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Financial compensation for elected officials is often criticized, but it is actually a little understood phenomenon. The goal of the ELUAR project is to fill this gap and develop an analysis of the material conditions of electoral mandates. It is structured around two primary research questions: the first addresses the codification of elected officials’ remuneration, and the second, coordinated by Didier Demazière, is on the pay elected officials receive for exercising a political mandate. This study focuses on the trajectories and careers of elected officials and dialogues with Max Weber’s work by exploring how and under what conditions remuneration for a mandate can mean living from politics. This requires specific attention to two dimensions of pay mechanisms for elected officials: their variety and complexity and the considerable economic inequalities that result, and the instability produced by electoral uncertainty and the security devices put in place to limit the consequences thereof. By focusing on material gratification, it is thus possible to understand the forms and mechanisms of political professionalization. Furthermore, this study will contribute to an analysis of how the political labor market functions.
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