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Le seul témoignage défavorable c'est que l'appelant a été momentanément vu en état de démarche chancelante, et qu'il marmonnait au moment où on l'a vu couché sur un divan; or ce sont là des symptômes compatibles avec la maladie diagnostiquée.

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To find intoxication in the present case, and hence to conclude that the failure to appear was unjustified, is to give testimonial cogency to evidence that is not far short of surmise, when related to other evidence in the case by witnesses much better situated to speak to that fact. No one testified to any odour of alcohol; the evidence on this was that there was none. The only adverse evidence was to the effect that the appellant was momentarily seen to be unsteady on his feet and that he mumbled when seen lying on a chesterfield, symptoms that are consistent with the diagnosed illness. The adverse evidence defies the principle of proof on a balance of probabilities let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Au procès, la défense a mis en preuve que la Commission de censure avait autorisé la présentation du film comme film réservé aux adultes et que celui‑ci avait été vu en Alberta par un vaste auditoire sans qu'aucune plainte ne soit présentée à la Commission.

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Appellant, owner of an Edmonton theatre, was charged with presenting an obscene motion picture contrary to s. 163 of the Criminal Code. At trial, the defence adduced evidence indicating that the film had been approved and classified by the Censor Board as a restricted adult movie and that it had been previously shown in Alberta to a large audience with no complaint being made to the Board. The evidence further showed that the film had been similarly approved and classified by the other provincial censor boards across the country. The trial judge found the film immoral, indecent and obscene and convicted the appellant. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision. This appeal is to determine whether the trial judge applied the proper test in finding the appellant guilty of presenting an obscene entertainment.

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L’équipe de surveillance leur avait transmis des renseignements portant que l’accusé avait été vu en train de remettre une substance ayant l’apparence d’une poudre blanche à d’autres personnes en échange d’argent, ce qui les a amenés à soupçonner l’accusé d’avoir du crack sur lui.

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10 With regard to the manner in which the search was conducted, I would agree with the Crown that the three searches must be looked at individually and justified according to the circumstances applicable to each of them.  In my view, the first search was perfectly justified.  As provided for in Cloutier, supra, the reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest provided the authority to search for evidence related to the crime.  The arresting officers had reasonable cause to believe the accused was hiding evidence.  Information that the accused had been observed passing a white powdery substance to other persons and receiving cash in return was passed onto the arresting officers by the surveillance team, giving rise to a suspicion that the accused would have crack cocaine on his person.  In addition, as the arresting officer approached the accused, he observed the accused crushing something between his fingers that left a white residue.  During the course of the arrest, the police found what looked to be cocaine under the table where one of the suspects was arrested.

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Entre‑temps, le témoin D. W. avait téléphoné à la police.  Deux policiers, les agents Jorgensen et Randhawa, sont arrivés peu après que le second garçon fut sorti des buissons.  Ils ont témoigné avoir vu, en entrant dans le parc, l'appelant accroupi dans les buissons.  L'appelant a tenté de quitter le parc en sautant par‑dessus une clôture, mais il en a été empêché par l'agent Randhawa.  Celui‑ci a fait produire à l'appelant une pièce d'identité, lui a appris qu'il faisait l'objet d'une enquête relativement à de possibles agressions sexuelles contre des enfants et l'a fait monter à l'arrière du fourgon cellulaire dans lequel Randhawa et Jorgensen s'étaient rendus au parc.  Les policiers ont ensuite interrogé les témoins adultes et les plaignants.

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The complainants were five and six years old at the time.  Two adult witnesses, D. W. and L. W., lived in a house which was adjacent to the park. They were working in their yard on May 22 at around 5 p.m. when D. W. observed the appellant walking in a crouched position along some bushes at the edge of the park. He was leading a young boy by the hand. When the appellant and the boy disappeared in the bushes, the witness L. W. went closer to attempt to find out what was happening. She saw the appellant and the boy seated together in an unusual position and overheard the appellant say "Let's keep it our secret, it will be our little secret." After the first boy left him in the bushes, a second young boy joined the appellant in the same secluded location. Once again L. W. heard the appellant say "shhh" and "let's keep it our little secret" before the second boy also left the bushes.

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En ces occasions il avait également remarqué les écriteaux sur la bouée signalant le danger que représentait la chute (Danger—Falls Ahead), cette chute-là qu’il avait vue. Le jour de l’accident, il a vu en venant du côté sud du chenal et ensuite au centre, un pont ordinaire à six piliers, sans aucun signe de l’existence d’un barrage ou de vannes.

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I am of the opinion that he also complied with the second requirement and determined that the bridge was prepared to allow him to enter. The suppliant, as I have stressed, had never seen the lock, dam and bridge except when the gates and curtains were down and had then and only then observed a waterfall on the north side thereof. On those occasions, he had also noted signs on the buoys warning of “Danger—Falls Ahead”, referring to the very falls which he had observed. On this occasion, he observed from the south end of the channel, and then again from midstream, an ordinary six-pier bridge with no sign of any dam or gate or curtain. The suppliant, neither then nor on previous occasions, saw any concrete weir. In normal flow of water, that weir was covered with 14 feet of water, and even with the dam open with 28 inches of water. The suppliant, when the gates and curtains had been lowered on these previous occasions, had observed the signs warning of the waterfall and had also observed the waterfall which was the subject of such warning.

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Comme nous l’avons vu, la question de savoir si Mme McLeod était capable d’identifier l’accusé comme étant son agresseur, ou si elle l’a simplement identifié comme étant l’homme qu’elle a vu en état d’arrestation et lors des audiences précédentes, est une question qu’il appartient au jury de trancher en définitive.

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93 In the same paragraph (para. 52), my colleague says that the trial judge should have stressed that Mrs. McLeod could not have divorced her previous recollection of the assailant from the mental images she formed after having seen the appellant arrested by the police on television. I disagree that a caution of this nature should have been given by the trial judge. As I discussed above, whether Mrs. McLeod was able to identify the accused as her assailant, or whether she was merely identifying him as the man she saw being arrested and at previous hearings, was ultimately a question for the jury to answer.

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33 La Cour d’appel semble estimer que l’obligation d’accommodement devait être appréciée au moment où l’employée s’était vu en définitive refuser une mesure additionnelle (par. 31). À mon avis, cette approche repose sur une compartimentation des différents problèmes de santé de l’employée.

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33 The Court of Appeal appears to have held that the duty to accommodate must be assessed as of the time the employee was effectively denied an additional measure (para. 31).  In my view, this approach is based on a compartmentalization of the employee’s various health problems.  Undue hardship resulting from the employee’s absence must be assessed globally starting from the beginning of the absence, not from the expiry of the three‑year period.

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Il est admis que l’homme et l’enfant ont été dans le champ de vision de Mme Coubrough pendant environ 22 à 25 secondes. L’homme qu’elle a décrit mesurait environ cinq pieds trois pouces, de la même taille mais un peu plus mince que l’accusé qu’elle a vu en cour.

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Joyce Smoke, a social worker who had been “handling” the Wildman family, said she was accustomed to seeing John Wildman wear a black hat and a black coat. But, as regards the hat, she was contradicted by her secretary Miss Carvel, and by several other witnesses who said Mr. Wildman did not wear a hat. Mr. Mclsaac said that on February 14 the appellant was wearing a long brown leather coat and tan cowboy boots. Wildman testified he had lost his gloves the night of February 14. He also testified he had put his coat and boots in the garbage on Monday, February 13, and put the garbage out on Wednesday, February 15. This happened about two hours after Tricia went missing. He explained this as the result of a call he received from his wife on February 13.

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Une fois revenus, les agents de police ont amené l’accusé dans la salle d’interrogatoire, l’ont averti qu’ils avaient enquêté sur l’affaire et lui ont dit: [TRADUCTION] «Nous avons parcouru la partie ouest de la ville où vous travaillez et nous avons abattu beaucoup de besogne cet après-midi»; ils avaient été informés qu’il avait été vu en compa­gnie de la victime la veille au soir.

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After their departure, the verbal resumé was reduced to a typewritten statement which the accused read over and signed. The police officers returned from their investigation, again took the accused to the interview room, informed him they had been working on the case and said, "We have been out going over the area in the west end of the city where you worked and we have been working pretty hard this afternoon" and that they had some information to the effect that the accused had been seen with the deceased girl on the previ­ous evening. They informed the accused that the lipstick that had been found in the truck had been identified as that of the deceased girl and that they had other information which indicated that he had been seen with the girl the previous night, and concluded, "We do not believe what you told us this morning". The accused then blurted out, "I was just thinking of my wife and my kids. I didn't mean to do it. She started kibitzing around and I grabbed her by the scarf and she didn't breathe no more".

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Comme nous l’avons vu en analysant la tentative d’infraction impossible, la soi-disant impossibilité «de droit» est en réalité un cas d’impossibilité de fait et cette distinction ne vaut plus, sauf dans les cas de «crimes imaginaires».

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99 Canadian courts have only rarely considered this issue.  In R. v. Chow Sik Wah, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 313, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in a case involving conspiracy to commit forgery, held at p. 315 that “[i]n a prosecution for conspiracy a conviction may not be registered if the operation for the commission of which the accused allegedly conspired would, if accomplished, not have made the accused guilty of the substantive offence”.  The respondent obviously finds comfort in this case.

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La possibilité de conclure également à la possession dépendrait vraisemblablement de la présence ou de l'absence d'un élément de preuve comme le moment où l'empreinte digitale a été laissée sur la bouteille, la question de savoir si le contenu pouvait être vu en manipulant la bouteille ou si la nature de la substance que renfermait le contenant était facilement reconnaissable.

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. . . I think that the principle that emerges from all these cases is that whether an accused's fingerprint on an article will support an inference that he was in possession of the article will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. The nature of the article will clearly be of significance, such that a fingerprint on a frying pan, as in O'Keefe, for example, would much more readily establish possession of that item than a fingerprint on a container, such as the bottle in Kuhn (No. 1), which might prove prior handling of the bottle, but not necessarily knowledge and control of its contents at the relevant time. Whether the further inference of possession would be available would presumably depend on the presence or absence of such evidence as when the fingerprint was placed on the bottle, whether the contents could be seen when handling the bottle, or whether the nature of the substance in the container was readily recognizable.

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Une fois revenus, les agents de police ont amené l’accusé dans la salle d’interrogatoire, l’ont averti qu’ils avaient enquêté sur l’affaire et lui ont dit: [TRADUCTION] «Nous avons parcouru la partie ouest de la ville où vous travaillez et nous avons abattu beaucoup de besogne cet après-midi»; ils avaient été informés qu’il avait été vu en compa­gnie de la victime la veille au soir.

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After their departure, the verbal resumé was reduced to a typewritten statement which the accused read over and signed. The police officers returned from their investigation, again took the accused to the interview room, informed him they had been working on the case and said, "We have been out going over the area in the west end of the city where you worked and we have been working pretty hard this afternoon" and that they had some information to the effect that the accused had been seen with the deceased girl on the previ­ous evening. They informed the accused that the lipstick that had been found in the truck had been identified as that of the deceased girl and that they had other information which indicated that he had been seen with the girl the previous night, and concluded, "We do not believe what you told us this morning". The accused then blurted out, "I was just thinking of my wife and my kids. I didn't mean to do it. She started kibitzing around and I grabbed her by the scarf and she didn't breathe no more".

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[30] Je ne constate aucune erreur justifiant notre intervention dans les conclusions du juge suivant lesquelles les policiers étaient fondés de croire et croyaient sincèrement à la nécessité d’une entrée musclée dans le cas qui nous occupe.  Ces conclusions sont également appuyées, à mon avis, par d’autres éléments de preuve versés au dossier que le juge de première instance ne mentionne pas expressément, mais qui concernent des faits qui étaient connus des policiers au moment de leur intervention.  La veille de leur intervention, M. Nguyen avait été vu, en compagnie de Hans Eastgaard comme passager, au volant d’un véhicule qu’il conduisait régulièrement.  M. Eastgaard avait un casier judiciaire chargé; il avait notamment fait l’objet de nombreuses accusations relatives à des armes et à des drogues.  Environ deux heures avant l’arrivée des policiers, le véhicule que M. Nguyen avait l’habitude de conduire a été vu, en train d’être garé à l’arrière de la résidence des Cornell.  Le conducteur, que l’agent qui faisait de la surveillance a décrit comme un homme asiatique, est sorti du véhicule et a semblé récupérer quelque chose dans la cour arrière, près de la clôture.  La voiture a été appréhendée environ une heure plus tard.  Elle était alors conduite par M. Nguyen, qui portait un gilet pare‑balles.  Le passager était M. Eastgaard.  M. Nguyen avait en sa possession de la cocaïne et de l’argent comptant.  Il y avait de bonnes raisons de craindre que M. Nguyen, M. Tran et M. Eastgaard ne soient violents.  Comme le juge Slatter l’a fait remarqué, si M. Nguyen pensait que le commerce auquel il s’adonnait était suffisamment dangereux pour justifier qu’il porte un gilet pare‑balles, il n’était certainement pas déraisonnable que les policiers en pensent autant : C.A., par. 23.  Au moment où les policiers sont entrés dans la résidence des Cornell, M. Nguyen et M. Eastgaard étaient en détention, mais on ignorait où se trouvait M. Tran.  Ces faits additionnels viennent renforcer les motifs de croire qu’il y aurait de la cocaïne dans la maison (et que cette cocaïne risquait donc d’être facilement détruite) et qu’on pouvait faire face à une réaction violente lors de l’intervention.

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[30] I see no reviewable error in these conclusions that the police view of the need for a hard entry was both reasonably based and genuinely held.  These conclusions are also supported, in my view, by other evidence in the record to which the trial judge does not specifically refer but relates to matters known to the police at the time of entry.  The day before entry, the vehicle often driven by Nguyen was observed with Hans Eastgaard as a passenger.  Eastgaard had an extensive criminal record which included weapons and drug charges.  About two hours before entry, the vehicle often driven by Nguyen was observed to pull up to the rear of the Cornell residence.  The driver, described by an officer conducting surveillance as an Asian male, left the vehicle and appeared to retrieve something from the yard of the residence near the fence.  The car was stopped about an hour later.  At the time, it was driven by Nguyen, who was wearing body armour.  His passenger was Eastgaard. Nguyen was in possession of cocaine and cash.  There was good reason to be concerned about violence on the part of Nguyen, Tran and Eastgaard.  As Slatter J.A. observed, if Nguyen thought his business was dangerous enough to justify wearing body armour, it can hardly have been unreasonable for the police to think the same thing: C.A., at para. 23. At the time of the entry into the Cornell residence, Nguyen and Eastgaard were in custody, but Tran’s whereabouts were unknown. These additional facts strengthen the grounds to believe that cocaine would be in the residence (and therefore liable to be easily destroyed) and that a violent reaction to entry might be encountered.

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[30] Je ne constate aucune erreur justifiant notre intervention dans les conclusions du juge suivant lesquelles les policiers étaient fondés de croire et croyaient sincèrement à la nécessité d’une entrée musclée dans le cas qui nous occupe.  Ces conclusions sont également appuyées, à mon avis, par d’autres éléments de preuve versés au dossier que le juge de première instance ne mentionne pas expressément, mais qui concernent des faits qui étaient connus des policiers au moment de leur intervention.  La veille de leur intervention, M. Nguyen avait été vu, en compagnie de Hans Eastgaard comme passager, au volant d’un véhicule qu’il conduisait régulièrement.  M. Eastgaard avait un casier judiciaire chargé; il avait notamment fait l’objet de nombreuses accusations relatives à des armes et à des drogues.  Environ deux heures avant l’arrivée des policiers, le véhicule que M. Nguyen avait l’habitude de conduire a été vu, en train d’être garé à l’arrière de la résidence des Cornell.  Le conducteur, que l’agent qui faisait de la surveillance a décrit comme un homme asiatique, est sorti du véhicule et a semblé récupérer quelque chose dans la cour arrière, près de la clôture.  La voiture a été appréhendée environ une heure plus tard.  Elle était alors conduite par M. Nguyen, qui portait un gilet pare‑balles.  Le passager était M. Eastgaard.  M. Nguyen avait en sa possession de la cocaïne et de l’argent comptant.  Il y avait de bonnes raisons de craindre que M. Nguyen, M. Tran et M. Eastgaard ne soient violents.  Comme le juge Slatter l’a fait remarqué, si M. Nguyen pensait que le commerce auquel il s’adonnait était suffisamment dangereux pour justifier qu’il porte un gilet pare‑balles, il n’était certainement pas déraisonnable que les policiers en pensent autant : C.A., par. 23.  Au moment où les policiers sont entrés dans la résidence des Cornell, M. Nguyen et M. Eastgaard étaient en détention, mais on ignorait où se trouvait M. Tran.  Ces faits additionnels viennent renforcer les motifs de croire qu’il y aurait de la cocaïne dans la maison (et que cette cocaïne risquait donc d’être facilement détruite) et qu’on pouvait faire face à une réaction violente lors de l’intervention.

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[30] I see no reviewable error in these conclusions that the police view of the need for a hard entry was both reasonably based and genuinely held.  These conclusions are also supported, in my view, by other evidence in the record to which the trial judge does not specifically refer but relates to matters known to the police at the time of entry.  The day before entry, the vehicle often driven by Nguyen was observed with Hans Eastgaard as a passenger.  Eastgaard had an extensive criminal record which included weapons and drug charges.  About two hours before entry, the vehicle often driven by Nguyen was observed to pull up to the rear of the Cornell residence.  The driver, described by an officer conducting surveillance as an Asian male, left the vehicle and appeared to retrieve something from the yard of the residence near the fence.  The car was stopped about an hour later.  At the time, it was driven by Nguyen, who was wearing body armour.  His passenger was Eastgaard. Nguyen was in possession of cocaine and cash.  There was good reason to be concerned about violence on the part of Nguyen, Tran and Eastgaard.  As Slatter J.A. observed, if Nguyen thought his business was dangerous enough to justify wearing body armour, it can hardly have been unreasonable for the police to think the same thing: C.A., at para. 23. At the time of the entry into the Cornell residence, Nguyen and Eastgaard were in custody, but Tran’s whereabouts were unknown. These additional facts strengthen the grounds to believe that cocaine would be in the residence (and therefore liable to be easily destroyed) and that a violent reaction to entry might be encountered.

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Cette conclusion n’était pas déraisonnable. Nous convenons avec les appelantes que la preuve était suffisante pour justifier cette conclusion, vu en particulier qu’aucun élément de preuve n’a été produit pour la réfuter.

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The trial judge had found, based on current enrolment of s. 23 children aged 6 to 11, as well as demographic projections for children up to 5 years of age in the area, that the relevant number of children who could potentially take advantage of French language education was 306.  This was a projection covering a ten-year period.  In this case, the appropriate estimate of the potential number of students who might attend the facility in any given year is 155, the uncontested number projected by the expert witness, Ms. Angéline Martel.  Therefore, according to the approach advocated in Mahe, the relevant number would be between 49 and 155.  The trial judge also attached some importance to the experience of parents in Charlottetown where projected numbers were surpassed once the educational facility was in place.  He compared the population of each locality and inferred that the same response could be expected.  This was not an unreasonable inference.  We agree with the appellants that there was sufficient evidence to support this inference, especially because no evidence was presented to rebut it.

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Ðdð ðappel€a€jug €la€police€dð ðassurance€inapplicable€pour€dð ðautres€raisons.€€Dans€lð ðaffaireÐ Ô P Ðò òBrown€c.€Continental€Casualty€Co.ó ó,€108€So.€464ò ò€ó ó(La.1926),€la€cour€a€jug €que€lð ðassur Ð l è Ð tait€d c d €accidentellement€apr s€avoir€inhal €par€m garde€plus€de€chloroforme€queÐ "€ Ðpr vu€en€voulant€rem dier,€comme€il€le€faisait€habituellement,€ €ses€maux€de€t te€et€ €sonÐ œ# " Ðinsomnie.€€De€m me,€dans€lð ðaffaire€ò òBertalan€Estate€c.€American€Home€Assurance€Co.Ð 4%° $ Ðó ó(1999),€68€B.C.L.R.€(3d)€118€(C.S.),€la€cour€a€conclu€que€lð ðassur € tait€d c d Ð Ì&H & Ðaccidentellement€apr s€avoir€omis€de€retirer€ €temps,€comme€il€le€faisait€normalement,Ð d(à ( Ðle€masque€reli € €sa€bouteille€dð ðoxyde€nitreux.€€Toute€cette€jurisprudence€repose€sur€laÐ ü)x!* Ðconclusion€que€lð ðassur €ne€sð ðattendait€pas€ €mourir€ou€nð ðavait€pas€lð ðintention€de€mourir.€Ð ”+ #, ÐComme€le€d montre€la€jurisprudence,€divers€facteurs€peuvent€expliquer€le€fait€que€laÐ ,-¨$. Ðvictime€ne€sð ðattendait€pas€ €mourir.€€Le€d c s€de€lð ðassur €peut€avoir€r sult €dð ð v nementsÐ Ä.@&0 Ð chappant€ €son€contrð= ðle.€€Lð ðassur €peut€avoir€commis€une€erreur€de€jugement€ou€avoirÐ \0Ø'2 Ðmal€ valu €sa€situation.€€Il€peut€avoir€omis€dð ðagir€en€temps€opportun€ou€dð ðeffectuer€uneÐ „ Ðv rification€n cessaire.€€Ou€encore,€il€peut€avoir€simplement€mal€ valu €les€cons quencesÐ ˜ Ðde€ses€actes€sur€son€corps.Ý ƒ % Ñýãš þš ݌Р´ 0 ÐŒÝ ÝÌÝ ‚ % Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ % Ñý÷¥ Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú23Ú ÚÛ € z Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà œ àLe€crit re€de€lð ðattente€est€g n ralement€applicable€dans€tous€les€cas€o €unÐ ä ` Ðd c s€parað3 ðt€accidentel.€€Dans€la€plupart€de€ces€cas,€il€nð ðest€pas€difficile€de€d terminer€siÐ | ø Ðla€victime€sð ðattendait€ €mourir.€€Cependant,€il€vaut€la€peine€de€sð ðattarder€davantage€ €unÐ  Ðpetit€nombre€de€cas€o €il€est€question€de€diff rents€types€dð ðactivit €risqu e,€ne€serait„ceÐ ¬ ( Ðque€parce€que€lð ðon€fait€parfois€valoir€quð ðils€justifient€le€recours€ €un€crit re€plus€strictÐ D À Ðpour€d terminer€si€le€d c s€est€non€accidentel€en€ce€sens€notamment€quð ðil€ taitÐ Ü X Ðraisonnablement€pr visible,€ou€encore€pour€d terminer€si€la€conduite€dð ðune€personneÐ t ð Ðrisquait€fortement€de€lui€coðE ðter€la€vie.€€La€jurisprudence€pr cise€clairement€que,€enÐ ˆ Ðlð ðabsence€de€clause€dð ðexclusion€particuli re€dans€la€police€dð ðassurance,€la€possibilit Ð ¤ Ðquð ðun€d c s€soit€accidentel€nð ðest€pas€ cart e€du€seul€fait€que€la€victime€exer ait€uneÐ

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Ðan€unlooked„for€mishap€or€an€untoward€event€which€is€not€expected€or€designedð ð.€€€ItÐ Ô P Ðfollows€that€death€is€not€non„accidental€merely€because€the€insured€could€have€preventedÐ l è Ðdeath€by€taking€greater€care,€or€that€a€mishap€was€reasonably€foreseeable€in€the€sense€usedÐ "€ Ðin€tort€law.€€Nor€does€a€death€that€is€unintended€become€ð ðnon„accidentalð ð€merely€becauseÐ œ# " Ðthat€person€was€engaged€in€a€dangerous€or€risky€activity.€€ò òó óAs€this€Court€emphasized€inÐ 4%° $ Ðò òCanadian€Indemnityó ó,ò ò€supraó ó,€at€p.€316,€the€jurisprudence€assigns€a€generous€meaning€toÐ Ì&H & Ðð ðaccidentalð ð,€in€the€absence€of€language€to€the€contrary€in€the€insurance€policy.Ý ƒ % Ñý Wp ݌Рd(à ( ÐŒÝ ÝÌÝ ‚ % Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ % Ñýèx Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú21Ú ÚÛ € z Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà œ àThe€pivotal€question€is€whether€the€insured€expected€to€die.€TheÐ ”+ #, Ðcircumstances€of€the€death€ð! ð€what€the€insured€said,€or€did,€or€did€not€do€ð! ð€may€point€toÐ ,-¨$. Ðthe€answer.€€However,€to€the€extent€that€the€answer€is€unclear€when€the€matter€is€viewedÐ Ä.@&0 Ðsolely€from€the€perspective€of€the€insured,€the€court€may€consider€whether€a€reasonableÐ \0Ø'2 Ðperson€in€the€position€of€the€insured€would€have€expected€to€die:ò ò€Candler€v.€London€&Ð „ ÐLancashire€Guarantee€&€Accident€Co.€of€Canadaó ó€(1963),€40€D.L.R.€(2d)€408ò ò€ó ó(Ont.€H.C.),Ð ˜ Ðat€p.€423;€ò òJohnson€v.€Mutual€of€Omaha€Insurance€Co.ó ó€(1984),€€45€O.R.€(2d)€676€(C.A.),Ð ´ 0 Ðaffð ðg€(1982),€39€O.R.€(2d)€559€(H.C.);€ò òStatsó ó,ò ò€supraó ó,€at€pp.€1164„65.Ý ƒ % Ñýèx y ݌РL È ÐŒÝ ÝÌÝ ‚ % Ñýÿ ÝÝ ÝÝ ‚ % Ñýö| Ýà „ àÚ ƒ z Ú22Ú ÚÛ € z Ûà Ü àÝ Ýà œ àThe€general€rule€that€unexpected€death€is€accidental€has€been€repeatedlyÐ | ø Ðapplied.€€In€ò òGlenlight€Shippingó ó,ò ò€supraó ó,ò ò€ó óthe€insured€drove€off€the€ferry€into€the€sea,Ð  Ðmistakenly€thinking€the€ferry€had€reached€the€pier.€€Because€he€ð ðdid€not€appreciateÐ ¬ ( Ðthrough€error€what€the€consequences€of€his€action€would€beð ð€(p.€243),€his€death€was€heldÐ D À Ðto€be€accidental.€€In€ò òCornish€v.€Accident€Insurance€Co.€ó ó(1889),€23€Q.B.D.€453€(C.A.),€theÐ Ü X Ðinsured€failed€to€notice€an€oncoming€train€when€crossing€a€railway€track€to€get€from€oneÐ t ð Ðpart€of€his€farm€to€another,€as€he€regularly€did.€€The€Court€of€Appeal€found€that€he€metÐ ˆ Ðhis€death€ð ðby€what€may€be€properly€called€an€accidentð ð;€though,€for€other€reasons,€it€heldÐ ¤ Ðthat€the€insurance€policy€in€question€did€not€cover€it€(p.€455).€€The€insured€in€ò òBrown€v.Ð