nature temporelle – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
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Or, tout au long de l’instance, le gouvernement n’a cessé de faire valoir que le par. 44(1.1) n’établit qu’une distinction de nature temporelle. Selon lui, la LMRAO ne distingue pas entre les conjoints de même sexe et ceux de sexe différent, mais plutôt entre deux groupes de conjoints survivants de même sexe selon la date à laquelle le décès a mis fin à la relation.
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37 As the Court of Appeal observed, essential to the question of differential treatment is the choice of comparator group.  Throughout this litigation, the government has argued that s. 44(1.1) draws a temporal distinction only.  The government’s position is that the provisions of the MBOA do not differentiate between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, but rather, between two groups of survivors of same-sex relationships, based on the date their relationships ended as a result of one partner’s death.  It cannot, therefore, violate s. 15(1) because a temporal basis for a distinction is not an enumerated or recognized analogous ground of discrimination.  In our opinion, the courts below were correct in rejecting this argument.
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Kishen Singh (1941), 76 C.C.C. 248 (C.A.C.‑B.) constitue le précédent classique qui a établi cette distinction de nature temporelle relativement aux principes qui devaient régir la réouverture de la preuve.
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The classic Canadian authority which drew this temporal distinction in the principles which were to govern reopening was R. v. Kishen Singh (1941), 76 C.C.C. 248 (B.C.C.A.).  There, the Crown inadvertently omitted to prove a proclamation bringing into force the statute constituting the offence.  At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict.  The trial judge dismissed the motion and allowed the Crown to reopen its case to allow the proclamation to be proved.  No evidence was called by the defence and the jury found the accused guilty.
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Compte tenu des motifs sous‑jacents à l'établissement d'une telle distinction fondée sur l'étape où est rendu le procès, qui, à mon avis, reposent sur le principe qu'un accusé ne doit pas être mobilisé contre lui‑même, la distinction de nature temporelle est importante et doit être maintenue.
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In my opinion, Robillard should be limited to its facts.  That is, I do not view Robillard as having eliminated, in all cases, the traditional and sound distinction made by courts between the broad discretion which exists before and immediately after the Crown closes its case and the very narrow discretion available after the defence begins to answer the case against it.  Rather, Robillard should be construed narrowly, as a case dealing with a mistake as to form rather than substance.  Given the underlying reasons for making this differentiation based on the phase reached in a trial, which I believe are grounded in the principle that an accused must not be conscripted against him- or herself, the temporal distinction is an important one which must be retained.
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L’acte d’expropriation lui‑même fait partie d’un processus continu. L’approche applicable à l’égard des dommages découlant d’une expropriation ne devrait donc pas être fondée sur des considérations de nature temporelle, mais plutôt sur le lien de causalité.
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Per La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.:   Since the Expropriations Act is a remedial statute, it must be given a broad and liberal interpretation consistent with its purpose to adequately compensate those whose lands are taken to serve the public interest.  Here, the appellant’s land was ready and appropriate for development.  The damages sustained by the appellant represented the financial loss suffered from the extra costs incurred and profits which were lost as a result of the delay by the respondent in acquiring the site. These losses are  compensable as disturbance damages pursuant to s. 13(2)(b) of the Expropriations Act.  They were  the natural and reasonable consequences of the expropriation. The delay in developing the land was not occasioned by the city’s decision to postpone the necessary approvals for the appellant’s proposed development.  When the respondent determined that some portion of the land might be required for a new GO Transit station, that entire parcel of land was frozen.  The city had no alternative but to wait until the respondent decided how much and what portion of the land it required for the station before considering a development.
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En toute déférence, je ne puis souscrire à cette position. L’approche applicable à l’égard des dommages découlant d’une expropriation ne devrait pas être fondée sur des considérations de nature temporelle, mais plutôt sur le lien de causalité.
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1                        The courts have long determined that the actual act of expropriation of any property is part of a continuing process.  In McAnulty Realty, supra, at p. 283, Duff J. noted that the term “expropriation” is not used in the restrictive sense of signifying merely the transfer of title but in the sense of the process of taking the property for the purpose for which it is required.  Thus whether the events that affected the value of the expropriated land were part of the expropriation process, or, in other words, a step in the acquisition of the lands, is a significant factor for consideration in many expropriation cases.  See Tener, supra, at pp. 557‑59.  Here there can be no doubt that Dell’s land would have come on stream for sale as developed lands in 1981 rather than 1984 but for the process of expropriation.  Damages should therefore be awarded for the losses occasioned as a result of the process of expropriation.
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La nature temporelle de la notion de réfugié au sens de la Convention ne permet pas de faire valoir l’argument que des conclusions officielles antérieures en matière de protection des réfugiés ont un « effet obligatoire ».
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[50] Under the Refugee Convention, refugee status depends on the circumstances at the time the inquiry is made; it is not dependent on formal findings.  As one author puts it, “it is one’s de facto circumstances, not the official validation of those circumstances, that gives rise to Convention refugee status”: James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (2005), at pp. 158 and 278.  It follows that the rights flowing from the individual’s situation as a refugee are temporal in the sense that they exist while the risk exists but end when the risk has ended.  Thus, like other obligations under the Refugee Convention, the duty of non-refoulement is “entirely a function of the existence of a risk of being persecuted [and] it does not compel a state to allow a refugee to remain in its territory if and when that risk has ended”:  Hathaway, at p. 302; R. (Yogathas) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] UKHL 36, [2003] 1 A.C. 920, per Lord Scott of Foscote, at para. 106.  The relevant time for assessment of risk is at the time of proposed removal: Hathaway, at p. 920; Wouters, at p. 99. This temporal understanding of refugee status under the Refugee Convention does not support the “binding effect” approach to earlier formal findings of refugee status.