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On pourrait cependant répondre à ce point de vue en faisant remarquer que les tribunaux, si peu préparés qu'ils soient pour cette tâche, sont saisis à tout moment de questions de principe et de politique générale.

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In my opinion, this passage makes clear that in Lord Radcliffe's view these kinds of issues are to be treated as non‑justiciable not simply because of evidentiary difficulties but because they involve moral and political considerations which it is not within the province of the courts to assess. Le Dain J. maintains that the difficulty is one of judicial competence rather than anything resembling the American "political questions" doctrine. However, in response to that contention it can be pointed out that, however unsuited courts may be for the task, they are called upon all the time to decide questions of principle and policy. As Melville Weston points out in "Political Questions," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1925), at p. 299:

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LE JUGE SOPINKA (dissident) -- J'ai eu l'avantage de lire les motifs de jugement que le juge Cory a rédigés en l'espèce. Je partage son point de vue en ce qui a trait aux arguments de l'appelant relativement à l'art.

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SOPINKA J. (dissenting) -- I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared in this appeal by Justice Cory.  I agree with my colleague's reasons in respect of the appellant's arguments concerning s. 508 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, and the cross-examination of the police officer.  I am further of the view that the learned trial judge properly exercised her discretion in refusing to issue a material witness warrant.  However, I respectfully disagree with my colleague on the issue of the propriety of the trial judge's refusal to reopen the case to permit the appellant to call the witness Ross, once it became apparent that Ross had appeared.  With respect to this issue I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice McLachlin and with her reasons.

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Je n'oublie pas que le juge Dickson parlait au nom de la minorité (lui‑même et le juge en chef Laskin), mais il serait difficile de prétendre que les trois juges de la majorité ont rejeté ce point de vue.  En fait, ils ne se sont jamais vraiment penchés sur cette question.  Cette affaire, nous l'avons vu, a été plaidée comme relevant d'une des exceptions à la règle de l'erreur de droit, en ce sens que les parties n'étaient pas in pari delicto, et les juges ont tranché en conséquence.  Après avoir lu les motifs du juge Dickson, le juge Estey a pris soin de préciser qu'au cours des débats l'enrichissement illégitime n'avait été évoqué qu'incidemment et qu'il n'avait pas été fait mention de la distinction entre l'erreur de fait et l'erreur de droit.  Cette distinction était acceptée.  "En conséquence", a‑t‑il conclu, "mes motifs se limitent à l'application de la doctrine de l'erreur de droit telle qu'elle a été plaidée."

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I am aware that Dickson J. was speaking in minority (for himself and Laskin C.J.), but it can scarcely be maintained that the three judges who formed the majority rejected this position.  Indeed, they never really faced this issue at all.  The case, we saw, was argued on the basis that it fell within one of the exceptions to the mistake of law rule, that the parties were not in pari delicto, and they dealt with it accordingly.  After having read Dickson J.'s judgment, Estey J. was at pains to note that in the argument unjust enrichment had only been tangentially mentioned and that the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law was not raised; indeed, it was accepted.  "Accordingly," he concluded, "my considerations have been confined to the operation of the doctrine of mistake of law as argued."

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Il évite également le point de vue en common law selon lequel tout élément de preuve pertinent est admissible peu importe la façon dont il a pu être obtenu (voir l'arrêt R. c. Wray, [1971] R.C.S. 272).

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The final question in this appeal is whether the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.  As Lamer J. noted in R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, the Charter enshrines a position with respect to evidence obtained in violation of Charter rights that falls between two extremes.  Section 24(2) rejects the American rule that automatically excludes evidence obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights (see, for example, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).  It also shuns the position at common law that all relevant evidence is admissible no matter how it was obtained (see R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272).  Evidence may be excluded under s. 24(2) if having regard to all the circumstances, it is established that the admission of it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

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L’article 20 exige de l’employeur qu’il réfute une preuve de discrimination suffisante à première vue en démontrant que la distinction se rapporte à une aptitude ou qualité requise par l’emploi — aussi appelée exigence professionnelle justifiée — selon le critère à trois volets établi dans Colombie‑Britannique (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) c.

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[72] It is important to note that this interpretation does not  negate the protection afforded by the second branch of s. 18.2.  Section 20 requires that an employer rebut a prima facie claim of discrimination by demonstrating that the distinction relates to an aptitude or qualification required for the employment, also referred to as a bona fide occupational requirement, governed by the three-part test set out in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (the “Meiorin” test).

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Elsley a témoigné qu’il n’avait pas sollicité d’anciens clients; malgré cela, deux cents clients lui ont transféré leur clientèle. C’est un exemple vivant de ce que lord Parker avait en vue en parlant de l’influence d’un employé sur les clients de son employeur.

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In the view which I take of this case a covenant against solicitation would not have been adequate to protect the proprietary interest entitled to protection. Exhibit 10 is telling support of that view. Elsley testified that he did not solicit former clients; notwithstanding, two hundred clients switched their custom to him. That is a vivid illustration of what Lord Parker had in mind in speaking of the influence of an employee over the customers of his employer. And it is not suggested that Exhibit 10 was a complete list of all those who took action. It was filed as representative only. Collins estimated that Elsley had taken close to

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Les cours d'appel ont adopté le même point de vue en se demandant si on pouvait raisonnablement considérer que le détournement de fonds en cause servait des intérêts personnels plutôt que les véritables intérêts de l'entreprise.

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Appellate courts have followed the same approach, asking whether the diversion of funds at issue could reasonably be thought to serve personal rather than bona fides business ends.  For example, in R. v. Geddes, supra, a motorcycle dealer accepted money from a purchaser as advance payment on a particular type of motorcycle.  After certain perfunctory efforts to obtain the desired motorcycle, the dealer deposited the money into his bank account, which was at the time overdrawn.  The dealer immediately wrote cheques on this account to service his personal debts.  The accused argued that he fully intended to carry through his undertaking to get the motorcycle, and failed only in because he was negligent in the operation of his business, in particular, in his expectation that he would shortly get a loan which would ultimately permit him to make good on his undertaking.  The Manitoba Court of Appeal rejected this defence, emphasizing that there was nothing negligent or inadvertent in the dealer's use of the purchaser's money to satisfy his personal obligations.

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Dans le même arrêt, le juge Kellock a souligné (à la p. 411) que l’intérêt public est enchâssé dans la politique législative de la liberté de la concurrence, et le juge Cartwright (alors juge puîné) a adopté le même point de vue en déclarant (à la p. 427) que [TRADUCTION] «la Cour, sauf, je le suppose, sur la question de la sentence, n’a ni l’obligation ni la faculté de se demander si, en l’espèce, les résultats recherchés et concrets de l’entente ont, en fait, profité ou nui au public».

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In the same case, Kellock J. emphasized (at p. 411) that public benefit is embedded in the statutory policy of freedom of competition, and Cartwright J. (as he then was) took the same point in saying (at p. 427) that “the Court, except I suppose on the question of sentence, is neither required nor permitted to inquire whether in the particular case the intended and actual results of the agreement have in fact benefited or harmed the public”.

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On doit noter que ni dans sa demande de certio­rari et de mandamus, ni dans son affidavit, l’appe­lant n’allègue ou jure que la faculté ou le comité du conseil était partial, avait agi de mauvaise foi ou était animé d’un motif répréhensible. Le seul motif de sa demande est de ne pas avoir été entendu par le comité du conseil. La lettre de l’appelant du 2 février 1976 dans laquelle il a écrit qu’on lui avait demandé d’abandonner ses études non à cause de ses notes mais de ses tendances névrotiques a été déposée au nom de l’université. Il s’agit d’une déclaration non assermentée sur laquelle l’appelant ne s’est pas fondé dans sa plai­doirie. Cette déclaration non assermentée, bien qu’elle ne soit pas précisément contredite, est incompatible avec plusieurs paragraphes de l’affi­davit du professeur Hanowski selon lequel il pou­vait être demandé à l’appelant d’abandonner ses études parce qu’il n’avait pas conservé une moyenne suffisante. La lettre du doyen adressée à l’appelant le 27 février 1976 confirme ce point de vue. En outre, et en réponse aux questions posées par les membres de la Cour au cours des plaidoi­ries, l’avocat de l’appelant a affirmé que ce dernier voulait fondamentalement que ses notes soient révisées une fois que le comité du conseil aurait déterminé au cours d’une audience tenue régulièrement si l’appelant avait contesté à bon droit le processus d’évaluation.

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It must be noted that neither in his application for certiorari and mandamus nor in his affidavit did appellant allege or swear that the faculty or the committee of the council were biased, acted in bad faith or were inspired by any improper motive. The sole basis of his application is that he was not heard by the committee of the council. Appellant's letter of February 2, 1976, in which he wrote that he was told that the reason why he was being asked to discontinue was not his marks but his tendency to be neurotic was filed on behalf of the university. It is an unsworn statement upon which appellant did not rely in his pleadings. This unsworn statement, although not specifically con­tradicted, is not consistent with several paragraphs of Professor Hanowski's affidavit according to which the reason why appellant might be asked to discontinue his studies was his failure to maintain an adequate academic standard. This reason was confirmed by the Dean's letter to appellant dated February 27, 1976. Furthermore, and in reply to questions asked by members of the Court in the course of argument, appellant's counsel answered that what appellant wanted, ultimately and basi­cally, was to have his marks revised after the committee of the council had determined in a properly held hearing, whether the evaluation process was rightly challenged by appellant.

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La Reine, [1980] 2 R.C.S. 956, où on a jugé que le viol et l'attentat à la pudeur étaient des infractions exigeant une intention générale. Il m'est impossible de voir pourquoi on ne pourrait adopter le même point de vue en matière d'agression sexuelle.

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12.              Implicit in this view of sexual assault is the notion that the offence is one requiring a general intent only. This is consistent with the approach adopted by this Court in cases such as Leary v. The Queen, [1978] l S.C.R. 29, and Swietlinski v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 956, where it was held that rape and indecent assault were offences of general intent. I am unable to see any reason why the same approach should not be taken with respect to sexual assault. The factors which could motivate sexual assault are said to be many and varied (see C. Boyle, Sexual Assault (1984), at p. 74). To put upon the Crown the burden of proving a specific intent would go a long way toward defeating the obvious purpose of the enactment. Moreover, there are strong reasons in social policy which would support this view. To import an added element of specific intent in such offences, would be to hamper unreasonably the enforcement process. It would open the question of the defence of drunkenness, one which has always been related to the capacity to form a specific intent and which has generally been excluded by law and policy from offences requiring only the minimal intent to apply force (see R. v. Bernard (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 574 (Ont. C.A., per Dubin J.A.)) For these reasons, I would say that the offence will be one of general rather than specific intent.

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60 La Cour d’appel a commis une erreur en refusant d’admettre la  preuve nouvelle.  Même si le gouvernement des États-Unis n’a pas appuyé leur point de vue, en permettant à ses représentants d’exercer une pression excessive sur un citoyen canadien pour qu’il renonce à l’application régulière du processus judiciaire au Canada, l’État requérant a perdu son droit de poursuivre ses démarches d’extradition devant les tribunaux.  Cette intimidation a entaché toute l’étape judiciaire du processus d’extradition, et a mis en jeu le droit de l’appelant à la justice fondamentale en vertu de l’art. 7 de la Charte et de la règle de l’abus de procédures.

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60 The Court of Appeal erred in declining to receive the fresh evidence.  Even if the U.S. Government did not endorse their views, by allowing its officials to place undue pressure on a Canadian citizen to forego due legal process in Canada, the Requesting State has disentitled itself from pursuing its extradition request before the courts.   The intimidation bore upon the judicial phase of the extradition process in its entirety, thus engaging the appellant’s right to fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter as well as by virtue of the doctrine of abuse of process.

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Elle ne peut être retenue en raison de la preuve déposée au procès, selon laquelle, en vertu du droit maritime des États-Unis, [TRADUCTION] «le propriétaire du navire a l’obligation absolue et non susceptible de délégation, envers l’arrimeur, de fournir un navire et un gréement à tous points de vue en bon état de navigabilité—le bon état de navigabilité signifiant que le navire ou le gréement en question convient raisonnablement aux fins auxquelles il est destiné», et [TRADUCTION] «que le propriétaire du navire sera responsable du gréement défectueux, même si un tiers l’a apporté à bord de son navire.» Il a été admis que la «banquette» que les arrimeurs devaient mettre en place pour charger les rouleaux de papier journal faisait partie du navire quant aux débardeurs.

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part of the ship and did not constitute a walkway. This contention was advanced solely on the basis of dictionary definitions. It cannot be supported in view of the evidence given at the trial that, under U.S. Maritime Law, “the ship owner owes an absolute non-delegatable duty to the Stevedore to provide a ship and appliances which are in all respects seaworthy—seaworthy meaning that the ship or appliances in question is reasonably fit for its intended purpose”, and “that the ship owner will be liable for a defective appliance even though a third party brought it aboard his vessel”. It was conceded that the “benching” which had to be put in by the stevedores for loading the newsprint rolls became part of the ship towards the longshoremen. No distinction can be made, the contract uses the single word “dunnage” to cover everything. The witness Yanik said:

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Ayant passé en revue le droit anglais, américain et canadien sur ce point, la Cour a déclaré qu'en common law le f{oe}tus ne devenait une personne que s'il était complètement expulsé, vivant, du sein de sa mère. Selon la Cour, le Code adopte ce point de vue en précisant, à l'art.

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The court first dealt with the issue of whether the child was a person within the meaning of s. 203.  After reviewing the law on this point in England, the United States, and Canada, the court stated that, at common law, the line of demarcation for a foetus to become a person was the requirement that it be completely extruded from its mother's body and be born alive.  The court noted that the Code reflected this position in s. 206 in defining when a child becomes a human being.  It stated that Parliament drew no distinction between a person and a human being prior to 1953 and that when Parliament legislated with respect to criminal negligence in 1953, it did not intend to insert such a distinction into the Code.  Accordingly, the child was not a person within the meaning of s. 203 and Sullivan and Lemay could not be found guilty of criminal negligence causing death (to another person).  The court noted, at p. 160, that

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Aucun article de la Loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions n’a pour effet de rendre la Loi applicable à Sa Majesté. Alors, à première vue, en raison de l’art. 16 de la Loi d’interprétation, la Loi
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	The Combines Investigation Act contains no section purporting to make the Act applicable to Her Majesty. Prima facie then, because of s. 16 of the Interpretation Act, the Combines Investigation

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[traduction] La règle selon laquelle la poursuite doit terminer sa preuve une fois pour toutes avant le début de la défense est une règle très importante et salutaire. Elle signifie que la défense n'aura pas à répondre à la preuve avant de l'avoir vue en entier.

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The rule that the prosecution must finish their case once and for all before the defence starts is a very important and salutary rule.  It means that the defence does not have to meet the case until it has seen the whole case. . . .  We do not say that in cases like the present where the matter has not arisen ex improviso the judge had no kind of discretion at all, but we are firmly of [the] opinion that in cases where the matter does not arise ex improviso the judge's discretion should not be exercised to allow the late introduction of an additional witness called for the prosecution whose evidence was available before the case for the prosecution closed.  One must have sympathy with overworked prosecution solicitors in long cases of this kind, but it seems to me in the interests of finality and in the interests of fairness to the defence one must take a strict line not to let in prosecution evidence coming in late in the proceedings if it is outside the ex improviso rule. [Emphasis added.]

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28.              Le point de vue adopté par le juge Bouck dans l'affaire Kaltenbach a été suivi par le juge Scott de la Cour de comté dans l'affaire Shaw v. Royal Trust Co. (1984), 33 R.P.R. 148 (C. cté Ont.), et par le juge Brennan dans l'affaire Re MacDonald and Royal Trust Corp. of Canada (1984), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 448 (B.R. Alb.) Toutefois, aucune des cours d'appel provinciales qui se sont penchées sur la question jusqu'à présent n'a adopté ce point de vue. En l'espèce, la Cour d'appel du Manitoba n'a pas adopté le point de vue de la décision Kaltenbach (faisant remarquer, à tort peut‑être, qu'elle faisait l'objet d'un appel) et la Cour d'appel de la Colombie‑Britannique l'a rejeté dans l'arrêt Re Turner and Royal Trust Corp. of Canada (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 746, non pas parce qu'elle était en désaccord avec la solution retenue, mais parce qu'elle estimait que cela relevait du domaine exclusif du législateur. En d'autres termes, elle l'a jugé incompatible avec le texte de l'art. 10.

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28.              Bouck J.'s approach in Kaltenbach was followed by Scott Co. Ct. J. in Shaw v. Royal Trust Co. (1984), 33 R.P.R. 148 (Ont. Co. Ct.), and by Brennan J. in Re MacDonald and Royal Trust Corp. of Canada (1984), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 448 (Alta. Q.B.). However, his approach was not adopted by either of the appellate courts of the provinces which have dealt with the issue to date. The Manitoba Court of Appeal did not adopt the Kaltenbach approach in this case (noting, perhaps mistakenly, that it was under appeal) and the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected it in Re Turner and Royal Trust Corp. of Canada (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 746, not because it disagreed with the result, but because it thought that only the legislature could achieve it. In other words, it considered it incompatible with the words of s. 10.

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En toute déférence, je pense que c’est le bon point de vue, en particulier à l’égard d’un problème relatif à la méthode que le tribunal utilise pour atteindre la vérité. Quand des changements se produisent, sa pratique s’adapte à la nouvelle situation en conformité des principes fondamentaux sous-jacents à la pratique. Élever la pratique au-dessus des principes serait se convertir au formalisme. Puisque ce secteur du droit est si négligé, «le démon du formalisme qui tente l’intellect sous le couvert de la rigueur scientifique» n’a qu’un attrait limité.

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That, I respectfully think, is the correct method of approach, particularly to a problem that deals with the court’s method of ascertaining truth. As new situations arise it adapts its practice to deal with the situation in accordance with the basic and established principles which lie beneath the practice. To exalt the practice above the principle would be a surrender to formalism. Since this branch of the law is so untidy, there is but little appeal in “the demon of formalism which tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order.”

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Dans l’arrêt Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482, le Conseil privé a réitéré ce point de vue en concluant que le Canada n’avait pas compétence pour abolir les appels au Conseil privé.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	…it would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the Colony to enact such a law. Their jurisdiction is confined within their own territories, and the maxim which has been more than once quoted, “Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur”, would be applicable to such a case.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	64 Compte tenu des faits et des conclusions de l’arbitre, la demanderesse n’a pas établi l’existence de discrimination à première vue.  En l’absence de cette preuve, l’employeur n’a pas à justifier la norme ou son comportement.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	64 On the facts and the findings of the arbitrator, the claimant did not establish prima facie discrimination.  Absent this, the employer is not called upon to justify the standard or its conduct.

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Si l’on considère les motifs de jugement rendus par le juge Sheppard de la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique, auxquels a souscrit le juge Norris dans l’arrêt Rustad[13], ainsi que ceux du juge Davey qui a abondé dans le même sens (c’est-à-dire le rejet de l’appel contre la déclaration de culpabilité d’homicide involontaire coupable), on retrouve entre les deux opinions une divergence de point de vue en ce qui regarde l’effet de l’arrêt Binet et je voudrais m’y arrêter.

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When one turns to the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Rustad[13] case, delivered by Sheppard J., Norris J.A. concurring, and also by Davey J.A. to the same result (dismissal of the appeal from conviction of manslaughter), there is a difference in view between the two sets of reasons as to the effect of Binet, and I wish to refer to it.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Bien que The Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1970, chap. 64, s. 70, qui englobe les trois premières lois visées par le Renvoi sur l’adoption, semble avoir retenu ce point de vue en attribuant seulement à la Cour suprême et aux cours de comté ou de district
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Although The Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 64, s. 70, which embraces the first three statutes involved in the Adoption Reference appears to have accepted this position by vesting jurisdiction to make adoption orders only in the Supreme

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION]  On ne saurait prêter à l'inconstitutionnalité un caractère absolu. Elle doit être vue en fonction de la capacité du demandeur d'obtenir un jugement favorable.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	Unconstitutionality cannot be understood as an unqualified condition. It has to be understood in light of the plaintiff's ability to bring to fruition judgment in his favour.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	La véritable impartialité n’exige pas que le juge n’ait ni sympathie ni opinion.  Elle exige que le juge soit libre d’accueillir et d’utiliser différents points de vue en gardant un esprit ouvert.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	True impartiality does not require that the judge have no sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with an open mind.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	La véritable impartialité n’exige pas que le juge n’ait ni sympathie ni opinion. Elle exige que le juge soit libre d’accueillir et d’utiliser différents points de vue en gardant un esprit ouvert.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	True impartiality does not require that the judge have no sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with an open mind.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	?       CRL voit à ce que la marque SuperClubs reste bien en vue en Ontario, car les résidants canadiens et ontariens représentent une part importante du marché ciblé par CRL;
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	?       CRL was licenced to use the “SuperClubs” label and itself “created” the “SuperClubs Cuba” label and used these labels to market the resort in Ontario;

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En l’absence d’une servitude de vue en faveur de l’immeuble des appelants, l’auteur des intimés disposait du droit, bien légitime d’ailleurs, de protéger son intimité. Mais, ici, le moyen retenu dépassait largement les mesures normales et acceptables.

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[translation]  In the absence of a servitude of view in favour of the appellants’ immovable, the respondent’s predecessor in title had the right, and a very legitimate one at that, to protect his privacy.  But the chosen method far exceeded what was normal and acceptable.  In light of the objective being pursued, the height of the walls was disproportionate and excessive, and the configuration of the walls was totally unacceptable. In exercising the right to privacy, it was necessary to respect the neighbours’ right to have access to their property and to enjoy, not a right of view, but the benefits of air and light.

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38.              La présente affaire est totalement différente. L'appelant n'a commis qu'un seul acte de voies de fait pour lequel il a été jugé et puni. La possibilité qu'une année d'emprisonnement soit imposée à la suite d'un "procès" devant le tribunal indique clairement que cette procédure participe de l'imposition d'une peine en vue de remédier à une faute sociale et non pas de procédures disciplinaires. La possibilité d'être renvoyé de la Gendarmerie, conformément à l'art. 38 de la Loi, renforce ce point de vue. En toute déférence, je ne puis partager l'opinion du juge Wilson, portant que les deux infractions sont en tous points totalement séparées et distinctes l'une de l'autre.

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38.              This case is completely different. Only one factual assault has occurred for which the appellant has been tried and punished. The potential imposition of a one‑year imprisonment pursuant to a "trial" by the tribunal clearly points to this procedure as being in the nature of punishment to redress a social wrong and not only in the nature of disciplinary proceedings. The possibility of dismissal from the Force pursuant to s. 38 of the statute reinforces this view. With respect, I cannot agree with the view of Wilson J. that the two offences are in any way totally separate from or different from each other.

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[29] La deuxième raison sous‑jacente à la restriction de la reconnaissance de la qualité pour agir a trait à la nécessité pour les tribunaux d’entendre les principaux intéressés faire valoir contradictoirement leurs points de vue.  En effet, les tribunaux agissent comme des arbitres impartiaux dans le cadre d’un système accusatoire.  Ils dépendent des parties quant à la présentation complète et adroite des éléments de preuve et des arguments.  Or, [traduction] « une opposition réelle » stimule les débats sur les questions en litige et l’intérêt personnel des parties dans l’issue de l’affaire contribue à la formulation exhaustive et diligente des arguments : voir, p. ex., Baker c. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), p. 204.

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[29] The second underlying purpose of limiting standing relates to the need for courts to have the benefit of contending points of view of the persons most directly affected by the issue.  Courts function as impartial arbiters within an adversary system.  They depend on the parties to present the evidence and relevant arguments fully and skillfully.  “[C]oncrete adverseness” sharpens the debate of the issues and the parties’ personal stake in the outcome helps ensure that the arguments are presented thoroughly and diligently:  see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), at p. 204.

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Ces témoins ainsi que John Edward Reid, un expert en détecteurs de mensonges, ont de toute évidence été cités pour étayer la prétention que l’appelant mentait lorsqu’il a fait ses aveux à la police; au cours de son témoignage, M. Reid a aussi exprimé ce point de vue en se fondant sur son interprétation des données fournies par le détecteur de mensonges lorsque l’appelant y a été soumis.

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to circumstances which never happened in order to satisfy his desire to attract attention to himself. These witnesses, together with John Edward Reid, an experienced polygraph examiner, were obviously called to support the contention that the appellant had been lying when he confessed to the police; this was the opinion expressed by the latter at trial on the basis of his interpretation of recordings shown on the polygraph machine when he administered a polygraph test to the appellant and it is this evidence which was excluded by the learned trial judge.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	69               Ceci étant, d'autres éléments tendent à écarter la perspective de voir soulevée, en la matière, une crainte raisonnable de partialité institutionnelle:  il ne faudrait pas perdre de vue, en effet, que les membres du Comité qui siègent en tant que juges de la Cour du Québec ont eu, à l'occasion de leur nomination, à prononcer le serment suivant, aux termes de l'art. 89 LTJ:
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine scc.lexum.org as primary domain	I swear (or solemnly affirm) that I will faithfully, impartially and honestly, and to the best of my knowledge and abilities, fulfil all the duties and exercise all the powers of a judge of the Court of Québec.  [Emphasis in original.]