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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
-- Si oui, s'agit‑il d'une décision de politique qui n'engage pas la responsabilité ou d'une décision opérationnelle qui peut être source de responsabilité? -- Highway Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, chap. 167, art. 8, 14 ‑‑ Crown Proceeding Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, chap. 86, art. 2, 3.
Torts -- Liability -- Government -- Policy decision or operational decision -- Boulder crashing onto car on highway -- System in place for inspection and remedial work on rock slopes -- Whether or not parties in relationship of sufficient proximity to warrant imposition of duty of care -- If so, whether policy decision to which liability does not attach or operation decision to which liability would attach -- Highway Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 167, ss. 8, 14 -- Crown Proceeding Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 86, ss. 2, 3.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
49 Compte tenu de l’objectif améliorateur nettement visé par la province et de la relation entre cet objectif et la situation distincte des Premières nations constituées en bandes, la Cour d’appel a jugé que le projet de casino était autorisé par le par. 15(2) et qu’il ne pouvait être source de discrimination au sens du par.
49 Given the province’s clear ameliorative purpose, and the relation between this purpose and the distinct circumstances of the First Nations bands, the Court of Appeal held that the casino project was authorized by s. 15(2) and could not constitute discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter.  Finally, the Court of Appeal held that the province did not act ultra vires the Constitution Act, 1867.  Although reserves and bands fall under federal jurisdiction, the province simply exercised its spending power, and did not act in any way to encroach upon the federal power.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Inversement, le recours collectif peut aussi être source de complications procédurales et administratives — personne ne profite de l’engorgement des tribunaux par des recours collectifs qui ne servent pas de finalité sociale ou juridique positive.
[translation]  It is true that the class action averts the duplication of proceedings and is conducive to the effective resolution of common issues.  It also makes economies of scale possible and helps deter wrongful conduct.  On the other hand, a class action can also lead to procedural and administrative complications — no one benefits from overburdening the courts with class actions that serve no positive social or legal purpose. . . .  In every case, the anticipated benefits must be reviewed to ensure that a representative proceeding would in fact serve the social purposes attributed to it.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que cet arrêt ait reconnu que la nature de l’infraction puisse être source de partialité, il n’a pas éliminé le besoin de démontrer l’existence d’une possibilité réaliste de partialité, facteur qui demeure le critère applicable en matière de récusation motivée.
9 K. (A.) involved two brothers charged with the sexual assault of children aged 4 to 12 years at the time of the alleged assaults.  The majority of the Court of Appeal, per Charron J.A., upheld the trial judge’s decision to deny challenges for cause, while allowing the appeal on other grounds.  Charron J.A. emphasized the distinction between racial prejudice and prejudice against persons charged with sexual assault, arguing that the first goes to a want of indifference towards the accused while the second relates to a want of indifference towards the nature of the crime.  The connection between racial prejudice and a particular accused is direct and logical, whereas “strong attitudes about a particular crime, even when accompanied by intense feelings of hostility and resentment towards those who commit the crime, will rarely, if ever, translate into partiality in respect of the accused” (para. 41).  She rejected the argument that this Court’s decision in Williams, supra, expanded the right to challenge for cause.  While Williams recognized the possibility of bias arising from the nature of an offence, it did not eliminate the need to show a realistic potential for partiality, which remains the governing test for challenges for cause.  This test was not met in the case before the court.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Suggérer que le fait même d’exposer des enfants à différents faits religieux porte atteinte à la liberté de religion de ceux-ci ou de leurs parents revient à rejeter la réalité multiculturelle de la société canadienne et méconnaître les obligations de l’État québécois en matière d’éducation publique. Bien qu’une telle exposition puisse être source de frictions, elle ne constitue pas en soi une atteinte à l’al.
[40] Parents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their children if they so wish.  However, the early exposure of children to realities that differ from those in their immediate family environment is a fact of life in society.  The suggestion that exposing children to a variety of religious facts in itself infringes their religious freedom or that of their parents amounts to a rejection of the multicultural reality of Canadian society and ignores the Quebec government’s obligations with regard to public education.  Although such exposure can be a source of friction, it does not in itself constitute an infringement of s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter and of s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
48 De toute évidence, il faut tenir compte de la position plutôt délicate dans laquelle se trouve le juge : il tient une audience à huis clos dans laquelle les deux parties — le présumé indicateur et le procureur général — plaident souvent toutes les deux dans le même sens. (Le procureur général pourrait, bien entendu, contester la revendication du privilège.)  Le cas échéant, le caractère non contradictoire de l’instance à cette étape peut être source de préoccupation.
47 While the judge is determining whether the privilege applies, all caution must be taken on the assumption that it does apply.  This means that under no circumstances should any third party be admitted to the proceedings, and even the claim of informer privilege must not be disclosed.  The only parties admitted in this part of the proceeding are the person who seeks the protection of the privilege and the Attorney General.  It is the responsibility of the judge at this stage to demand from the parties some evidence which satisfies the judge, on balance, that the person is a confidential informer.  Once it has been established on the evidence that the person is a confidential informer, the privilege applies.  I cannot overemphasize the importance of this last point. The judge has no discretion not to apply the privilege: Bisaillon v. Keable, at p. 93.  If the person is an informer, the privilege applies fully.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Car, quoiqu’il soit souvent vrai que des distinctions peuvent être source de discrimination, il y a de nombreuses autres situations où l’égalité réelle exige que des distinctions soient faites pour tenir compte de la situation concrète d’individus vivant dans des conditions sociales, politiques et économiques différentes.
60 The application of the substantive equality analysis cannot be reduced to simple analytical formulae.  For, while it is often true that distinctions may produce discrimination, there are many other situations where substantive equality requires that distinctions be made in order to take into account the actual circumstances of individuals as they are located in varying social, political, and economic situations.  This is why this Court has long recognized that the purpose of s. 15(1) encompasses both the prevention of discrimination and the amelioration of the conditions of disadvantaged persons (see Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, per Sopinka J. at para. 66).  Accordingly, there has been an equally longstanding recognition that an underinclusive ameliorative law, program or activity may violate the constitutional equality interest (Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, per Dickson C.J. at p. 1240).  However, until recently, this Court’s consideration of underinclusiveness has been limited to the review of universal or generally comprehensive benefit schemes (see Eldridge, supra; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493).
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Or, si les faits survenus auparavant ne pouvaient être source de responsabilité délictuelle en raison de la prescription, ils demeuraient pertinents pour évaluer la conduite du Barreau à la suite du dépôt de nouvelles plaintes par Mme McCullock-Finney.
41 First, the problem of how the rules of civil liability defined above are to apply does not raise a question of fact or of the assessment of evidence.  On this point, the appellant is wrong to suggest that the Court of Appeal improperly revised the trial judge’s findings of fact.  Rather, we must resolve a question of law, having regard to facts that have been clearly established; the question is whether the conduct of the Barreau, when considered in its entirety, constitutes a fault for which the Order cannot claim the immunity set out in s. 193 of the Professional Code.  In any event, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, the Superior Court made an obvious and serious error in assessing the facts.  The trial judge failed to have regard to events prior to 1993 in assessing the conduct of the Barreau.  Even though civil liability based on the events that occurred before that time is precluded by prescription, those events were still relevant in assessing the conduct of the Barreau after fresh complaints were made by McCullock‑Finney.  They were also useful for putting together a profile of Belhassen’s professional career since he was entered on the Roll of the Order and were needed in order to make a better assessment of the duty of diligence that rested on the Barreau after it received these complaints.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Cependant, pour les besoins de l’analyse relative à la norme de contrôle, j’accorde peu d’importance à ce terme. Il n’ajoute rien à l’analyse et peut être source de problèmes. L’accent mis à tort sur la notion qui le sous-tend a embrouillé le droit administratif par le recours à des conditions préalables liées à la compétence qui autorisaient une immixtion indue dans les décisions administratives.
[95] I begin with the significance of the terms “jurisdiction” and “vires”.  I remain of the view that true questions of jurisdiction or vires exist.  As I will explain later in these reasons, the jurisprudence affirms that they do.  However, for the purposes of the standard of review analysis, I attach little weight to these terms.  They add little to the analysis, and can cause problems.  Undue emphasis on the concepts they embody bedevilled administrative law with preliminary jurisdictional questions that allowed for undue interference with administrative decisions.  This Court’s jurisprudence has long eschewed an expansive approach to “jurisdiction” that animated early cases such as Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425, and Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 756.  As was wisely said in Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, at p. 233, courts “should not be alert to brand as jurisdictional . . . that which may be doubtfully so”.  In Dunsmuir, the Court repeated this sentiment and noted that such questions will be “narrow” and that jurisdiction should be understood in the “narrow sense of whether or not the tribunal had the authority to make the inquiry . . . whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter” (para. 59).