obligations de nature – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] De fait, la règle a souvent été énoncée comme suit: «lorsqu’un agent a des obligations de nature fiduciaire envers son mandant, il n’a pas le droit de conclure des engagements dans lesquels il a ou peut avoir un intérêt personnel qui vient, ou peut venir, en conflit avec les intérêts de ceux qu’il doit protéger».
the rule has often been laid down, in effect, as follows: “that where an agent has duties of a fiduciary character to perform towards his principal, he shall not be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those he is bound to protect”.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[40] Les droits découlant du « contrat A » entre Olympic et TP ne sont pas des droits réels universellement opposables. Le « contrat A » n’imposait entre TP et Olympic que des obligations de nature personnelle.
[40] The rights arising out of “Contract A” between Olympic and PW are not in rem rights meant to exclude the rest of the world.  “Contract A” only imposed in personam obligations between PW and Olympic.  Since “Contract A” is not property, no property was damaged.  Because no property was damaged, the appellants’ claims do not fall within the existing category of relational economic loss.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] A l’égard d’un tuteur, d’un subrogé-tuteur ou d’un membre d’un conseil de famille, plus peut-être qu’à toute autre personne, les tribunaux doivent appliquer strictement la sage doctrine que «celui qui a des obligations de nature fiduciaire à remplir n’a pas le droit de conclure des engagements ou d’assumer des fonctions dans lesquels il a ou peut avoir un intérêt personnel qui vient, ou peut venir, en conflit avec les intérêts de ceux qu’il doit protéger»; ou, pour reprendre le bref énoncé du Conseil privé dans Bank of Upper Canada v.
Towards a tutor, a sub-tutor or a member of a family council, more than to any others perhaps, the tribunals are bound to rigorously enforce the wholesome doctrine that “no one having duties of a fiduciary character to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements or assume functions in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with the interests of those he is bound to protect;” or as the Privy Council tersely puts it in Bank of Upper Canada v. Bradshaw[4], that an agent or mandatary (and a
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je conviens avec la Cour d’appel fédérale que l’observation par la ville de ses obligations de nature comptable ne peut être assimilée à la fourniture d’un bien, d’un service ou d’un avantage à la province.
[59] The Province provided funding under the Agreements to assist the City in carrying out its own activities.   The Province did not contribute funding to obtain a supply of accountability from the City; the contributions only went to assist the City with the capital costs of improving its municipal transit system.  I agree with the Court of Appeal that the City’s compliance with the accountability measures did not amount to the provision of any goods, services, or benefit to the Province.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Selon le premier courant, auquel se rattachaient les relations fondées sur le statut, il y avait toujours eu concomitance des obligations de nature délictuelle et des obligations résultant du contrat:  Brown c.
In Central Trust v. Rafuse, supra, Le Dain J. also rejected any distinction between status relationships and other relationships in determining whether parties to a contract can also recover in tort.  Instead, Le Dain J. found that a single rule applied to all relationships (at p. 205): "[T]he question is whether there is a relationship of sufficient proximity, not how it arose."  The rule of concurrency which Le Dain J. adopted was a compromise between two strands of authority.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je ne discuterai que de l’un de ces moyens qui, à mon avis, doit être accueilli et qui est concluant: le fondement juridique du recours de l’appelant contre la Chambre est la violation par celle-ci d’obligations de nature contractuelle.
Appellant contended that this question should be answered in the negative, and he put forward several submissions in support of his position and in opposition to the decision of the Court of Appeal and the judgment of the Superior Court. I shall only discuss one of these submissions which, in my opinion, is well founded and conclusive: the legal basis of appellant’s action against the Board is the latter’s breach of contractual obligations.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Même si elle étudiait « à distance », l’appelante était un membre de la communauté universitaire qui payait des frais de scolarité, ce qui avait pour effet de générer des droits et responsabilités mutuels. Le lien entre l’appelante et l’Université avait un fondement contractuel, ce qui donnait naissance à des obligations de nature à la fois contractuelle et délictuelle : Central Trust Co. c.
31 In short, in the present case, proximity was not simply grounded in a misguided report to CPS, but was rooted in the broader relationship between the professors at Memorial University and their students.  The appellant, even as a “distant” student, was a fee-paying member of the university community, and this fact created mutual rights and responsibilities.  The relationship between the appellant and the University had a contractual foundation, giving rise to duties that sound in both contract and tort:  Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le paragraphe 12(1) de la LACC définit une « réclamation » comme étant « toute dette, tout engagement ou toute obligation [. . .] qui [. . .] constituerait une dette prouvable en matière de faillite », une définition dont la portée reconnue se limite aux obligations de nature financière ou pécuniaire.
[78] Regulatory obligations are, as a general proposition, not compromisable claims.  Only financial or monetary claims provable by a “creditor” fall within the definition of “claim” under the CCAA.  A “creditor” is defined as “a person having a claim”: s. 2, BIA. Thus, the identification of a “creditor” hangs on the existence of a “claim”.  Section 12(1) of the CCAA defines “claim” as “any indebtedness, liability or obligation . . . that . . . would be a debt provable in bankruptcy”, which is accepted as confined to obligations of a financial or monetary nature.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Lorsque, parce qu’elle a la chance de ne pas avoir d’ennuis ou d’accidents de nature mécanique au cours d’une certaine période, une entreprise de location accepte «passivement» les revenus de location ainsi que les risques et les obligations de nature commerciale, il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant qu’elle n’exploite pas une entreprise au cours de cette période.
Where machinery is rented out, the essential core operations may at times be limited to accepting rental revenue and assuming the business risk and other obligations. At any time during that period, any client could demand the execution of any of the contractual obligations, such as fixing an engine, for example. Where, because a rental business is fortunate enough to experience no mechanical breakdowns or accidents during a period of time, it "passively" accepts rental revenue and assumes business risk and obligations, it does not necessarily follow that it is not carrying on a business during that period. Holding otherwise would imply that rental businesses are "intermittent", that is, that they carry on a business only when something goes wrong in the operations. Such a proposition is unacceptable.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Lorsque, parce qu’elle a la chance de ne pas avoir d’ennuis ou d’accidents de nature mécanique au cours d’une certaine période, une entreprise de location accepte «passivement» les revenus de location ainsi que les risques et les obligations de nature commerciale, il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant qu’elle n’exploite pas une entreprise au cours de cette période.
43                       Moreover, the record discloses positive evidence that Hickman Motors did indeed carry on the equipment-related sales and rental activities during the period: (1)  the equipment rental business was in fact carried on;  (2) Hickman Motors assumed the business risk and other obligations;  (3)  it is a common practice in the construction industry to buy the rented equipment just before the December 31 year-end, so there was a clear opportunity for doing business during that specific period; (4) Equipment in fact sold a backhoe on December 21, 1984; (5) evidence of rental revenue, and a bundle of rental invoices applicable to the period, as detailed infra; (6) the equipment was available for sale, and was advertised as such; (7) on December 31, 1984, Hickman Motors accepted an order for rental of at least one piece of equipment.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Dans les faits, ces articles ont protégé les Indiens contre l'imposition d'obligations de nature civile qui pouvaient conduire, quoique indirectement, à l'aliénation de leurs terres à la suite de ventes forcées et par d'autres moyens semblables; voir l'examen par le juge Brennan du but des exemptions de taxe accordées aux Indiens en contexte américain dans l'arrêt Bryan v.
The exemptions from taxation and distraint have historically protected the ability of Indians to benefit from this property in two ways.  First, they guard against the possibility that one branch of government, through the imposition of taxes, could erode the full measure of the benefits given by that branch of government entrusted with the supervision of Indian affairs.  Secondly, the protection against attachment ensures that the enforcement of civil judgments by non‑natives will not be allowed to hinder Indians in the untrammelled enjoyment of such advantages as they had retained or might acquire pursuant to the fulfillment by the Crown of its treaty obligations.  In effect, these sections shield Indians from the imposition of the civil liabilities that could lead, albeit through an indirect route, to the alienation of the Indian land base through the medium of foreclosure sales and the like; see Brennan J.'s discussion of the purpose served by Indian tax immunities in the American context in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), at p. 391.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Dans les faits, ces articles ont protégé les Indiens contre l’imposition d’obligations de nature civile qui pouvaient conduire, quoique indirectement, à l’aliénation de leurs terres à la suite de ventes forcées et par d’autres moyens semblables.
. . . by terms of the “numbered treaties” concluded between the Indians of the prairie regions and part of the Northwest Territories, the Crown undertook to provide Indians with assistance in such matters as education, medicine and agriculture, and to furnish supplies which Indians could use in the pursuit of their traditional vocations of hunting, fishing, and trapping.  The exemptions from taxation and distraint have historically protected the ability of Indians to benefit from this property in two ways.  First, they guard against the possibility that one branch of government, through the imposition of taxes, could erode the full measure of the benefits given by that branch of government entrusted with the supervision of Indian affairs.  Secondly, the protection against attachment ensures that the enforcement of civil judgments by non-natives will not be allowed to hinder Indians in the untrammelled enjoyment of such advantages as they had retained or might acquire pursuant to the fulfillment by the Crown of its treaty obligations.  In effect, these sections shield Indians from the imposition of the civil liabilities that could lead, albeit through an indirect route, to the alienation of the Indian land base through the medium of foreclosure sales and the like . . . . [pp. 130-31]
  document  
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Ðto€the€making€of€the€CPS€report€and€would€not€excuse€the€University€and€its€employeesÐ Ô)D"+ Ðfrom€failure€to€live€up€to€their€broader€responsibilities€to€the€appellant€as€a€member€ofÐ l+Ü#- Ðthe€university€community.€€The€facts€in€this€case€do€not€trigger€the€protection€of€the€ActÐ -t%/ Ðbecause,€quite€simply,€the€respondent€Dr.€Rowe€acted€on€nothing€more€than€speculationÐ œ. '1 Ðand€conjecture€in€making€his€report€which,€as€Director€of€the€School€of€Social€Work,Ð 40¤(3 Ðhe€must€have€known€would€have€serious€consequences€within€the€small€community€ofÐ  Ðsocial€workers€in€Newfoundland,€including€the€likely€posting€of€the€appellantð ðs€nameÐ ( ˜ Ðon€the€provincial€Child€Abuse€Registry.Ý ƒ ` Ñý¢ò ½ò ݌РÀ 0 ÐŒÝ ÝÔ # † X ãÐ X X b X ãÐ?ô # ÔÔ ‡ b X ãÐ X X X ãÐ ÔÌÓ E Ü , ‚X « ‚á ä …X } L ¤ Ü , ‚X « Œ †X } L X E Óà0 « à(2)à0 m « !« ! àò òThe€Standard€of€Careó óÐ ð ` m !m ! ÐÓ I Ü , ‚X « Œ †X } L X Ü , ‚X « ‚á ä …X } L X uù I ÓÌÝ ‚ ` Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ ` Ñý`ú Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú33Ú ÚÛ € z ! Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà « àThe€standard€of€care€that€ought€to€be€exercised€by€professors€towards€theirÐ  Ðstudents€was€emphasized€in€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Wayne€Ludlow€who,€during€theÐ ¸ ( Ðrelevant€1994„1996€period,€was€the€Dean€of€Student€Affairs€at€Memorial€University.€Ð P À ÐDr.Ludlow€testified:Ý ƒ ` Ñý`ú {ú ݌Рè X ÐŒÝ ÝÌÓ Óà0 « àThe€relationship€between€the€professor€and€the€student€is€a€specialÐ ˆ Ðrelationship€...€[I]t€is€an€imbalanced€relationship€because€professor€is€allÐ ä T Ðknowing,€and€I€can€see€now€the€fear€and€trembling€of€the€young€first„yearÐ ° Ðstudents€when€they€went€to€classes,€someone€in€a€flowing€black€robe.€€SoÐ | ì Ðthe€power€balance€was€evident....Ó ÓÐ H ¸ « !« ! ÐÌÝ ‚ ` Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ ` ÑýSþ Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú34Ú ÚÛ € z " Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà « àThose€whose€professional€responsibilities€include€the€exercise€of€suchÐ x è Ðpower€over€the€careers€and€future€lives€of€fee„paying€students€are€required€to€take€theÐ !€ Ðnecessary€care€to€get€their€facts€straight€before€taking€a€potential€career„ending€actionÐ ¨" " Ðin€relation€to€a€student.€€While€legislative€and€judicial€policy€mandates€the€quickÐ @$° $ Ðreporting€of€information€of€suspected€child€abuse,€it€does€not€do€so€to€the€exclusion€ofÐ Ø%H & Ðconsideration€of€the€legitimate€interests€of€the€person€named€in€the€report,€or€theÐ p'à ( Ðinterests€of€informants.€€This€€is€not€at€all€to€say€that€the€respondents€were€obliged€toÐ )x!* Ðconduct€their€own€investigation€of€the€suspected€abuse.€€Informants€are€ò ònot€ó órequired€toÐ  * #, Ðha