their experiences.

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Toutefois, le témoignage de Hope Denard a été admis et son effet sur le jury a pu être fort préjudiciable. J'estime, en outre, que la mise en garde que le juge du procès a faite au jury était insuffisante pour éliminer cette possibilité de préjudice.

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However, the evidence of Hope Denard was admitted, and its effect on the jury may have been highly prejudicial.  In my opinion, moreover, the trial judge's caution to the jury was inadequate to remove this possibility of prejudice.  Indeed, this prejudice could not have been eliminated except by an instruction to the jury that they must ignore the Crown's theory in respect of the evidence of Hope Denard altogether.  The learned trial judge did not go this far.

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Deuxièmement, même si on pouvait établir un certain lien entre la non‑déduction des prestations d'emploi des sommes accordées à titre de dommages‑intérêts et son effet dissuasif sur les comportements négligents, notre droit ne va généralement pas jusqu'à préconiser que la dissuasion est en soi un motif valable qui justifie l'augmentation des dommages‑intérêts.

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Second, even if some connection between non-deduction of employment benefits from damage awards and deterring negligent conduct could be established, our law has not generally gone so far as to suggest that deterrence alone is a valid basis upon which to justify increasing damages.  If that were so, one might expect heavily punitive damages in many more cases.  In fact, we have not chosen to follow that path.

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La validité de la cession et son effet ne tiendraient aucunement à l’insolvabilité du cédant et, d’après leurs Seigneuries, il est clair que l’article 9 s’appliquait, que le cédant fût ou non insolvable.

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Moreover, the operation of an assignment for the benefit of creditors was precisely the same, whether the assignor was or was not in fact insolvent. It was open to any debtor who might deem his solvency doubtful, and who desired in that case that his creditors should be equitably dealt with, to make an assignment for their benefit. The validity of the assignment and its effect would in no way depend on the insolvency of the assignor, and their Lordships think it clear that the 9th section would equally apply whether the assignor was or was not insolvent.

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On se rend compte que le genre d’actions mentionnées dans le dernier groupe d’arrêts cités, diffère essentiellement de la présente affaire, en ce qu’ici le délit civil allégué était nécessairement de nature interprovinciale quant à sa portée et son effet.

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It is appreciated that the nature of the actions referred to in the last-cited group of cases differed essentially from that with which we are here concerned in that the alleged tort in the present case was one which was necessarily inter-provincial in its scope and effect. It is essential to remember, however, that this case is being presented on the basis that the acts of the appellants in discharging the pollution in Ontario and Saskatchewan were justified by reason of the permission of the regulatory authority having jurisdiction to permit it. Whether that authority was provincial or federal is a matter with which we are not here concerned.

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61 Loin de constituer de la discrimination fondée sur une déficience, le délai établi par cette clause prévoyant la cessation assure, de par son objet et son effet, une protection considérable contre la perte d’emploi due à une déficience.

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61 Far from representing discrimination on the basis of disability, the length of this termination clause represents, in purpose and effect, extensive protection from job loss caused by disability.  Through clause 12.11.5 of the collective agreement, the union has negotiated exemplary protection for employees who are absent due to illness or accident unrelated to work (work-related accidents or illnesses are covered by a different provision).  For 36 months, the employee’s job and seniority are protected.  According to the definition of “disability” in clause 23.03 of the collective agreement, employees can lose their jobs only if, at the end of the three years, they are [translation] “totally incapable of the usual duties of his or her job and of any other comparable, similarly compensated job”.

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La raison expliquant la différence de résultat dans ces deux affaires est probablement le fait que, dans le premier cas, l’information préjudiciable émanait d’une source extérieure à la salle des jurés, alors que, dans le second, l’information, bien que tout aussi préjudiciable, avait été donnée par un des jurés. Dans chaque cas, toutefois, l’information était la même et son effet sur le jury était vraisemblablement le même.

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56 The application of the rule in the English cases has resulted, at times, in incongruous results.  For example, evidence that a jury bailiff told the jurors of the accused’s previous convictions has been held to be admissible (Brandon, supra), whereas evidence that the jury foreperson told the other jurors of the accused’s previous convictions has been held to be inadmissible (R. v. Thompson, [1962] 1 All E.R. 65 (C.C.A.)).  The rationale for the different result in these two situations is presumably that, in the former, the prejudicial information emanated from a source outside the jury room while, in the latter, the information, though equally prejudicial, was furnished by one of the jurors.  In each case, however, the information is the same and its effect upon the jury is likely the same.