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60 The application of the substantive equality analysis cannot be reduced to simple analytical formulae. For, while it is often true that distinctions may produce discrimination, there are many other situations where substantive equality requires that distinctions be made in order to take into account the actual circumstances of individuals as they are located in varying social, political, and economic situations. This is why this Court has long recognized that the purpose of s. 15(1) encompasses both the prevention of discrimination and the amelioration of the conditions of disadvantaged persons (see Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, per Sopinka J. at para. 66). Accordingly, there has been an equally longstanding recognition that an underinclusive ameliorative law, program or activity may violate the constitutional equality interest (Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, per Dickson C.J. at p. 1240). However, until recently, this Court’s consideration of underinclusiveness has been limited to the review of universal or generally comprehensive benefit schemes (see Eldridge, supra; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493).
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