responsabilité pour dommages – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	a) l’action en responsabilité pour dommages à la personne;
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Elle peut alors (tout comme une législature provinciale ou le Parlement du Canada) excéder ses pouvoirs, ainsi que le penserait finalement un tribunal, bien qu'elle ait suivi le conseil d'avocats. Dans ces circonstances, il serait inconcevable qu'on puisse dire qu'elle a une obligation de diligence qui entraîne sa responsabilité pour dommages si elle y manque.

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Its public character, involving its political and social responsibility to all those who live and work within its territorial limits, distinguishes it, even as respects its exercise of any quasi-judicial function, from the position of a voluntary or statutory body such as a trade union or trade association which may have quasi-judicial and contractual obligations in dealing with its members: cf. Abbott v. Sullivan; Orchard v. Tunney. A municipality at what may be called the operating level is different in kind from the same municipality at the legislative or quasi-judicial level where it is exercising discretionary statutory authority. In exercising such authority, a municipality (no less than a provincial Legislature or the Parliament of Canada) may act beyond its powers in the ultimate view of a Court, albeit it acted on the advice of counsel. It would be incredible to say in such circumstances that it owed a duty of care giving rise to liability in damages for its breach. "Invalidity is not the test of fault and it should not be the test of liability": see Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise, 1958, at p. 487.

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Puisque la loi choisie, celle des États-Unis, traite effectivement de la responsabilité pour dommages découlant d’une violation fondamentale d’un contrat dont les parties contractantes ont entrepris l’exécution, rien ne justifie la prétention qu’une violation fondamentale a pour effet non seulement d’écarter cette loi, mais aussi d’introduire les règles de fond du tribunal compétent.

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Parties to a contract are entitled, subject to limitations which it is unnecessary to spell out in this case, to choose the law that will govern the interpretation and application of the terms of their bargain. Since the chosen law, that of the United States, does deal with liability for damages arising upon a fundamental breach of contract upon whose performance the contracting parties have entered, there is no ground for contending that the occurrence of a fundamental breach results not only in the effacement of that law but also in the introduction of the substantive law of the forum. Although this is a matter which does not call for decision here, I do not think that it automatically follows that if a contract, originally subject to or governed by foreign law, is held to have lost its force because of fundamental breach, the law of the forum becomes the applicable law to determine the ensuing rights and liabilities of the contracting parties. The attendant circumstances may point to another conclusion.

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Elle [la municipalité] peut alors [dans l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire] (tout comme une législature provinciale ou le Parlement du Canada) excéder ses pouvoirs, ainsi que le penserait finalement un tribunal, bien qu’elle ait suivi le conseil d’avocats. Dans ces circonstances, il serait inconcevable qu’on puisse dire qu’elle a une obligation de diligence qui entraîne sa responsabilité pour dommages si elle y manque.

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In exercising [a discretionary legislative] authority, a municipality (no less than a provincial Legislature or the Parliament of Canada) may act beyond its powers in the ultimate view of a Court, albeit it acted on the advice of counsel.  It would be incredible to say in such circumstances that it owed a duty of care giving rise to liability in damages for its breach.  "Invalidity is not the test of fault and it should not be the test of liability":  see Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise, 1958, at p. 487.

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C’est pour cela qu’à mon avis cette responsabilité n’est pas assujettie à l’art. 648. Comme il s’agit d’une exception aux règles ordinaires de la responsabilité pour dommages causés par une faute, on ne peut en étendre la portée au-delà du texte.

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In Gartland Steamship Co. v. The Queen[8], this Court held that this provision was not applicable in the case of a claim by the Crown against a ship for damages to a bridge. Such a claim was held to be governed by the law of the province respecting contributory negligence, subject to limitation of liability. Of course, the present case is different in that damage was caused to a vessel by the fault of two vessels. However, it is not the damage so caused that was claimed by the petition of right but the damage caused by the fault of servants of the Crown. In other words, the basis of the claim against the Crown is not the fault of the vessels but that of its servants. For this reason, it appears to me that this liability does not come within the terms of s. 648. As this is an exception to the ordinary rules of liability for damages caused by fault, it cannot be extended to apply beyond its terms.

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Dans l’arrêt Colonial Coach Lines, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a pensé qu’elle devait tenir compte d’une modification du droit régissant la responsabilité pour dommages causés par des animaux errants, en appréciant les conséquences du manquement au devoir statutaire d’ériger une clôture.

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The trial judge made a finding that the injured boy “was of an age that we could talk without absurdity of his contributory negligence”. In my view, such negligence was involved in his venturing close to the icy bank when a train was passing. In Colonial Coach Lines, the Ontario Court of Appeal felt that a change in the law governing liability for damage caused by stray animals ought to be taken into account in assessing the consequences of the breach of the statutory duty to fence. Similarly, it seems to me that there would be no justification for not apportioning such liability in accordance with the Contributory Negligence Act, as this Court

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Si l’on avait fourni à l’appelant un certificat énonçant les conditions de la couverture que lui donne son certificat de conducteur, l’exclusion de la responsabilité pour dommages résultant de la mort d’«un assuré» ne pourrait être interprétée autrement que visant une personne assurée en vertu de ce certificat.

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Per Laskin C.J. and Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon and Beetz JJ.: Although neither owners’ policies nor drivers’ policies are issued under the Manitoba scheme, the owner’s and the driver’s certificates evidence separate contracts which provide distinct coverages and must be construed as if the terms of each were separately set forth instead of having to be gathered from the Act and the Regulation. If appellant had been provided with a certificate setting forth the terms of the coverage under his driver’s certificate, the exclusion of liability for loss resulting from the death of “an insured” could not have been read otherwise than as referring to an insured under that particular certificate. The exclusion from the coverage under the driver’s certificate cannot be read as referring to an insured under the owner’s certificate unless the driver is considered as insured under the owner’s contract.

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Quant à la prétention qu’une loi provinciale accroissant la responsabilité pour dommages et adoptée après la date de la Loi sur la responsabilité de la Couronne ne s’applique pas à une réclamation en vertu de cette dernière Loi, l’avocat de l’appelante s’appuie surtout sur l’arrêt Gauthier c.

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In support of the contention that a provincial statute extending liability for damages, enacted after the date of The Crown Liability Act does not apply to a claim under that Act, counsel for appellant relied essentially on Gauthier v. The King[24]. The decision in that case turned upon the construction of the provisions of the Exchequer Court Act then in force respecting the extent of jurisdiction to deal with liabilities of the Crown. That decision was duly considered in a recent appeal: The Queen v. Murray[25]. This Court did not consider it applicable to a case under s. 50 of the Exchequer Court Act which is in the following terms:

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Toutefois, les termes employés sont les suivants: «Le montant accordé par jugement pour dommages … porte intérêt». Cela veut-il dire que cette disposition se rapporte vraiment à l’intérêt et non à la responsabilité pour dommages?

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On the first point, one must start from the premise that s. 3 of that Act provides that “the Crown is liable in tort for the damages for which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be liable …”. By virtue of the definition section, “tort” in respect of any matter arising in the Province of Quebec, means “delict or quasi-delict”. On that basis, it is clear that art. 1056c can have application only if it is to be characterized as an enactment pertaining to liability for damages in delicts or quasi-delicts.

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Toutefois, les termes employés sont les suivants: «Le montant accordé par jugement pour dommages… porte intérêt». Cela veut-il dire que cette disposition se rapporte vraiment à l’intérêt et non à la responsabilité pour dommages?

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It must first be noted that when enacted, art. 1056c was inserted in the Code as the last provision under the heading “Offences and Quasi-Offences”, in French “Des Délits et Quasi‑Délits”. However, the wording is “The amount awarded by judgment for damages… shall bear interest”. Does this mean that the provision really is with respect to interest, not with respect to liability for damages? Such a construction would be unduly literal. It would lose sight of the fact that the so-called interest is in fact nothing but a part of the compensation allowed to the successful claimant. Properly speaking, a judgment cannot bear interest

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162, un tribunal américain a affirmé que la [traduction] « responsabilité pour dommages causés par la diffusion d’un libelle doit être fondée sur l’accomplissement d’un acte, sur quelque chose qui a été fait par la personne que l’on cherche à accuser ».

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[85] There appears to be an emerging consensus among the courts and commentators that only deliberate acts can meet the first component of the bilateral conception of publication. According to Prof. Brown, “a person must knowingly be involved in the process of publishing the relevant words” (para. 7.4 (emphasis added)). In Stanley v. Shaw, 2006 BCCA 467, 231 B.C.A.C. 186, pleading that the defendants “said and did nothing” (para. 7) was held to be insufficient to support a finding of publication, because no tortious act had been alleged in relation to their silence (see also Smith v. Matsqui (Dist.) (1986), 4 B.C.L.R. (2d) 342 (S.C.), at p. 355; Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), at p. 281 (“[a] plaintiff cannot establish [publication] by showing that the defendant silently adopted a defamatory statement”); Pond v. General Electric Co., 256 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958), at p. 827 (“[s]ilence is not libel”); Brown, at para. 7.3). In Scott v. Hull, 259 N.E.2d 160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970), at p. 162, a U.S. court held that “liability to respond in damages for the publication of a libel must be predicated on a positive act, on something done by the person sought to be charged”. I agree with this view.

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Elle peut alors (tout comme une législature provin­ciale ou le Parlement du Canada) excéder ses pouvoirs, ainsi que le penserait finalement un tribunal, bien qu’elle ait suivi le conseil d’avo­cats. Dans ces circonstances, il serait inconceva­ble qu’on puisse dire qu’elle a une obligation de diligence qui entraîne sa responsabilité pour dommages si elle y manque.

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authority. In exercising such authority, a muni­cipality (no less than a provincial Legislature or the Parliament of Canada) may act beyond its powers in the ultimate view of a Court, albeit it acted on the advice of counsel. It would be incredible to say in such circumstances that it owed a duty of care giving rise to liability in damages for its breach. "Invalidity is not the test of fault and it should not be the test of liability": see Davis, 3 Administrative Law Trea­tise, 1958, at p. 487.

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Elle peut alors (tout comme une législature provinciale ou le Parlement du Canada) excéder ses pouvoirs, ainsi que le penserait finalement un tribunal, bien qu’elle ait suivi le conseil d’avocats. Dans ces circonstances, il serait inconcevable qu’on puisse dire qu’elle a une obligation de diligence qui entraîne sa responsabilité pour dommages si elle y manque.

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A municipality at what may be called the operat­ing level is different in kind from the same munici­pality at the legislative or quasi-judicial level where it is exercising discretionary statutory authority. In exercising such authority, a municipality (no less than a provincial Legislature or the Parliament of Canada) may act beyond its powers in the ultimate view of a Court, albeit it acted on the advice of counsel. It would be incredible to say in such cir­cumstances that it owed a duty of care giving rise to liability in damages for its breach.

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Assurance—Véhicules à moteur—Propriétaire tué alors qu’il était un passager dans sa voiture—Action intentée par la succession du propriétaire contre le conducteur—Régime universel et obligatoire d’assurance automobile—Exclusion de la responsabilité pour dommages résultant de la mort d’un assuré—Le conducteur n’est pas exclu de la couverture—Contrats distincts—The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, C.S.M. c.

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Insurance—Motor vehicles—Car owner killed while passenger in own automobile—Action by owner’s estate against driver—Universal compulsory automobile insurance scheme—Exclusion for loss resulting from death of insured—Driver not excluded from coverage—Separate contracts—The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, C.S.M. c. A180—Man. Reg. 333/74, s. 31(3)(h).

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mesure doit être déterminée en fonction des circonstances particulières de l’espèce où il faut en juger, on ne saurait dans un cas comme celui qui nous occupe, apprécier les actes de l’agent Lafortune comme on pourrait le faire s’il s’agissait d’un cas où les précautions à prendre pour satisfaire au devoir de ne pas nuire à autrui ne sont pas conditionnées par les exigences d’un devoir public. En somme, l’agent n’encourt aucune responsabilité pour dommages causés à autrui lorsqu’il ne fait pas négligemment ce que la législature lui impose précisément l’obligation de faire.

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circumstances of the case to be decided, the actions of Lafortune cannot, in a case like that before the Court, be evaluated as they would be if it were a case in which the precautions to be taken in accordance with the duty not to injure others were not conditioned by the requirements of a public duty. In short, the police officer incurs no liability for damage caused to another when without negligence he does precisely what the legislature requires him to do; see Priestman case supra. Interpreted otherwise the justification provided by s. 25(4) would be reduced to a nullity.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	LE JUGE RITCHIE—Ce pourvoi attaque un arrêt de la Cour d’appel fédérale qui a modifié le jugement rendu en division de première instance par M. le juge Collier lequel conclut que l’appelant ne pouvait pas limiter sa responsabilité pour dommages à 300,000 francs-or en tant que propriétaire du navire Blue Waters en raison de l’abordage du navire Centennial 71 et du naufrage de celui-ci.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	RITCHIE J.—This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal varying the judgment rendered at trial by Mr. Justice Collier and concluding that the appellant was not entitled to limit his liability to damages in the amount of 300,000 gold francs in his capacity as owner of the vessel Blue Waters when that vessel collided with and sank the motor vessel Centennial 71.

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L’intimé n’était pas engagé dans la simple exécution d’un acte permis par la loi, mais dans la périlleuse exécution du grave devoir que la loi lui imposait d’accomplir. Et il n’encourt aucune responsabilité pour dommages causés à autrui lorsqu’il ne fait pas négligemment ce que la législature lui impose précisément l’obligation de faire.

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and requiring in such circumstances a standard of care greater than that required of a reasonable man. Respondent was not engaged merely in performing an act permitted by law, but he was engaged in the hazardous performance of a grave duty imposed on him by law. And he incurs no liability for damage caused to another when without negligence he does precisely what the legislature requires him to do.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION] Il y a un conflit dans la jurisprudence sur la question de savoir si l’alinéa b) ci-dessus interdit à un entreposeur de limiter sa responsabilité pour dommages aux marchandises ou pour leur perte, à une somme spécifiée, à moins qu’une valeur plus élevée ne soit déclarée et des frais additionnels payés.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	There is a conflict of authority as to whether subdivision (b), above, prohibits a warehouseman from limiting his liability for damage to, or loss of, the goods to a specified sum unless a higher value is declared and an increased charge paid. The better view supports such a limitation if the requisites for the formation of a contract are satisfied.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Sur la question de l’intention, il faut garder présent à l’esprit que les baux ont été rédigés par Eaton; que tout doute doit s’interpréter contre elle; qu’Eaton était bien au courant de la règle de droit énoncée dans l’arrêt Hutson; et qu’Eaton est une entité importante et organisée possédant une connaissance du droit. Le silence des baux sur la question de responsabilité pour dommages
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	On the question of intention, it must be remembered that the appellant Eaton’s prepared the lease, that any doubt must be resolved against it, that Eaton’s was fully cognizant of the legal rule embodied in the Hutson case, and that Eaton’s is a large sophisticated entity with a background of legal knowledge. The silence of the leases on the issue of liability for damage by fire caused by the

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Si l’action en responsabilité pour dommages à la personne comprend la responsabilité contractuelle, pourquoi en serait-il autrement de l’action pour lésions ou blessures corporelles? La seule base de distinction qui ait été proposée dans la jurisprudence est celle qui a été retenue dans Griffith c.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	If an action for the recovery of damages resulting from personal injuries covers contractual liability, why would it be otherwise for an action for bodily injuries? The only basis of distinction suggested in the case law is that which was adopted in Griffith v. Harwood, and why it must be rejected has been shown.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	L’article 17 de la Convention ne couvre pas uniquement la responsabilité pour la mort d’un passager, mais aussi la responsabilité pour dommages résultant de blessures ou autre lésion corporelle.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Art. 17 of the Convention covers not only liability for the death of a passenger, but also liability for damage resulting from wounding or other bodily injury.

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Elle peut alors (tout comme une législature provinciale ou le Parlement du Canada) excéder ses pouvoirs, ainsi que le penserait finalement un tribunal, bien qu’elle ait suivi le conseil d’avocats. Dans ces circonstances, il serait inconcevable qu’on puisse dire qu’elle a une obligation de diligence qui entraîne sa responsabilité pour dommages si elle y manque.

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. . . A municipality at what may be called the operating level is different in kind from the same municipality at the legislative or quasi‑judicial level where it is exercising discretionary statutory authority.  In exercising such authority, a municipality (no less than a provincial Legislature or the Parliament of Canada) may act beyond its powers in the ultimate view of a Court, albeit it acted on the advice of counsel.  It would be incredible to say in such circumstances that it owed a duty of care giving rise to liability in damages for its breach.  “Invalidity is not the test of fault and it should not be the test of liability” . . . .

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	L’appelant se pourvoit à l’encontre d’un arrêt de la Cour d’appel fédérale qui modifie le jugement rendu en première instance et qui conclut que l’appelant ne pouvait pas limiter sa responsabilité pour dommages à 300,000 francs-or en tant que propriétaire du navire.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Appellant appealed from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal which varied the judgment rendered at trial and concluded that the appellant was not entitled to limit his liability to damages of 300,000 gold francs in his capacity as owner of the vessel.

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Si l’on avait fourni à l’appelant un certificat énonçant les conditions de la couverture que lui donne son certificat de conducteur, l’exclusion de la responsabilité pour dommages résultant de la mort d’«un assuré» ne pourrait être interprétée autrement que visant une personne assurée en vertu de ce certificat.

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In, my view, this reasoning is well-founded. Although neither owners’ policies nor drivers’ policies are issued, the owner’s and the driver’s certificates evidence separate contracts which provide distinct coverages and must be construed as if the terms of each were separately set forth instead of having to be gathered from the Act and the Regulation. If appellant had been provided with a certificate setting forth the terms of the coverage under his driver’s certificate, the exclusion of liability for loss resulting from the death of “an insured”, could not have been read otherwise than as referring to an insured under that particular certificate. The exclusion from the coverage under the driver’s certificate cannot be read as referring to an insured under the owner’s certificate unless the driver is considered as insured under the owner’s contract.

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EN APPEL DE LA COUR D’APPEL DU MANITOBA Assurance—Véhicules à moteur—Propriétaire tué alors qu’il était un passager dans sa voiture—Action intentée par la succession du propriétaire contre le conducteur—Régime universel et obligatoire d’assurance automobile—Exclusion de la responsabilité pour dommages résultant de la mort d’un assuré—Le conducteur n’est pas exclu de la couverture—Contrats distincts—The Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Act, C.S.M. c.

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