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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le juge en chef Thurlow, dissident, a appliqué un critère qui, à première vue, paraît un peu plus restrictif. Il affirme, aux pp. 619 et 620:
Thurlow C.J., dissenting, employed a test which on its face appears to be slightly more restrictive. He stated at pp. 619‑20:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je pourrais mentionner que, dans certaines affaires, on a laissé entendre que le pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge en matière d'extradition peut être plus restrictif, mais cela n'a aucune importance en l'espèce et il ne m'est pas nécessaire d'aborder cette question.
71.              In Shephard, an extradition case, the evidence was that of an accomplice who gave affidavit evidence in which he acknowledged that, if he co‑operated and gave successful evidence against Shephard to the satisfaction of the American prosecuting authorities, all charges against him would be dropped. It was common ground, that the test to be applied by a judge in extradition matters is the same as that of a judge sitting at a preliminary inquiry or a judge deciding a motion for a directed verdict. I might mention that some cases have suggested that an extradition judge's discretion may be more restrictive, but this has no bearing on this case and I need not enter into that issue.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
28. Le procureur de l'intimée a plaidé que la clef de l'interprétation était le mot «source» auquel il donne un sens restrictif. Il cite certains arrêts de la Cour d'appel où celle‑ci aurait précisé et limité le mot «source» en lui donnant un tel sens restrictif.
28.              Counsel for the respondent argued that the key to interpretation lay in the word "source", to which he gave a limiting meaning. He cited certain judgments of the Court of Appeal in which the latter explained and limited the word "source", giving it such a limiting meaning. In particular, he cited Continental Casualty Co. v. O’Neill, [1971] C.A. 703, and Lapierre v. Prévoyance Compagnie d’assurance, [1977] C.A. 287. In the first of these cases, a plaintiff bringing an action in delict was not allowed to amend the pleadings after the prescription deadline and add a claim that was contractual in nature. In the second case, a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to a clause in an insurance policy was not allowed to amend after the prescription deadline and add a claim under another clause in the same policy. With respect, I see no analogy between these cases and the one at bar.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
28. Le procureur de l'intimée a plaidé que la clef de l'interprétation était le mot «source» auquel il donne un sens restrictif. Il cite certains arrêts de la Cour d'appel où celle‑ci aurait précisé et limité le mot «source» en lui donnant un tel sens restrictif.
28.              Counsel for the respondent argued that the key to interpretation lay in the word "source", to which he gave a limiting meaning. He cited certain judgments of the Court of Appeal in which the latter explained and limited the word "source", giving it such a limiting meaning. In particular, he cited Continental Casualty Co. v. O’Neill, [1971] C.A. 703, and Lapierre v. Prévoyance Compagnie d’assurance, [1977] C.A. 287. In the first of these cases, a plaintiff bringing an action in delict was not allowed to amend the pleadings after the prescription deadline and add a claim that was contractual in nature. In the second case, a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to a clause in an insurance policy was not allowed to amend after the prescription deadline and add a claim under another clause in the same policy. With respect, I see no analogy between these cases and the one at bar.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
122, la Cour, après avoir donné un sens restrictif à l’expression «un acte criminel», n’en a pas moins appliqué la règle qui interdit les déclarations de culpabilité multiples pour une même chose ou un même délit.
Although the approach of the Court in the Quon case was on the basis of construction of s. 122, it nonetheless followed, once the words “any criminal offence’’ were given a restricted meaning, that the Court applied a rule against multiple convictions for the same matter or delict. Kerwin J., who alone dissented, saw no reason to cut down the scope of the words “any criminal offence”. However, adverting to the view of the Ontario Court of Appeal that its quashing of the conviction did not rest on res judicata or, rather, that it did not consider that defence, he concluded that, if that be so, the case should be remitted to that Court to pass upon the defence. However, if the Ontario Court of Appeal had decided the point against the accused, the appeal should be dismissed. I shall return to the Quon case later in these reasons.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je ne vois rien dans ces textes qui limite à une très courte période le droit des médecins de fournir «des médicaments». En l’absence de texte clairement restrictif, le médecin a le droit de fournir les médicaments indiqués par le traitement et d’exiger compensation du patient.
Section 59 of the Pharmacy Act has remained essentially unchanged since 1875 (38 Vict, c. 37, s. 24), except that the words “unless the drugs or poisons contemplated by this act are sold for therepeutic purposes” were added by 1-2 Eliz. II, c. 55, s.47. Does this clearly indicate that a doctor may no longer sell medicines as part of his treatment, contrary to the situation up to that time? I think not, especially since, under s. 59 of the Medical Act, a doctor may recover compensation for medicine he may have “furnished” (fournis). This verb (fournir) is used in the second paragraph of s. 20 of the Pharmacy Act, according to which a hospital may “supply” (fournir) drugs to its patients, even if they are not hospitalized. I see nothing in these provisions which limits to a very short period the right of doctors to supply “medicines”. In the absence of any clearly restrictive provision, a doctor is entitled to supply the medicine indicated by the treatment and require compensation from the patient.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le règlement a été adopté à des fins de bon gouvernement et vise à mettre un frein aux larcins commis par des jeunes de moins de dix-huit ans en leur retirant un moyen facile d'écouler de la marchandise volée dans les magasins d'articles usagés. Aussi louable que puisse être ce motif, il ne peut fonder un règlement qui outrepasse le pouvoir accordé par la Loi et qui est, à première vue, déraisonnablement restrictif.
The By-law is justified in the interests of good government, so as to stop pilfering of trifles by youths under eighteen, by shutting up a ready means of disposing of what is unlawfully gained through the agency of the junk shops. However praiseworthy the motive may be, that will not support a regulation which transcends the power conferred by the statute, and which is on its face unreasonably restrictive. The power given by the Municipal Act is to regulate the junk shop, not to prescribe the class of people who shall deal thereat: see In re Barclay and the Municipality of Darlington (1854), 12 U.C.R. at pp. 95-97; … In brief, the By-law is open to the objections pointed out by Lord Russell in [Kruse v. Johnson] [1898] 2 Q.B. at p. 99, as being partial and unequal in operation as between different classes, and inviting oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to the By-law without reasonable justification.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Mis à part le fait que le raisonnement que lord Buckmaster a soumis à l'appui d'un concept restrictif de l'intérêt assurable ne semble pas très convaincant, l'affaire Macaura est elle‑même plutôt étrange.
27.              Quite apart from the fact that Lord Buckmaster's rationale for a restrictive concept of insurable interest seems somewhat less than convincing, the Macaura case is in itself a rather odd case. The case originally went to arbitration on the question of fraud. The arbitrator held that there was no fraud but that the insured had no insurable interest. Professor Robert Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law (1971), has noted that "it is difficult to reject the inference that, though not proved, [the charges of fraud] influenced the court to reach a theory of insurable interest that is nothing short of pernicious" (p. 117). See also Brown and Menezes, supra, at p. 69. In my view, this inference, if legitimate, further weakens the authority of Macaura as a precedent.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ce changement est, en outre, compatible avec la modification que le législateur a apportée au Code criminel en 1983 lorsqu’il a supprimé l’expression «la nature et le caractère de l’acte», qui porte à croire que, même s’il a conservé la common law régissant la fraude relative au consentement qui permet de réfuter les voies de fait, le législateur n’a pas voulu figer le moule restrictif de la décision Clarence.
67 Prior to Clarence, the common law recognized that deception as to sexually transmitted disease carrying a high risk of infection, constituted fraud vitiating consent to sexual intercourse.  Returning the law to this position would represent an incremental change to the law.  If it was an increment to reverse the previous common law rule that deceit as to venereal disease could vitiate consent, it is no greater increment to reverse that decision and return to the former state of the law.  The change is, moreover, consistent with Parliament’s 1983 amendment of the Criminal Code to remove the phrase “nature and quality of the act”, which suggests that Parliament, while retaining the common law of fraud in relation to consent negativing assault, did not wish to freeze the restrictive mould of Clarence.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Plutôt que d’introduire une présomption ou notion législative qu’un contribuable ne doit habituellement être imposé que pour une seule résidence ou situs, la Loi sur les lettres de change laisse voir une intention plus large de clarifier et de simplifier le commerce par l’utilisation d’effets négociables. C’est de ce point de vue conciliant plutôt que d’un point de vue restrictif qu’il faut considérer l’emploi du verbe «résider» à l’art.
Here we do not have a taxing statute and thus no legislative inclination to establish a simple situs for the taxation of a natural or artificial person. The Legislature has enacted a code of rules for the guidance of commerce in negotiable instruments. Rather than evidencing some kind of legislative presumption or assumption that a taxpayer should ordinarily have but one exposure to taxation through one residence or situs, the Bills of Exchange Act reveals, if anything, the broader intent to clarify and simplify the conduct of commerce through the use of negotiable instruments. It is from this facilitative rather than restrictive viewpoint that the use of the word “resident” should be viewed in its position in s. 25. In my view, such an approach to the meaning of the words “person resident” in that subsection makes it even clearer than do the taxation cases mentioned above that ‘resident’ has a functional or business connotation in s. 25 which reflects the commercial realities which the statute was designed to serve. So interpreted, the subsection contemplates a person, organized as are the banks, as having more than one residence in which its business might be carried on and in which for those purposes such person would be ‘resident’.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Au nom des juges majoritaires, le juge Dickson (plus tard Juge en chef) a expliqué que le libellé du par. 83(1) était plus restrictif que celui du par. 122(1) pour souligner sa préoccupation concernant l’utilisation réelle d’une arme à feu, par opposition à sa simple possession, qui suffisait pour fonder une déclaration de culpabilité suivant le par.
25 In McGuigan, for example, the central issue was whether R. v. Quon, [1948] S.C.R. 508, continued to apply despite the material differences between what was then s. 122(1) of the Criminal Code and its successor, s. 83(1) (now, in substance, s. 85).  Section 122(1) provided that “[e]very one who has upon his person a rifle, shotgun, pistol, revolver or any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person while committing any criminal offence is guilty of an offence” and subject to a minimum of two years’ imprisonment in addition to any penalty imposed for the underlying offence.  Writing for the majority, Dickson J. (as he then was) explained that s. 83(1) was more narrowly phrased than s. 122(1) to underscore its concern with the actual use of a firearm, as opposed to its mere physical possession, which sufficed to support a conviction under s. 122(1) (pp. 317-18).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
17 et tient mieux compte du principe du caractère volontaire. Cela confirmera le point de vue selon lequel l’art. 17 reste trop restrictif et viole donc l’art. 7 de la Charte. Rappelons-nous que les principes de justice fondamentale « font partie depuis toujours des règles de droit au Canada et dans d’autres États semblables » (Seaboyer, précité, p. 603).
55 Thus, by the strictness of its conditions, s. 17 breaches s. 7 of the Charter because it allows individuals who acted involuntarily to be declared criminally liable. Having said that, it will be interesting to see how the common law addresses the problem of duress, especially with respect to the immediacy component.  In that regard, we will have the opportunity to see how the common law on duress in Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and even in some U.S. jurisdictions is often more liberal than what s. 17 provides and takes better account of the principle of voluntariness.  This will confirm the view that s. 17 is overly restrictive and therefore breaches s. 7 of the Charter.  We recall that the principles of fundamental justice may be distilled from the “legal principles which have historically been reflected in the law of this and other similar states” (Seaboyer, supra, at p. 603).  Examining the common law of other states like Great Britain and Australia to confirm our interpretation of s. 7 will therefore be relevant.  The analysis of duress in common law will also be useful as it will shed some light on the appropriate rules which had to be applied to the defence of the accused in the case at bar and which will now be applied in all other cases, once s. 17 of the Criminal Code is partially struck down.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Cela ne semble pas s'être produit dans les quelques affaires publiées au cours des cinquante années suivantes. Dans certains cas, les tribunaux ont pu éviter tout effet restrictif en inventant la notion de continuité des infractions.
25.              Application of either the gist of the offence test or the completion of the offence test has the effect of limiting the courts' jurisdiction in criminal matters to a single location, namely, where the essential element of the offence occurred or where it was completed. Such a result does not appear to have occurred in the few cases reported over the next fifty years. In some cases the courts were able to avoid any limiting effect by creating the notion of continuity of offences. Thus in R. v. Mackenzie and Higginson (1910), 6 Cr. App. R. 64, the accused Mackenzie was accused of procuring a girl to have sexual intercourse with Higginson. Everything in the nature of procuring occurred in Scotland but the intercourse took place in London. The court concluded that the offence of procuring is continuous and since a part of the procuration occurred in England, the court had jurisdiction. This approach has continued to be applied in more recent cases; see R. v. Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd.; R. v. Millar, [1970] 2 Q.B. 54 (C.A.); Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, supra; R. v. Baxter, [1972] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A.); Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, supra.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Lorsqu’on aborde cette question, qui concerne l’interprétation des pouvoirs dont l’Office, le Ministre et le gouverneur en conseil sont investis, il importe de tenir compte de ce que la Loi sur la stabilisation des prix agricoles, loin d’avoir un caractère restrictif ou de toucher directement aux droits existants des producteurs ou du public, est une loi qui envisage une aide financière positive aux producteurs de produits agricoles désignés, sans aspect restitutoire.
quantities, in pursuance apparently of a ministerial directive. The Act clearly contemplates that ceilings might be imposed to limit eligibility and the question is whether it is s. 11 (a) of the Act alone that can lawfully support quantity limitations on claims to subsidy. In approaching this question, one of the construction of the powers vested in the Board, in the Minister and in the Governor in Council, it is a relevant consideration that the Agricultural Stabilization Act is not a restrictive statute, not one that interferes in any direct way with existing legal rights of producers or members of the public, but rather a statute that envisages positive financial assistance to producers of designated agricultural commodities and without restitutionary features. The subsidies are in fact a type of conditional grant, and I do not, therefore, understand the observation of the trial judge that payment of a subsidy is not an ex gratia matter. It certainly is, in inception at least. This persuades me that a broad view should be taken of the powers vested in the agencies involved in the operation of the Act and, especially, of the powers vested in the Board as the administrator of the Act.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Même en appliquant un critère aussi restrictif que celui du «danger imminent», j’estime qu’il y avait danger imminent tant que la cause de l’explosion n’était pas connue et qu’on ne savait pas si d’autres bacs pouvaient exploser.
I also agree with the Ontario Court of Appeal that determination of the cause of the explosion was an essential preliminary to prevent damage both to property already affected and to other insured property. I can find nothing in the language of Statutory Condition 9, nor in the authorities, to justify the “imminent danger” test. The language of the condition is broad and general and should be given a large and liberal interpretation. The insurers, of course, were under a continuing obligation to indemnify the insured, in the event of damage from explosion of one or more of the other tanks. It seems to me that damage having occurred, the measures taken by the insured were reasonable steps to prevent damage to other property insured within Statutory Condition 9. Even applying such a limited construction as the “imminent danger” test, I think that danger was imminent so long as the cause of the explosion was unknown and the potential of the other tanks to explode was unknown. So far as the other tanks are concerned, exposure to real and immediate danger would arise as soon as those tanks were refilled.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il y a lieu de penser que les tribunaux pourraient adopter un point de vue plus large, du moins dans d'autres domaines de réglementation, lorsqu'un pouvoir de percevoir des droits de permis est accordé en termes généraux et qu'il n'y a aucune indication dans la loi appuyant un point de vue restrictif.
6.                Traditionally, there has been a strong tendency to confine powers of municipalities strictly within the limits granted by the legislature. This was particularly true of powers of taxation, which themselves are generally strictly construed. See Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (2nd ed. 1971), at pp. 388‑89, 690‑92. This philosophy has been reflected in judicial decisions (see, for example, R. v. Stronach (1928), 3 D.L.R. 216 (Ont. S.C. App. Div.)) and in the manner in which municipal statutes were drafted. There is some basis for thinking that a broader view might be taken by the courts, at least in other regulatory areas, where a power to levy licence fees is given in broad terms and there is no indication in the statute favouring a restricted approach. Thus in Procureur général du Canada v. La Compagnie de Publication La Presse, Ltée, [1967] S.C.R. 60, a majority of this Court held that a power given by the Radio Act to the Governor in Council to prescribe a tariff of fees to be paid for licences for broadcasting stations authorized that body to impose a fee based on the gross revenue of the station and to impose differing rates based on the amount of such revenue.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Quelles étaient donc les différences entre les affaires Quon et Langevin qui ont fait que dans ce dernier on n’a pas suivi le premier arrêt? Je crois qu’aucune différence ne peut s’expliquer par le sens restrictif donné à l’expression «un acte criminel» figurant dans l’ancien art. 122 étudié dans l’affaire Quon.
from 1934 to 1951 (with some changes in 1938), and as already noted, was the provision that, subject to the changes in 1938, was considered in the Quon case. What then were the differences between Quon and Langevin that produced in the latter case a departure from the former? I do not think that any difference can turn on the restricted meaning given to the words “any criminal offence” in former s. 122, considered in the Quon case. The question of principle raised here must be assessed on the basis that the words “any criminal offence” do not include an offence of which an essential element is the possession upon the person of a revolver or any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person. Put another way, this Court has said in Quon that the Crown is not entitled to vex an accused, to subject him to prosecution, coming and going, so to speak; that is, to prosecute him for robbery while armed with a revolver and to prosecute him also for having that revolver while committing the robbery. These are, in short, obverse faces of the same coin.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il me semble que si c'est le souci de traiter équitablement un accusé qui doit prévaloir, alors le critère de la connaissance des conséquences adopté par le juge Beetz dans l'arrêt Horvath, précité, doit écarter le critère plus restrictif de "l'état d'esprit conscient" à titre de norme en fonction de laquelle il faut juger l'admissibilité de confessions faites en état d'ébriété.
15.              It seems to me that if it is the concern over fair treatment of an accused which must prevail, then the test of awareness of the consequences as espoused by Beetz J. in Horvath, supra, must displace the more restrictive "operating mind" test as the appropriate standard against which to measure the admissibility of intoxicated confessions. The continued interrogation of an accused who, although not so incapacitated as to be incoherent and uncomprehending of her own words, incriminates herself without being aware that that is what she is doing, is incompatible with the view that the adjudicative process must arrive at the truth in a way which does not reflect an abuse by the police or the Crown of its dominant position vis‑à‑vis the individual. In order to avoid the problem of a person unwittingly inculpating herself in a criminal offence, the police must necessarily hold off their interrogation until their suspect has become sober enough to appreciate the consequences of making a statement.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
165(3) vise notamment des situations comme celle qui existait dans l’arrêt Royal Bank of Canada c. Wild (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 188 (C.A. Ont.), c’est‑à‑dire celle où un preneur dépose un chèque dans son compte sans endossement, et qu’il vise aussi l’endossement restrictif.
76.              In my view, the "person" in s. 165(3) must mean a person who is entitled to the cheque.  This means that only the payee or the legitimate endorsee of the payee would qualify as a "person" for the purposes of s. 165(3).  The purpose of s. 165(3), in my view, is to deal with, among others, situations like the one that arose in Royal Bank of Canada v. Wild (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 188 (Ont. C.A.), that is, where a payee deposits a cheque to his or her own account without endorsement, and to deal with restrictive endorsements.  In that case, a cheque drawn by Wild and payable to Interlocking Building Systems Limited was delivered to the bank by the payee, to be deposited to the credit of his account.  The words "for deposit only to the credit of Interlocking Building Systems Limited, dealer's account" were typed on the back of the cheque.  There was no actual signature by way of endorsement on the cheque.  The cheque was credited to the payee's account.  When the cheque was presented by the collecting bank to the drawee, it was dishonoured, and charged back to the account of the payee.  However, the funds in the payee's account were insufficient, there being an overdraft of $1,550.  Several months later, the collecting bank demanded payment from the drawer of the cheque, Wild.  The defendant conceded that the collecting bank had acquired the rights of a holder in due course by virtue of s. 165(3) of the Act.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Pour répondre aux arguments de l’intimée, l’appelante a principalement fait valoir que l’art. 17 peut recevoir une interprétation atténuée qui le rendrait moins restrictif et plus compatible avec la Charte.
49 Section 17 limits the defence of duress to a person who is compelled to commit an offence under threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed.  To counter the respondent’s arguments, the appellant’s key submission was that s. 17 is capable of being read down in a way that would make it less restrictive and more consistent with the Charter.  The appellant argues that the immediacy and presence requirements do not dictate that the threatener be physically present at the scene of the crime.  Rather, they require a temporal connection between the commission of the offence and the threatener’s presence, in the sense that the threatener must be able to execute the threat immediately should the accused fail to comply.  The respondent replies that the appellant’s proposed interpretation would stretch the language of s. 17 beyond recognition.  As counsel for one of the interveners put it during the hearing of this appeal, it would amount to construing presence as absence and immediate as sometime later.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Elle prétendait que le pouvoir de l'intimée d'imposer une taxe spéciale reposait sur l'art. 697 du Code municipal. Cet article est plus restrictif que l'art. 684a du Code municipal. La Cour d'appel a rejeté cet argument et l'appelante admet devant nous que l'intimée agissait en vertu de l'art.
In the Court of Appeal the appellant raised an argument which it has since abandoned.  It claimed that the respondent's power to impose a special tax rested on art. 697 of the Municipal Code.  That article is more restrictive than art. 684a of the Municipal Code.  The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and in this Court the appellant admitted that the respondent was acting pursuant to art. 684a.  On this basis, it is now disputing the allocation of costs made by the corporation, which it says was not in accordance with the article.  In its submission, the provision does not allow the corporation to impose a special tax without assuming at least part of the financial burden.  The appellant relies on the legislative amendment of 1979, which added to the second paragraph that the costs could be charged "entirely to the ratepayers of one or more parts of the municipality", and on the legislature's silence on this point prior to the amendment.  It thus argues that at the time the disputed by‑laws were adopted the corporation had a duty to assume at least part of the financial burden.  Its argument assumes that the article is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the bases of taxation and the second with the way in which the cost is to be allocated.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
18. Les tribunaux ontariens ont adopté un point de vue plus restrictif. Le passage suivant des motifs du juge Morden de la Cour d'appel dans l'arrêt Harrington expose le raisonnement sur lequel se fonde cet autre point de vue (aux pp. 154 et 155):
18.              A more restrictive view has been espoused by the Ontario courts. The following passage from Morden J.A.'s reasons in Harrington articulates the rationale for this alternative approach (at pp. 154‑55):
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le règlement attaqué, quoique très restrictif, permet quand même la libre exploitation des appareils et des salles d'amusement dans les lieux et les secteurs autorisés. Tout compte fait, je ne trouve pas d'erreur dans la conclusion du premier juge selon laquelle «La sévérité du règlement 5156 ne le rend pas pour cela prohibitif».
The impugned By-law, though very limiting, nonetheless permits the free operation of amusement machines and halls in the premises and sectors authorized. All things considered, I find no error in the conclusion of the trial judge that "The severity of By-law 5156 does not per se make it prohibitory".
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
a) aucune portion de ses frais d'adhésion n'était allouée à la participation à des audiences relatives aux tarifs et b) que son avocat n'était pas employé à plein temps. Ces faits ont convaincu le Conseil que le libellé employé dans la taxation des frais de l'A.C.C. était trop restrictif.
Uncontested affidavit evidence submitted by the CAC established that: (a) no portion of the membership fees of this Association are allocated to participation in rate hearings; and (b) counsel to the CAC is not a full time employee of the Association. These facts have convinced the Commission that the wording employed in the award of costs to the CAC was inappropriately narrow in scope.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
23 En dépit de cet emploi relativement restrictif de l’expression « attente raisonnable de profit » (visant à interdire la déduction des dépenses relatives à des biens non entretenus dans le but ou avec l’espoir raisonnable de tirer un profit de l’exploitation d’une entreprise), un auteur souligne que plusieurs décisions ont commencé à en étendre l’utilisation en considérant que l’« attente raisonnable de profit » est une exigence générale de la notion de « source de revenu » :
23 Despite this fairly restrictive statutory use of the term “reasonable expectation of profit” (to disallow deductions for expenses of properties not maintained in connection with a business carried on with a reasonable expectation of profit), one author notes that several cases began to expand the use of the phrase in viewing “reasonable expectation of profit” as a general requirement of the “source of income” concept:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
45. Le caractère restrictif de l'interprétation judiciaire de la portée du droit canadien ressort de l'arrêt ancien R. v. Blythe (1895), 1 C.C.C. 263 (C.A.C.‑B.), dans lequel l'accusé avait, au moyen de lettres écrites à Victoria (C.‑B.), amené une jeune fille de moins de seize ans à quitter l'état de Washington où elle vivait avec ses parents pour venir habiter avec lui à Victoria.
45.              The restrictive character of judicial interpretation of Canadian legislative ambit can be seen in the early case of R. v. Blythe (1895), 1 C.C.C. 263 (B.C.C.A.), where an accused had by letters written in Victoria B.C. induced a girl under sixteen to leave the State of Washington where she lived with her parents to come to stay with him in Victoria. He met her when she arrived in Canada and took her to his home. He was acquitted on a charge of abduction, albeit by a 3 ‑ 2 majority, on the ground that the abduction took place in the State of Washington.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
20 L’absolue nécessité est le critère le plus restrictif qui puisse être formulé en deçà d’une interdiction absolue dans tous les cas. Les circonstances dans lesquelles il a été satisfait à ce critère illustrent sa nature restrictive.
20 Absolute necessity is as restrictive a test as may be formulated short of an absolute prohibition in every case.  The circumstances in which the test has been met exemplify its restrictive nature.  In  Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, at p. 841, for example,  it was found that subject to strict safeguards, mail received by an inmate at a penitentiary could be inspected to maintain the safety and security of the penitentiary. Similarly, in McClure, it was found that documents subject to privilege could be disclosed where there was a genuine danger of wrongful conviction because the information was not available from other sources and the accused could not otherwise raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
32 Il serait donc difficile de conclure de façon certaine que le terme « poursuite » a un sens plus restrictif que « proceedings » et que c’est déterminant dans le contexte de l’art. 32. Il convient donc, en l’espèce, de conclure que le sens commun aux versions française et anglaise de la disposition n’est pas clair et qu’il faut recourir à d’autres règles d’interprétation des lois pour discerner l’intention du législateur.
32 It would therefore be difficult to conclude definitively that “poursuite” is  more restrictive than “proceedings” and that this is determinative in the context of s. 32.  It is then necessary, in this case, to conclude that the common meaning of the English and French versions of the provision is unclear and that resort to the other rules of statutory interpretation is necessary in order to discern Parliament’s intent.  Applying those rules, construing s. 32 in context, harmoniously with the purpose of the CLPA, I have concluded that it was meant to include administrative mechanisms that enable the Crown to achieve exactly the same result as it would through a formal action in court.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le droit du mandat s’est depuis longtemps écarté du concept restrictif du pouvoir, surtout en ce qui a trait à la responsabilité patronale en matière délictuelle (voir, par exemple, Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. [(1862), 1 H. & C. 526, conf. 9 Jur. N.S. 333]).
Agency law, especially as it relates to vicarious liability in tort, has long ago departed from strict conceptions of authority (see, for example, Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. [(1862), 1 H. & C. 526, aff'd 9 Jur. N.S. 333]) and has, similarly, departed from notions of benefit or detriment so that an employer may be held vicariously liable to a person injured by his employee's negligence, even though the employee has, while acting within the scope of his employment, carried out his duties in a way expressly prohibited by the employer:  see, for example, Lockhart v. Stinson and C.P.R. [[1941] S.C.R. 278, aff'd [1942] A.C. 591]; and cf. Rose v. Plenty [[1976] 1 All E.R. 97].
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Selon les règles d’interprétation reconnues, le mot «désigne», utilisé à l’alinéa (e) de l’art. 99 par rapport au terme «fonctionnaire», a un sens explicatif et restrictif tandis que le mot «comprend», au contraire, utilisé à l’alinéa (d) de l’art.
According to recognized rules of interpretation, the expression “means”, used in s. 99(e) with respect to the word “official”, is of an explanatory and restrictive nature and, in contradistinction, the expression “includes”, used in s. 99(d) with respect to the word “office”, is of an extensive nature. The definition of official in s. 99(e)(i) being, as it is, governed by the definition of office
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