on ne nous a pas – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
On ne nous a pas convaincus que les cours d’instance inférieure ont commis une erreur en
We have not been persuaded that there was error on the part of the courts below in dismissing
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Et, même si l'on présume qu'on pourrait apporter une telle modification sans respecter l'art. 110 (question dont je discuterai plus tard), on ne nous a pas non plus présenté de modifications des dispositions de cet article concernant la langue des lois.
No other argument was made that any provision of the Saskatchewan Act was inconsistent with s. 110 of The North-West Territories Act or intended as a substitute for it. Nor, even on the assumption that such an amendment could be made without complying with s. 110 (a matter I will discuss later), have we been directed to any amendment of the provisions of that section regarding the language of the statutes. The Legislative Assembly Act, S.S. 1906, c. 4, did not, pursuant to s. 14 of the Saskatchewan Act, exclude the application of s. 110. It follows that s. 110 continues in effect and that the statutes of Saskatchewan must be enacted, printed and published in English and French.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En l’espèce, le juge du procès a conclu que l’appelant avait été détenu par les policiers lorsqu’ils l’ont fouillé. On ne nous a pas demandé de réexaminer cette conclusion et, dans les circonstances, je m’abstiendrai de le faire.
[23] However, this latter understanding of detention does not mean that every interaction with the police will amount to a detention for the purposes of the Charter, even when a person is under investigation for criminal activity, is asked questions, or is physically delayed by contact with the police.  This Court’s conclusion in Mann that there was an “investigative detention” does not mean that a detention is necessarily grounded the moment the police engage an individual for investigative purposes.  Indeed, Iacobucci J., writing for the majority, explained as follows:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
On ne nous a pas démontré que les dispositions relatives au report des pertes ou quelque autre disposition de la Loi révèlent l'intention du législateur d'empêcher l'appelante de conclure une telle opération et de faire les versements en cause.
not here in issue. If it were in issue, it is difficult to see why Grover could not have acquired production assets from any source including non-arm's length sources as here, so a; to produce earnings in futuro in order to take advantage of its deficit accumulations before their expiry under the provisions of the Income Tax Act Neither the loss carry-forward provisions, nor any other provision of the Act, have been shown to reveal a parliamentary intent to bar the appellant from entering into such a binding transaction and to make the payments here in question. Once the tax loss concept is included in the statute, the revenue collector is exposed to the chance, if not the inevitability, of the reduction of future tax collections to the extent that a credit is granted for past losses.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Nous limitons le renvoi à l'alinéa b) du paragraphe 44(2), étant donné qu'on ne nous a pas convaincus que le juge‑arbitre a commis une erreur susceptible d'examen judiciaire en vertu de l'article 28 de la Loi sur la Cour fédérale, lorsqu'il a conclu que le prestataire s'était déchargé du fardeau de la preuve que lui imposait l'alinéa 44(2)a).
7.                It was agreed that: "The decision of the Board of Referees with respect to Randolph Valois will be applied to each claimant whose name appears on this list", namely the other members referred to above.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En fait, comme on ne nous a pas demandé de réexaminer les principes régissant l'utilisation différente qui peut être faite des déclarations antérieures d'un accusé et d'autres témoins, j'estime qu'il ne serait pas souhaitable de rendre ici une décision sur cette question.
This supplementary ground of appeal was not pressed before us in argument, and in view of the conclusions I have reached in respect of hearsay evidence and the evidence of Hope Denard, it is not necessary to decide this ground as well.  Indeed, as we have not been invited to reconsider the principles governing the differential use that may be made of past statements by an accused and by other witnesses, in my view it would not be desirable to make a pronouncement on this issue in the present appeal.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[traduction]  On ne nous a pas convaincus qu’en Nouvelle‑Zélande des éléments comme les mesures prises pour vérifier l’information, l’obtention de commentaires de la personne diffamée et le statut ou la source de l’information entrent dans l’examen visant à déterminer si les circonstances donnent lieu à une immunité relative.
We are not persuaded that in the New Zealand situation matters such as the steps taken to verify the information, the seeking of comment from the person defamed, and the status or source of the information, should fall within the ambit of the inquiry into whether the occasion is privileged. [para. 38]
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] Le seul prétendu «droit» d’accès à cette réserve dont peuvent jouir les Indiens est simplement le privilège accordé à toute la population d’entrer dans la réserve sans transporter d’armes à feu. On ne nous a pas signalé que les Indiens aient reçu un droit d’accès spécial, particulier à cette réserve, ou qu’ils jouissent de pareil droit.
Any so called "right" of access which the Indians may enjoy in respect to this preserve is, so far as we were shown, merely the privilege accorded to all persons to enter the preserve without carrying fire-arms. We were not told of any special, peculiar right of access to this preserve conferred upon or enjoyed by the Indians. (at p. 707)
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
CONSIDéRANT que, même si cette Cour ne peut approuver toutes les interventions dudit juge lors du procès, on ne nous a pas démontré que, soit par ces interventions soit autrement, l'appelant a été privé de son droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière;
WHEREAS even though this Court cannot sanction all the said judge's interventions during the trial, it was not established before us that either through these interventions or otherwise, appellant was deprived of his right to make full answer and defence;
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
R     Bien, l’information que j’avais alors [. . .] était que les documents que nous voulions provenaient d’une source anonyme.  On ne nous a pas dit que c’était une source confidentielle.
[154] But the most notable fact missing from the narrative that was revealed by the cross-examination of Corporal Gallant, was that the document came from a confidential source:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
On ne nous a pas présenté de décisions américaines dans lesquelles on a jugé qu'une simple supposition que d'autres créanciers ont subi un préjudice était suffisante pour satisfaire à la deuxième exigence du principe de la subordination reconnue en equity.
In any event, it does not appear to have been suggested at any time in the courts below nor was any evidence led to suggest that any creditor of CCB was misled by any of the above actions or that the press release, accounting treatment or any flaw in the support program operated to cause any creditor to act to its detriment.  Thus, even if this Court were to find that the Participants acted in an inequitable manner in their dealings with CCB and its depositors and other creditors, we do not have a shred of evidence upon which to conclude that the improper conduct resulted in actual harm to the ordinary creditors of CCB now before this Court.  One can only speculate that depositors and other creditors relied on the press release or accounting treatment and thereby suffered damages.  We have been offered no United States decision in which mere speculation of harm to other creditors has been found sufficient to meet the second requirement of the doctrine of equitable subordination.  Of course, the ordinary creditors of CCB who appear before this Court have, to a varying extent, suffered from the winding-up of CCB, just as any creditor (including the Participants) suffer following an insolvency or bankruptcy.  The Legal Representative has not shown, however, that these ordinary creditors have suffered identifiable prejudice attributable specifically to the alleged misconduct of the Participants.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il importe également de souligner qu'on ne nous a pas présenté de décisions dans lesquelles il y a eu subordination en vertu de la Loi d'une créance fixe payable sur les bénéfices (c'est‑à‑dire qui relèverait de l'al.
The question then is whether s. 4 of the Partnerships Act can be triggered by an arrangement falling under s. 3(3)(a).  Indeed, as previously noted, the Legal Representative takes the alternative position that, even if s. 3(3)(d) does not apply, the transaction in this case is surely one contemplating "the receipt by a person of a debt or other liquidated amount by instalments or otherwise out of the accruing profits of a business".  While one cannot seriously dispute this proposition, the fact remains that s. 4 cannot apply unless "money has been advanced by way of loan upon such a contract as is mentioned in section 3".  The first point to note is that s. 3(3)(a) of the Partnerships Act makes no reference whatsoever to a "contract" and thus appears to be beyond the realm of s. 4.  Clearly, the legislature could have chosen a more general term than "contract" in s. 4 had it wished this postponement provision to apply to every transaction described in s. 3.  The same could also be said about the absence of the word "loan" in s. 3(3)(a).  It is not without significance that we were not presented with any jurisprudence in which a person who had a fixed debt to be paid out of profits (i.e., who would fall under s. 3(3)(a) and not s. 3(3)(d)) was subordinated under the Act.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ce raisonnement est également en parfait accord avec les motifs du Juge d’appel Riddell dans Re Bayack[7], où l’erreur invoquée consistait en un changement de locataire et de religion entre la préparation de l’évaluation et celui de la revision définitive du rôle. On ne nous a pas cité une seule affaire où l’article ait été appliqué à une demande fondée sur une surévaluation.
Such a result is at variance with the whole scheme of the Act, which is that the municipality, at the beginning of the tax year, has a certified roll on which it can rely in making this levy. Section 131 does not duplicate, in whole or in part, the appeal provisions of s. 72. There is no connection between the two sections and they deal with different problems. The first is the regular appeal procedure (s. 72). The second (s. 131) deals with the state of the roll and has nothing to do with the quantum of assessment validly made. When s. 131 is invoked the taxes are being levied on “the last revised assessment roll” of the previous year, (57(1) and 57(4)). At this stage, the assessor’s error in judgment, if any, of over-assessment cannot be attacked. The section is applicable to the correction of a mistake of fact in the making of the assessment or placing it on the roll. This was the ratio of the Municipal Board. This ratio is also in accordance with the reasons of Riddell J.A. in Re Bayack[7], where the error complained of was a change in tenancy and religious affiliation between the making of the assessment and the final revision of the roll. We have not been referred to any case where the section has been applied on a complaint of over-assessment. I wish to adopt the reasons of the Board in the following paragraph:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
On ne nous a pas signalé que d’autres gouvernements provinciaux, comme tels, se soient engagés dans une entreprise de transport aérien commercial ni ne projettent de le faire. Compte tenu du fait que la compétence dans le domaine de l’aéronautique relève exclusivement du Parlement du Canada, il serait plutôt invraisemblable qu’une disposition prévoie une intervention des gouvernements provinciaux dans ce champ d’activité à des fins commerciales.
It was not indicated to us that any provincial Government, as such, engaged or proposed to engage in the business of a commercial air carrier. In view of the fact that jurisdiction in relation to aeronautics resides exclusively in the Parliament of Canada, it would not be likely that there would be any disposition for entry into that field for commercial purposes by provincial Governments. In any other character, as, for example, through an ordinary public corporation, subjection to applicable regulatory authority would be automatic. Any apprehension by the Government or Parliament of Canada that any provincial Government would attempt to engage in air carrier business without compliance with federal regulatory provisions could easily be allayed by appropriate legislation.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] On ne nous a pas convaincus que le juge de première instance a commis une erreur en refusant de conclure que le panier à courrier de la demanderesse avait acquis, en Ontario, une notoriété propre ou une réputation seconde telles que les acheteurs, sur le marché où il se vendait, ont associé le style, la forme, la configuration ou la présentation du panier de la demanderesse au produit de la demanderesse.
We have not been persuaded that the trial judge erred in declining to find that the desk tray of the plaintiff had acquired in Ontario, a secondary meaning or secondary reputation so that purchasers in the market in which it sold associated the design, shape, configuration, or get-up of the plaintiff’s tray as being the plaintiff’s product. Without such a finding the plaintiff could not succeed in this action.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
30 Nous tenons à souligner qu’on ne nous a pas demandé — et que nous n’avons pas l’intention d’établir — une définition exhaustive de l’identité métisse aux fins de présentation des revendications fondées sur l’art.
30 We emphasize that we have not been asked, and we do not purport, to set down a comprehensive definition of who is Métis for the purpose of asserting a claim under s. 35.  We therefore limit ourselves to indicating the important components of a future definition, while affirming that the creation of appropriate membership tests before disputes arise is an urgent priority.  As a general matter, we would endorse the guidelines proposed by Vaillancourt Prov. J. and O’Neill J. in the courts below.  In particular, we would look to three broad factors as indicia of Métis identity for the purpose of claiming Métis rights under s. 35: self-identification, ancestral connection, and community acceptance.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il n'est pas opportun en l'espèce de réexaminer l'arrêt Shephard dans le but d'adopter l'avis de la minorité; on ne nous a pas invité à le faire et les questions en litige en l'espèce ne posent pas le problème directement.
79.              My reading of the majority reasons in Shephard is that when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, that is when determining whether "there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty", the judge cannot assess the witness' honesty but may assess the witness' capacity to be accurate and his or her resulting reliability. If I am wrong in reading that distinction in Ritchie J.'s reasons, then I propose that this Court find that to be the proper test. This is not a proper case for reconsidering Shephard with a view to adopting the views of the minority; we have not been invited to do so, nor do the issues in this case raise the matter squarely.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Comme on ne nous a pas demandé d’examiner le problème à la lumière de la clause générale d’assurance, et vu la conclusion à laquelle je suis parvenu sur la question de la diligence raisonnable, je n’estime pas nécessaire d’examiner ce point.
In view of the fact that we were not asked to examine the problem in the light of the general insuring clause, and in view of my conclusion on the question of due diligence, I do not find it necessary to examine this point.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
CONSIDéRANT qu'on ne nous a pas démontré non plus que ledit juge s'est mal dirigé en droit ou a mal apprécié la preuve;
WHEREAS it was not established either that the said judge erred in law or incorrectly assessed the evidence;
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Dans le contexte de la présente affaire, au contraire, on ne nous a pas dit si les autorités suisses examineront le fondement de la demande de fouille, perquisition et saisie présentée par un gouvernement étranger, nous ne savons pas non plus quelle forme prendrait un tel examen.
57 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concludes, as mentioned above, that the letter of request is not subject to s. 8 scrutiny at all.  In support of her conclusion she provides as an example the procedure for requests for assistance in the execution of a search and seizure between Canadian jurisdictions.  The requesting authorities need not obtain prior judicial authorization in accordance with s. 8 before sending the request.  Section 8 does not apply until the request is received, at which point a warrant must be obtained for the execution of the search and seizure.  With respect, I do not find this example persuasive.  In the domestic context, the requesting authority knows that the request will be subject to judicial scrutiny prior to the execution of the proposed search and seizure.  In the present context, to the contrary, we have not been told whether the Swiss authorities will examine or review the basis behind a foreign request for a search and seizure nor are we aware of the form that any such examination would take.  However, we have been told, as has been mentioned by the courts below, that there is a reasonable expectation that the request will be acted upon by the Swiss authorities.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En l’espèce, le juge du procès a conclu que l’appelant avait été détenu par les policiers lorsqu’ils l’ont fouillé. On ne nous a pas demandé de réexaminer cette conclusion et, dans les circonstances, je m’abstiendrai de le faire.
19 “Detention” has been held to cover, in Canada, a broad range of encounters between police officers and members of the public.  Even so, the police cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, or even interview.  The person who is stopped will in all cases be “detained” in the sense of “delayed”, or “kept waiting”.  But the constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological restraint.  In this case, the trial judge concluded that the appellant was detained by the police when they searched him.  We have not been urged to revisit that conclusion and, in the circumstances, I would decline to do so.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pour cet aspect de l’affaire, le dossier n’indique pas clairement quelles mesures l’intimée a prises en application de cette loi et on ne nous a pas fourni de motif de son omission de demander jugement en l’espèce.
On its second argument, the appellant argues that the claim of the respondent should fail because it did not pursue any remedy under The Mechanics’ Lien Act. The evidence on this aspect of the case is not clear as to what steps were actually taken by the respondent under The Mechanics’ Lien Act and no reason was given for its failure to proceed to judgment in the matter. Although it did not initiate the proceedings, it seems to have been a party to them but did not pursue them to a conclusion. A copy of the judgment in The Mechanics’ Lien Act proceedings appears in the record and discloses that the respondent was served with notice of trial. It also discloses that $81,264.12 was paid into court in full satisfaction of the obligation of the Minister of the Environment under s. 11 of The Mechanics’ Lien Act to hold back 15 per cent of the contract price. The claims of certain claimants, including the respondent, were dismissed and the trial judge ordered the distribution of the hold-back fund in payment of claims and costs in the amount of $71,711.75, leaving an undistributed balance of $9,552.37. He ordered that this last mentioned sum remain in court until further order and we are without information as to any further disposition which may have been made of those funds.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je m'empresse de préciser que cette opinion ne repose nullement sur une crainte des inexactitudes du détecteur de mensonges, question sur laquelle on ne nous a pas présenté une preuve suffisante pour que nous puissions nous prononcer.
19.              I would say at once that this view is not based on a fear of the inaccuracies of the polygraph. On that question we were not supplied with sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion. However, it may be said that even the finding of a significant percentage of errors in its results would not, by itself, be sufficient ground to exclude it as an instrument for use in the courts. Error is inherent in human affairs, scientific or unscientific. It exists within our established court procedures and must always be guarded against. The compelling reason, in my view, for the exclusion of the evidence of polygraph results in judicial proceedings is two‑fold. First, the admission of polygraph evidence would run counter to the well established rules of evidence which have been referred to. Second, while there is no reason why the rules of evidence should not be modified where improvement will result, it is my view that the admission of polygraph evidence will serve no purpose which is not already served. It will disrupt proceedings, cause delays, and lead to numerous complications which will result in no greater degree of certainty in the process than that which already exists.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
23. En l'espèce, on ne nous a pas démontré l'existence d'un tel changement de circonstances. En fait, les tribunaux d'instance inférieure ont conclu qu'il n'y avait eu aucun changement si ce n'est que l'intimé avait cessé de verser la pension alimentaire en application du paragraphe 3 de la convention, ce qu'ils ont jugé qu'il était autorisé à faire, et que l'appelante recevait des prestations sociales au moment de la demande.
23.              We have no evidence in this case of such a change in circumstances. Indeed, the courts below found no change apart from the fact that the respondent had discontinued maintenance pursuant to paragraph 3 of the minutes of settlement, which they found he was entitled to do, and that the appellant was receiving social assistance at the time of the application. We know nothing about the appellant's work pattern either prior to or during the marriage; what marketable skills she has; the level of health she enjoys; the availability of jobs for which she might be suited; the efforts she has made to find employment. We know that she is 41 years of age and looks after an 11 year old daughter who is presumably attending school. I do not believe that the evidence of change in the appellant's circumstances meets the stringent test set out in Pelech. I would conclude therefore that this is not an appropriate case for the Court's exercise of its power under s. 11(2) of the Divorce Act.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION]  On ne nous a pas présenté, pas plus qu'au juge Maddison, d'éléments de preuve d'un changement de circonstances des parties respectives ou de circonstances spéciales qui pourraient justifier la modification des stipulations alimentaires, outre la violation formelle de la disposition prévoyant la cessation.
We do not have before us, nor did Maddison J. have before him, any evidence of change or special circumstances of the respective parties which might warrant or justify variation of the maintenance provisions, apart from consideration of the technical breach of the provision for termination. To strike out what I would call a dum sola clause such as this cannot be considered in isolation from all of the circumstances of both parties. In the result, I cannot say that Maddison J. was wrong. Indeed, I consider him to be correct on the basis of the facts upon which he made his finding.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] …Le seul prétendu «droit» d’accès à cette réserve dont peuvent jouir les Indiens est simplement le privilège accordé à toute la population d’entrer dans la réserve sans transporter d’armes à feu. On ne nous a pas signalé que les Indiens aient reçu un droit d’accès spécial, particulier à cette réserve ou qu’ils jouissent de pareil droit.
…Any so called “right” of access which the Indians may enjoy in respect to this preserve is, so far as we were shown, merely the privilege accorded to all persons to enter the preserve without carrying firearms. We were not told of any special, peculiar right of access to this preserve conferred upon or enjoyed by the Indians. The Indians assuredly have a peculiar right of access to certain Crown lands, as, for instance, the reservations upon which they live and which are vested in the Crown, but it does not appear that they have any similar right of access to the land comprising this preserve. (at p. 707)
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je suis d’accord avec mon collègue le Juge Hall qu’on ne nous a pas fourni de motif suffisant pour qu’il soit possible d’adopter à ce sujet un avis différent de celui du savant juge de première instance.
Be that as it may, in the case at bar we are all of opinion that Mrs. Sorra was negligent and that her negligence was a cause of the accident. The question as to which there is a difference of opinion is whether there was a negligent failure on the part of the respondent to give an adequate warning which was an effective cause of the accident. I agree with my brother Hall that no sufficient ground has been shown for differing from the view of the learned trial judge on this point.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
On ne nous a pas démontré que les dispositions relatives au report des pertes ou quelque autre disposition de la Loi révèlent l'intention du législateur d'empêcher l'appelante de conclure une telle opération et de faire les versements en cause.
Neither the loss carry‑forward provisions, nor any other provision of the Act, have been shown to reveal a parliamentary intent to bar the appellant from entering into such a binding transaction and to make the payments here in question. Once the tax loss concept is included in the statute, the revenue collector is exposed to the chance, if not the inevitability, of the reduction of future tax collections to the extent that a credit is granted for past losses.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Gagnon, (no de greffe A‑1059‑84), la Cour a rejeté l'interprétation du paragraphe 20(7) de la Loi sur l'assurance chômage que propose M. MacLean en l'espèce. On ne nous a pas convaincus que cette décision était manifestement erronée et, par conséquent, nous nous estimons tenus de la suivre.
In a judgment pronounced on May 22, 1985, in the case of Canada [Employment and Immigration Commission] v. Gagnon, (Court File No. A‑1059‑84), the Court rejected the interpretation of subsection 20(7) of the Unemployment Insurance Act that was proposed by Mr. MacLean in this case. We have not been persuaded that that decision was clearly wrong; we, therefore, feel that we have to follow it.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
1. Le Juge en Chef‑‑On ne nous a pas convaincus que la Cour d'appel fédérale a commis une erreur dans ces deux appels. Les pourvois sont, en conséquence, rejetés. Il n'y aura pas d'adjudication de dépens.
1.                The Chief Justice -- We have not been persuaded that there was any error in law on the part of the Federal Court of Appeal in these two appeals.  The appeals are accordingly dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs.
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