rumsfeld – English Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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Lettre à Monsieur Rumsfeld, secrétaire américain de la Défense,
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Letter to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.
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janvier 2004. Curieusement, cette lettre et la réponse positive de Rumsfeld ont été effacées du site Web du ministère de la Défense. [TCO]
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January, 2004. Interestingly, the letter and the positive reply have been deleted from the DND website.
  L'OTAN devrait-elle pou...  
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Le secrétaire de la Défense Donald Rumsfeld (centre) avec un groupe de ministres de la Défense potentiels de l'OTAN, provenant de l'Albanie, la Bulgarie, la Croatie, l'Estonie, la Lettonie, la Macédoine, la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Slovénie, le 7 juin 2002.
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US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (centre) with a group of NATO aspirant defence ministers from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 7 June 2002.
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Donald Rumsfeld,
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aurait probablement permis à Donald Rumsfeld et à Tommy Franks d'être mieux informés pendant la « deuxième guerre du Golfe » et a certainement façonné la mentalité de l'OTAN en ce qui concerne les opérations en Afghanistan.
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may have better informed Donald Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks in ‘Gulf War Two,’ and certainly shaped NATO’s thinking with regard to operations in Afghanistan. A very good and succinct description and explanation of these two ‘kinds’ of strategy can be found in a 2009 book by two Greek professors:
  Revue Militaire Canadie...  
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Note de service en date du 16 octobre 2003 destinée au général Richard Myers, président du Joint Chiefs of Staff, au général Peter Pace, vice-président du Joint Chiefs of Staff, à Paul Wolfowitz, secrétaire adjoint à la Défense, et à Douglas Feith, sous-secrétaire à la Défense pour la politique. Voir www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeld-d20031016sdmemo.htm.
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Fourth, when used appropriately, SOF create military, diplomatic and political successes out of all proportion to their numbers. They are cost-effective. They operate across the spectrum of conflict, understand the requirements of other government departments and are comfortable with tactical, operational and strategic goals. Armed appropriately, employed sensibly and supported by joint assets, they are high-intensity warfighters, as important a contribution to coalition operations as any other arm. They can be capable force ‘packages’ that Canada can afford to develop to the highest world standard, and ones that allies will request in the future.
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Devenu premier ministre, Paul Martin a réaffirmé en décembre 2003 l'importance de la participation, et, dès janvier 2004, le ministre sortant de la Défense nationale, David Pratt, a demandé à Donald Rumsfeld, secrétaire américain de la Défense, d'ouvrir des négociations officielles : « Notre intention est de négocier avec les États-Unis, dans les prochains mois, un protocole d'entente sur la défense antimissiles, dans le but de faire participer le Canada au programme antimissiles actuellement en place aux États-Unis et d'accroître les échanges de renseignement entre nos deux pays12. » Soulignant le rôle central du NORAD dans le cadre de cette participation, Pratt a aussi remarqué que « les États-Unis étaient prêts à consulter le Canada sur les questions de planification opérationnelle13.»
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As a first priority, the Minister’s letter suggested rapid movement to use NORAD for the early warning mission for GMD. Eight months later, Mr. Pettigrew, in announcing the NORAD amendment, separated it from the missile defence decision and suggested that the primary purpose was to safeguard NORAD as an institution. The missile defence decision was supposed to follow after the conclusion of further negotiations. It appears that nothing developed further until the Bush visit in November, which set off a relative firestorm. But even then, subsequent remarks by the Prime Minister provided no indication of what would follow in February.
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Une grande partie des termes de l'accord avait d'ailleurs été fixée plusieurs mois avant le début des négociations officielles, en janvier 2004, dans la correspondance entre David Pratt, ministre canadien de la Défense, et Donald Rumsfeld, secrétaire américain de la Défense.
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On 24 February 2005, in the House of Commons, Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew announced that Canada would not participate in the American ground-based ballistic missile defence (GMD) system for North America. The relevant sentence ended with the phrase “at this time,” leading to speculation that a different political environment might lead the government to re-consider.1 Later that day in Question Period, however, the Foreign Minister used the phrase ‘this no is final,’ and since then, Prime Minister Paul Martin has reiterated the finality of the decision. However, it still remains unclear exactly what the government said ‘no’ to, and thus what ‘no’ is final, if you will. Even though Mr. Pettigrew also concluded: “This decision [was] based on policy principles and not sheer emotion,” neither the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister nor any other government official has articulated these principles.
  America Unbound: The Bu...  
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Elle présente les principaux acteurs du gouvernement Bush, les fameux « Vulcains » (Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, etc.), et leur cheminement idéologique ainsi qu’un examen du leadership de Bush et de sa conception du monde.
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The first part of the book is somewhat unexciting because, for the most part, it repeats information that the informed reader already knows. It provides background information about the key actors in the Bush administration – the so-called Vulcans: Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others – and their intellectual roots, and discusses Bush’s leadership and his world view. An early section of the book focuses on Bush’s apparent ignorance of foreign policy and international security issues prior to his being elected. Nevertheless, during his run for presidency, Bush made clear that “American foreign policy cannot be founded on fear”. His world view was deeply rooted in the realist take on international affairs that shares the following assumptions: (1) The United States would only get involved in international affairs if its vital national interests are threatened; (2) The United States lives in a dangerous world; (3) Nation states are the key actors in international relations; (4) Military power and will are important to defend vital national interests: “If America leads, others will follow; and, (5) Multilateral agreements are neither important nor necessary. Overall, Bush wanted his foreign policy to be ABC – Anything But Clinton.
  Le northern command et ...  
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Pour mieux protéger le pays, l’administration du président George W. Bush a chargé ce département d’« assumer la responsabilité des ressources opérationnelles de la Garde côtière, des Services de douane, des Services de l’immigration, de la naturalisation et de la Patrouille frontalière, des Services d’inspection sanitaire des animaux et des plantes du département de l’Agriculture, ainsi que de l’Administration en sécurité des transports récemment mise sur pied1. Sur le plan militaire, une mesure similaire a été prise pour la défense continentale. Le 17 avril 2002, le secrétaire à la Défense, Ronald Rumsfeld, annonçait que le Plan de commandement unifié des États-Unis (UCP) comporterait un nouveau commandement régional, le Northern Command (NorthCom). Le NorthCom, qui est responsable la zone continentale des États-Unis, du Canada, du Mexique, d’une partie des Caraïbes ainsi que des eaux qui s’étendent jusqu’à 500 milles des côtes nord-américaines2, a pour mandat de « se consacrer à la défense aérienne, terrestre et maritime du continent, et de fournir une aide capitale aux autorités civiles de la nation en temps de crise »3.
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In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, defence of the North American continent has returned to the forefront of American national security policy, and the United States recently formed a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. In an effort to better protect the United States, the administration of President George W. Bush has mandated the Department to “assume responsibility for operational assets of the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border Patrol, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture, and the recently created Transportation Security Administration.”1 Militarily, the revival of continental defence resulted in a similar initiative. On 17 April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the American Unified Command Plan (UCP) was being updated to include a new regional command, United States Northern Command (NorthCom). Allocated responsibility for the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans up to 500 miles off the North American coastline,2 NorthCom’s mandate is to “provide a necessary focus for [continental] aerospace, land and sea defenses, and critical support for [the] nation’s civil authorities in times of national need.”3 In no sense an incidental modification, Rumsfeld estimates that the introduction of NorthCom, and its resulting designation of North America as a geographic command, “is part of the greatest transformation of the Unified Command Plan since its inception in 1947.”4
  L'éthos militaire  
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Récemment, c'est le secrétaire de la Défense Donald Rumsfeld qui a personnellement veillé à ce que les forces spéciales américaines aient un rôle de premier plan dans les opérations américaines et jouissent de fortes augmentations sur le plan des ressources humaines et financières.
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The support of the most senior decision-makers has always been critical. Their support is often a function of their belief in the capability provided. For instance, Prime Minister Winston Churchill took great interest in the development of the commandos, and he championed other similar aggressive, unorthodox type units. General George Marshall personally pushed his subordinates to promote the establishment of the American Rangers, and his political master, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, allowed the director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to maintain a direct pipeline to the White House. Later, President John F. Kennedy heaped lavish attention upon the American Special Forces, much to the chagrin of his conventional chiefs of staff, and, recently, it was former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who personally ensured that American SOF received starring roles in US operations, as well as hefty increases in manpower and budgets. Within the Canadian context, key support by some of the most senior commanders was instrumental in ensuring the creation and survival of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command.
  Le northern command et ...  
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Pour mieux protéger le pays, l’administration du président George W. Bush a chargé ce département d’« assumer la responsabilité des ressources opérationnelles de la Garde côtière, des Services de douane, des Services de l’immigration, de la naturalisation et de la Patrouille frontalière, des Services d’inspection sanitaire des animaux et des plantes du département de l’Agriculture, ainsi que de l’Administration en sécurité des transports récemment mise sur pied1. Sur le plan militaire, une mesure similaire a été prise pour la défense continentale. Le 17 avril 2002, le secrétaire à la Défense, Ronald Rumsfeld, annonçait que le Plan de commandement unifié des États-Unis (UCP) comporterait un nouveau commandement régional, le Northern Command (NorthCom). Le NorthCom, qui est responsable la zone continentale des États-Unis, du Canada, du Mexique, d’une partie des Caraïbes ainsi que des eaux qui s’étendent jusqu’à 500 milles des côtes nord-américaines2, a pour mandat de « se consacrer à la défense aérienne, terrestre et maritime du continent, et de fournir une aide capitale aux autorités civiles de la nation en temps de crise »3.
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In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, defence of the North American continent has returned to the forefront of American national security policy, and the United States recently formed a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. In an effort to better protect the United States, the administration of President George W. Bush has mandated the Department to “assume responsibility for operational assets of the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border Patrol, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture, and the recently created Transportation Security Administration.”1 Militarily, the revival of continental defence resulted in a similar initiative. On 17 April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the American Unified Command Plan (UCP) was being updated to include a new regional command, United States Northern Command (NorthCom). Allocated responsibility for the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans up to 500 miles off the North American coastline,2 NorthCom’s mandate is to “provide a necessary focus for [continental] aerospace, land and sea defenses, and critical support for [the] nation’s civil authorities in times of national need.”3 In no sense an incidental modification, Rumsfeld estimates that the introduction of NorthCom, and its resulting designation of North America as a geographic command, “is part of the greatest transformation of the Unified Command Plan since its inception in 1947.”4