|
|
If DHS is right that homegrown terrorists are now a bigger threat than the international variety, we should celebrate. Even if American-born jihadists grow more numerous and skilled, which now seems unlikely, they will remain far less deadly than the terrorist supervillains we have been taught to expect.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
ونظرًا لأن المجموعات الإرهابية عادةً ما تكون سرية، فإنها غالبًا ما تفتقر إلى تلك السمات. فهي تناضل من أجل اكتساب معرفة الدمار ونقلها، وجمع الثروة، وبناء المنشآت المادية اللازمة لتصنيع أسلحة متطورة أو امتلاك القوة البشرية اللازمة لدعم الهجوم على الشعوب. تتجلى هذه العيوب على وجه خاص في تنظيم القاعدة، الذي كان ولا يزال مجموعة من المتطرفين لا تخضع لترابط مركزي فيما بينها أكبر من كونه تنظيمًا يقود أعضائه.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Поскольку эти организации обычно являются подпольными, террористические группы, как правило, не обладают такими свойствами. Им сложно приобретать и передавать несущие смерть знания, накапливать материальные блага, строить заводы для производства сложного оружия или обеспечивать достаточное количество участников для ведения атак против населения. Эти недостатки особенно заметны в Аль-Каиде, которая всегда была скорее слабо связанной группой радикалов, нежели организацией, командующей своими сторонниками.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|
|
|
Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.
|