trop étroit – Übersetzung – Keybot-Wörterbuch

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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De toute évidence Sundance ne peut pas dire qu'elle n'a rien à voir dans la malchance de Crocker. Le lien qui existe entre Sundance et Crocker est beaucoup trop étroit pour cela. Sundance doit accepter à titre de promoteur d'un sport dangereux la responsabilité d'avoir à prendre toutes les mesures raisonnables pour empêcher qu'une personne qui n'est manifestement pas en possession de ses moyens y participe.
23.                     Sundance set up an inherently dangerous competition in order to promote its resort and improve its financial future. Sundance employees were in charge of the way in which the event was to be conducted. Sundance provided liquor to Crocker during the event and knew of Crocker's inebriated and injured condition before the start of the second heat. Sundance officials were well aware that Crocker's condition heightened the chance of injury. Both Beals and Durno questioned Crocker's ability to continue. It is clearly not open to Sundance to characterize itself as a stranger to Crocker's misfortune. The nexus between Sundance and Crocker is much too close for that. Sundance must accept the responsibility as the promoter of a dangerous sport for taking all reasonable steps to prevent a visibly incapacitated person from participating.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il y est mentionné que si le moyen de autrefois convict, tel que défini à l’art. 536 et à l’al. a) du par. (1) de l’art. 537 du Code criminel actuel (l’art. 517 et l’al. a) du par. (1) de l’art. 518 de l’ancien code), est trop étroit pour embrasser la situation, le moyen de chose
I am of the opinion that the judgment of this Court in Kienapple should govern here so as to prevent multiple convictions for the same matter. It was there indicated that if autrefois convict as defined in what are now ss. 536 and 537(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (formely ss. 517 and 518(1)(a)) was too narrow to cover the situation, res judicata was available for that purpose. The extended meaning of autrefois
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
A mon avis, le juge O’Driscoll de première instance a adopté un point de vue trop étroit lorsqu’il a déclaré que: [TRADUCTION] «Les préoccupations de Scott n’avaient rien à voir avec le rachat par Engelhard des rebuts de Giles.»
In the result, I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal and restore the judgment of O’Driscoll J. but would vary it to limit the recovery of Canlab up to the time that Scott and Fabian had their conversation. If the parties cannot agree on the transactions with Giles that took place after that time, I would direct a reference before O’Driscoll J. or, failing him, another judge of the High Court of Justice of Ontario, to settle the issue. I should add that the fact that Engelhard thought it was buying from Giles and not from Cook should not affect the limitation of Engelhard’s liability as above indicated.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Décider que l'expression «récompense couronnant une oeuvre» connote nécessairement un prix pour une victoire dans une compétition ou un concours avec autrui reviendrait à lui donner un sens trop étroit et trop rigide.
That sum, however, was a prize for achievement in a field of endeavour ordinarily carried on by the taxpayer, within the meaning of s. 56(1)(n) of the Act. The word prize has to be construed in the context of the other words of the Act which give it color, meaning and content. It would place too narrow and inflexible a meaning on the words "prize for achievement" to hold that they necessarily connote an award for victory in a competition or contest with others. Section 56(1)(n) taxes prizes and other amounts that in aggregate exceed $500. The $500 exclusion in s. 56(1)(n) is an exemption from tax. Therefore the $300 payment is not taxable.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
A mon avis, le ministère public ne se libère pas du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombe en produisant simplement un témoignage oral montrant que la déclaration incriminante de l’accusé n’a pas été obte­nue par suite d’une promesse, par crainte d’un préju­dice ou dans l’espoir d’un avantage. Cet énoncé de la règle de droit est trop étroit.
Thus it appears that Roach J.A., with the concurrence of Aylesworth J.A., held the view that the decision of this Court in Boudreau v. The King did not change the law as stated by Viscount Sumner and that a declaration made by an accused is a voluntary statement if it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority. In the view of Pickup C.J.O. and Laidlaw and Schroeder JJ.A., this statement of the rule is too narrow and in addition to proving that the statement has not been obtained by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, the prosecution must further show that the statement
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] A mon avis, le ministère public ne se libère pas du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombe en produisant simplement un témoignage oral montrant que la déclaration incriminante de l’accusé n’a pas été obtenue par suite d’une promesse, par crainte d’un préjudice ou dans l’espoir d’un avantage. Cet énoncé de la règle de droit est trop étroit.
In my opinion, the Crown does not discharge the onus resting upon it by merely adducing oral testimony show­ing that an incriminating statement made by an accused person was not induced by a promise or by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage. That statement of the rule of law is too narrow. The admissions must not have been "improperly instigated or induced or coerced": per Rand J. in Boudreau v. The King, supra. The admis­sions must be self-impelled, and the statement must be the statement of a man "free in volition from the compulsions or inducements of authority". The statement must be "freely and voluntarily made".
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que cette cour se soit abstenue de dire que le lieu d'une infraction ne peut jamais être déterminé en fonction de notions tirées du domaine des contrats ou des mandats, elle a conclu que, dans l'arrêt Selkirk, la cour avait adopté un point de vue trop étroit.
54.              These two cases, it is true, related to interprovincial rather than international situations, but it is clear from the rejection in Trudel of the reasoning in R. v. Selkirk that the court attached no importance to this distinction. In any event, the reasoning in Trudel was approved by a panel of five members of the Ontario Court of Appeal, consisting of Gale C.J.O. and McGillivray, Kelly, Laskin (later C.J.C.) and Brooke JJ.A., in 1970 in the important case of Re Chapman, supra. While that court refrained from saying that the situs of an offence can never be determined on the basis of notions derived from contract or agency, it concluded that the court in Selkirk had taken too limited a view. "Since the credit card did reach the accused in Toronto", it noted at p. 53, "there was factual realization of the fraudulent scheme put into motion by the accused, and hence, a sound basis for concluding that if an offence had been committed it was committed in Toronto".
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Hart doit être étendu à de telles actions de contribuable fédéral (et, si c’est le cas, il s’étendrait aussi aux actions de contribuable provincial), comme le prétend l’appelant, ou si ce genre d’action, comme le prétendent les intimés, ne doit jamais, pour les motifs énoncés dans l’arrêt Smith, être autorisé. Je suis d’avis que cet énoncé de la question en litige est à la fois trop large et trop étroit.
I agree with the submission of counsel for the respondents that the appellant’s taxpayer class action here is realistically a class action by a member of the public. He is bringing what has been called a “public action” (see Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (1965), p. 483), and the question that arises is whether the principle of MacIlreith v. Hart should be extended to cover such federal taxpayer actions (and, if so, it would extend as well to provincial taxpayer actions), as contended for by the appellant, or whether this kind of action should never be permitted for the reasons given in the Smith case, as contended for by the respondents. It is my view that this statement of the issue is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because it does not take account of the nature of the legislation whose validity is challenged; it is too narrow because it suggests an “either or” approach by the Courts. I am of the opinion that the Court is entitled in taxpayer actions to control standing no less than it is entitled to control the granting of declaratory orders sought in such actions. In short, the matter to me is one for the discretion of the Court, and relevant to this discretion is the nature of the legislation under attack.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[4] Soit dit en tout respect, la Cour d’appel fédérale, qui a rendu la décision attaquée dans la présente affaire, semble avoir considéré la question de l’égalité linguistique à travers un prisme trop étroit, sans tenir compte de la nature du programme en question et de ses objectifs, lorsqu’elle a défini la portée des obligations linguistiques en l’espèce.
[11] In 2000, the appellant Raymond DesRochers, CALDECH’s Executive Director, filed a complaint with the Commissioner, alleging that North Simcoe was unable to provide its services in French.  After investigating, the Commissioner concluded, in an investigation report sent to the parties in 2001, that Industry Canada had breached its duties under Parts IV and VII of the OLA (Investigation Report on the North Simcoe Business Development Center’s Ability to Provide French‑Language Services to the Region’s French‑Speaking Population, September 2001).  She recommended that Industry Canada take measures to ensure that services provided by North Simcoe to the French‑speaking community were equal in quality to those provided to the English‑speaking community.  In view of the government’s commitment in s. 41 of Part VII of the OLA, she also recommended that adequate and appropriate measures be taken to meet the economic development needs of French‑speaking businesspersons in Simcoe County.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Hart doit être étendu à de telles actions de contribuable fédéral (et, si c’est le cas, il s’étendrait aussi aux actions de contribuable provincial), comme le prétend l’appelant, ou si ce genre d’action, comme le prétendent les intimés, ne doit jamais, pour les motifs énoncés dans l’arrêt Smith, être autorisé. Je suis d’avis que cet énoncé de la question en litige est à la fois trop large et trop étroit.
I agree with the submission of counsel for the respondents that the appellant’s taxpayer class action here is realistically a class action by a member of the public. He is bringing what has been called a “public action” (see Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (1965), p. 483), and the question that arises is whether the principle of MacIlreith v. Hart should be extended to cover such federal taxpayer actions (and, if so, it would extend as well to provincial taxpayer actions), as contended for by the appellant, or whether this kind of action should never be permitted for the reasons given in the Smith case, as contended for by the respondents. It is my view that this statement of the issue is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because it does not take account of the nature of the legislation whose validity is challenged; it is too narrow because it suggests an “either or” approach by the Courts. I am of the opinion that the Court is entitled in taxpayer actions to control standing no less than it is entitled to control the granting of declaratory orders sought in such actions. In short, the matter to me is one for the discretion of the Court, and relevant to this discretion is the nature of the legislation under attack.