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29 In this case, in addition to denying that the constitutional guarantee had in any way been violated, the respondent argued, in the alternative, that its by-law was justified under s. 1 of the Charter on the ground that it was designed to prevent visual pollution and driver distraction. The justification process is not limited to the objective defined. The other tests must also be met, including demonstration of a rational connection, minimal impairment and proportionality. An examination of the practical effects of the by-law shows that the respondent did not meet any of the tests involved in the justification process. To be sure, the prevention of visual pollution is a reasonable objective. The creation of zones is an appropriate urban planning exercise that is authorized by the Act and is very common in most municipalities. It is easy to understand the reasons that prompt municipalities not to allow any kind of sign, in any place and at any time. It is a matter of maintaining a pleasant environment for the residents. However, as it stands, the respondent’s by-law prohibits only those signs that expressly indicate the trade name of a commercial enterprise in residential areas. All other types of signs of a more generic nature are exempt from the by-law. Thus, if Guignard had merely stated on his sign “Don’t trust insurance companies” without anything further, or “Don’t trust the insurance company located at this address”, or “Purchase your insurance elsewhere than in Saint-Hyacinthe”, his sign would have complied with the by-law, even though it was just as polluting from a visual point of view as a billboard bearing the trade name “Commerce Group”. These difficulties illustrate the arbitrary nature of the ban and of the distinctions that underlie it.
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