vu en – -Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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Bien qu’on ait appliqué aux arrestations la notion de «vu en train de commettre une infraction», son application à l’obligation de révéler son identité est une curieuse innovation. Elle va à l’encontre de toute la jurisprudence.

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Although the idea of “within his view” has been applied to arrests, its application is relation to a duty to disclose identity is novel and bizarre. It runs counter to all authority. The right to remain silent, enunciated in Rice v. Connolly, does not admit of such erosion. There is nothing in the language nor in the facts of that case to suggest that the broad principle ceased to have application in the event of a police officer witnessing an infraction.

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Droit criminel—Entrave à agent de la paix—Cycliste vu en train de commettre une infraction aux règles de la circulation—Demande d’identité adressée par un constable dans l’intention de lui donner une contravention—Refus du cycliste de donner son identité—Motor-vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, chap. 253, art. 2, 58, 63, 127 et 128, modifié par 1975 (B.C.), chap. 46, art. 121 et 173(1)—Police Act, 1974 (B.C.), chap. 64, art. 17(1), 22 et 30—Summary Convictions Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, chap. 373, art. 101—Code criminel, S.R.C. 1970, chap.

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Criminal law—Obstructing peace officer—Cyclist seen committing traffic infraction—Police officer asking cyclist for identification with intention of giving traffic ticket—Cyclist refusing to give name—Motor-vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 253, ss. 2, 58, 63, 127, 128, amended 1975 (B.C.), c. 46, ss. 121, 173(1)—Police Act, 1974 (B.C.), c. 64, ss. 17(1), 22, 30—Summary Convictions Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 373, s. 101—Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 450(2).

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10 L’intimé Jason Brown est vu en train de chercher Baksh le jour du meurtre. Il est aussi à la recherche d’un vélo de montagne qu’il lui aurait donné dans le cadre d’une transaction en matière de drogue.

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10 The respondent Jason Brown was seen looking for Baksh on the morning that Baksh was killed.  Brown was also looking for a mountain bike that he had allegedly fronted to Baksh as part of a drug deal.  Witnesses stated that Brown had in his possession a napkin, on which Baksh’s pager number was written in red ink.  A videotape showed Brown entering his own apartment building, located one block from the crime scene, at 4:47 a.m. on July 21, 1998, less than an hour after Baksh had been found stabbed.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	·      « [Il] a été vu en train de manipuler le pantalon d’un autre patient et il se serait emparé de [20 $] appartenant à ce patient.  Il a d’abord avoué avoir subtilisé cette somme, puis il a retiré cet aveu. »
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	·      “[He] was seen handling another patient’s pants and was believed to have taken [$20.00] from the patient.  He admitted taking the money at first, but later retracted his admission.”

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[165] Premièrement, comme nous l’avons vu en ce qui concerne l’inscription, les termes clairs de la Loi assujettissent le droit de voter à l’inscription sur la liste électorale ou au dépôt d’un certificat d’inscription (art. 149).

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[167] Third, such an approach would be unfair.  It disregards the fact that other qualified electors who did not follow the necessary steps to become entitled to vote may have rightly been turned away from the polling station and not permitted to vote on election day. The Act sets out the rules and procedures electors must follow in order to exercise their constitutional right to vote. Those rules must be applied fairly and consistently if the right is to have meaning.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Q. Qu'avez-vous vu en plus de la voiture?
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	A. Oh, probably a couple hundred feet.

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33 La Cour d’appel semble estimer que l’obligation d’accommodement devait être appréciée au moment où l’employée s’était vu en définitive refuser une mesure additionnelle (par. 31). À mon avis, cette approche repose sur une compartimentation des différents problèmes de santé de l’employée.

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33 The Court of Appeal appears to have held that the duty to accommodate must be assessed as of the time the employee was effectively denied an additional measure (para. 31).  In my view, this approach is based on a compartmentalization of the employee’s various health problems.  Undue hardship resulting from the employee’s absence must be assessed globally starting from the beginning of the absence, not from the expiry of the three‑year period.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	La notion de «pris sur le fait» ou «vu en train de commettre une infraction» n’est pas inconnue. Le concept a parfois servi à donner un pouvoir d’arrestation quand l’infraction est commise en présence de celui qui procède à l’arrestation.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The notion of “found committing” or “within his view” is not unknown. The concept has been resorted to on occasion to give a power of arrest where the offence is committed in the presence of the arrester. But even here the application of the concept is not without problems. In an article “Arrest: a General View”, [1966] Crim. L.R. 639, at p. 645, the following appears:

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Au procès, la défense a mis en preuve que la Commission de censure avait autorisé la présentation du film comme film réservé aux adultes et que celui‑ci avait été vu en Alberta par un vaste auditoire sans qu'aucune plainte ne soit présentée à la Commission.

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Appellant, owner of an Edmonton theatre, was charged with presenting an obscene motion picture contrary to s. 163 of the Criminal Code. At trial, the defence adduced evidence indicating that the film had been approved and classified by the Censor Board as a restricted adult movie and that it had been previously shown in Alberta to a large audience with no complaint being made to the Board. The evidence further showed that the film had been similarly approved and classified by the other provincial censor boards across the country. The trial judge found the film immoral, indecent and obscene and convicted the appellant. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision. This appeal is to determine whether the trial judge applied the proper test in finding the appellant guilty of presenting an obscene entertainment.

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[76] Au cours de cette période, Nguyen avait été vu à quatre reprises en train d’entrer dans la résidence des Cornell : une fois [traduction] « pour environ deux minutes », une autre fois « pour environ huit minutes », la fois suivante, « pour une courte visite » et, finalement, « pour quelques instants » (motifs du juge O’Brien, par. 61). M. Nguyen n’avait jamais été vu en train d’entrer quelque chose dans la maison des Cornell ou d’en sortir quoi que ce soit.

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[76] During this time, Nguyen was observed entering the Cornell dwelling four times: once “for approximately two minutes”; once “for approximately eight minutes”; next, for “a short visit”; and, finally, for “a short stop” (reasons of O’Brien J.A., at para. 61).  Nguyen was never seen carrying anything into or out of the Cornell dwelling.  Tran was never observed entering the dwelling at all, but had been seen in the vicinity.

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Selon lui, il était impossible de dire [TRADUCTION] "si la plaignante, quand elle a identifié l'accusé la seconde fois, n'a fait qu'identifier l'homme qu'elle avait vu en cour la première fois, ou si elle procédait alors à une identification valide de son agresseur" (p. 285).

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7.                Matas J.A. in his dissenting reasons concluded that the trial judge was correct in directing a verdict. He thought that "the difficulty with the several descriptions furnished by the complainant was compounded by the improper show‑up identifications" (p. 284). He concluded that it was impossible to say "if the complainant identified the accused on the second occasion only as the man she saw in court the first time or whether she was making a valid identification of the assailant" (p. 285). Accordingly, for this reason Matas J.A. thought that the only course open to the trial judge was to direct a verdict of acquittal.

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Le 18 janvier 1997, dans un accès de colère, il l’avait étranglée et menacée dans un bar parce qu’il avait caché une arme à feu chez elle et voulait la récupérer. Mme McGilvery a dit ne pas avoir eu personnellement connaissance qu’il portait une arme à feu et ne l’avoir jamais vu en porter une.

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25 According to Ms. McGilvery, Mr. Papin was physically and verbally abusive to her.  He held a knife to her throat in February 1996, and threatened to kill her a few times in 1996.  On January 18, 1997, he choked and threatened her while she was in a bar because he was angry at her because he had hidden a gun at her place and wanted it back.  Ms. McGilvery testified that she had no personal knowledge that Mr. Papin carried a gun, and that she had never seen him with a gun.  She did, however, say that she found a gun in her residence which she believed was placed there by Mr. Papin.  She reported the January 18 incident to the police, resulting in Mr. Papin being arrested and charged with several offences, including assault.  As a result of the charges arising from the January 18 assault on Ms. McGilvery, and a separate charge of threatening Ms. McGilvery, Mr. Papin was held in custody from January 18, 1997 until April 7, 1997.

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Le fait qu'il ait dit à Snowbird d'arrêter quand il l'a vu en train d'étrangler la victime indique que, si l'appelant avait jamais été partie à des infractions, il s'était retiré à ce moment‑là de tout acte conjoint avec Snowbird qui comportait le meurtre de Mme Johnson.

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However, there was no evidence that the appellant knew or had any reason to believe that death was likely to result from the sexual assault.  Nor did the death result from the sexual assault.  Rather, as stated above, the jury must have found that the death occurred due to strangulation.  There was no evidence that the appellant was a party to Snowbird's strangulation and suffocation of Mrs. Johnson.  Once again, the only evidence was that of his statement in which he denied any participation in those acts.  The fact that he told Snowbird to stop when he saw him strangling the victim indicates that if the appellant ever had been a party to any offences, from that point on he had removed himself from any joint enterprise with Snowbird that involved the killing of Mrs. Johnson.

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Comme nous l’avons vu, la question de savoir si Mme McLeod était capable d’identifier l’accusé comme étant son agresseur, ou si elle l’a simplement identifié comme étant l’homme qu’elle a vu en état d’arrestation et lors des audiences précédentes, est une question qu’il appartient au jury de trancher en définitive.

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93 In the same paragraph (para. 52), my colleague says that the trial judge should have stressed that Mrs. McLeod could not have divorced her previous recollection of the assailant from the mental images she formed after having seen the appellant arrested by the police on television. I disagree that a caution of this nature should have been given by the trial judge. As I discussed above, whether Mrs. McLeod was able to identify the accused as her assailant, or whether she was merely identifying him as the man she saw being arrested and at previous hearings, was ultimately a question for the jury to answer.

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Les autres mandats de perquisition se rapportant à cette opération avaient déjà été exécutés et M. Nguyen, le seul individu soupçonné de faire le trafic de drogues ou d’être membre d’un gang qui avait jamais été vu en train d’entrer dans le domicile, était déjà détenu par la police.

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[65] Shortly before executing their warrant to search the Cornell home, the police observed Lorraine and Ashley Cornell leave and drive away.  The other search warrants relating to this operation had already been executed, and Mr. Nguyen, the only suspected drug dealer or gang member ever observed entering the dwelling, was already in police custody.  The police made no effort to intercept the departing women in order to secure — or at least attempt to secure — a nonviolent, peaceful means of entering the residence  to search within.  Instead, some 15 minutes later, the tactical team made its unannounced and violent “dynamic entry”.

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Entre‑temps, le témoin D. W. avait téléphoné à la police.  Deux policiers, les agents Jorgensen et Randhawa, sont arrivés peu après que le second garçon fut sorti des buissons.  Ils ont témoigné avoir vu, en entrant dans le parc, l'appelant accroupi dans les buissons.  L'appelant a tenté de quitter le parc en sautant par‑dessus une clôture, mais il en a été empêché par l'agent Randhawa.  Celui‑ci a fait produire à l'appelant une pièce d'identité, lui a appris qu'il faisait l'objet d'une enquête relativement à de possibles agressions sexuelles contre des enfants et l'a fait monter à l'arrière du fourgon cellulaire dans lequel Randhawa et Jorgensen s'étaient rendus au parc.  Les policiers ont ensuite interrogé les témoins adultes et les plaignants.

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The complainants were five and six years old at the time.  Two adult witnesses, D. W. and L. W., lived in a house which was adjacent to the park. They were working in their yard on May 22 at around 5 p.m. when D. W. observed the appellant walking in a crouched position along some bushes at the edge of the park. He was leading a young boy by the hand. When the appellant and the boy disappeared in the bushes, the witness L. W. went closer to attempt to find out what was happening. She saw the appellant and the boy seated together in an unusual position and overheard the appellant say "Let's keep it our secret, it will be our little secret." After the first boy left him in the bushes, a second young boy joined the appellant in the same secluded location. Once again L. W. heard the appellant say "shhh" and "let's keep it our little secret" before the second boy also left the bushes.

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L’équipe de surveillance leur avait transmis des renseignements portant que l’accusé avait été vu en train de remettre une substance ayant l’apparence d’une poudre blanche à d’autres personnes en échange d’argent, ce qui les a amenés à soupçonner l’accusé d’avoir du crack sur lui.

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10 With regard to the manner in which the search was conducted, I would agree with the Crown that the three searches must be looked at individually and justified according to the circumstances applicable to each of them.  In my view, the first search was perfectly justified.  As provided for in Cloutier, supra, the reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest provided the authority to search for evidence related to the crime.  The arresting officers had reasonable cause to believe the accused was hiding evidence.  Information that the accused had been observed passing a white powdery substance to other persons and receiving cash in return was passed onto the arresting officers by the surveillance team, giving rise to a suspicion that the accused would have crack cocaine on his person.  In addition, as the arresting officer approached the accused, he observed the accused crushing something between his fingers that left a white residue.  During the course of the arrest, the police found what looked to be cocaine under the table where one of the suspects was arrested.

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19 Étant donné que sa conclusion sur la question initiale de savoir si M. Paice avait été attaqué illégalement reposait uniquement sur la conclusion de droit qu’il avait tirée à l’égard de la question du consentement, le juge du procès ne s’est jamais demandé si M. Paice avait, en fait, consenti à la bagarre.  Les aspects suivants de ses motifs m’incitent à me demander si le juge du procès a jamais tiré une conclusion à ce propos.  À un endroit de ses motifs de jugement, il affirme que [traduction] « [o]utre la conclusion qui précède [sa conclusion qu’aucune des parties n’était en mesure de consentir à la bagarre], personne ne conteste que, par rapport à l’accusé, c’est la victime qui a été l’agresseur tout le long de l’épisode. »  De plus, ses conclusions de fait sur ce qui s’est passé dans le bar avant que les parties aillent se battre à l’extérieur ne sont pas vraiment déterminantes en ce qui concerne la question du consentement de M. Paice, à supposer qu’il ait consenti.  Il va sans dire que le consentement véritable de M. Paice est crucial pour déterminer si la poussée donnée par M. Bauck était illégale.  Toutefois, comme nous l’avons vu, en commençant par tirer une conclusion de droit déterminante à cet égard, le juge n’a jamais accordé l’attention requise à la question du consentement de M. Paice.

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19 Because the trial judge based his finding on this initial question of whether Mr. Paice had been unlawfully assaulted solely on the legal conclusion he had reached on the issue of consent, he never inquired into whether Mr. Paice had in fact consented to the fight.  The following aspects of his reasons cause me to question whether the trial judge ever came to a conclusion on this issue.  At one point in his reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated that “[a]part from the above finding [his finding that neither party was capable of consenting to the fight], there is no dispute that it was the deceased who was the aggressor, vis-à-vis, the accused throughout the incident.” Further, his findings of fact as to what transpired in the bar before the parties stepped outside to fight are rather inconclusive on the question of Mr. Paice’s consent, if any.  Mr. Paice’s actual consent is, of course, crucial to the unlawfulness of Mr. Bauck’s push.  However, as stated above, by starting with a legal conclusion determinative of the issue, the question of Mr. Paice’s consent never received the attention it demanded.

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La grande latitude dont elle semblait jouir à priori était néanmoins freinée par l'obligation qu'elle avait de soumettre chacune de ces activités à l'approbation du Gouverneur général en conseil. Sous la plume du juge en chef Duff, notre Cour a vu en cet état de choses l'élément de contrôle indispensable à l'application du concept de l'alter ego.

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The two differentiating points noted by Brossard J.A., namely operation in common by several establishments, all of which enjoy an exemption, rather than under the direct authority of each of them, and operation somewhere other than within each establishment, do not seem to me to be conclusive.  We must accordingly look more closely at the corporate nature of the Halifax Harbour Commissioners ("the corporation").  In that case Duff C.J. undertook a very detailed analysis of the rights and powers conferred on the corporation by the statute creating it (S.C. 1927, c. 58).  Before examining their substance, however, it is worth noting the purposes for which the corporation was created.  These were twofold:  first, the responsibility of managing and administering the Port of Halifax; second, regulation of the way in which navigation was carried on within the port.  It appears from Duff C.J.'s analysis that the corporation in fact held vast powers of acquisition, alienation, expropriation and regulation in order to carry out the purposes for which it had been created.  The broad latitude which it appeared to enjoy a priori was nonetheless limited by the obligation which it had to submit each of these activities to the approval of the Governor General in Council.  This Court, per Duff C.J., saw this situation as demonstrating the element of control essential for the alter ego concept to apply.  I would mention again that this aspect is not in itself of any assistance in solving the problem now before this Court.

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Hendricks et Atkinson se sont donc trouvés à regarder vers le barrage, puisqu’ils étaient assis face à l’arrière du bateau. M. Hendricks a juré qu’il a alors cru que la rivière continuait au-delà des six piliers sans aucun obstacle et sans différence de niveau à la surface de l’eau. Il a même vu, en regardant sous le pont, entre les piliers, plusieurs petites embarcations qui se trouvaient au nord du pont et dont les occupants semblaient pêcher. A ce moment-là, le bateau des Hendricks se trouvait à environ un quart de mille en amont du pont c’est-à-dire au sud et M. Hendricks a persisté à affirmer en contre‑interrogatoire qu’à cet endroit il n’y avait aucun signe visible de chute du niveau de l’eau sous le pont. Comme je l’ai déjà dit, M. Hendricks avait, en 6 ou 7 occasions dans ces parages constaté une grosse chute du côté nord du pont. Il s’est dit convaincu, quand il a témoigné, que toutes les fois qu’il avait vu ces chutes, les vannes étaient abaissées et les rideaux fermés. De toute évidence, à chacune de ces occasions, il s’était attendu à voir une chute en aval du barrage. Le rôle du barrage consistait à élever le niveau de l’eau et il fallait qu’il y eût une chute au nord du barrage. Par contre, le jour de l’accident, il n’y avait aucun barrage. Les vannes avec leurs rideaux étaient complètement relevés sous le tablier du pont. La digue en béton était cachée par les 28 pouces d’eau coulant par dessus. Évidemment, un observateur placé au nord du barrage pouvait facilement voir la chute de 4 à 5 pieds de hauteur, mais pour celui qui se trouvait un quart de mille au sud du barrage, c’est-à-dire en amont de celui-ci, la chute était tout à fait invisible.

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left Mr. Hendricks and Mr. Atkinson, sitting as they were facing the stern, looking downstream toward the dam. Mr. Hendricks swore that he then perceived that the river flowed past the six piers with no kind of obstruction whatsoever and without any apparent break in the level of the water. In fact, looking under the bridge and between the piers, he saw several small boats to the north side of the bridge where the occupants were apparently engaged in fishing. At this time, the Hendricks boat was about one-quarter of a mile upstream, i.e., south of the bridge, and Mr. Hendricks was unshaken in his evidence that from that point there was no evidence whatsoever of any fall in the level of the water passing beneath the bridge. As I have said, Mr. Hendricks had, on 6 or 7 occasions before when at this area perceived a considerable waterfall on the north side of the bridge. Mr. Hendricks was equally certain in his evidence that on each of those occasions the gates and curtains were down and the slats were closed. Of course, at that time, Mr. Hendricks would have expected to see a waterfall on the downstream side of the dam. The purpose of the dam was to lift the level of the water and on the north side of the dam there would have had to be a waterfall. On this occasion, there was no dam whatsoever. The gates and curtains were all up beneath the floor of the bridge. The concrete weir part of the dam was hidden by 28″ of water flowing over it. Of course, if one had been on the north side of the dam, one could most easily have perceived a waterfall of some 4 to 5 feet but from one-quarter of a mile south, i.e., upstream of the dam, that waterfall would be quite imperceptible.

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Une fois revenus, les agents de police ont amené l’accusé dans la salle d’interrogatoire, l’ont averti qu’ils avaient enquêté sur l’affaire et lui ont dit: [TRADUCTION] «Nous avons parcouru la partie ouest de la ville où vous travaillez et nous avons abattu beaucoup de besogne cet après-midi»; ils avaient été informés qu’il avait été vu en compa­gnie de la victime la veille au soir.

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After their departure, the verbal resumé was reduced to a typewritten statement which the accused read over and signed. The police officers returned from their investigation, again took the accused to the interview room, informed him they had been working on the case and said, "We have been out going over the area in the west end of the city where you worked and we have been working pretty hard this afternoon" and that they had some information to the effect that the accused had been seen with the deceased girl on the previ­ous evening. They informed the accused that the lipstick that had been found in the truck had been identified as that of the deceased girl and that they had other information which indicated that he had been seen with the girl the previous night, and concluded, "We do not believe what you told us this morning". The accused then blurted out, "I was just thinking of my wife and my kids. I didn't mean to do it. She started kibitzing around and I grabbed her by the scarf and she didn't breathe no more".

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Comme nous l’avons vu en analysant la tentative d’infraction impossible, la soi-disant impossibilité «de droit» est en réalité un cas d’impossibilité de fait et cette distinction ne vaut plus, sauf dans les cas de «crimes imaginaires».

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99 Canadian courts have only rarely considered this issue.  In R. v. Chow Sik Wah, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 313, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in a case involving conspiracy to commit forgery, held at p. 315 that “[i]n a prosecution for conspiracy a conviction may not be registered if the operation for the commission of which the accused allegedly conspired would, if accomplished, not have made the accused guilty of the substantive offence”.  The respondent obviously finds comfort in this case.

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L'arrêt O'Connor, précité, est une décision de la Haute Cour de l'Australie. O'Connor a été vu en train de retirer un support de carte et un couteau d'une automobile. Un policier l'a vu faire, s'est identifié et lui a demandé pourquoi il avait pris ces articles.

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O'Connor, supra, is a decision of the High Court of Australia.  O'Connor was seen removing a map holder and a knife from a car.  A police officer saw him, identified himself and asked O'Connor why he had taken the articles.  O'Connor ran away with the officer in pursuit.  When he was arrested, O'Connor stabbed the officer with the knife.  He was charged with theft of the map holder and knife and wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm.  O'Connor testified that he had consumed alcohol and car sickness tablets before these events and stated that he had no memory either of taking anything from the car or of his subsequent arrest.  Medical evidence was given that the combined effect of the tablets and alcohol could have produced such a state of intoxication that O'Connor would have been incapable of reasoning or forming an intent to steal or wound.  The trial judge directed the jury, in accordance with Majewski, supra, that evidence of self‑induced intoxication, although relevant in determining whether the accused had acted with intent to steal or to inflict grievous bodily harm, was not relevant with respect to the included alternative offence of unlawful and malicious wounding.  O'Connor was acquitted on the charges of theft and wounding with intent and convicted of the included offence of unlawful wounding.

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L’accusé est vu en train de chercher la victime le jour du meurtre. Une bande‑vidéo le montre entrant dans son immeuble d’habitation, situé à un pâté de maisons du lieu du crime, moins d’une heure après la découverte du corps poignardé du défunt.

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The accused was seen looking for the deceased on the morning the deceased was killed.  A videotape showed the accused entering his own apartment building, located one block from the crime scene, less than an hour after the deceased had been found stabbed.  Under warrant, the police seized from the accused’s apartment a napkin with the deceased’s pager number on it.  The accused was charged with the deceased’s murder shortly after a jailhouse informant reported that he had overheard a conversation between the accused and a third inmate.  According to the informant, the accused told the third inmate that he had purchased drugs from the deceased and stabbed him.  Although the informant was called as a witness at the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor has not yet received approval from the Attorney General’s in-custody informer committee to call him at trial.  The accused brought a McClure application for an order compelling production of the files, documents and notes, if any, relating to communications between the appellant and his lawyers concerning the appellant’s involvement in the deceased’s death.  The motions judge found that the accused had satisfied both the threshold question and the innocence at stake test of the McClure application.  He ordered production of one document and portions of other documents.

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[101] Ainsi qu’on l’a vu, en matière de poursuites abusives, la malveillance exige la preuve d’un but illégitime afin de distinguer les actes qui ne confèrent pas de droit d’action de ceux qui en confèrent un parce qu’ils ne relèvent pas du rôle d’un « représentant de la justice ».  Comme le signale le juge Vancise avec justesse, ni les demandeurs ni les juridictions inférieures ne relèvent quelque but illégitime qui aurait incité M. Miazga à poursuivre les intimés.

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[101] As explained earlier, the malice element of malicious prosecution requires  proof of an improper purpose so as to differentiate between prosecutorial conduct that is not actionable and that which is, by virtue of the fact that it brings the prosecutor outside of his or her role as “minister of justice”.  As Vancise J.A. aptly noted, neither the plaintiffs nor the courts below have pointed to any such improper purpose that impelled Miazga to prosecute the respondents.

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91(24) de l’A.A.N.B. investit le Parlement du Canada d’un pouvoir législatif exclusif sur les «Indiens et les terres réservées pour les Indiens», et vu que les terres en cause n’ont jamais été cédées à la Couronne, vu en outre que le fédéral est chargé de l’administration et de la gestion des terres réservées aux Indiens, j’estime que la Couronne peut à bon droit revendiquer auprès des défendeurs la possession, au profit des Indiens, des biens-fonds en question.

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In the two authorities cited the lands had been surrendered by the Indians to the Crown, and the substantial point in issue in both cases was whether in virtue of secs. 109 and 117 of the British North America Act such lands had passed to the Crown in the right of the province interested. Here there has been no surrender […] The Parliament of Canada, in virtue of sec. 91(24) B.N.A. Act has exclusive legislative authority over “Indians and lands reserved for Indians,” and there never having been any surrender of the lands in question to the Crown, and the control, direction and management of lands reserved for Indians being in the Dominion, I think the Crown is entitled to seek possession of the property in question from the defendants for the benefit of the Indians.

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55 Le présent litige soulève plusieurs aspects du recours aux règles et principes  appartenant à l’ordre public.  Il faut se demander, en premier lieu, si les droits d’auteur, en tant que droits moraux, sont analogues aux matières énumérées à l’art. 2639, al. 1 C.c.Q. et donc hors du domaine de compétence de l’arbitrage.  Ensuite, on doit déterminer si cette même disposition interdit l’arbitrage portant sur la paternité des droits d’auteur en raison du caractère erga omnes de ce type de décision.  Enfin, bien que la question de la validité des contrats n’ait pas été portée devant lui, comme nous l’avons vu, en raison du débat survenu entre les parties, il demeure utile d’étudier si l’arbitre aurait pu détenir la compétence de déclarer les contrats d’édition invalides en raison des vices de forme dont ils auraient été affectés selon les prescriptions des art. 31 et 34 de la Loi sur le statut professionnel des artistes.

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55 This case raises a number of aspects of the application of the rules and principles that form part of public order.  We must first ask whether copyright, as a moral right, is analogous to the matters enumerated in art. 2639, para. 1 C.C.Q. and is therefore outside the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the arbitration system.  Second, we must determine whether that provision prohibits arbitration as to the ownership of copyright based on the erga omnes nature of this type of decision.  And third, although the question of the validity of the contracts was not before the arbitrator in this case, as we have seen, because of the discussion that took place between the parties, it is nonetheless useful to consider whether the arbitrator might have had the authority to declare the publishing contracts invalid because of the defects of form that were alleged to exist in them, under the rules set out in ss. 31 and 34 of the Act respecting the professional status of artists.

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[30] Je ne constate aucune erreur justifiant notre intervention dans les conclusions du juge suivant lesquelles les policiers étaient fondés de croire et croyaient sincèrement à la nécessité d’une entrée musclée dans le cas qui nous occupe.  Ces conclusions sont également appuyées, à mon avis, par d’autres éléments de preuve versés au dossier que le juge de première instance ne mentionne pas expressément, mais qui concernent des faits qui étaient connus des policiers au moment de leur intervention.  La veille de leur intervention, M. Nguyen avait été vu, en compagnie de Hans Eastgaard comme passager, au volant d’un véhicule qu’il conduisait régulièrement.  M. Eastgaard avait un casier judiciaire chargé; il avait notamment fait l’objet de nombreuses accusations relatives à des armes et à des drogues.  Environ deux heures avant l’arrivée des policiers, le véhicule que M. Nguyen avait l’habitude de conduire a été vu, en train d’être garé à l’arrière de la résidence des Cornell.  Le conducteur, que l’agent qui faisait de la surveillance a décrit comme un homme asiatique, est sorti du véhicule et a semblé récupérer quelque chose dans la cour arrière, près de la clôture.  La voiture a été appréhendée environ une heure plus tard.  Elle était alors conduite par M. Nguyen, qui portait un gilet pare‑balles.  Le passager était M. Eastgaard.  M. Nguyen avait en sa possession de la cocaïne et de l’argent comptant.  Il y avait de bonnes raisons de craindre que M. Nguyen, M. Tran et M. Eastgaard ne soient violents.  Comme le juge Slatter l’a fait remarqué, si M. Nguyen pensait que le commerce auquel il s’adonnait était suffisamment dangereux pour justifier qu’il porte un gilet pare‑balles, il n’était certainement pas déraisonnable que les policiers en pensent autant : C.A., par. 23.  Au moment où les policiers sont entrés dans la résidence des Cornell, M. Nguyen et M. Eastgaard étaient en détention, mais on ignorait où se trouvait M. Tran.  Ces faits additionnels viennent renforcer les motifs de croire qu’il y aurait de la cocaïne dans la maison (et que cette cocaïne risquait donc d’être facilement détruite) et qu’on pouvait faire face à une réaction violente lors de l’intervention.

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[30] I see no reviewable error in these conclusions that the police view of the need for a hard entry was both reasonably based and genuinely held.  These conclusions are also supported, in my view, by other evidence in the record to which the trial judge does not specifically refer but relates to matters known to the police at the time of entry.  The day before entry, the vehicle often driven by Nguyen was observed with Hans Eastgaard as a passenger.  Eastgaard had an extensive criminal record which included weapons and drug charges.  About two hours before entry, the vehicle often driven by Nguyen was observed to pull up to the rear of the Cornell residence.  The driver, described by an officer conducting surveillance as an Asian male, left the vehicle and appeared to retrieve something from the yard of the residence near the fence.  The car was stopped about an hour later.  At the time, it was driven by Nguyen, who was wearing body armour.  His passenger was Eastgaard. Nguyen was in possession of cocaine and cash.  There was good reason to be concerned about violence on the part of Nguyen, Tran and Eastgaard.  As Slatter J.A. observed, if Nguyen thought his business was dangerous enough to justify wearing body armour, it can hardly have been unreasonable for the police to think the same thing: C.A., at para. 23. At the time of the entry into the Cornell residence, Nguyen and Eastgaard were in custody, but Tran’s whereabouts were unknown. These additional facts strengthen the grounds to believe that cocaine would be in the residence (and therefore liable to be easily destroyed) and that a violent reaction to entry might be encountered.

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L'identité des appelants existait avant la violation de la Charte, tout comme les perceptions des témoins du crime. Une telle preuve existe dès qu'un accusé est vu en flagrant délit. Cette preuve ne peut pas être considérée comme "émanant" des appelants simplement parce qu'elle peut par la suite servir à établir la crédibilité de la preuve d'identification.

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Per McIntyre and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ. (dissenting): The admission of the evidence of the identification line-up would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The fairness of the trial was not affected by the admission of the evidence. The identity of the appellants existed prior to the violation of the Charter, as did the perceptions of the witnesses to the crime.  Such evidence comes into existence when an accused is seen committing the crime.  The evidence cannot be considered as "emanating" from the appellants simply because it may later be used to establish the credibility of identification evidence.  Evidence that could not have been obtained but for the participation of the appellants will not automatically render the trial process unfair.

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La Cour d’appel semble estimer que l’obligation d’accommodement devait être appréciée au moment où l’employée s’était vu en définitive refuser une mesure additionnelle (par. 31). À mon avis, cette approche repose sur une compartimentation des différents problèmes de santé de l’employée.

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The Court of Appeal appears to have held that the duty to accommodate must be assessed as of the time the employee was effectively denied an additional measure (para. 31).  In my view, this approach is based on a compartmentalization of the employee’s various health problems.  Undue hardship resulting from the employee’s absence must be assessed globally starting from the beginning of the absence, not from the expiry of the three‑year period.